Comrades! I must, once more, apologise for my lateness. I have had more difficulties than anticipated assembling this document.
To the First issue of the day. Comrade
@Emyx I must ask. Is Japan perhaps no longer a capitalist nation? While the lack of official state cooperation is unfortunate, we should not let perfect be the enemy of good. State cooperation or not, their bourgeoisie is like any other, too greedy, too disloyal, to ignore the profits we can promise them. What remains to be seen, is if the earned goodwill will be enough for the state to turn a blind eye, and let them come to us unmolested. If yes, it will reveal theirs to be empty rethoric. As our coffers fill, factories multiply, technology is brought in, and workers trained.
And perhaps, in the future, such goodwill may gain communism new sympathy, among the Japanese Proletariat... eventually, all will fall to the World Revolution.
Still, even if empty, the Japanese State rethoric must be answered. And to the question
Should the USSR reenter negotiations on the Kuril Islands?
I say
A) No, these lands are integrally Soviet and the Japanese have no claim to them and C) Other
Sometimes, silence can be as defeaning as any answer. We shall continue negotiations, yet stretch them to infinity. We cannot surrender Kuril Islands, for this would make the Party appear weak, would surrender a strategic staging ground, and from an international law point of view, would be unnecessary as the Union holds a legitimate claim, if through conquest, on the islands. But, we can create a mutually beneficial fiction. One where, from our point of view, we, the Party and Union and Soviet Proletariat, are the reasonable side. Willing to negotiate a compromise, like reparations or self-determination, out of the goodness of ours hearts and for the harmony among all the Earth's People. Only to be rebuffed by Imperialists barely changed, literally in case of some famous faces in charge, since their overt Fascist days.
While from their point of view, the Japanese politicians can claim to be fighting tooth and nail to reclaim wrongfully stolen lands from Insidious Bolsheviks.
To the next issue:
Should the USSR restablish Intervision?
My choices are
A) Yes, this will strengthen bonds between our nations and bolster our cultural expression
C) No, we should instead petition to join Eurovision
In the spirit of brotherhood and reconciliation beyond borders, the USSR should join Eurovision, and encourage other Fraternal Republics to follow
However, the presence of imperialist nations, as well as its status as an exclusively European or even worse, Imperialist, affair, are most disappointing
While membership in Eurovision shall help first reawaken the Soviet Workers Proletarian internationalism from the obvious examples of capitalist sufferings and aesthetic superficiality; stimolate cultural and societal development; overall, help re-establish a strong Socialist Culture able to influence and subsume all others, like it was in the years after October. And then subsequently, do all the same among the masses of Western Europe, by broadcasting the equity, brotherhood and genuine life under socialism.
Being so compromised, it cannot be a valid laboratory to develop a new Worldwide Socialist Cultural Hegemony. And as much it pains to say, neither can the Union alone, even so stimulated. The spirit of October is long gone, a new Socialist Culture and Society, can only emerge by confrontation between all socialist nations. Uniting what came before from old revolutions such as ours, what the capitalist world has produced. To be elaborated by all, and most importantly, by the youngest revolutions, still fresh with the dynamism and hope of October.
As such, I believe it necessary, to reestablish Intervision, as a socialist-only, worldwide, song constest. Hopefully, followed by many more similar projects. The first step to an All-socialist, Worldwide, Web of Exchange, and subsequently, Proletarian Culture.
Finally however, the most crucial issue of the day. One highlighting the many structural deficiencies still plaguing our Union, and the many tensions that may subsequently explode beyond their scope if let through the cracks:
How should state media portray the April 9th Tragedy in Tbilisi?
To such a delicate crisis itself, and overall systemic issue, no single answer can be right. Subsequently, I suggest:
B) Admit "Individual errors" in the handling of the incident and find scapegoats
C) Admit no blame and instead blame it on the aggression of the protesters
D) Other
Publically, the brutal response should be blamed yes on systematic issues in the forces tasked with maintaining a Socialist, Safe and Just, Society. However, that such issues exclusively extended to the insufficient filtering out of bad recruits, insufficient accountability for militsiya members' bad conduct, and a manpower shortage leading to the use of Armed Forces in a role they are unfit for. Publically, all reform efforts should be painted as directed to solve these issues and these issues alone. For less broadcasted systemic reforms, I'll go in depth later on.
Consequently, all militsiya and soldiers publically identified while committing brutality against Soviet citizens, should be publically investigated, put on trial, and judged subsequently. If necessary, the local leadership responsible for such a mangled response, can also face public consequences, but this is not advised. They should still however, suffer a private reprimand, and if necessary, disciplinary action, if it became known they had ordered any such disproportionate answer. As should all law enforcement or army personnel known to have intentionally acted in an unbecoming manner.
