A Glorious Union or America: the New Sparta
- Thread starter TheKnightIrish
- Start date
The initial international ripples will start to be noticed soon. The end of the war will see a lot more....
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While Longstreet has proven a master on defense, that's a lot of manpower that's been bled away...
The question has been asked, where ARE Lee and Jackson? Longstreet's army could be sacrificed if Lee/Jackson can get in Kearny's rear and smash him or make a move on Washington.
Again, I have NO clue how this is all going to shake up. I wish I could find a way to give this timeline more love!
The question has been asked, where ARE Lee and Jackson? Longstreet's army could be sacrificed if Lee/Jackson can get in Kearny's rear and smash him or make a move on Washington.
Again, I have NO clue how this is all going to shake up. I wish I could find a way to give this timeline more love!
Chapter Twenty-Two The Battle of Ashland Part I
Chapter Twenty-Two
The Battle of Ashland
Part I
Part I
From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern
NorthWestern
“Before the Army of the Potomac was Longstreet’s Corps. Longstreet’s four remaining divisions covered Blunt’s Bridge, Elliott’s Bridge and the Railroad Bridge over the South Anna River. Longstreet had thrown out Fitzhugh Lee’s and W.H.L Lee’s cavalry brigades to the west to watch for a flanking movement. Hampton had been thrown out east to Wickham’s Station.
Against this force, Kearny had deployed Mansfield’s, Reynolds’ and Couch’s Corps near the river bank. Each was to assault a respective crossing. Von Steinwehr’s Corps was pulled up in reserve north of Perkins Farm.
General Hooker had been given command of a wing of the army and was marching west with his own, Richardson’s and Baldy Smith’s Corps. He was to cross the South Anna, somewhere between Blunt’s Bridge and Ground Squirrel Bridge, and attack Longstreet’s flank…”
Reynolds' Corps storms down to the river bank
From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962
“Kearny took Hooker by the arm “Joe, be careful. Jackson is out there prowling somewhere. We have a chance to crush Longstreet and while I’ll gamble on it and I am not willing to loose you and your boys in the attempt…Don’t bite off more than you chew Joe” (From the Memoirs of George Armstrong Custer)…
Kearny had one last card up his sleeve. A messenger had been had sent to Sedgwick. Reno’s Corps was to be detached, and accompanied by Davis’ Cavalry Division, was to force march south. He was to aim for the Cedar Farm Bridge on the North Anna Bridge… If Jackson was nearby, Kearny wanted his full strength near at hand…”
From “Two Days and Three Fights – The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU
LSU
“The morning broke to the sound of General Hunt’s artillery. A massed battery had been formed near Dr. Wood’s house. From that position it shelled Anderson’s troops at Blunt’s Bridge and Pickett’s at Elliott’s. A smaller battery near the Baker Farm, on Couch’s flank, bombarded Walker’s position beyond the Railroad Bridge. Some of the larger pieces at Dr.Woods were even targeting Hood’s troops, which Longstreet had drawn up in reserve around Independence Court House…
Mansfield's Corps assaults Blunt's Bridge
After a barrage that lasted 90 minutes Mansfield attacked Anderson, masking the guns which now focused on Pickett. Shortly after Mansfield’s attack commenced, Reynolds went in against Pickett…About 10am Couch finally launched his assault on the Railroad Bridge…
“Pete [Longstreet’s nickname] why in hell have we left those bridges standing?” enquired General Hood.
“Because Sam [Hood’s nickname] the river is fordable in about a dozen places on our front. I’d rather defend three bridges than the whole riverbank…”
Longstreet was right. Kearny’s corps focused on the bridges. It would be some hours before any of his commanders was to look for alternative crossing points on that front…”
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
Buffalo 1999
“It was midday before Hooker approached the battlefield. His troops had started marching at 4am. His three corps were now south of the river, on Longstreet’s flank. His own corps was at Ground Squirrel Court House, with Baldy Smith’s on his left and rear. Richardson was hard alongside the river…”
From “Two Days and Three Fights – The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU
LSU
“Just as Kearny’s assault on the river crossings was one fight, Richardson was about to open the second fight on the extreme western flank of Longstreet's dispositions. His skirmishers clashed with the alert vedettes of Fitzhugh Lee somewhere around the E.Cross Farm (there were several Cross families in the area which has caused historians some confusion). Fitz Lee’s troopers were quickly pushed back to the Eddleton Farm. Fitz Lee had send a message early in the scrape to General Longstreet – “The Federals are across the river in at least corps strength. I will not stop them alone”…
“At the same time Whipple’s Division of Hooker’s Corps ran into WHL Lee’s brigade of cavalry just beyond the Ground Squirrel Court House. WHL Lee’s vedettes had been less well placed and he was lucky to get his brigade out only slightly battered. It was a poor reflection on Southern horse-soldiering that WHL Lee had almost let himself be surrounded by advancing infantry…”
From “Yankee Dawdle - the Memoirs of a Private of Pennsylvania” by Anonymous
“I had developed a finely tuned ear for the sound of battle. My sergeant swore by my ears. So when I said that the firing wasn’t coming from Mansfield’s boys down river, but Hooker’s on the south bank, well didn’t they just take it as gospel.
