A Glorious Union or America: the New Sparta

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Ten​

The West Fights in Winter​

From “The Vicksburg Campaigns” by Horace E. Parker
Radical Press 1899​

“Sherman disembarked with three divisions at Johnson's Plantation on the Yazoo River to approach the Vicksburg defenses from the northeast. On December 27, the Federals pushed their lines forward through the swamps toward the Walnut Hills, which were strongly defended. On December 28, several futile attempts were made to get around these defenses. On December 29, Sherman ordered a frontal assault, which was repulsed with heavy casualties, and then withdrew…

During this period, the overland half of Grant's offensive was failing. His lines of communication were disrupted by raids by Van Dorn and Forrest, who destroyed his large supply depot at Holly Springs. Unable to subsist his army without these supplies, Grant abandoned his overland advance…”

The arrival of Jeff Davis' slaves at Chickasaw Bayou​

From “The Most Hated of Men – Braxton Bragg in the Civil War” by Grafton Lowe
University of Kentucky

“The uproar over the appointment of a “Yankee” to the command of the Army of Mississippi, in the form of John C Pemberton, had caused a major political revolt in the West. Governor John J. Pettus had said of the appointment “I am Mississippian to the Core. My ancestors are buried upon her hillsides. Whatever may happen, I would rather eat fire than sit down with a Yankee.” Generals Sterling Price and Van Dorn were both encouraged to declare their reluctance to serve under a Yankee. Furthermore hostile elements in Congress were quick to re-ignite the row over Pemberton's command in Charleston when he declared “I would abandon this area rather than risk the loss of this outnumbered army”…

Generals John C Pemberton and William Barksdale​

President Davis was not a man given to compromise, but the deterioration of the situation in Virginia was demanding his full attention. He needed someone he could trust for the Western Command. The choice should have fallen upon Joseph E. Johnston, recently recovered from his Peninsula wound, but as the result of an observation of Lee’s, Johnston had been sent to Montgomery, Alabama to assess the potential to raise a force to liberate New Orleans. General Lee was of the belief that the appointment of General Porter to the New Orleans command, opened an opportunity for an aggressive move to retake the city. It was an idea that quickly gained momentum in political circles in Richmond (General William Barksdale of Mississippi is widely created with disseminating a private view expressed by Lee to a hand full of officers in camp, throughout the congressional delegations of Mississippi, Louisiana and Alabama). Johnston was appointed to raise new troops in Alabama and Louisiana, as well as to encourage the release and use of standing state forces. Richard Taylor’s command in West Louisiana was transferred to Johnston’s new Department of the Gulf…

The perfect candidate, to President Johnston’s mind, then presented itself. General Braxton Bragg would be promoted to command the Department of the Mississippi and Tennessee with responsibility for the defense of Mississippi as far south as Port Hudson, Kentucky, and Tennessee, but excluding Johnston’s newly established Department of the Gulf. He would have Pemberton’s Army of Mississippi and Hardee’s Army of Tennessee under his command. The President ordered Bragg to run his command from Mississippi initially in order to dampen the Pemberton turmoil. Bragg promptly established himself in Vicksburg…

Generals Joseph E Johnston and William J Hardee​

Johnston lobbied like a gentleman for command of the Army of Tennessee. Beauregard lobbied like a politician. Johnston was rejected because Davis needed the good will of the delegations he had been appointed to placate. Beauregard was rejected because Davis simply hated him. Bragg, expecting to return to the field in Tennessee at some point, lobbied successfully for General Hardee to be appointed to the command, following the failure of General Polk to follow Bragg’s orders on several occasions in the previous campaign in Kentucky. Hardee’s performance at Mount Vernon had made him the darling of the Western Press so Davis reluctantly demurred to one friend’s judgment and ignored the claims of another…”

From “Blood and Toil in the Heartland” by Assumpta McCook-Douglas
University of Tennessee 1998

“General Rosecrans did not want to move his army until he was ready. On his appointment his considered the army “poor in spirit, poor in supply, poor in drill, and poor in officers”. Rosecrans worked hard to restore morale and good order from the army’s base in Nashville, beginning with its renaming – The Army of the Cumberland. He replaced the incompetent Gilbert with Thomas to command the newly renamed XIV Corps. He was also keen for William “Bull” Nelson’s embryonic corps at Louisville to be added to his command. Thus he waited throughout December for Nelson to be officially ordered to join the army in Nashville.

Generals William S Rosecrans and William Nelson​

Before that order arrived Rosecrans was ordered by Halleck in no uncertain terms to advance and attack Bragg’s (now Hardee’s) Army of Tennessee now lurking in Eastern Tennessee. Reluctantly Rosecrans advanced. It would be January before the armies would meet…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Eleven​

The Politics of War​

Part I​

From “Emancipation” Paul Robeson White
Radical Press 1970

“On December 24, 1862, 14 days after the Rapidan battles, Lincoln called his cabinet into session and issued the Preliminary Proclamation. According to Civil War historian, Carl Zeigler, Lincoln told Cabinet members that he had made a covenant with God, that if the Union drove the Confederacy out of the Shenandoah and wintered deep in Virginia, he would issue the Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln had first shown an early draft of the proclamation to Vice President Hannibal Hamlin an ardent abolitionist, who was more often than not kept in the dark on presidential decisions.

The final proclamation was issued March 21, 1863. Although implicitly granted authority by Congress, Lincoln used his powers as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, "as a necessary war measure" as the basis of the proclamation, rather than the equivalent of a statute enacted by Congress or a constitutional amendment. Some days after issuing the final Proclamation, Lincoln wrote to Major General John McClernand: "After the commencement of hostilities I struggled nearly a year and a half to get along without touching the "institution"; and when finally I conditionally determined to touch it, I gave a hundred days fair notice of my purpose, to all the States and people, within which time they could have turned it wholly aside, by simply again becoming good citizens of the United States. They chose to disregard it, and I made the peremptory proclamation on what appeared to me to be a military necessity. And being made, it must stand."

From “Kearny and the Radicals” by Hugh W. McGrath
New England Press 1992

“President Lincoln had sought the views of several leading politicians and generals prior to the issuing of the Emancipation Proclamation. General Philip Kearny was among them. His letter to President Lincoln has been the centre of controversy since its disclosure in 1867…

“…but besides drafting, it is time for us to deprive the enemy of their extraneous engines of war. There is no more Southern man at heart than myself. I am so from education, association and from being a purely unprejudiced lover of the Union. But there is now no longer time for hesitation. As the blacks are the rural military force of the South, so should they indiscriminately be received, if not seized and sent off. I would not arm them, but I would use them to spare our boys, needed with their colors, needed to drill, that first source of discipline…But in furtherance of this, instead of the usual 20 pioneers per regiment I would select 50 stalwart blacks, give them the ax, the pick and the spade. But give them high military organisation. We want bands – give 20 blacks – gain military organisation. So too cooks for the companies, teamsters – even artillery drivers. Do not stop there – and always without arms – organise engineer regiments of blacks for fortifications, pontoon regiments of blacks, black hospital corps of nurses. Put this in practice…awaken to the conviction that you have an army of over 50,00 highly disciplined soldiery superior to double the number of our ordinary run of badly disciplined, badly officered, unreliable regiments now instructed with the fortunes of the North…I would seek French officers for them, for their peculiar gift over “natives”. In their own service they easily beat the Arabs – and then officer them and surpass their own troops in desperate valor. Also, I should advise some Jamaica sergeants of the black regiments…

I know the Southern character intimately. It is not truly brave. It is at times desperate, invincible if successful – most dispirited if the reverse – is intimidated at a distant idea, which they would encounter, if suddenly brought to them, face to face. This idea of black adjuncts to the military awakens nothing inhuman. It but prevents the slave, run away or abandoned to us from becoming a moneyed pressure upon us. It eventually would prepare them for freedom; for surely we do not intend to give them to their rebel masters. In fine, why have we even now many old soldiers on the frontier garrisons? Send there a black regiment on trial – not at once, but gradually – by the process I named above. Do this, and besides acquiring a strong provisional army, you magnify your present one by over fifty thousand men…” Kearny to Lincoln…

From “Emancipation” Paul Robeson White
Radical Press 1970

“The recruitment of African American regiments commenced in earnest following issue of the provisional Proclamation. A reluctant Halleck also acted on instructions from Lincoln and Stanton to raise “pioneer” companies to be attached to existing white regiments. It was some years before it emerged that Lincoln was acting on advice received from General Kearny. “What better way to allow both classes of free men to become familiar with one another’s ways and habits, while maintaining a separate organisation. Exposure to our Northern troops must have a beneficial effect on men who have not known and cannot have seen the exercise of freedom in its daily, commonplace form.” (Secretary Chase).

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Eleven​

The Politics of War​

Part II​

From “Emancipation” by Paul Robeson White
Radical Press 1970

“In response to the Emancipation Proclamation and recruitment of African American troops, Jeff Davis issued his own proclamation (otherwise known as General Order 111) which included among it’s terms:

"That all negro slaves captured in arms be at once delivered over to the executive authorities of the respective States to which they belong to be dealt with according to the laws of said States; and that the like orders be executed in all cases with respect to all commissioned officers of the United States when found serving in company with armed slaves in insurrection against the authorities of the different States of this Confederacy."

From “An Uncivil War” by Dr Guy Burchett
LSU

“In January 1863, Stuart, with Lee's concurrence, authorized Captain John S. Mosby to form and take command of the 43rd Battalion Virginia Cavalry, Partisan Rangers. This was quickly expanded into Mosby's Command, a regimental-sized unit of partisan rangers operating in the Shenandoah Valley and Northern Virginia…

This coincided with John F. Reynolds appointment to command of the newly created Department of the Shenandoah. This was the beginning of what Secretary Stanton called "the war within a war". The Valley was under occupation during the period from November 1862 to Mach 1863 by two full corps. Reynolds quickly established fortifications with a view to maintaining control of the Valley with, ultimately, a smaller force. Perhaps only two divisions in strength…

Initially hampered by the sheer number of Union troops stationed in the Valley it was not long before Mosby, with other irregular and partisan forces, quickly began to “raise hell” in the Valley.”

Mosby's raids in the Shenandoah on Union Supply Trains​

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern

“Without consultation with Washington or waiting for an official response, Kearny issued Special Order 54. It clarified the Army’s position on spies – any Rebel, officer or enlisted man, found out of uniform behind Union lines would be summarily executed. However it went on to stress that if any troops from the Army of the Potomac were executed, with specific reference to African-American troops and their officers, in defiance of recognised protocols for the treatement of prisoners of war, then a like number of Rebel prisoners of war would be summarily put to death…

Special Order 54 was formally adopted by the War Department as official government policy. Furthermore Kearny’s position was hugely popular in an army that many claimed was at least ambivalent about the Emancipation Proclamation and the arming of former slaves…

It confirmed what many already knew, regardless of color or creed, General Kearny would treat any man appointed to his command as an American serviceman fully entitled to the rights and protection of their country and commanding general…

Special Order 54 ensured that General Kearny, was at least in the first half of 1863, the darling of the Radicals Republicans in Congress…”

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962

“During the upcoming campaign Kearny desired the co-operation, if not the complete operational control of both McDowell’s VII Corps, Department of Virginia, and Burnside’s X Corps, Department of the South. Kearny lobbied Lincoln and the War Department for the transfer of Burnside’s troops to the Peninsula to join with McDowell in creating a new army to threaten Richmond from the east. When Kearny began his campaign against Richmond in the spring, from the west, this envelopment would place Lee between “the anvil of an Army of the Peninsula and the hammer of the Army of the Potomac”…

Stanton approved the plan to concentrate forces in the Peninsula. It solved a political problem that the Administration faced. McDowell and Burnside were retained in command of their corps but the commander of the new Army of the James would be the influential War-Democrat, Major General Benjamin Butler, who had been in search of a post since he was relieved of the Gulf Command…

Generals Benjamin Butler, Irvin McDowell and Ambrose E Burnside
of the newly constituted Army of the James​

Butler’s instructions were “to co-operate with the forces of General Kearny”. Unfortunately Butler’s orders did not deal with the issue of seniority leaving compliance with requests from Kearny to Butler’s discretion…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Eleven​

The Politics of War​

Part III​

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern

“The passing of the Enrollment Act in March 1863 did not pass unnoticed in the camps of the Army of the Potomac at it stirred for a spring offensive. Kearny’s view on conscripts was relatively generous for the time, “perhaps with no full understanding of the grave issues at stake; with the picture painted by a jaundiced press; with the pressures of family and its responsibilities, it is easy to see how many young men might otherwise have baulked at the idea of service…we shall give these men the opportunity to serve their country; to learn an order and discipline their lives may have been lacking; to become part of this great enterprise; to garner the honor of having served their country. Here we shall not shun conscripts, if they shall not shun their duty once here”…

Those paying a commutation fee or worse paying for a substitute however were the subject of contempt in General Kearny’s view. “There are perhaps a few thousand men in the northern states – a small number – whose duty to the nation in political office or in vital industry is the best service they can provide. But the numbers now seeking to buy their freedom from duty, their escape from service, are beyond contempt. They shall forever be shunned by those who have taken up arms in the service of their country, volunteer or conscript, white or black…There is more honor in one newly freed, ill educated run away who has taken up arms to preserve his freedom and serve the Union that has bestowed that freedom upon him…than is to be found in a hundred New York gentlemen, of no useful employment, now advertising for a substitute. There is no substitute for honor sir…What man might make his application for a place in society or for one of his nation's offices in the times to come who has not taken service in his country's cause? None by heaven if my word is heard...” General Kearny to General James Wadsworth.