For a final public act, blame the incident itself on the unlawful, violent and confrontational attitude of the protest. Especially play up its unlawful and probably counterrevolutionary nature, to attempt a logic jump to concluding this incident itself may have been the organisers goal itself. To sell themselves as helpless victims, possibly as well, to gain the attention of agonised Western puppeteers who would use them as, very wealthy, Trojan horses. Never however imply such a connection already exists. If it is found, all the better. But as it most likely doesn't exist, best to avoid such heavy accusations, lest we unleash a beast impossible to control.
To tune down tensions, also concede that participants can't all be expected to know the true status of the protest. Be it unlawful, or counterrevolutionary. Some, may just be misguided by nationalism, without realising the grave threat to their own socialist quality of life they pose. So, restrict official, throughout, investigations, to only the leaders, organisers, and most prominent faces. If sufficient criminal evidence is dug up, it may even lead to a lengthy arrest.
Indeed, turn it into official policy. A notice of surveillance shall be in the future handed, to all organisers who are discovered to be planning unauthorised demonstrations of substantial scale. With clearly delineated consequences, if the warning isn't followed. Flee, and be confined to house arrest until an investigation clears them, under the "likely suspicion of criminal or counterrevolurionary activity". Start the demonstration and be speedily arrested at most an hour hence. Stand down however, and the notice will be rescindend, marking their return as law abiding workers.
Speaking of official policy, from the contents of the incident itself, take inspiration to denounce negative nationalism, while im the Spirit of October supporting its positive kind. This is to say, support the self-determination, development and uniqueness of separate cultures, however as part of one prosperous fraternal union, allowing all to interact freely and become more than they would alone. For Socialism isn't against the nationhood, to the contrary, but is against separate states, for the workers deserve to be united, and have much more in common with eachother than with their bourgeoisie.
All the while, denounce separatism as a Trojan Horse of counterrevolutionaries, to dismember the Union into small, frightened, weak states. Ripe for the bourgeoisie vultures to attack, and erase socialism.
(OPEN QUESTION) How should the USSR limit police brutality in future?
As evidenced by my wording above, systematic issues extend far beyond mere filtering of recruits.
First and foremost, the usage of the Armed Forces being sanctioned by official doctrine is, frankly, a recipe for disasters much greater than this one, as Comrade
@seraphim74 points out. Changes shall be made to restrict their use only to gravest of equally armed violent threats. Like outright armed insurrection, or terrorism.
The actions taken to disperse the riot, have also more in common with those taken to reduce a pocket of enemy soldiers, than convincing misguided citizens out protesting, to go home. Rioters shouldn't be surrounded on all sides, but when actions to disperse the riot begin, atleast one avenue of, excuse my usage of ironically, military terms, retreat should be left open, and indeed advertised. Such a disorganised rout, can then be easily pressed, until the rioters are fully dispersed.
While I disagree that the militarization of our militsiya is in itself an issue, for correct training is what makes or break any law enforcement. The way less than lethal weapons were used, well, lethally. Leaves little openings to introduce even more actually lethal equipment. However, I believe events like these require more defensive equipment be made available, to if nothing else, ensure no excuse about the danger of the situation can be used to justify unnecessary brutality.
Subsequently, a great reform in our police training must begin. Firstly, lessons must be taken in how to deescalate. In general in all events of law enforcement. But sticking to such tense matters, even better, to identify and disarm such ticking bombs before they burst. The particular conduct of our forces, was caratherized by near passivity in the very first crucial moments, before then acting with far too much zeal against the same escalation they had allowed. Initiative is necessary, to disperse such riots before they even happen. Negotiators must be sent, speakers must blare reasonable logic while advertising the illegal nature of the event and calling to disperse. The militsiya must immediately block all avenues for the protest to advance, then start to slowly mount pressure by advancing forward, on all but one side, which will be left open. Even if the protest doesn't disperse, the objective can also simply be to herd them, direct them, through a cordon, to a safer, less inconvenient for us, possibly more for the protesters. Location. Say, in the city outskirts, on this case.
New doctrine must also be drafted on the usage of less than lethal equipment. Which isn't non lethal. Restraint in charges and batons strikes. Deployment of gas to fumigate in a more limited manner, possibly restricted to the very front line of confrontation, to avoid stampedes.