I thought we finally had Old Gloomy Longstreet by the beard. Little did I know that Lee was about to grab us by our bayonets [a suspected editor's amendment]”.
Generals Lee and Jackson confer on Tompkins Mound
From “The Gray Fox – Robert E. Lee” by R. Southey-Freeman
Orange & West 1958
“Lee, Jackson and Edward Johnson had ridden a short way from the railroad to a little hillock near Tompkins Farm, from where they could observe Hooker’s troops on the south bank. They had waited through the morning for an attack to develop. Lee’s intent was clear
“General Jackson, those people are isolated. Kindly drive them back into the river…”
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Battle of Ashland can be followed using:
http://www.rainfall.com/posters/mapscivilwar/8015.htm
PS - I was able to the view the complete map online. I didn't purchase it (in case anyone thinks I am touting/schilling for poster salesmen!).
http://www.rainfall.com/posters/mapscivilwar/8015.htm
PS - I was able to the view the complete map online. I didn't purchase it (in case anyone thinks I am touting/schilling for poster salesmen!).
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II Corps - Richardson
I Division - Hancock
II Division - Gibbon
III Division - French
III Corps - Hooker
I Division - Birney
II Division - Sickles
III Division - Whipple
VI Corps - Baldy Smith
I Division - Slocum
II Division - Stoneman
III Division - Rodman
As Hooker acts as a wing commander, Sickles is the senior officer in II Corps so he will step up to the Corps. Hiram Berry will then step up to command II Division.
Hooker might be very 'political' but as far as Kearny is concerned he is a hard fighter with a good head on his shoulders. Smith too is clever but is also an overcritical complainer and is fairly intolerant of what he considers underperformance. Richardson is tough character and a hard fighter. As he's always been under Hooker's wing since taking command its hard to get a feel for his independant capacity to think and plan.
Of the divisional commanders so far Hancock, Sickles and Rodman have distinguished themselves. Birney is a good friend of Kearny's as well. Kearny is not impressed by Stoneman's failure to get up and into battle at Trevilian Station.
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Chapter Twenty-Two The Battle of Ashland Part II
Chapter Twenty-Two
The Battle of Ashland
Part II
The Battle of Ashland
Part II
From “The Gray Fox - Robert E. Lee” by R. Southey-Freeman
Orange & West 1958
“Field and D.H. Hill had already been set in motion. Charles Field’s Division was advancing up the Old Mountain towards Hooker’s right rear. D.H. Hill’s Division was marching up the Plank Road directly to Ground Squirrel Court House. A.P. Hill and his division were soon also on the march from Ashland west along the Court House Road. By a combination of trains and hard marching the divisions of Ewell, Johnson and Evans were not far behind. Lee had “borrowed” two divisions from the temporary corps…”
From “Two Days and Three Fights - The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU
“Hooker had not stayed put after his skirmish with Rebel Cavalry. He had taken the lead with his own corps in marching up Hugher’s Road. Smith was behind at Grove Church..."
Hooker's Corps presses on
From “The Maverick - General D.H.Hill” by Duncan Frasier Jones
Buffalo 1988
“Hill took his division off the road to the east to form a line of battle. He was south of the Palman, Kelly and Thatcher Farms. With three brigades in front and two behind he drove through the intervening woods straight for Smith’s Corps still in column…
“He can never achieve a success, tho he might, I suppose, blunder upon one, as other short-witted people do” Josiah Gorgas.
“High and well deserved reputation as a hard fighter…seemed to go from choice into the most dangerous place he could find on the field…” John Haskell.