​

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962

“The one other vital aspect of Kearny’s reorganisation in early 1863 was the cavalry. “After the transfer of Burnside to the Peninsula, the one thing I value above all others is the accumulation of trained cavalry to this department” (Kearny to Stanton, early February 1863)…

By March 1863 Kearny had sufficient cavalry to divide Wynn Davis’ force into four divisions: Buford’s I, Pleasanton’s II, Benjamin Franklin Davis’ III, and Wyndham’s IV. Buford and Pleasanton remained attached to Kearny’s main body of the Army of the Potomac directly under Wynn Davis' eye; B.F. Davis was attached to Sedgwick’s wing of the Army now resting on the Rappahannock; and Wyndham was assigned to Reynolds’ Department of the Shenandoah to assist in the suppression of partisans…

Brigadier Generals John Buford and Alfred Pleasanton​

It was an unusual error of judgment for Kearny for surely the European manners, training and tactics of Wyndham, who had served in both Austrian and Italian cavalry regiments, were best suited to the grand warfare of open fields and manoeuvre upon which Kearny was about to embark, and perhaps of all B.F. Davis was the most temperamentally suited to hunting down guerrillas and partisans…

Colonels Benjamin F. Davis and Sir Percy Wyndham​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Twelve​

Grant shovels while Bragg shuffles​

From “The Kingdom – The Civil War in the Trans-Mississippi” by Professor Raymond B. Santana
Texas State 1959

“The Second Battle of Galveston occurred on January 1, 1863 when forces under major General John B. Magruder attacked and expelled occupying Union troops from the city of Galveston, Texas…The Union blockade around the city of Galveston was lifted temporarily for four days, and Galveston remained in Confederate hands for the remainder of the war. The Confederate Congress stated this on the successful recapture of Galveston:

The Second Battle of Galveston​

“The bold, intrepid, and gallant conduct of Maj. Gen. J. Bankhead Magruder and other officers, and of the Texan Rangers and soldiers engaged in the attack on, and victory achieved over, the land and naval forces of the enemy at Galveston, on the 1st of January, 1863, eminently entitle them to the thanks of Congress and the country... This brilliant achievement, resulting, under the providence of God, in the capture of the war steamer Harriet Lane and the defeat and ignominious flight of the hostile fleet from the harbor, the recapture of the city and the raising of the blockade of the port of Galveston, signally evinces that superior force may be overcome by skillful conception and daring courage. We trust it will provide an example of the fruits of bold action...”

General Magruder, Prince John of the old Army, had redeemed the name he had made in command on the Peninsula and lost under General Lee in the Seven Days Campaign. When General Bragg requested the assistance of a senior general with experience of independent command, with a view to corps command at Vicksburg, the press quickly took up the name of Prince John, the Victor of Galveston…”

Major General "Prince" John Bankhead Magruder​

From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984

“Rear Adm. David Dixon Porter began landing troops near Arkansas Post in the evening of January 9. The troops started up river towards Fort Hindman. Sherman's corps quickly overran Confederate trenches, and the defenders retreated to the protection of the fort and adjacent rifle-pits. Porter, on January 10, moved his fleet towards Fort Hindman and bombarded it, withdrawing at dusk. Union artillery fired on the fort from positions across the river on January 11, and the infantry moved into position for an attack. Union ironclads commenced shelling the fort and Porter's fleet passed it to cut off any retreat. As a result of this envelopment, and the attack by Morgan's troops, the Confederate command surrendered in the afternoon. Although Union losses were high and the victory did not contribute to the capture of Vicksburg, it did eliminate one more impediment to Union shipping on the Mississippi…

Grant was not happy to learn that McClernand had conducted the operation without his approval, considering it a distraction from his main objective of Vicksburg, but since it had been successful and his ally Sherman had suggested it, he took no punitive action. However, he ordered McClernand back to the Mississippi and assumed personal command of the campaign on January 13 at Milliken's Bend, 15 miles northwest of Vicksburg…”

From “The Most Hated of Men – Braxton Bragg in the Civil War” by Grafton Lowe
University of Kentucky

“The attack did nothing to convince General Bragg in Vicksburg that troops should be left to defend Arkansas in anything like their current numbers. “This campaign, and indeed the war, will not be decided in Arkansas. The troops currently assigned to the command of General Whiting, and jealously husbanded by that officer, would be better applied in this Army of Mississippi, and in preparing to repulse Grant’s inevitable movement towards this city [Vicksburg]…I have formerly applied to the President either for General Whiting’s department to be placed under my command, or for a substantial transfer of troops from that department to this…” (General Bragg to Generals Hardee and Johnson)…

Brigadier General John S. Marmaduke and Major General Carter L. Stevenson​

Bragg’s requests for more troops would net him the division of General John S. Marmaduke from Whiting’s command, as well as the division of General Stevenson from Hardee’s Army of Tennessee…

Bragg's newly instituted "Left" Corps would be assigned to John Magruder, currently on his way from Texas, and contained the divisions of Stevenson and Martin L. Smith. The "Right" Corps went to the next senior Major General William W.Loring, and contained the divisions of Forney, Bowen, Maury and Marmaduke. Lieutenant General Pemberton remained in his position as commander of the Army of Mississippi, but in practice acted at Bragg's Chief of Staff...

Major General William W. Loring​

From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984

“Through January, February and March, Grant conducted a series of initiatives to approach and capture Vicksburg, now termed "Grant's Bayou Operations". Their general theme was to use or construct alternative waterways so that troops could be positioned within striking distance of Vicksburg, without requiring a direct approach on the Mississippi under the Confederate guns…

The Canal Dam​

1. Grant's Canal

The Williams Canal across De Soto Peninsula had been abandoned by Adm. Farragut and Brig. Gen. Williams in July 1862, but it had the potential to offer a route downriver that bypassed Vicksburg's guns. In late January 1863, Sherman's men, at the urging of Grant, who was advised by the navy that President Lincoln liked the idea, resumed digging. Sherman derisively called the work "Butler's Ditch" (since it was originally Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler who had sent Williams upriver to do the work). Grant ordered Sherman to expand the canal… and the effort became known as Grant's Canal. It was not properly engineered based upon the hydrology of the Mississippi River, however, and a sudden rise in the river broke through the dam at the head of the canal and flooded the area. The canal began to fill up with back water and sediment. In a desperate effort to rescue the project, two huge steam-driven dipper dredges, Hercules and Sampson, attempted to clear the channel, but the dredges were exposed to Confederate artillery fire from the bluffs at Vicksburg and driven away. By late March, work on the canal was abandoned…

2. Lake Providence Expedition

Grant ordered Brig. Gen. James B. McPherson to construct a canal of several hundred yards from the Mississippi to Lake Providence, northwest of the city. This would allow passage to the Red River, through Bayous Baxter and Macon, and the Tensas and Black Rivers. Reaching the Red River, Grant's force could join with Fitz John Porter’s at Port Hudson. McPherson reported that the connection was navigable on March 18, but the few "ordinary Ohio River boats" that had been sent to Grant for navigation of the bayous could only transport 8,500 men, far too few to tip the balance at Port Hudson. Although this was the only one of the bayou expeditions to successfully bypass the Vicksburg defenses, historian Terence Shearsmith calls this episode the "Lake Providence Boondoggle"…

3. Yazoo Pass Expedition

The next attempt was to get to the high ground of the loess bluffs above Hayne's Bluff and below Yazoo City by blowing up the Mississippi River levee near Moon Lake, some 150 miles (240 km) above Vicksburg, and following the Yazoo Pass into the Coldwater River, then to the Tallahatchie River, and finally into the Yazoo River at Greenwood, Mississippi. The dikes were blown up on February 3, beginning what was called the Yazoo Pass Expedition. Ten Union boats, under the command of Lt. Cmdr. Watson Smith, with army troops under the command of Brig. Gen. Benjamin Prentiss, began moving through the pass on February 7. But low-hanging trees destroyed anything on the gunboats above deck and Confederates felled more trees to block the way. These delays allowed the Confederates time to quickly construct a "Fort Bragg" near the confluence of the Tallahatchie and Yalobusha Rivers near Greenwood, Mississippi, which repulsed the naval force on March 11, March 14, and March 16. The Union effort collapsed in early April…

4. Steele's Bayou Expedition

Admiral Porter started an effort on March 16 to go up the Yazoo Delta via Steele's Bayou, just north of Vicksburg, to Deer Creek. This would outflank Fort Bragg and allow landing troops between Vicksburg and Yazoo City. “Animals attacked their boats from the trees!” according to one riverboat sailor. Confederates once again felled trees in their path, and willow reeds fouled the boats' paddlewheels. This time the Union boats became immobilized, and aggressive Confederate cavalry and infantry under newly assigned General Dabney Maury threatened to capture them. Sherman sent infantry assistance to repel the Confederates bedeviling Porter, but Porter's approach was abandoned as too difficult…

5. Duckport Canal

Grant's final attempt was to dig another canal from Duckport Landing to Walnut Bayou, aimed at getting lighter boats past Vicksburg. By the time the canal was almost finished, on April 6, water levels were declining, and none but the lightest of flatboats could get through. Grant abandoned this canal and started planning anew…

All of the Bayou Operations were failures, but Grant was known for his stubborn determination and would not quit. His final option was bold but risky: March the army down the west side of the Mississippi, and try to cross the river south of Vicksburg…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Thirteen

Duck! The Battle of Duck River

Part I​

From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965

“Hardee had chosen the Duck River south of Shelbyville as initial defensive line, and set up his headquarters in the town. He had decided to follow the example of Lee and Bragg in reorganizing his divisions into two Napoleonic sized corps. General Polk’s Corps consisted of Cheatham’s and Wither’s Divisions, with Wharton’s cavalry brigade attached. General Breckinridge’s Corps consisted of Cleburne’s, Churchill’s and McCown’s Divisions with Wheeler’s cavalry brigade attached. Abraham Buford with the brigade of John Pegram (formally Pegram’s and Buford’s brigades, now united) remained under Hardee’s direct control, as did the artillery which Hardee pooled together under newly promoted Major Felix Huston Robertson. General Hardee’s orders in the coming campaign to Robertson were clear - he was to take his orders from Hardee and his staff directly, and from the corps commanders. He was not to follow the orders of divisional and brigade commanders to “squander” his artillery piecemeal…

Generals Polk, Breckinridge and Buford and Major Robertson​

The departure of Bragg had the winter had been a good time for the Army of Tennessee. The Duck River area was rich in food, forage and other supplies and morale was high. One reporter visiting the army from Richmond in late December and early January reported “General Hardee, whose excellent text book of tactic was the bane of our youthful military education, but whose volumes nevertheless, have acted as the Drill Master for both armies in the war, is in fine spirits. Hardee, whom all the ladies adore!…He is always a gallant and graceful gentleman in the parlor as well as on the field…Hardee, a philosopher and a hero”. One cannot imagine a visitor to Bragg being moved to write similar words of him…

At Christmas, Rosecrans, an old army friend sent numerous flags of truce “and almost always some kind message…was sent thereby to General Hardee usually accompanied by a bottle of brandy” (Major Roy)…

Hardee was not resting on his laurels over this period. The bridges over the Duck River had been destroyed, from Simpsons and Werners Bridges west of Shelbyville to the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad Bridge in the east. Hardee had also seen the high ground above the cluster of fords south east of the town. He had Major Robertson prepare artillery emplacements and had him work out the ranges to each of the critical fords and landmarks in range. The five divisions were ordered to prepare obstacles at the fords and dig rifle pits, an activity not designed to please the troops in a cold winter. Hardee also took the opportunity to ride the banks of the river with both corps commanders and all the divisional during the first two weeks in January…