In this, the commission of new defensively-minded equipment, can be of use. Cheap but possibly comfortable, thridly in priority threatening, gas masks for our militsiya. To allow for tactical use of gas right on top of our forces, without them being affected. New body armour, riot shields, helmets, able to withstand chains, rocks, possibly knives.
In an ironic twist of our revolutionary lineage, deployable barricades, so many times used to great effect against reactionary law enforcement, now a wall of steel on which protesters will not necessarily break. But simply be unable to pass.
And, for possibly the most daring of my proposal, armoured vehicles up to refit old tanks. Equipped at most with less than lethal weaponry, like water cannons or tear gas fumigators. Usually, simply a way to deploy militsiya in a manner protected from any harm the protesters may direct their way, short of RPGs coming from the rooftops. At which point however, the Armed Forces would be authorized to intervene.
New less than lethal equipment should also be researched. Indelible paint to mark protesters for later ID, deployed by water cannon or airsoft guns. New forms of uncomfortable gas, even less lethal, possibly however also permanent unless special detergents distributed to our militsiya are used. Possibly inspired by skunks. Microwave and sonic cannons, to sow again discomfort among the protesters.
(OPEN QUESTION) What, if any, action should be taken in response to the Letter of the Six?
I would like to begin, on the matter of our Minister of Foreign Affairs, comrade Gorbachev. While initiative in the face of a crisis is commendable, this was no crisis, and anyway, such privilege goes hand-in-hand with full responsibility for one's actions. While his logic was sound, and lacking damning evidence on "comrade" Silviu Brucan, probably my own. It speaks of either initiative and boldness crossing the thin line into recklessness, by not conducting the necessary background checks. Or if they were conducted, of a complete disregard for the integrity and defense of the World Socialist Revolution against probable Western infiltrators and Revisionists.
While as Comrade @Altov underlined, comrade Gorbachev acted in a manner compatible with out latest deliberations. Even if he hadn't, a maverick Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Workers of the World could afford. A Minister consistently backing the losing horse, not even our sole Union can. This is already his second strike, in a VERY short succession. If comrade Gorbachev is unable to not cause a diplomatic crisis everytime he negotiates with dissidents in socialist nations. Maybe he would be best of use to the Revolution and Union by restricting his duties, to his admittedly far more successful relationships' building with the West.
As for the Group of Five themselves, the situation is tricky. Firstly, there are only Five comrades worth of even considering granting even a sliver of support. There is no Sixth, especially not a comrade. For the same exact criticism of Gorbachev, applies tenfold to Silviu Brucan. As Comrade
@ruffino underlined, no real comrade seeks first support from the enemies of Communism, before its very First Vanguard. I however, disagree that the other Five are inherently lost to us, if nothing else from a pragmatic point.
Romania is currently in a very volatile situation. We must hold all cards, all options, close to our chest. And if the Five come out on top, yet are revealed to have been willfully in bed with the West? Then, that just means we have all the blackmail to hold them on the shortest leash there can be.
All that is clear, is that Ceaușescu current way ruling, cannot last forever. And is most definitely not for the betterment of World Revolution. Either his Romania changes, or it will be changed.
As such, I suggest feelers, contacts, entrees be made, with dissidents among not just the Communist Party ranks. But also all of society. The Armed Forces, the Bureaucracy, the Church, the Unions. All possible players.
At the same time, to convince not just all neutral players, but possibly Ceaușescu himself. Officially the USSR shall employ
@Emyx carrot and stick approach, if necessary with
@Odo suggestion for mediation by the People's Republic of China during the negotiations.
All immediate or nearly so crisis done, I wish to comment on other developments. Those in and around Burma seem to be promising. All that's missing, is an equally promising baptism of fire.
Still, even assuming the new People's Liberation Army is successful, which we can optimistically hope considering the treasure trove of fresh lessons from Afghanistan to apply, just as the guerilla instead of the armed forces. Preemptive care should be taken to ensure that, be it under duress from losses or even excessive success, the United Front of Burmese People not fracture like its National Democratic United Front predecessor. Suggesting Soviet-Indian mediation in preemptive negotiations, over not just the most crucial programme clashes but down to the finest details, may be in order. The Junta defeat must be but the very first step in a radiant future for Burmese Socialism.
To formulate other preemptive measures, I would like to request reports on [whether our actions have had any effects on]:
• The demographic trends of our Constituent Soviet Socialist Republics
• Events, especially political trends, in Western Europe, particularly Germany, France, Italy, UK
• The insurgencies against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
• Our stance on the Israel-Arab or Israel-Palestine conflict, and developments of such