When Hill’s Division burst from the trees on Smith Corps, it was no “blunder”…
From “Isaac Peace Rodman - Soldier, Statesman, Quaker” by Leonard H.K. Wool
Empire 1918
“There was a time, before Kearny took charge of the Army of the Potomac, when such an attack from an unexpected quarter would instantly demoralize the troops and they would flee. A dozen victories under Kearny, Hooker and Smith had filled the men of VI Corps with a confidence that meant they stood under the initial onslaught…
Rodman rallies his division to resist Hill's attack
Rodman took the divisional flag and planted it in the “front” line, at the edge of the road. Too closely packed in the road to form into line of battle, Rodman had his division face right, and those at the back loaded rifles for those in front. While it was difficult for Hill’s men to miss such a compact target, the volume of fire, returned by Rodman’s way of loading at the rear, was fierce…
Taking Rodman’s example, Slocum and Stoneman deployed likewise. It was now a stand up fight, with less than 30 yards in some places between Smith’s men in the roadbed and Hill’s on the tree line…”
From “Two Days and Three Fights - The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU
“Having formed a firing line of sorts, Baldy Smith rode up and down the line exhorting the men. But Smith had no better idea what to do next. Smith saw clearly that Jackson was at hand, and had sent gallopers to Hooker, Richardson and to Kearny, but as to what he should do next with his corps, Smith was at a loss…”
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
“Hooker could see straight down the Court House Road and knew well that at least a Rebel Division was on the road marching towards him. Sickles’ deployed the corps in line near the junction of the Court House and Hugher’s Road. Hooker set himself up on a hill behind the line next to the oddly named “Beaste” House…
But was this Longstreet’s reserve or was Jackson on the field. Smith’s message confirmed what the firing to the right had already told Hooker - Jackson had arrived in force. Now Hooker was on the horns of a dilemma. He was a good distance from the river. Jackson and Lee may very well be planning to trap him where he stood. On the other hand he was in Longstreet’s rear with 3 corps. Perhaps there was still an opportunity…
Hooker was too far from Kearny for a message to be sent and return in time. Hooker would have to rely on Hooker…”
From “Two Days and Three Fights - The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU
“Smith’s Corps was holding D.H. Hill in check. Rodman had anchored Smith’s left. However the threat to the Corps when it came, was on the right. Field’s leading brigade under Edward T.H. Warren emerged from the Old Mountain Road and pitched into Smith’s exposed flank. Slocum, who’s division was on the right rushed to the scene. In a few minutes he was down and being carried to the rear. Brigadier General Albion P Howe, who had stayed in the field despite severe bruising caused by a spent shell fragment at Trevilian Station, quickly assumed command. “General Smith I cannot maintain First Division here. I must withdraw before I can be rolled up”. General Smith concurred with Howe’s assessment. Howe’s men began to pull out through and around the Woodford farm complex, north in the direction of Richardson and the river. “Howe, do not go far. Find me a line to defend for a time” was Smith's departing instruction…
Smith's Corps pulls out in search of a better position
Stoneman was to follow Howe, and Rodman would be left with the difficult task of fending of Hill and Field’s leading brigades with the rearguard. Smith stayed with Rodman long enough to send another message to Hooker, informing him of the withdrawal, before leaving to see what position Howe might have discovered…
Rodman remained in the mouth of the track the corps had followed with his rearmost brigade, The Old Brigade of Vermont under William T.H. Brooks. Rodman knew the timing of his order to retreat, to run, would be critical. Hill was marching to assault them now and Field's leading troops were again lapping at their flanks…”
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born before the POD. He will be here, but what he will be as is up to the Author.