From “Old Rosy - A Biography of General William S. Rosecrans” by Lemuel M. Williams
Old Miss 1961

“Cold rain splashed heavily throughout the night of January 18. At reveille tents were struck, and breakfasts eaten. Veterans remarked that soldiers are more cheerful on gloomy days. Sheridan later remembered that the army was “compact and cohesive, undisturbed by discord and unembarrassed by jealousies; under a commander who had the energy and skill necessary to direct us to a success. A national confidence in our invincibility made us all keen for a test of strength”…

Major Generals Thomas, Crittenden and McCook​

Rosecrans intelligence had told him that Hardee had occupied Shelbyville and was sitting behind the Duck River with two corps. Rosecrans initial plan was to send McCook’s Corps to the west towards Franklin and Columbia to lure Hardee into divide his forces. Although Hardee kept a close eye on McCook’s movement with Wheeler’s cavalry he did not dispatch any other formations to the west. Crucially both Wheeler and Forrest had arranged for deserters to Rosecrans camp to confirm that Cleburne and Churchill’s divisions had been moved to counter McCook’s Corps. Rosecrans gave the order to concentrate in the direction of Shelbyville…

Wheeler's cavalry raids McCook's encampments​

Thomas advanced along the line of the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad; Crittenden via the Murfeesboro Pike; and McCook arrived along the Unionville Pike. All during McCook’s march east, Wheeler had aggressively nipped at his heels. Rosecrans’ cavalry, under David S. Stanley, had therefore been focused on keeping Wheeler at bay. Therefore on the morning of January 19, Rosecrans did not know he faced all 5 divisions of the Army of Tennessee across the Duck River. The Battle of Shelbyville was about to commence…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Thirteen

Duck! The Battle of Duck River

Part II​

From “The Battle of Shelbyville” by Jones N. Keegan
Osprey 1998

“Rosecrans’ plan was relatively simple in principle. It was an attack in echelon from west to east. Crittenden’s XXI Corps, being the first to arrive, would push through Shelbyville and seek a crossing. A pontoon train had been created for the purpose. Van Cleve’s Division was to attempt a crossing at Silvan’s Mill; Palmer’s across the river at the now ruined Shelbyville Bridge; the unfortunately named Jeff Davis was to keep his division in reserve to support either of the two crossings.

McCook’s XX Corps, coming down the Unionville Pike, passed behind Crittenden to the east of the town. His objectives were the Scullcamp Ford, assigned to Richard Johnson’s Division, Caldwell’s Ford and Lacey’s Ford, both assigned to Robert Mitchell’s Division. Sheridan formed his division up along the line of the Shelbyville Branch railroad to support the attacks.

Finally Thomas would force the Three Forks Mill Ford, assigned to James Jackson’s Division, and Paines Ford and Good Ford, assigned to James S Negley’s Division. Thomas intended that Rousseau’s Division would support Negley in order that the hammer blow fall on the extreme flank.

Rosecrans’ hope was to stretch the under strength Rebels, drawing troops westwards to deal with Crittenden and McCook. Thomas would then cross, turning Hardee’s flank and interposing himself between Hardee and his supply base at Chattanooga…”

A section of the newly created Artillery Reserve, Army of Tennessee​

From “The Battle of Duck River” by C. M. Townsend
LSU

“With the two bridges to the west of the Shelbyville down, Hardee did not anticipate a concerted effort to cross there. The entire sector north of the Lewisburg Pike was placed in the stewardship of Wheeler’s recently arrived, and somewhat worn out, cavalry. Then came McCown’s Division sitting along the Lewisburg Pike with his line refused parallel to the Fayetteville Pike. Next Cleburne’s division covered the Scullcamp Ford and the mid river island. This narrow front meant that Cleburne placed the brigades of Polk and Wood in front, with Liddell and Johnson in reserve near the Reed Farm.

Churchill’s division covered Caldwells and Lacey’s Ford, and did so from the high ground south of the river. This mean that the loop in the river, at Caldwell’s Ford, was unoccupied. Robertson had placed the bulk of his artillery along well prepared positions on the high ground, and had found a perfect vantage point from the roof of the Davidson's Farm barn.

Evander McNair’s Arkansas Brigade had been separated from Churchill’s Division to cover the river between Little Flat Creek and Tompsons Creek. Shaffners Bridge had been thoroughly destroyed, but Hardee was concerned that a pontoon bridge might be made, and it was McNair’s job to both prevent such a crossing and to warn Hardee if such were attempted.

General Cheatham covered the Three Forks Mill Ford. With the time at his disposal the Cobb Farm, a farmhouse, a barn and 3 other sundry timber buildings had been turned into a not insubstantial fortification. Often referred to Creighton’s Castle, after Lt J. R. J. Creighton whose Tennessee Sharpshooters of Smith’s Brigade, were the first assigned there. Cheatham had kept Stewart’s Brigade in reserve at the Jenkins Farm.

A sketch of "Fort Creighton"​

There is still some debate as to whether this was the original building that stood at the time of the battle​

Finally General Withers had responsibility for covering the Paines and Good Fords (the Railroad Bridge having been destroyed). He had also discovered Deep Ford on his flank so he formed his troops into an inverted L, with the long end facing Paines and Good Ford, and the short end (Maingault’s Brigade) facing Deep Ford. His troops were positioned close to the track running west to east near the Loran House. Withers did not like the look of the Sulphur Bluff on the north side of the river, “if Rosecrans gets artillery up there, I will need a pail to catch their shot”. Polk, who had set himself up in the church at Rowesville, had kept Wharton’s Cavalry in reserve at the village of Normandy.

Such were Hardee’s dispositions as the battle opened…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Thirteen

Duck! The Battle of Duck River

Part III​

From “The Battle of Shelbyville” by Jones N. Keegan
Osprey 1998


“Crittenden’s orders to Van Cleve may have been responsible for his lack luster performance that day. He was ordered to “make a demonstration before the left wing of the Rebel line. Your attack is to be made and maintained until Thomas can make a lodgment on our left”. Van Cleve seems to have focused on the word demonstration rather than the word attack. Thus, despite having been provided with an adequate pontoon train, he did not aggressively pursue his attack or meaningfully attempt to cross Duck River. Indeed Van Cleve found it “difficult to concentrate on developing the crossing and assault to our front for the balls General Wheeler threw at our headquarters from our right flank. It was very good shooting for horse artillery I am told.” (Captain Lawrence G. Buckman)…

John Palmer’s performance was quite the reverse. He only read the word “attack”. ..Twenty minutes after firing commenced on Van Cleve’s front, the engineers assigned to Palmer were attempting to restore a crossing at what was formerly the Shelbyville Bridge. McCown’s small arms fire was not enough to stop the completion of a viable crossing by mid-morning…McCown missed the presence of divisional artillery that morning, and his request for support went unanswered…

Palmer’s leading troops sustained terrible casualties in the initial assault on McCown’s position…Ultimately Palmer’s troops secured a lodgment on the Rebel bank of the river forcing McCown’s right flank back down the Fayetteville Pike to the line of the Big Flat Creek…Crittenden sought to support this success with troops from Davis division, but as the lodgment was a narrow one, Palmer had not yet been able to cross with his full division…

Van Cleve’s lassitude allowed McCown to continually to reinforce his right flank. At the critical moment General Cleburne led Liddell’s Brigade into the exposed left of Palmer’s lodgment. Palmer’s attack collapsed under this counterattack…

Cleburne leads Liddell's Brigade to the attack​

Palmer would attempt several times more during the afternoon to development a lodgment. His divisions performance and willingness to try that day was second to no other division in the Union Army. Its casualties were correspondingly high…”

From “The Battle of Duck River” by C. M. Townsend
LSU

“Poor communication between Crittenden, McCook and Johnson meant that Scullcamp Ford went unattended by Union forces that day. Johnson’s division instead attacked Caldwell’s Ford, while Mitchell assaulted Lacey’s Ford. Both attacks were in full view of Robertson’s “Grand Battery”. Mitchell in particular suffered from assaulting “infantry and artillery on a very narrow front, heavily fortified, while exposed completely on the flank to a storm of shot and shell” (General Robert B. Mitchell)…

“Like logs in a flood in our old river at home, the bodies of Yankees all but damned the river” (Color Sergeant J.S. Green)…

The position of Churchill’s line allowed Johnson to feed half a brigade into the open ground in the loop of the river. “The Bloody Bend” may sound like hyperbole, but it was an appropriate name. Churchill had created a killing ground into which Johnston fed his troops. “I lay up to my neck in the water, flat against the bank. To take a step further onto the bank, was to resolve to met the creator…” (Major Joab P. Stafford)…

Rosecrans was not perturbed. Generals Palmer and Johnston had “forced” lodgments on the Rebel bank. He surmised Hardee must be re-enforcing his left. It was after 1.30pm that Thomas’ attack was unleashed on the Confederate right…

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Thirteen​

Duck! The Battle of Duck River​

Part IV​

From “The Battle of Shelbyville” by Jones N. Keegan
Osprey 1998​

“James Jackson’s attack went in at Three Forks Mill Ford. The mill itself was built on a slight eminence and so Jackson was able to get a couple of batteries into position to pepper Cheatham’s line with shot. Under the cover of this barrage Colonel Walker’s Brigade went in. The Ohioans, with a handful of Indianans, stormed across the ford with alacrity. Cheatham’s forward line, which was effectively only a skirmish line, quickly fell back. It was then that Walker’s men ran into the Cobb Farm complex, that was known to the Rebels as Fort Creighton. Without artillery Walker could not make any breaches in its, all be it rudimentary, defences. Fort Creighton was to be an uncrackable nut for Jackson’s Division until artillery could be brought across the ford…​

Thomas' Batteries at Sulphur Bluff​

Negley’s attack, against Paines and Good Fords, too seemed to falter. Wither’s defensive line in this sector was right on the riverside, in dug in positions. However as the afternoon progressed, Wither’s casualties mounted, not as the result of Negley’s attempts to cross, but as a result of Thomas’ artillery which had been ranged on Sulphur Bluff, exactly as Withers had feared. Nonetheless his lines were holding…

General Rousseau was becoming agitated. There seemed little prospect of his division coming into action in support of either Jackson or Negley. The fords were simply too narrow and too well defended. He therefore left a surprised Col. John C Starkweather in charge of the division while he personally reconnoitred the river beyond Negley’s left. It was on this reconnaissance that he discovered the Deep Ford. It took perhaps 40 minutes to get his first brigade into position, but its attack on Wither’s right flank was devastating – Wither’s had stripped Col. Maingault of two regiments to reinforce his defence against Negley’s attack. Starkweather, whose brigade led the attack, quickly rolled by Wither’s line. Polk’s attempts to blunt the assault with an attack by Wharton’s dismounted cavalry was a nuisance that Rousseau seemed happy to ignore. Polk’s attempts to remedy the breach were curtailed by a shell from the Sulphur Bluff batteries, which took his left leg off below the knee. Wharton’s cavalrymen quickly rushed Polk from the field…The Rebel right had been beheaded at its most critical moment…​

Rousseau realised he had secured the planned breakthrough and was quick to send messages to Negley to redouble his attack as Withers faltered, and to Thomas to reinforce both attacks. Thomas seized the moment, and the division of General Philip Sheridan, which was unemployed in the rear of McCook’s attacks. Furthermore Rosecrans was quick to detach Jeff Davis’ Division on his right and send it marching to support Thomas. Thomas might soon have control of 5 Union divisions to bring against the Rebels collapsing right wing…”​

From “The Battle of Duck River” by C. M. Townsend
LSU​

“As the Federals pushed Withers back through Rowesville, he had the good sense to send a galloper to Cheatham to warn him of the breakthrough. Cheatham would quickly be in serious difficult as Withers withdrew. In his current position he risked having Thomas attack his open right flank. Such an attack, while still fending off Jackson’s assaults on Fort Creighton, could roll up his line.​

In the absence of Polk, Cheatham took the risky decision of abandoning the line of the river. Leaving the garrison of the farm to slow the pursuing Federals in his rear, he would retreat towards his reserves on the line of Tompson’s Creek. He advised Withers to maintain contact with his troops and retreat along the Kunze Farm and Jenkins Farm tracks to the creek. Hardee’s rides along the south bank with his generals were paying dividends in the midst of this crisis…​

The fall of Cobb's Farm​

It was Robertson from his barn top vantage point who first spotted the breakthrough, quickly alerting Hardee and Breckinridge who were together on the high ground near Davidson’s farm. A message sent by Cheatham quickly followed. “The enemy has forced a lodgement and is advancing in large numbers, at least two divisions. Withers is falling back on my flank. Intend to retire to the line of Tompson’s Creek. Request assistance and artillery upmost…”...

Hardee’s first action was to order McNair’s Brigade to the support of Cheatham. He then authorised the redeployment of two of Robertson’s batteries, but their removal from the fortified heights would take time. Hardee’s concern increased as all on the heights observed Federal troops marching east (the divisions of Sheridan and Davis)…​

It was then that a messenger from Wharton brought news explaining the silence of General Polk on the right. Hardee resolved to take more decisive action. He summoned Generals Churchill and Cleburne to join him on the ridge. It was approaching 3pm…​

Could General Churchill hold his current position as well as spare troops to cover the Scullcamp Ford? Churchill confirmed he could. He still had a full brigade in reserve. Could General Cleburne redeploy his division quickly to the right? Cleburne confirmed that he could. Only one of his brigades, Liddell's, had seen any fighting that morning and their success had only given them “more of a spirit to fight”. The rest of his brigades were fresh and ready to move. They could use the dirt road running parallel to river all the way to Tompson’s Creek. General McCown’s front had stabilised and he could hold his own against Palmer, Cleburne felt…​

So Hardee left Breckinridge on the left to manage McCown, Churchill and Wheeler, and rode with Cleburne and his division to the relief of the right…”​

From “The Irish Corporal – The Life and Battles of Patrick Ronayne Cleburne” by James Fitzgerald Maguire
Trinity Press​

“Thomas had crossed the river in person and had organised the deployment of Rousseau and Negley. Negley advanced over a front from Paines Ford, through Rowesville, half way to the Kunze farmhouse, Rousseau formed his troops on Negley’s left fanning out to the south. It was about this time that Jackson’s men manhandled some artillery across Three Forks Mill Ford and pounded the Cobb Farmhouse. The remains of that command surrendered, under Lieutenant Creighton, about 4.30pm. Having removed the main obstacle to his advance Jackson pressed on with the intention of linking up with Negley’s right as he advanced… ​

Cleburne arrived with the leading brigade of his division near the Jules Farm. As one soldier observed “Look at General Cleburne, don’t you see war in his eyes?”. Cleburne quickly deployed his division into line, keeping Liddell in reserve, between Cheatham and Withers hastily formed line along the creek. Hardee had already inspected the position. “Tell Cleburne we are to fight,” Hardee said to a staff officer and “that his division will undoubtedly be heavily attacked, and that he must do his best”…​

Col. John Beatty of Rousseau’s Division observed “with the exception of the narrow dirt tracks running directly to the rebel lines, the intervening ground was some of the roughest broken ground it has ever been my misfortune to fight over”. Rousseau’s attack on Withers and on Cleburne’s right was, as a result of the broken nature of the ground, piecemeal and disorganised. The ground was easier to Negley’s front. Negley launched his three brigades at Cleburne’s line, to be repulsed. A second attacked was launched, with Brigadier General Sill’s Brigade of Sheridan’s Division in support…

"Time after time, line after line of Federals charged over that ground against Cleburne’s lines,” a soldier of Cheatham’s Division observed “only to be shattered and hurled back into the hollows”…​

The light of the day was fading. Rousseau’s and Negley’s Divisions were exhausted and only one brigade of Sheridan’s troops had arrived as he had been ordered to cross by the Deep Ford. Cleburne resolved on a bold move. If Cheatham could cover his flank to prevent flanking fire from Jackson, Cleburne would lead the brigades of McNair, Polk, Johnson and Liddell, once again, in an attack. (Wood faced off against Rousseau and Withers requested he remain on his flank). Hardee approved the move...The last things Negley’s Federals expected was a counterattack…

“We all believed Cleburne, that the success of this counterattack would compel the Federals to give up their assault altogether” General St.John R. Liddell…

Negley's troops flee in the face of Cleburne's counterattack​

Sweeping in an arc, with its hinge on the Jules farm, Cleburne’s brigades attacked. Negley’s forces did not stand. Some made for Paines Ford; some held up in Rowesville; some made for Rousseau’s line. Sheridan, however, personally steadied Sill’s brigade and withdrew in fine order towards the railroad, Deep Ford, and the brigade of Col. Roberts just crossing. Feeling the ground unfit for an attack and with night descending, Rousseau drew off with Thomas’ reluctant approval towards the railroad and the village of Normandy…

Jackson’s troops drew back to the farmhouse which had been the focus of their endeavours all day…

From “The Battle of Duck River” by C. M. Townsend
LSU

“Cleburne’s was not the last counterattack. Churchill saw an opportunity to raise a little hell on the left. With the Federals having missed Scullcamp Ford, within sight of the town, Churchill proposed to his corps commander that he lead two regiments across the ford. He would attack the town and Palmer’s flank. Having “raised a commotion” he would withdraw across the ford. Breckinridge was concerned this “diversion” would naturally highlight to the Federals the existence of the ford. Churchill suggested that, under the cover of night, this might not be so, but that in any event if the Federals made any efforts to question the remaining inhabitants of Shelbyville, they could expect to know about the ford soon enough. Breckinridge authorised the attack and Churchill personally led the 3rd and 9th Georgia Battalions across the river as soon as night fell…

Churchill led in person as the attack would require fine judgment in keeping the men in hand and in withdrawing in good time, safely across the river... “With fires in the town, many thought we were under a serious counterattack by at least a brigade. We did not known if the rebels had forced our pontoons at Shelbyville, which I thought unlikely, or crossed at some unknown point. Rosecrans arrived with his staff in great alarm, the burning buildings making a great spectacle on the horizon. It was an impressive shambles.”(Col. William B. Hazen)…

Churchill withdrew safely across the ford with only a handful of casualties. The diversion was to have an impact out of all proportion to the numbers involved…

​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Thirteen​

Duck! The Battle of Duck River​

Part V​

From “The Battle of Shelbyville” by Jones N. Keegan
Osprey 1998​

“General Thomas cussed Rosecrans up and down” one nearby soldier claimed upon receipt of the order to retire to the north bank. It was about 11pm…​

The arguments have raged about whether the collapse of Negley’s Division was a reasonable justification for the withdrawal order. Sheridan’s Division was now on the south bank in force, and Davis’ Division was fresh and nearby on the north bank. Thomas’ position was therefore not as exposed as perhaps Rosecrans feared. Rousseau’s withdrawal to Normandy had secured his left flank…​

On the other hand the conflagration in Shelbyville had spread a sense of panic among Palmer’s Division. Rosecrans was disconcerted by the perceived aggressiveness of the Rebels on both flanks. Clearly Hardee was present with the full force of the Army of Tennessee, and not divided as Rosecrans had expected…​

“Only Thomas had made proper use of his corps artillery” Rosecrans observed in his report, while “the Rebel deployment of artillery, massed in his centre, was unprecedented, effective, and would have had a devastating effect on any renewed attack on the centre”…

Major General William Starke Rosecrans​

From “The Battle of Duck River” by C. M. Townsend
LSU

“Hardee was surprised to see that the Federals had vacated the south bank on his right in the morning. Knowing General Thomas from the old army, he knew who was responsible “Thomas must be in a rage with Rosecrans. It is a poor judgment for which I am very grateful”. Hardee also knew who to credit his success to “General Cleburne’s support of McCown on the left and Cheatham on the right was in the highest traditions of our service, and was responsible for the near collapse of the Federal left… General Churchill’s night time raid on Shelbyville was well conceived and equally well executed. Its results were out of all proportion to the numbers of our troops involved…”.

Rosecrans roundly blamed Halleck. “I was forced to attack the enemy before I had achieved a full concentration [we assume he means that Nelson’s troops had not yet been formally assigned to him], with an inadequate number of cavalry and poor knowledge of the ground. The administration must bear the full blame for this setback…”. Perhaps an unsurprising response from a man who had first seen service in this war under the command of George B. McClellan…”

From “Army of the Heartland” by Col. J.T. Starke
University of Tennessee

“The Battle of Shelbyville did not end the fighting in Tennessee that spring. It was only the beginning. The next 40 days would see Rosecrans manoeuvre, first to the east, where McCook would clash with Cheatham’s Corps at Manchester, and Wheeler’s cavalry clashed with Stanley’s at Altamont and McMinnsville, and then in a race to the west.

The Second Battle of Shelbyville would see Churchill blunt an attempt to cross at the town by Sheridan’s Division. Forrest’s cavalry would then make an appearance in Rosecrans rear with a major skirmish at Chapel Hill. Skirmishes occurred up and down the Duck River as Rosecrans sought an opening to cross. but was skilfully blocked by Hardee, and the judicious use of his cavalry. Finally an opportunity in early March to catch Hardee was lost when Cleburne’s own “foot cavalry” beat Crittenden’s troops to the crossing at Columbia. In the ensuing attempt to force a crossing, Cleburne gave Van Cleve and Palmer’s Divisions a very bloody nose…

Union troops try to out pace Hardee's Army​

Rosecrans withdrew to the vicinity of Spring Hill to rest and regroup. William Nelson’s Corps, at the time of only two divisions, was finally assigned officially to the Army of the Cumberland. It was designated XXIII Corps…

From “The War Between the States” by Otis R. Mayhew
Sword & Musket 1992​

“Congress was extremely displeased with the stagnant nature of the Tennessee front. Senator Sumner believed Hardee’s army should have been “driven into the Deep South to die by now! This bundling is intolerable”...Matters might have gone against Rosecrans if attentions were not focused on Virginia that spring...​

General Bragg however believed Hardee could do more. “The movements of Rosecrans’ forces may present an opportunity for a descent on Nashville…You should not be content with holding Rosecrans to the river…Find a means to attack him with advantage…”. In the words of General Churchill “such ungratefulness will do little to endear Bragg to the boys of this fine army”. However attack was not far from Hardee’s mind… ​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Fourteen​

The Butler's Tale​

Major General Benjamin Butler
Commander of the Army of the James​

From “The Fighting Lambs – The Army of the James” by Geoffrey T. W. Werner
Radical Press 1928

“By the middle of March Benjamin Butler had gathered his host around Suffolk, Virginia. XVIII Corps, under Ambrose E. Burnside, was the largest in the Union Army. Formally under David Hunter it had done sterling work in freeing the enslaved in South Carolina, Georgia and in Florida. Burnside had reorganised this force into 5 divisions under John G. Foster, Innis N. Palmer, Henry M. Naglee, Alfred H. Terry and George H. Gordon. Few troops were left behind in the south, unfortunately, but those left continued their good work under Robert H. Milroy, who would prove himself a righteous man in that role…

Generals Foster, Palmer, Naglee, Terry and Gordon​

VII Corps numbered but three divisions, under Irvin McDowell, which had formerly been split between Norfolk, on the peninsula, and Suffolk. These three divisions were commanded by John J. Peck, friend of Kearny, Michael Corcoran, the noted Irishman, and George W. Getty, a southerner by birth. McDowell had left a small divisional sized force on the peninsula under the foreigner, Egbert Ludovicus Viele [sic – the general was a New York born]…

Generals Peck, Corcoran and Getty​

The re-organisation over the winter had left two senior generals unassigned. Both volunteered to assist General Butler. General David Hunter held an unspecified position on General Butler’s staff, but it was generally held he would be appointed to a post appropriate to his stature as soon as one became available… The creation of a third corps from Burnside’s was muted. General Quincy A. Gilmore had also lost his post in the reorganisation but he had been recommended to Butler as the “best artillerist in the army”. Butler asked him to serve as the Army’s Chief of Artillery, if only until a better post could be found, and Gillmore consented…

Generals Hunter and Gillmore​

The War Office had assigned General Butler the task of taking Petersburg, and thus the severing of the major southern rail and road links between Richmond and the south. With the Rebel forces under General Lee fully occupied by Kearny, Butler anticipated this would be a relatively easy task…

XVIII Corps would advance along the line of the Norfolk & Petersburg Railroad, while the VII Corps would advance along the coastal roads via Newport Mews and Surry Courthouse, with the support of the navy…

It was beyond the Blackwater that the aspirations for General Butler’s command would meet their betrayal…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Fifteen​

Too Clever By Half​

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern​

“The winter had allowed Kearny to complete the reorganisation of the Army of the Potomac. The performance of Erasmus Keyes, at the head of IV Corps had been lacklustre. The performance of William Franklin, at the head of VI Corps, had been infuriating. As a result Keyes was replaced at the head of IV Corps by Darius N. Couch. Kearny also took William F. Smith from IV Corps and placed him at the head of VI Corps. As part of the re-organisation, the III Division of IV Corps was detached and assigned to the Department of the Shenandoah…

Generals Couch and "Baldy" Smith​

Robert Milroy was transferred from his divisional command in XI Corps to command the much reduced Department of the South. He was replaced by Charles Devens…