Chapter Twenty-Two The Battle of Ashland Part III
Chapter Twenty-Two
The Battle of Ashland
Part III
Part III
From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern
“Lee’s plan was to defeat Hooker’s wing using Jackson’s Corps, while Longstreet held Kearny at the river. It was the plan of a man who had not been at Rhoadesville, Grindstone Hill, Hunters Landing or Trevilian Station. Of a man yet to see the state of Longstreet’s Corps after those battles and Kearny’s pursuit. Of a man who believed Kearny’s attack on the river would be “a demonstration”…
“When Couch inquired as to the extent he should push his attack, Kearny responded bluntly. “We are here to fight General. We will have no more show in this army""
From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962
“Kearny rode over to Reynolds early in the afternoon. The artillery bombardment had forced Pickett’s left wing back from the river. Kearny directed Reynolds to employ some of his reserves (Doubleday’s Division) in fording the river, while redoubling his assaults on the bridge and Pickett’s centre beyond…
Meade's Division forces Elliott's Bridge for a third time
Pickett’s Division was in a lethal artillery crossfire. Hunt’s grand battery with Reynolds was targeting him directly, while the battery with Couch was hitting Pickett’s men every time it overshot Walker’s troops…”
From “Two Days and Three Fights – The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU
“Von Steinwehr had realised he would have his hands full with his new divisional commander, General Barlow. Barlow was keen to explore the river bank beyond Mansfield’s right. There might be an opportunity to cross in Longstreet’s flank, and at the same time establish closer communication with Hooker’s wing. It was a sound proposal and Von Steinwehr allowed Barlow an hour to search the bank with Von Steinwehr’s cavalry guard as protection…”
From “Yankee Dawdle - the Memoirs of a Private of Pennsylvania” by Anonymous
“It was one of those grand tactical plans I was sure. I was certain that there was a very good why I was on the rebel side of the river sat behind a tree, drenched to the skin, and with a wet musket that wasn’t very keen on firing. I just couldn’t think of it right then. At least I had company. I could see half the regiment about me. Drying out in the sun and the heat of the rebel fire. Then the Major had a grand idea. “Fix bayonets!”. I forgot about my unfireable rifle right quick…”
General George Pickett rallies his troops to try to retake the river bank
From “Two Days and Three Fights – The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU
“Doubleday succeeded in making and holding a lodgement on the south bank of the river. Even with Longstreet looking over his shoulder, Pickett was struggling to push the bridgehead back…
Longstreet had resolved to summon reinforcements from Hood when a messenger arrived from Hood. Yankees were pouring across the river near Barton’s Farm well beyond Anderson’s left…Barlow had found Barton’s Ford and Kearny had unleashed Von Steinwehr. Longstreet was in serious trouble…”
Abner Doubleday's troops swim to the Rebel Bank
From “The Gray Fox – Robert E. Lee” by R. Southey-Freeman
Orange & West 1958
“Lee had dispatched Dick Ewell to follow A.P. Hill’s route down the Court House Road. Lee now had four divisions moving on Hooker’s three Corps. Jackson had departed with Ewell to organise the assault and to keep Hooker’s wing on the run. Shanks Evans' division now arrived. Lee was ordering him to follow Ewell when Longstreet’s message arrived. It was about 3.45pm…
Longstreet reported that Reynolds was pushing Pickett back from the river. If Pickett fell back, Walker would be exposed to assault in the rear, and so too would have to withdraw. Longstreet had deployed the last of his reserves, Hood’s Division, to try to stem the flood of Dutchmen crossing at Barton’s Farm. There was fierce fighting at Lumpkin Farm between Hood and XI Corps, which in turn was in Anderson’s rear. If Lee wanted Longstreet to hold the river he needed reinforcements and he needed them quickly…
If Jackson was to overwhelm Hooker, the divisions of Evans and Johnston were needed, but all was for nought if Kearny could gain purchase on the south bank and link up with Hooker. Reluctantly Lee ordered Shanks Evans to Longstreet’s relief. When Edward Johnston’s command came up he would be sent to assist Jackson. In the meantime Jackson would have to whip Hooker with his old 4 divisions…”.
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I am away for a few days so you'll have to wait for the outcome of the Battle of Ashland...