Kearny had no intention of going into the campaign “with one boot off” so John F. Reynolds' three month tenure as head of the Department of the Shenandoah ended and he returned to command the I Corps, which also returned to the Army. Reynolds returned to join what some referred to as “Kearny’s holy trinity – Hooker, Reynolds and Sedgwick” (orginally attributed to William Seward)… ​

From “Yankee Dawdle - the Memoirs of a Private of Pennsylvania” by Anonymous​

“Although we welcomed back our old general R to our campfires, we knew his return meant a spring of hard marchin [sic] and a summer of bloody mayhem. Huzzah for Old General R we cried!”​

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962​

“In February, the patrols of Buford and Pleasanton had fixed the location of Longstreet’s Headquarters at Trevilian Station, his divisions spread out covering the gaps from Rapidan in the north to the minor Hardware Gap in the south. Jackson was supposed to be based at Canton. His divisions were all south of the James River. The location of the bulk of Stuart’s horsemen was a matter of debate. Davis seemed convinced that Stuart was screening Richmond to the north, before Sedgwick and Reno on the Rappahannock, but Buford had expressed a concern. Something was stirring on the right beyond Jackson’s troops, it might be Stuart…​

Buford leads his division on a patrol beyond Lynchburg​

Phil Kearny had got the better of Robert E. Lee in the previous campaign, but Kearny did not expect Lee to calmly await his advance come the spring. “Lee cannot afford to stand on the defensive. A siege will kill his army and will finish the rebellion. He will go on the offensive if he can. We must, all of us, be alert to any movement by the enemy which could indicate an attack” Kearny warned his corps commanders…

An attack by Jackson on the extreme southern flank of the Army of the Potomac was not out of the question. The Army was still disbursed, covering the gaps and passes, and Mansfield’s XII Corps on the extreme right was spread thin, with detachments as far south as Rose Mills to support Buford, who had wintered his division at New Glasgow…​

As a result the corps were ordered to concentrate. Kearny planned to march on 25 March, 4 days after Butler, in order that Butler's advance might draw off some of Lee’s forces. However on 22 March the Rebels, who until then had been happy to watch the routes through the hills from afar, advanced closely and in force to cover the likely routes of Kearny’s advance…​

From Richardson at Rapidan to Mansfield in the south, all corps commander’s reported the gaps, passes and roads being closely covered, usually in brigade strength, by Rebel troops. Buford reported categorically that the bulk of Stuart’s cavalry was in the south covering the crossings over the James at Norwood and near Lynchburg…​

"Fighting Joe" was given command of Kearny's left wing​

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton

NorthWestern​

Instead of the general advance he had planned, Kearny altered his orders. “Hooker’s” wing would led off; Richardson would push out of Rapidan and Hooker’s own corps would push the opposing Rebels beyond Orange Court House. All being well this movement would be followed by the two division of IV Corps, now under Couch, probing Gordonsville with support from Pleasanton’s cavalry. If Lee had moved his weight south, Hooker should push out quickly, with little resistance. Kearny would then risk ordering Sedgwick and Reno across to the south side of the Rapidan & Rappahannock Rivers…​

This movement would be followed by VI and XI Corps, under Kearny’s own eye, crossing beyond Charlottesville. Finally a decision would be made about whether to move “Reynolds’” wing of I and XII Corps, along with Buford’s cavalry…​

Confederate Skirmishers​

Every corps commander had the same orders. To keep plenty of gallopers on staff to communicate with Kearny. To only engage brigade sized opposition. If larger formations were met these were to be reported immediately and the corps commander was to “dig in” pending further orders and support…Kearny’s corps were spread out over a large area and each corps could only be guaranteed the immediate support of one or two others, until the army concentrated somewhere north west of Richmond... But just as the hills screened Lee from Kearny’s eyes so to did it keep Lee from guessing where Kearny’s strength was, and where the blow would fall…

From “The Fighting Lambs – The Army of the James” by Geoffrey T. W. Werner
Radical Press 1928​

“Kearny’s strength was dissipated. It would take time for him to deal with the Rebels before him. His staged advance meant it was several days before he realised the makeup of the formations before him. Even then it took another two days to effect a concentration. Kearny’s failures were to have a catastrophic effect… ​

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962​

“Kearny’s strategy worked, in that it intimidated Lee into resolving not to attack Kearny. Lee had dismissed Jackson’s idea of a march around Kearny’s flank to attack Mansfield. The valley was too narrow. Anyone of Kearny’s Corps could halt an attack if well led. In the meantime the remainder of Kearny’s army could debouch from the hills, at a point Lee could not predict, and sweep towards Richmond...​

But Lee was not prepared to wait to be attacked, as Kearny had predicted. What Kearny had not counted on was the gamble Lee was about take…”​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Sixteen​

Lee Plays For High Stakes
​

From “The Gray Fox – Robert E. Lee” by R. Southey-Freeman
Orange & West 1958

“The summer of 1862 had been good for Lee from the moment he took command in the Peninsula. The Seven Days campaign had seen the Army of the Potomac driven from the very gates of Richmond. The Battle of the Rappahannock had almost destroyed the Federal Army of Virginia, and had certainly bunted Federal plans for several months…but the accession of Philip Kearny to command of the Army of the Potomac had seen Lee’s fortunes take a tumble…Kearny had fooled Lee, as Lee himself admitted, and side-stepped the Army of Virginia plunging deep into Virginia itself. Control of the Shenandoah had decisively passed to the Federals, and a second Federal army had then been established south east of Petersburg under Benjamin Butler…The opening days of 1863 looked bleak for the Army of Northern Virginia and the fate of its capitol…

Lee however was a man of faith. In God, in the Army of Northern Virginia, in his lieutenants, Jackson and Longstreet, and in himself. Lee had a plan, and for it he would need the consent of the President…”

President Jefferson Davis​

From “The Unyielding Office – the Presidency of Jefferson Davis” by James L. Caney
Buffalo

“Mr President I mean to leave General Longstreet and his corps before the Army of the Potomac. His task will be to slow the advance of those people and mask the departure of General Jackson’s corps for as long as possible…I also seek your authority to strip the garrisons of Richmond and Petersburg of troops to enhance the strength of the force at my disposal…”

“To denude the garrisons of our centre of government?! To what end General?”

“Mr President I mean to take and destroy the Army of the James…” Extract of the conference between Lee, Jackson, Gustavus W. Smith and Jefferson Davis…

This inaccurate print shows a more "collegiate" Davis. In fact most the Cabinet were kept in the dark initially about Lee's plan.​

It was an astonishing proposal. Lee intended that James Longstreet should face the full force of the Army of the Potomac alone, while Lee took Jackson by rail south to Petersburg. Lee intended to garner further troops from Richmond and Petersburg on the way, effectively stripping those garrisons of organised infantry. Furthermore Lee believed the plan would only succeed if troops were transferred from the Departments of South-West Virginia, North Carolina and the South. With the departure of the bulk of the Federal forces in the Carolinas, Georgia and Florida, such a redistribution of forces was not only possible, it was in Lee’s opinion “essential if any meaningful attempt is to be made to prevent the capture of Richmond in the coming campaign…The balance of Federal forces is here, in Virginia. If we are to contend with those people we must ensure the balance of our forces is likewise here…”.

From “A Man in Search of Death - The Life of Richard Brooke Garnett” by Ganett Brooke
Orange & West

“While Jackson’s accusations remained outstanding, Dick Garnett found it difficult to find a permanent post. Having served briefly in the Rapidan Campaign he was again unemployed and at leisure in Richmond…

Edward Johnson hobbled in to the hotel. Had Garnett known he was still so disabled by his wound he would have insisted on meeting Johnson at his home. Upon sitting down to an uninspiring meal Garnett asked whether Johnson knew anything of the implausible rumours about a “temporary corps” being formed in Petersburg.

“Know sir, know! Why Dick I am to have a division in it. And I would honoured if you would take one of my brigades, Dick.”

From “The Unyielding Office – the Presidency of Jefferson Davis” by James L. Caney
Buffalo

Gustavus Woodson Smith had been on the verge of resigning his command of the Richmond defences when the President invited him to attend the meeting with Lee. Frustration at what he perceived as the promotion of junior officers to high commands had left him disillusioned. He had after all commanded the Army briefly upon the injury of Joseph Johnson on the Peninsula…

Major General Gustavus Woodson Smith​

The President insisted that, as the assignment of troops to Lee’s command was temporary, these should not be added to the existing corps of Jackson. Instead a separate “temporary corps” would be placed under Lee, and the President assigned Smith to the command. Lee, reluctantly, acquiesced to the President’s assignment of Smith. It had been a triumph to secure the numbers of troops he had, and Lee had no intention of contradicting the President’s judgment, having gained his support for what was an extremely bold plan...

The President expected Congress to “ignite” upon the discovery that the garrison of Richmond had been dramatically reduced, if not entirely stripped as Lee had originally proposed…”

From “The Temporary Corps” from an article by Jim Harris
North & South Magazine 2002

“Edward Johnson described the force as “as mixed a parcel of heroes and rogues, veterans and green militia as could be assembled in one place, and that goes for its officers double”.

As Lee has little choice in the assignment of Smith, so too had Smith had little discretion in his choice of divisional commanders. He got who was available in Richmond...

Edward Johnson was recovering from wounds, but he asserted his fitness for a field command. He could only walk with the assistance of a thick black cane “that gave the impression of an irascible Irishman and his shillelagh”…

Howell Cobb, formerly a potential candidate for the Presidency of the Confederacy, had been sent north from Georgia by General Beauregard, many suspected simply to irritate President Davis…

Nathan “Shanks” Evans had been on detached duty for weeks. General Longstreet thought highly of him, but the rumours of his colossal intake of alcohol grew and grew in the retelling. Nonetheless he was an experienced commander who knew how to make a stand, which in this instance, was exactly what Lee needed…

Raleigh Colston was also recovering from injury in Richmond. His promotion had been endorsed and indeed actively recommended by General Jackson…

Generals Johnson, Cobb, Evans and Colston​

Each of these four divisions was to have three brigades. Johnston had three made up of Virginians: two from the defences of Richmond and Petersburg and one from south west Virginia. His brigade commanders were Richard B. Garnet, John Echols and William W. MacKall…

Cobb was to have three small brigades of North Carolinians, formerly deployed in that state and South Carolina. Brigadier General James Green Martin was joined by Colonels Collet Leventhorpe and Henry M. Shaw in commanding these…

Evans’ South Carolinians were commanded by Johnson Hagood, James H. Trapier and William S. Walker. Finally Colston’s division, which many considered the “runt of the litter” contained South Carolinians, under Roswell S. Ripley, a tiny brigade of Floridians under Edward A. Perry, and a motley band of North Carolinians and Virginians under Henry A. Wise…

Neither these officers, nor their men, knew what Lee had planned as they assembled in Petersburg during late February and early March…

Lee was not slow to realise these formations were not like his beloved Army of North Virginia. Few had seen a large scale battle. The formations were new, and few of the officers and troops had served together or had much experience of one another. Lee knew the part to be played in his plan by the Temporary Corps would have to be simple to succeed…"

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Seventeen​

Deep in the Black Stuff​

General John J. Peck and staff at Suffolk​

From “The Life and Letters of John J. Peck” by John Watts de Peyster Jr.
Buffalo 1892

“…My own division was at the rear of McDowell’s column just passing by Surry Court House. It was about 5 O’clock. General McDowell passed a message down the line that Burnside’s scouts had spotted a small rebel force to the south west. I understood that Burnside’s column had got as far as Waverly, but that Butler and the bulk of that corps were still around Wakefield Station…We received no communications from Butler or Burnside indicating concern about the rebels. Indeed Butler went into camp, as far as I can tell, exactly where he planned – at Wakefield…

General McDowell summoned me to his headquarters about 8. Getty and Corcoran were there. McDowell had ridden as far as Dendon with the intent of seeking out General Butler, but he had found David Hunter instead. McDowell confirmed that Hunter believed that a strong force of rebels was on their left flank – between Reem’s [sic] Station and Sussex Court House. Hunter anticipated a battle in the morning…

McDowell had no orders from Butler but he confirmed we would march through Spring Grove in the morning to be in a position to support Butler if needed. God knows that Irvin McDowell deserves credit for that…In the morning Getty was to lead off, then Corcoran and finally my own division…

The head of the column had been on the march for perhaps an hour or more when I heard the first indications that an engagement was taking place…

From “The Battle of the Blackwater” by Francis Hemmingway
Osprey 2001

“East of Ream’s Station Smith had drawn up his troops on some rising ground. The line ran from north west to south east, parallel to Butler’s line of march. From north to south the divisions were Johnson’s, Cobb’s, Evan’s and Colston’s. Burnside quickly began to shake his line of march out into a line of battle.

A portion of "Shanks" Evans line ​

Terry, Palmer and Foster quickly formed. Negley found the ground between his division, at the rear of Burnside’s column to be flanked with impassable swampland. Gordon, whose division led Burnside’s column, had the dubious honour of having David Hunter ride with him. Hunter’s interference meant that Gordon was slow getting his division into line.

Butler’s scouts confirmed what he could see from Smith’s dispositions: Burnside's Corps alone outnumbered the Confederates, whose position, while good, was no compensation for what they lacked in numbers.

Butler sent a message to McDowell confirming he was to come up quickly but could expect to remain in reserve. Burnside’s corps could deal with the Confederates.”

From “The Life and Letters of John J. Peck” by John Watts de Peyster Jr.
Buffalo 1892

“The battle, such I could tell from the rear of our line, from the first sound of cannon fire had gone on for about an hour. Thank heavens that either McDowell or Getty had thought to put out flankers, for they came running in from our right about that time – [from] the direction of Brandon Court House and beyond that Petersburg. Two of them had got turned around in their haste and finished up in my division - Rebs – thousands of them was the report. I barely credited it at first. Butler was likely facing troops from a North Carolina command diverted to slow us down, and the Petersburg garrison would not simply march out to face us in the open field. It did not occur to me that Lee would have abandoned his lines before Kearny to march on us…

Those Rebs on the flank were not long in appearing in numbers. The roads from Brandon and Prince George Court Houses were choked with them. Those on the road from Prince George’s were going to fall on Burnside’s open flank…

From “The Battle of the Blackwater” by Francis Hemmingway
Osprey 2001

“Once Butler had deployed and committed his line of battle to engage Smith, Jackson launched his two pronged attack. Dick Ewell followed by A.P. Hill marched down the road and rail bed from the direction of Prince George Court House. This was in order to bring them down behind Burnside’s line. Charles W. Field followed by D.H. Hill marched down the road from Brandon Court House. Their objective was to prevent any interference by McDowell’s command…

Fully engaged on his front, Gordon, with David Hunter, could only look on in horror at the approach of Jackson’s foot cavalry…”

Jackson's Corps bursts upon the flank of the Army of the James​

From “The Life and Letters of John J. Peck” by John Watts de Peyster Jr.
Buffalo 1892

“I rode up the column to find McDowell. He was with Getty directing him into line to blunt the [Field’s] attack…I then rode back with him to Corcoran’s Division…another division [D.H. Hill's] quickly came up to flank Getty’s boys. Corcoran’s troops arrived just in time to form line on Getty’s right…It was the third division [A.P. Hill’s] that came up on Getty’s left that decided the matter. My division was still coming up was would arrive to the right rear of Corcoran – on opposite flank to where the threat was…Getty’s boys bore it well, but when Getty was seen to fall his brigades began to break…”

From “The Battle of the Blackwater” by Francis Hemmingway
Osprey 2001

“Ewell’s troops “seemed not to break their stride” (Edward Johnson)when they made contact with Gordon’s flank. Gordon was shot and killed instantly in the first few moments of this attack. At the same time Johnston, with his three brigades, who had so far stood on the defensive, attacked with his full force. Garnet and Echols struck Gordon’s front, while MacKall’s brigade hit the end of Terry’s line. Edward Johnson, rode in with the attack, and is widely reported to have struck an Union officer from horseback with his walking stick “like some gallant lord of old, striking down his foes with his wooden mace from horseback” (Richmond Examiner)…

Gordon’s division simply disintegrated under this double assault, and General Hunter was captured. Terry however had managed to disengage a brigade and refused his right flank. He hoped to hold Ewell and Johnson, at least for awhile. In the distance Getty’s division could be seen contending with an ever increasing rebel force…

The collapse of Getty’s division released a tidal wave of Confederates troops into the Union rear. Field swung his left wing around Corcoran’s flank, while A.P. Hill’s troops raced into Burnside’s rear beyond Terry’s refused line and directly into the rear of Palmer’s division, still fixed in place by its contest with Cobb and Evans…

A one point there was literally not a soul between Butler and his staff, in the rear of Palmer’s division, and A.P. Hill’s charging troopers…

From “The Life and Letters of John J. Peck” by John Watts de Peyster Jr.
Buffalo 1892

“McDowell directed me to lead my men south towards Foster and Negley. He kept saying it was Pope all over again, we needed to form some semblance of a line and attempt to retreat beyond the Blackwater. He said he had had no instructions from Butler [note in side margin – It was chaos in the centre. Who knows what messages went awry]. He would use Corcoran’s division as best he could to hold up the rebels…

Burnside had had the same idea. Negley had evidently got into position and had mauled Colston on the extreme left, so Burnside had space to disengage both Negley’s and Foster’s divisions. Palmer managed to pull out one of his brigades as well. I made contact with Palmer’s flank as we four formed something of a line withdrew south towards the Blackwater…

Terry was swallowed up by rebels. I could no longer see where his command stood. But my vantage point did allow me to see one of the most stirring sights this war has produced. Corcoran had held his Legion in reserve. When the rebels washed over his first line [Field and D.H. Hill], Corcoran counterattacked. I could see the green banners and the flash of bayonets as they went in. It was a grand hopeless dash. I could feel the rebels stagger at the blow… It slowed the rebels long enough for us to form a line and withdraw in the direction of Wakefield Station. Once we had the Blackwater on our right and the [Seacock] swamp on our left we began to feel secure…Few of Corcoran’s Irish made it back to our lines…

The death of Michael Corcoran as he climbed over a wall​

There was a pursuit, and I had several stiff skirmishes, but with my flanks secure we were able to manage a fighting retreat, though I had a very brisk night time scrape with the rebels. My division was kept as the rearguard as we were freshest. It was a trying night…”

From “The Battle of the Blackwater” by Francis Hemmingway
Osprey 2001

“Lee’s victory was comprehensive. Four divisions of the Army of the James had effectively ceased to exist – Getty’s, Corcoran’s, Gordon’s and Terry’s. The toll among the Union’s senior officers was also high. George H. Gordon, George W. Getty and Michael Corcoran were dead. David Hunter and Alfred H. Terry were captured. Irvin McDowell had been shot twice. Though perceived to be mortal wounds, General McDowell would ultimately recover. Benjamin Butler himself had come close to capture and was slightly wounded. The Confederate’s had also bagged a large haul of prisoners. The fate of General Hunter and the 35 men of Gordon’s divisional pioneers were to have repercussions that would last long beyond those of the Battle of the Blackwater…”

Major General David Hunter​

From “Kearny and the Radicals” by Hugh W. McGrath
New England Press 1992

“General John Peck was the primary force behind the criticism of Butler’s performance at the Blackwater. In his own words “Butler found an enemy force he thought he could whip. Pitched into it with his whole force. Thought nothing of a reserve; nothing of his flanks; nothing of why Smith was there, daring an attack; and had nothing left when Stonewall appeared”. Although Peck saw himself as standing up for McDowell and the troops of VII Corps, his friendship and ties with Kearny (his Chief of Staff was Kearny’s cousin), meant many saw his later attacks on Butler as sanctioned by Kearny…

Butler’s allies among the Radicals in Congress were quick to support Butler’s line – that McDowell had been ordered to protect the exposed flank and had failed to do so. The Radicals pitched into McDowell and the performance of VII Corps. Peck was derided as a coward as he did not get his men into the fight until the evening during the retreat. Corcoran was derided as a Democrat and a foreigner. Getty as a southerner…

Though no evidence has ever been found to support Butler’s assertions about the “McDowell Order”, this was not clear either at the time or for decades afterwards. In the short term few would pay much attention – Butler’s and McDowell’s injuries would remove them from the Army of the James and the Hunter incident would drown out everything else for months, but the Butler/Peck feud would have serious long term implications for the Republican Party…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Eighteen

The Hunter is Himself Trapped
Part I​

From “The Life and Letters of John J. Peck” by John Watts de Peyster Jr.
Buffalo 1892

“We have heard the most dreadful rumors here about the execution of prisoners taken but a few days ago at the Blackwater. One cannot give credence to every rumor one hears here but the stories about General Hunter and some of our Negro pioneers have a ring of truth about them. I pray god the rumors prove false…”

The Illustrated London News reports the executions​

From “The War Between the States” by Otis R. Mayhew
Sword & Musket 1992

“Three days after the battle Major-General David Hunter was taken from the Kemp Farmhouse, where he had been kept since his separation from General Alfred Terry the previous day. Taken to the open yard of the farmhouse, General Orders Number 60 and 111 were read to him. The General was bound and blindfolded. He was the shot by a firing squad of 10 South Carolinians from Roswell S. Ripley’s Brigade of Colston’s Division. Later that afternoon 35 African American pioneers of Gordon’s Division of the Army of the James were likewise put to death. These are the only undisputed facts of a series of executions that would change the face of the war…”

From “The Martyr - The Biography of David Hunter” by Ambrose E. Edward Sr.
New England Press 1927

“There can be no doubt that David Hunter was put to death on the orders of Jefferson Davis. Were not the General Orders signed by the so called Southern President himself. General Hunter, had himself indicated his belief that “the social relations” between the two men in their pre-war service allowed them “to understand each other thoroughly”. For that reason General Hunter believed Davis was “capable of carrying out the threat” made in General Order 60...

The 35 men of the Pioneer Company, mostly former slaves and North Carolinians, were put to death, again on the orders of Jefferson Davis. Whether the unarmed pioneers had taken up the arms of their fallen comrades in the chaos of the Battle of Blackwater is utterly irrelevant to their fate. These brave men were enlisted soldiers in the service of the United States Government and deserved by all the rules of war to be treated as prisoners of war…

The South reveled in the news. “The cold-blooded abolitionist miscreant who, from his former headquarters at Hilton Head, and then from Suffolk, engaged in executing the bloody and savage bequests of the imperial gorilla [Abraham Lincoln] is dead, and justly so” (Savannah Daily Morning News)…

The murders of the noble Hunter and the 35 heroes who dedicated their lives to freedom would not go unavenged…

From “A Day That Will Live in Infamy - the Hunter Controversy” by Prof. J. K. Lang
LSU 2003

“From the moment that Abraham Lincoln confirmed the executions in his great “Blackwater Speech” to Congress, and coined the phrase “a day that will live in infamy” accusations and conspiracy theories have swirled around the deaths. Few in Davis’ government or Lee’s army have not been accused of being complicit in the executions. However no entirely objective investigation has ever taken place…

Although Jefferson Davis had authorized General Orders 60 and 111 no evidence has ever been produced linking Davis or any member of his cabinet to a direct order to execute General Hunter or the pioneers. Indeed the surviving correspondence indicates Davis was incensed by the execution. “Does not the order say that such men are to be held in close confinement for execution as a felon at such time and place as the President shall order?!” Davis is supposed to have exclaimed to his cabinet “I have given no such order. My authority has been usurped.”…

General Robert E. Lee was accused of complicity by the Radicals, yet exonerated by the post-war Wallace Commission. Yet it is unlikely, given Lee’s later standing orders that no officer in the Army of Northern Virginia was to put any man to death, whether Federal or Confederate, slave or free, without a signed order from Lee’s Headquarters, that Lee knew or was consulted about the execution. Indeed by the time of the execution Lee was already north of Richmond on the way to oppose Kearny’s advance…

The three individuals who bare the most responsibility for the execution were Major-General Gustavus Smith, Brigadier General Roswell S. Ripley, and Colonel Robert Barnwell Rhett….