Chapter Twenty-Two The Battle of Ashland Part IV
Chapter Twenty-Two
The Battle of Ashland
Part IV
The Battle of Ashland
Part IV
From “Two Days and Three Fights - The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU
“Smith’s new line, consisting of Slocum’s Division now under Howe, formed between Beach and Stog Creeks. Dr Jones’ and the Montgomery Houses anchored the flanks of that line. There was palpable relief in Smith’s Corps when Rodman, Brooks and the bloodied Old Brigade passed through Howe’s line at last, with D.H. Hill and Field at his heels. Smith had sent Stoneman and the balance of Rodman’s Division further north to form a second line between the creeks near E. Cross’ Farmhouse. Smith had resolved upon a fighting retreat back to the river…
One of Baldy Smith's fighting rearguard actions
When Hood engaged Von Steinwehr’s bridgehead at the Lumpkin Farms, he had attacked with Wofford’s, Law’s and Kershaw’s (formerly of McLaws’ Division) Brigades. He had kept the battered brigade of Barksdale’s Mississippians in reserve at Independence Church. Mississippi was to have a very bad day as Richardson’s Corps with Gibbon’s Division in the lead burst upon the Mississippians. Hood’s position, and by implication Anderson’s, appeared untenable. It was then that Hooker’s staff officer found Richardson near the Hannover Alms House. Hooker’s Corps was coming down Hugher’s Road with A.P. Hill and Dick Ewell on his heels with Jackson at their head…”
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
“Hooker had recognised the Beaste position was a strong one from which to fight but an awful one from which to retreat. With some of Field’s troops on the flank (William E. Starke’s brigade) and A.P Hill closing to contact and with another division clearly coming down the road behind him, Hooker could only retreat by moving across the front of A.P Hill’s line of attack. Hooker decided the position was not worth the risk. He would retreat and link up with Richardson. If he could link up all three corps he might be able to hold Jackson. Little did Hooker know that Von Steinwehr’s XI Corps was also on the southern bank…”
From “The Gray Fox - Robert E. Lee” by R. Southey-Freeman
Orange & West 1958
“Leaving Jackson to deal with Hooker Lee rode forward to find Longstreet and decide where Evans should go in. As he rode up the railroad line in the direction of Pickett’s position, the firing on the left increased. Lee found Longstreet ashen faced. Hood and Anderson were retreating towards the railroad. II and XI Corps had driven back Hood and had threatened Anderson’s rear. Anderson’s withdrawal had meant that Mansfield’s XII Corps was crossing at Blunt’s Bridge in force. Longstreet wished to withdraw Pickett and Walker to a new defensive line. Pickett was himself under increasing pressure from Reynolds.
Lee disagreed. Evans and his four brigades (Edward A. Perry’s small Florida Brigade had been added to Evan’s Division) would counterattack Richardson’s Corps. It was essential that Longstreet hold Kearny back to allow Jackson to obtain a decisive victory over Hooker, who must now only have his own Corps and Smith’s against Jackson’s Corps. Soon Johnston’s Division would be on the field. Lee could still see victory within reach…”
Richardson sends in the Irish Brigade
From “Two Days and Three Fights - The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU
“Hooker’s warning had given Richardson time to pause his attack on Hood’s troops and realign his divisions. The Union line now followed the Hughers Road in part. Mansfield’s leading division (Greene’s) was across the river and had formed on the road facing east, as Anderson withdrew. Von Steinwehr’s XI Corps had pushed Anderson and Hood back beyond the road. Von Steinwehr’s left rested at the Blunt House and ran along the road to Independence Church. Richardson deployed Gibbon and French in a line between the Church and the Almshouse. Hancock’s Division was drawn up in reserve behind the line.
A contemporary illustration of Richardson's assault on Hood's flank
The exhausted III Corps which had been almost constantly on the march since 4am filed past Richardson’s line. Hooker prepared his own line between the Almshouse and the Lawrence W. Stone House. Hooker’s line was spread out as Hooker had not heard from Smith since his note announcing his withdrawal…”
From “Isaac Peace Rodman - Soldier, Statesman, Quaker” by Leonard H.K. Wool
Empire 1918
“As darkness fell Stoneman’s Division was the first to arrive at Hooker’s line. Hooker directed him to the right of his line, between the L.W. Stone House and the riverbank. When Howe’s boys marched in at the double quick, Hooker directed them behind Stoneman and his own right (Sickles division now under Berry). Howe’s tired men would ensure that Gilmer’s Ford, Hooker’s most direct line of retreat if necessary, would be held.
When Baldly Smith rode in with Rodman’s rearguard he was ready for a fight according to his staff. Hooker had given orders direct to his divisional commanders without his knowledge or consent. Smith was a stickler for the chain of command and had “a dislike for any ideas not his own”. However his anger was quickly overwhelmed by Hooker effusive praise for his fighting retreat. With a strong handshake for Smith and Rodman, Hooker’s resolve to stand and fight, now his line was compact, his flanks secure was renewed. “Let Jackson strike. By heavens I am ready for him now”. Hooker directed Isaac Rodman to take his battered, bloodied division into reserve behind the III Corps…”
From “Two Days and Three Fights - The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU
“As darkness set in Hooker had settled his line. A semi-circle from the J. Stanley Farm on the river bank in the west to the woods east of Blunt’s Bridge. There was a rectangular salient as Richardson’s Corps stuck out along the Hughers Road with its flanks resting on the Almshouse and Independence Church. As Jackson viewed Hooker’s line in the fading light from Beaste’s Hill he knew exactly where his attack would fall in the morning…”
Jackson surveys Hooker's line
From “The Gray Fox - Robert E. Lee” by R. Southey-Freeman
Orange & West 1958
“What had started as a widely dispersed fight had coalesced into a continuous front from Field’s Division on the left to Pickett’s Division at Elliott’s Bridge. Kearny had not succeeding in getting the balance of Reynolds Corps across the river, so Doubleday’s lodgement on the south bank remained isolated and tenuous. Couch had yet to seriously threaten a lodgement on his front before Walker. With that in mind Lee withdrew Posey’s Brigade from Walker and provided it to Hood to reinforce his seriously depleted division come the morning. Longstreet remained pessimistic about another attack come the morning, but Jackson’s message was clear. Jackson not only wished to remain on the field but he wished to continue his attack on Hooker come the morning. If Jackson wished to stay Lee would not give up the field. Lee remained disappointed that Johnson’s Division had still not come up. Lee had overtaxed the railroad that day. Edward Johnson would have all his troops on the field come the morning though…”
From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962
“The sounds of small arms and cannon fire had died down. It was about midnight. Kearny was satisfied with his troops' performance given the arrival of Lee and Jackson. Hooker’s decision to withdraw and consolidate had Kearny’s full approbation. Come the morning the struggle would be renewed, and if the note Kearny had just received was accurate then he would have a surprise for Bobby Lee come the morning…”
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I had an unexpected hour to do an update! Huzzah.
.. / .-.. .. -.- . / - .... .. ... / ..- .--. -.. .- - .
(I like this update!)
Enjoy your weekend...Bobby Lee might not.
And it's nice to see "Fighting" Joe Hooker in the role he did best.
Chapter Twenty-Two The Battle of Ashland Part V
Chapter Twenty-Two
The Battle of Ashland
Part V
Part V
From “Two Days and Three Fights - The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU
“From left to right Lee’s line was made up of Field, D.H. Hill, Evans, Hood, Anderson and Pickett. The balance of Walker’s division still faced Couch’s immobile Corps at the Railroad Bridge. Jackson had placed A.P. Hill’s division athwart the Hugher’s Road, with Branch, Brockenborough’s and Archer’s brigades in front and Pender’s and Gregg’s behind. Behind A.P Hill came Ewell’s Division, Lawton and Trimble (only back from Northern imprisonment a few weeks) in front and Early and Hays behind. Jackson had also “borrowed” the brigades of Fitzhugh and W.H.L Lee which waited behind Ewell’s lines near Beaste Hill.
Lee and Jackson before Jackson's assault on the Almshouse Salient
Jackson’s plan was simple. While the other divisions kept Hooker’s line engaged, Jackson would bring overwhelming force against the west end of Richardson’s salient, by pushing A.P Hill and Ewell straight down Hugher’s Road. He would split Hooker’s wing in two…”
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
“Very shortly after first light the contest reignited all along Hooker’s lines. Kearny arrived early at Hooker’s makeshift headquarters next the ruins of one of the Lumpkin’s Farmhouses. Reynolds had been left in command of both his own corps’ attempts to reinforce Doubleday and break out at Elliot’s Bridge and to spur Couch into action. Kearny approved Hooker’s dispositions and saw no reason to interfere…”
From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962
“Kearny’s concerns about Richardson’s salient could not be acted upon at that moment as Evans troops had renewed their attack on Richardson. Hooker’s men had built up defensive barricades from the branches and timber of the woods all about them. Only along Richardson’s line, where there was little nearby woodland, did the troops have to rely on the meagre protection offered by the few feet of the “sunken” roadbed…
It was a cautious Kearny who placed Hancock in reserve at the Lampen Farm and Rodman at the Dillard House…”
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
“Having sought and received Kearny’s approval for his dispositions Hooker left Kearny at Lumpkin’s Farm. Kearny would see to the deployment of Mansfield’s two divisions as they crossed that morning, in taking the offensive against Pickett.