Colonel, later Brigadier General, Robert Barnwell Rhett​

If not complicit in the act General Smith certainly made little effort to identify those responsible. “If Congress will issue incendiary orders, it must expect officers of a political persuasion to act zealously in the execution of those orders”. Little of the credit in the jubilant south accrued to Smith, but the hostility of Davis and Lee certainly did. Lee made it clear to the Secretary of War that, if General Smith was unable to maintain a strict compliance with orders among his subordinates, he had no place in a position of military responsibility. It was a view with which President Davis concurred. Upon the re-organization of the Temporary Corps, Smith would languish without orders for 8 months before he tendered his resignation…

General Ripley almost certainly did know that the executions were about to take place. However the General’s poor performance in the Seven Days Campaign had meant he had been sidelined. In his own correspondence he outlines his need for allies to “advocate for my preference". The fact that Robert Barnwell Rhett of South Carolina had accepted a temporary commission in the South Carolina militia following his disillusionment with President Davis and the Confederate Government had been an opportunity that Ripley could not afford to miss. Ripley had not been prepared for the force of nature that the newly minted Colonel Rhett had proven. Ripley had effectively lost control of his brigade from the date Rhett and his South Carolinian “Fire-Eater” Regiment had brigaded with his other troops. The correspondence of Colston's and Ripley's officers and later testimony to the Wallace Commission clearly indicate Ripley deferred entirely to Colonel Rhett…

No doubt can remain that one conclusion of the Wallace Commission was wholly correct. To quote General, later Senator, Lew Wallace “there can be no doubt as to the villain of the piece. The prime instigator of the separation of General Hunter and the pioneers from the other prisoners was Colonel Rhett. The order to draw lots for a firing squad was Colonel Rhett’s. The order to fire was given by an officer on Colonel Rhett’s orders. In thought, in preparation, in deed and in execution the murders were the work of Colonel Robert Barnwell Rhett…”

The body of Major General David Hunter​

From “The War Between the States” by Otis R. Mayhew
Sword & Musket 1992

“It would be several weeks before the news of the executions was confirmed, though rumors began to circulate within a few days of the deeds. In the interim Generals Lee and Jackson marched north from the Blackwater to the relief of General Longstreet who stood alone against the full might of the Army of the Potomac…

[Note: I will return to the reaction to General Hunter’s execution after updating on the campaign north of Richmond…]

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Nineteen​

Parry & Lunge​

Kearny -v- Longstreet​

Phil Kearny and James Longstreet​

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962

“As the Union juggernaut set off, beginning with Richardson’s II Corps, the army believed it faced the full force of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. In fact, as Lee took Jackson south to attack the Army of the James, only Longstreet’s Corps remained:

· Walker’s Division based around Roberston’s Tavern had the task of convincing Richardson’s IV Corps at Rapidan and the right wing of Sedgwick’s V Corps on the Rapidan that he had at least two divisions at his disposal.
· Pickett, who had succeeded D.R. Jones to divisional command, sat near the Orange Court House at the mouth of the North Anna River opposite Hooker’s II Corps.
· Lafayette McLaws’ Division screened Gordonsville with one brigade, but had the remainder of his strength at Trevilian Station. Couch had brought up his reduced strength IV Corps to Barboursville, with Pleasanton in support.
· Anderson’s Division screened Boyd and Keswick on McLaw’s left flank, opposite Baldy Smith’s VI Corps.
· Hood’s Division sat back from the Hardware Gap opposite Von Steinwehr’s XI Corps at Red Hill.
· Stuart’s Cavalry had spread themselves on Longstreet’s left/southern flank. Stuart’s headquarters were in Warminster. Reynold’s I Corps sat at Poor House. Mansfield’s XII Corps screened the Gap well west of Norwood. Buford sat at New Glasgow with his cavalry division.
· Only militia lurked on the southern bank of the Rappahannock opposite the bulk of Reno’s IX Corps at Fredericksburg. Reno also had Davis’ division of cavalry straining at the leash to attack…​

All in all Longstreet’s Corps was spread pretty thin. It would also be impossible for Longstreet to manage the whole corps because of it’s dispersion. However the narrowness of the gaps in the hills meant Longstreet could hold up Kearny’s advance with fewer numbers. Longstreet’s greatest concern was his northern/right flank. With only a hand full of militia guarding the main fords, an aggressive advance by Sedgwick or Reno would quickly be in Longstreet’s rear. It was for this reason that Longstreet reinforced his orders to his divisional commanders. There were to be no last stands. They were to withdraw slowly towards the North Anna River. Ultimately if the line was broken at any point, the divisions were to make for Hanover Court House…”​

From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999​

“Walker had the loan of two of Pickett’s brigades, Jenkin’s and Benning’s. With Sedgwick on the flank, Walker retreated in the face of Israel Richardson’s advance. Richardson’s leading division, under Winfield S. Hancock, could not be shaken off. The initial skirmishing flared into battle at Rhoadesville as Hancock almost snared Van H. Manning’s Brigade…​

“Hooker lead his own corps east out of Orange Court House against Pickett’s remaining 4 brigades. Pickett, as Longstreet’s newest commander, remained under Longstreet’s watchful eye, that day and the next, as he withdrew steadily east. Walker and Pickett were to met at Grindstone Hill…”​

General Winfield Scott Hancock​

“Of the Battle of Grindstone Hill I say this: Hooker’s men were fully up to their work. I saw Hooker everywhere in the front, never away from the fire, and all the troops believed in their commander, and fought with a will. As for Hancock, he was again, simply superb.” (Harpers Weekly Correspondent).​

From “Lee’s Right Hand – James Longstreet” by Geoffrey E. Turner
UNC 1993​

“The Battle of Grindstone Hill was much like its name. Longstreet had both divisions in line south the Hill. As Hooker and Richardson came up Hooker threw his divisions in at Longstreet, “two at a time” according to Richardson, “piecemeal” according to Longstreet. When Dana’s and Whipple’s division were driven off, in went Hancock and Sickles. It was observed to be a good attacking combination – “Hancock is pugnacious and Sickles simply knows no better than but to go straight at them” (General David Birney)…​

“Hancock and Sickles both came up and got right into our lines. Having bloodied one attack, and being outnumbered and having Federal cavalry in the rear [Davis was now across the river] we gave Hancock and Sickles a good hard push back, and then began to withdraw.” (General James Kemper)…​

General Sickles directs his division into line of battle​

Withdrawing the face of Generals like Hooker, Richardson, and Hancock was no easy prospect, but with night falling and the Federals encamping, Longstreet was able to put some distance between himself and Hooker’s corps as he withdrew southeast towards Chilesburg. Longstreet was surprised to be given the time to get away “Hooker is a very good soldier and a capital officer to command an army corps, but I should doubt his qualifications to command a large army. But if fighting is all that is necessary to make a general, he will certainly continue to distinguish himself I am afraid”…​

From “The Battle of Trevilian Station” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU 1987​

“When Pleasanton’s troopers crossed over at Gordonsville, they quickly fanned out. Richard H. Anderson believed McLaws had the bulk of his force at Gordonsville, and was notably horrified to find Federal cavalry in his rear at Cobham. Believing a disaster had ensued, Anderson did not wait for an advance on his front. Instead he sent word to Hood of his intention to withdraw towards Trevilian Station, where McLaws’ reserve should be. Such a movement would inevitably leave Hood isolated, so upon receipt of the message, Hood withdrew in the same direction, via Hunter’s Landing…​

McLaws was surprised to see Anderson arrive with his full division at Trevilian Station. A frustrated Anderson demanded to know why McLaws was not defending the pass from a forward position as ordered. McLaws believed he was with his single brigade which had now withdrawn…

Major Generals McLaws, Anderson and Hood​

“McLaws was rather a peculiar personality. He certainly could not be called an intellectual man, nor was he a brilliant and aggressive soldier; but he was regarded as one of the most dogged defensive fighters in the army. His entire make-up, physical, mental and moral, was solid, even stolid… Of his type, he was a handsome man, but the type was that of the Roman centurion; say that centurion who stood at his post in Herculaneum until the lava ran over him.” (Robert A.Styles)…

Reynolds was quick to realize that Hood was withdrawing, and although his orders were only to march in two days, he quickly got von Steinwehr on the road, with his own troops close behind. Mansfield trailed behind somewhat. Reynolds sent a galloper to Kearny – “The Rebels are retiring on my front. I will follow them and maintain contact unless otherwise ordered”…​

General Hood's Division "ambushes" an overeager Julius Stahel​

Julius Stahel’s Divisions caught the tail of Hood’s Division at Hunter’s Landing. Hood’s Division was quick to turn round and “bite” Stahel, before Hood put Wofford and Law back on the road to Trevilian Station…​

As soon as Kearny got Reynolds’ note he got Baldy Smith’s and Couch’s Corps moving, a full day in advance of schedule. Pleasanton reported that a large force of Rebels, perhaps a full corps, was assembling near Trevilian Station…​

So far Longstreet’s subordinates had performed well in fighting and withdrawing under pressure. As Hood and Anderson arrived at Trevilian Station, the senior major-general, Lafayette McLaws took command…and prepared to give battle…”​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Twenty​

The Battle of Trevilian Station​

From “The Battle of Trevilian Station” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU 1987​

“General Anderson vigorously disagreed with General McLaws decision to defend Trevilian Station. Three Union Corps would be on them in the morning (Couch, Smith and Von Steinwehr), with one more close behind (Reynolds). McLaws intended to stand at the Station with three divisions, or twelve brigades in total. McLaws had the seniority however, and Hood agreed to stand on the defensive. Anderson gathered his troops about him at Trevilian Station and sent an urgent message to General Longstreet…”​

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962​

“Kearny had attached himself to Couch’s Corps which advanced down the Virginia Central Railroad with Newton in front, and Casey behind. Kearny was closely co-ordinating with Baldy Smith who was advancing along the Charlottesville Road. Rodman’s division led with Slocum and Stoneman in column following down the road.​

Von Steinwehr had also pressed on in Hood’s wake and was fortuitously nearby on the Green Spring Road, with the division of the now wary Julius Stahel in front, followed by Schimmelfennig and Devens columns. Stahel’s earlier experience at Hunter’s Landing meant that he was quick to form his men into line that morning at the first sound of gunfire…”​

From “The Battle of Trevilian Station” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU 1987​

McLaws had deployed his division forward, with Semmes covering Charlottesville Road behind Poore’s Creek, Cobb and Kershaw astride the Railroad, and Barksdale on the right flank behind Hickory Creek.​

General Barksdale leads his troops to their new position​

Hood had deployed his two brigades of Law and Wofford on either side of the Green Spring Road to welcome the IX Corps. Anderson had lent Hood Wright’s Brigade which Hood kept in reserve at the junction of the Charlottesville and Green Spring Roads.​

Anderson had only three further brigades “in reserve” at Trevilian Station. He had deployed Mahone near the Poindexter Farm on the Fredericksburg Road to warn of any attempt to flank the station. Featherston’s Brigade was far in the rear at the crossroads of the Nunn’s Creek and Gordonsville Roads. “Needless to say General Anderson expected us to be flanked and the roads in our rear cut at anytime” (General Cadmus M. Wilcox)…​

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962​

“It was General John Newton who opened the battle that morning. He deployed his division with two brigades in front, and one in rear and went at Cobb and Kershaw’s brigades. General Kearny was concerned that General Couch had let Newton go in before Casey’s Division had come up. Couch reported that Casey had “a touch of the slows” that morning. He was not to be the only one…​

Kearny had Couch pull Newton back and wait for Casey to deploy his brigades in two lines of two. When both divisions went in, Kearny was pleased with the results. Cobb and Kershaw were being pushed back. Casey complained that flanking fire (from Barksdale’s troops behind the stream) was decimating his flanking regiments. Kearny’s response was blunt “Stop complaining about their fire General and just damn well attack them”…​

On the flank at Poore’s Creek the Rebel General Semmes was finding out how Quakers fight. Rodman had dismounted that morning at first light and crept down to the creek bank himself to establish that it was not much of an impediment to infantry. Afterwards he took his time to get all three of his brigades in line before launching an enveloping attack on Semmes. General William “Baldy” Smith, VI Corps commander, rode with him in the attack.​

General Rodman thoroughly scouted his division's route​

“I have never met a soldier with less thirst for military distinction, and with as little taste or predilection for military life yet he has risen by merit alone to the high rank he now holds… Patient, laborious, courageous, wholly devoted to his duties and influenced by deep religious convictions. It was a rare pleasure to have such a subordinate”.​

Semmes brigade melted under the assault, and with his rout McLaws’ line was flanked. In a short time Rodman regrouped and hit Cobb’s flank as he tried to withdraw. The bulk of Cobb’s brigade would join Semmes at the rear of Rodman’s division on the way to a northern prison camp…​

Kershaw and Barksdale were led from disaster by McLaws back towards the station…​

At little later that morning Stahel’s line ran into Hood’s. Von Steinwehr would permit Stahel’s troops to engage in a vigorous firefight, all be it at a “respectful distance” while he brought up Schimmelfennig’s leading brigades on Stahel’s right. Von Steinwehr was always “cool, collected and judicious” according to Kearny “I need not be concerned for the 11th in his hands”…Eventually Hood was forced to pull his men back, to the other side of a clearing south of Trevilian Station. Into the gap Anderson placed Wright on the left, next to Hood’s brigades, and Armistead on the right…

Major General Adolph Wilhelm August Friedrich, Baron von Steinwehr​

North of Trevilian Station McLaws had formed a new line of Kershaw, Barksdale and Wilcox. The new confederate position was in many ways two lines, parallel facing north west, with Armistead joining them in the middle as he faced southwest towards Stahel’s advance. Anderson likened the line to “an stretched S or a lightening bolt”…