Hooker was to ride over to the Union right, towards Dillard House near Rodman’s position, and manage the line from there…”
From “Two Days and Three Fights - The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU
“William French’s section of Richardson’s line had been quiet for the first hour of the morning. D.H Hill was attacking Whipple’s Division of the III Corps on his right and Evans’ troops had engaged Gibbon’s Division on his left…
When Jackson’s attack struck the salient, it hit French’s line like “a runaway freight train” (Isaac R. Trimble). In the first 15 minutes of the attack, of French’s three brigade commanders, Max Webber had been shot in the right hand, Nathan Kimball had been wounded and captured, and David Morris was dead…
Brigadier Max Weber quickly sought a return to combat
French rode his horse back to Hancock at Lampen Farm. “Come up Hancock. For god sake come up for my position is lost”. As he spoke to Hancock, his horse was shot for the fourth time and collapsed underneath him…
Despite what the biographers of Hooker and Kearny claim, Hancock’s own staff assert that he made the counterattack on his own authority before orders arrived…”
Hancock's Division blunts Jackson's first wave
From “Stonewall – Jackson in the Civil War” by Isaac T. Medway
LSU 1967
“A.P. Hill’s attack had smashed the Almshouse salient. Richardson was desperately trying to refuse Gibbon’s right, despite Shanks Evans' renewed attack upon Gibbon’s front. But Hill’s attack had been blunted by Union reinforcements. Hill’s men were fighting bayonet to bayonet with the troops of Hancock the Superb’s Division. Jackson had expected a Union reserve behind the salient, which was why his attack was an attack in depth. Ewell was about to strike Hancock’s reserves and Whipple’s left…”
From “Isaac Peace Rodman - Soldier, Statesman, Quaker” by Leonard H.K. Wool
Empire 1918
“Rodman often said afterwards that when Jackson’s second line struck, it felt it physically as Whipple’s leftmost brigade, Bowman’s Pennsylvanians and New Hampshirites, crumpled.
Rodman’s Division was tired. It had marched hard the day before and done the bulk of the hard fighting during Smith’s fighting retreat, but it did not falter as Rodman led it into battle to stem Ewell’s breakthrough…”
Rodman's exhausted men go on the offensive
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
“If Lee can put in one more division we cannot hold him” Dan Sickles report to Hooker.
From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962
“Kearny only had two of Alpheus Williams’ three brigades to hand, the last was still crossing the river and behind them, Augur’s Division. Yet Kearny was quick to send Williams to Richardson’s relief, himself at their head…”
From “The Gray Fox - Robert E. Lee” by R. Southey-Freeman
Orange & West 1958
“Doctor Maguire raced towards Lee with Jackson’s message. “Give me Johnson now and I can defeat these people”. Maguire had arrived moments after Captain Grenfell of Hampton’s staff. Despite the crescendo of noise along the battle line gunfire and cannon fire could be heard in the east…
Hampton was under attack at Wickham’s Station, initially by Davis’ Division of cavalry which had crossed at Littlepage ford, which concerned Hampton not at all. Union infantry however was pouring across Carter’s Bridge (Stevens’ Division of Reno’s IX Corps). Hampton was already falling back along the road to Ashland. Reno’s whole corps might be behind that attack and Sedgwick too (Sedgwick was miles away and Reno’s other two divisions of Wilcox and Sturgis were crossing at Maury’s Ford)…
Lee had reached a crisis. If Jackson was reinforced a great victory could be won over Kearny and Hooker, but there was a real threat that Lee would soon have two fresh Corps in his rear, either cutting off the route of retreat via Ashland, marching up the other road into Pickett’s rear, or perhaps both…”
From “Two Days and Three Fights - The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU
“Long will the what-ifs of Lee’s decision to send Johnson to support Hampton’s retreat be discussed. As Lee said “I can beat those people a dozen times and they will have legions to spare. If they defeat me but once I may loose this army and thus our country”…
Jackson was ordered to pull A.P Hill and Ewell out of the maelstrom around the Almshouse…Field and D.H. Hill withdrew by way of the Old Mountain and Plank Roads to the railroad line. Walker and Pickett were the first to withdraw on the right, directly down the line of the railroad. The remaining divisions withdrew under cover of Fitzhugh Lee’s and W.H.L Lee’s cavalry…
Kearny would not let Lee withdraw unchallenged and Meade’s and Patrick’s Divisions of Reynolds Corps were quickly brought across the now unguarded Elliott’s Bridge to pursue the retreating rebels…
Edward Johnson and his division, with the support of the two Lees and Hampton, would give Marsena Patrick a bloody nose at Langfoot’s Crossing, before Lee’s rearguard withdrew…
Confused and dejected Confederates retreat towards Richmond
There was nothing between Kearny and Richmond now but Lee’s bloodied army and Brook Creek…”
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