Kearny now had operational control of the three corps. The attack on McLaws section would consist of, from left to right Casey, Newton and Rodman, with Slocum in reserve. Stoneman had yet to bring up his division. Stahel prepared to assault Armistead…​

From “The Battle of Trevilian Station” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU 1987​

“It is unclear whether Kearny or Von Steinwehr stumbled in launching Stahel’s attack. It was to take place across 150 yards of open ground with the brigades of Wofford, Law and Kershaw on the flank... Stahel’s troops were cut down by the score. That was not enough for the aggressive Hood who sent Wofford and Law to the attack to ensure the route of Stahel’s brigades.​

Stahel's Division are in over their heads in Hayfield Clearing​

Rodman on the right flank of his own attack saw the collapse and warned his superior. Smith quickly grabbed Slocum’s leading brigades and lead them into the storm now raging before Trevilian Station. He was quickly joined by Von Steinwehr with Devens’ leading brigades, while Schimmelfennig assaulted Hood’s flank…​

There were simply too many Union troops on the field. Kearny had a full division in reserve. Yet when Anderson summoned his remaining brigades only the distant Featherston marched to his relief. Mahone had himself been attacked on the Fredericksburg Road by more Union troops and had summoned Pryor to assist him. The ominous sound of gunfire could be heard in the lulls at Poindexter Farm. Anderson firmly believed another Union force has attempting to cut their line of retreat…​

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962​

“Kearny had deployed Pleasanton’s brigades of Averell and Gregg to raise hell in the rebel rear. It was working as Pleasanton held down two brigades sorely needed by McLaws and Anderson at the Station…”​

From “The Battle of Trevilian Station” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU 1987​

“As Kershaw was driven back, Armistead’s flank was exposed to Rodman’s and Slocum’s attack. Anderson was pleading with McLaws to order a withdrawal. It was not forthcoming. Anderson sent word to Mahone – withdraw to Netherland Tavern. He then rode over to General Hood. Hood concurred, it was time to go…​

Anderson gathered the artillery and sent it back down the road beyond Netherland Tavern and East Crossing, to the far side of a great clearing around the Gordonsville Road and the Railroad. It was to deploy in line, but only where it could retreat at speed.​

Anderson then informed McLaws that he was pulling his troops out. Hood would cover the withdrawal by making another assault on the clearing before Trevilian Station, against the “Dutchmen” with his two brigades and Wright... An engagement of this kind was in direct breach of General Longstreet’s orders and could result in disaster for the corps. McLaws gave in…​

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962​

“Having thrown back the last desperate assault of Hood’s Division, General Kearny organised the pursuit of the fleeing rebels. Again Casey and Newton led, under Couch, with Rodman and Schimmelfennig in close support. Couch ran straight into the Rebel line of batteries. They did fearful execution…

Couch's divisions stand in the face of heavy artillery fire​

General Kearny turned to General Smith and Rodman “Gentlemen lets us ride to that knoll so that we may draw fire from the boys of 4th Corps”. The three generals calmly sat on the knoll for 10 minutes while shot and shell descended on them. Two of Kearny’s staff and Rodman’s chief of staff were killed. Several mounted officers around the three were injured. Baldy Smith was grazed by a small fragment on his scalp. “Why sir you will have a grand scar to show the ladies and it will have done your hairline no harm at all” Kearny joked. All three generals laughed.”

From “The Army of the Potomac in Their Own Words” edited by Horace Weldon

Greeley Publishing 1907​

“I saw the Kearny and Baldy Smith and Rodman roaring with laughter while sat ahorse in the worst storm of bullet and shell on the field. I am convinced our generals are clean mad!” (Private Samuel M. Cooper)​

From “The Battle of Trevilian Station” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU 1987​

“In the narrows between two creeks just north west of the Nunn’s Creek and Gordonsville Crossroads, McLaws blocked the Union advance with four brigades – Armistead, Wright, Featherston and Pryor, while Hood and Anderson marched of with the remaining six organised brigades (and the remains of Semmes and Cobb's brigades) and most of the artillery. McLaws insisted on commanding the rearguard. He intended to hold till nightfall and then withdraw….​

Anderson waited expectantly the next morning, as Longstreet arrived after a dangerous overnight ride through contested country. Armistead marched in first, reporting that Kearny had maintained the assault throughout the night and eventually the tiny Confederate line had been routed. Pryor and Wright would also march in with the remains of their brigades, which were little enough. McLaws and Featherston did not. They had both been captured…”​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Twenty-One​

A Breather Between Annas​

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern​

“…The next morning Kearny wrote to Hooker from his headquarters at Trevilian Station “We have engaged what I believe to be the bulk of Longstreet’s Corps here and defeated them. Longstreet has retreated down the south bank of the North Anna River…Confirm which elements of Jackson’s Corps oppose you…”. Within an hour of Kearny’s dispatch a day old note from Hooker arrived. “Have routed two and perhaps three divisions of Longstreet’s Corps near Grindstone Hill…With 2nd and 3rd Corps am pressing Longstreet along the north bank of the North Anna River…”. ​

In the words of George Armstrong Custer of Kearny’s staff, years later, “I have seen much of the world in my life, and heard many languages and strange tongues spoken across it, and I have never yet heard a word that would properly describe General Kearny’s expression that morning when he read Hooker’s dispatch and realised James Longstreet was holding off the entire Union Army on his own”…”​

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962​

“Until that morning Kearny had been satisfied with his army’s performance to date and had repressed any particular concerns he had about individual performances. But when he realised General Longstreet was holding the bulk of the army at bay with but one corps, heads rolled…”​

From “The War Between the States” by Otis R. Mayhew
Sword & Musket 1992​

“In mid-campaign General Silas Casey was relieved and replaced with General James Wadsworth, Kearny’s fellow New Yorker. The wounded Dana, of Richardson’s Corps, and Stahel of Von Steinwehr’s, were replaced by Generals John Gibbon and Francis Barlow respectively. Furthermore it was clear to everyone in Kearny’s staff that Couch’s days at the head of IV Corps were numbered…

Generals James S. Wadsworth, John Gibbon, Francis C. Barlow​

Notification was also received that Reno had relieved an ill General Cox from the command of his third division and Brigadier General Orlando Wilcox had been appointed to command instead…”

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern​

“Kearny quickly realised two important facts. Firstly he needed to concentrate the army. With Jackson and possibly Lee unaccounted for, a blow could fall on any part of his army at any time. He needed to gather his strength against such a blow. Secondly that while Jackson’s Corps was unaccounted for, an opportunity existed to crush Longstreet. It was an opportunity Kearny intended to seize…​

Kearny would march I, IV, VI, XI and XII Corps, along the south bank of the North Anna as far as Beaver Dam Station. General Hooker was ordered to march from his current position at Brokenburg to the Station with II and III Corps. Most daringly General Sedgwick was ordered to cross the Rappahannock with Reno and march as far as Bowling Green. Sedgwick was still ordered to screen Washington, but with Davis on his left and now Pleasanton on his right, Kearny hoped Sedgwick would suffer no surprises…”​

From “Kearny and the Radicals” by Hugh W. McGrath
New England Press 1992​

“It was about this time that rumours began to circulate throughout the army. “We hear all kinds of wild talk from the secess prisoners, from the newspaper men, and from the darkies here about” General Sickles noted. “Corcoran has been murdered. Butler and Hunter hung. Negros put to death in Richmond and Petersburg. Wild talk is the order of the day. Human nature being what it is, I suspect some of it to be true…”.”​

From “Yankee Dawdle - the Memoirs of a Private of Pennsylvania” by Anonymous​

“I heard a rumour yesterday from some of Meagher’s Irishmen that I had been hung by the rebels for being Pennsylvanian. I checked with my sergeant. He said it wasn’t true…”​

From “The Gray Fox – Robert E. Lee” by R. Southey-Freeman
Orange & West 1958​

“Longstreet had gathered up his corps just south of the South Anna River. He had amalgamated Cobb’s and Semmes’ Brigades and placed them under the senior surviving officer, Col. Edgar B. Montague. Featherston’s Brigade was also placed under the senior colonel, Carnot Posey…​

General Longstreet and staff​

With his battered corps Longstreet knew he could not retreat much further towards Richmond without offering battle. Where were Lee and Jackson...?”

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962​

“Kearny’s “officer at large” Colonel Custer had seen Longstreet’s Corps with his own eyes after a daring reconnaissance which almost saw him bagged by Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry. Just beyond South Anna Bridge…​

Custer's wild ride with two aides as he escapes Fitzhugh Lee​

Kearny’s plan was simple. Kearny would take half the army and seek to force a crossing at South Anna Bridge. While Kearny amused Longstreet there, Hooker would take II, III and VI Corps crossing by the Ground Squirrel Bridge and the nearby fords, hitting Longstreet in the flank. Kearny also ordered Reno south from Bowling Green to the Pamunky River. Word of his advance would hopefully confuse and unsettled Longstreet with fear of a double envelopment…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Twenty-Two​

The Battle of Ashland
Part I​

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern​

“Before the Army of the Potomac was Longstreet’s Corps. Longstreet’s four remaining divisions covered Blunt’s Bridge, Elliott’s Bridge and the Railroad Bridge over the South Anna River. Longstreet had thrown out Fitzhugh Lee’s and W.H.L Lee’s cavalry brigades to the west to watch for a flanking movement. Hampton had been thrown out east to Wickham’s Station.​

Against this force, Kearny had deployed Mansfield’s, Reynolds’ and Couch’s Corps near the river bank. Each was to assault a respective crossing. Von Steinwehr’s Corps was pulled up in reserve north of Perkins Farm.​

General Hooker had been given command of a wing of the army and was marching west with his own, Richardson’s and Baldy Smith’s Corps. He was to cross the South Anna, somewhere between Blunt’s Bridge and Ground Squirrel Bridge, and attack Longstreet’s flank…”

Reynolds' Corps storms down to the river bank​

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962

“Kearny took Hooker by the arm “Joe, be careful. Jackson is out there prowling somewhere. We have a chance to crush Longstreet and while I’ll gamble on it and I am not willing to loose you and your boys in the attempt…Don’t bite off more than you chew Joe” (From the Memoirs of George Armstrong Custer)…

Kearny had one last card up his sleeve. A messenger had been had sent to Sedgwick. Reno’s Corps was to be detached, and accompanied by Davis’ Cavalry Division, was to force march south. He was to aim for the Cedar Farm Bridge on the North Anna Bridge… If Jackson was nearby, Kearny wanted his full strength near at hand…”​

From “Two Days and Three Fights – The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU​

“The morning broke to the sound of General Hunt’s artillery. A massed battery had been formed near Dr. Wood’s house. From that position it shelled Anderson’s troops at Blunt’s Bridge and Pickett’s at Elliott’s. A smaller battery near the Baker Farm, on Couch’s flank, bombarded Walker’s position beyond the Railroad Bridge. Some of the larger pieces at Dr.Woods were even targeting Hood’s troops, which Longstreet had drawn up in reserve around Independence Court House…​

Mansfield's Corps assaults Blunt's Bridge ​

After a barrage that lasted 90 minutes Mansfield attacked Anderson, masking the guns which now focused on Pickett. Shortly after Mansfield’s attack commenced, Reynolds went in against Pickett…About 10am Couch finally launched his assault on the Railroad Bridge…

“Pete [Longstreet’s nickname] why in hell have we left those bridges standing?” enquired General Hood.​

“Because Sam [Hood’s nickname] the river is fordable in about a dozen places on our front. I’d rather defend three bridges than the whole riverbank…”​

Longstreet was right. Kearny’s corps focused on the bridges. It would be some hours before any of his commanders was to look for alternative crossing points on that front…”​

From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999​

“It was midday before Hooker approached the battlefield. His troops had started marching at 4am. His three corps were now south of the river, on Longstreet’s flank. His own corps was at Ground Squirrel Court House, with Baldy Smith’s on his left and rear. Richardson was hard alongside the river…”​

From “Two Days and Three Fights – The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU​

“Just as Kearny’s assault on the river crossings was one fight, Richardson was about to open the second fight on the extreme western flank of Longstreet's dispositions. His skirmishers clashed with the alert vedettes of Fitzhugh Lee somewhere around the E.Cross Farm (there were several Cross families in the area which has caused historians some confusion). Fitz Lee’s troopers were quickly pushed back to the Eddleton Farm. Fitz Lee had send a message early in the scrape to General Longstreet – “The Federals are across the river in at least corps strength. I will not stop them alone”…​

“At the same time Whipple’s Division of Hooker’s Corps ran into WHL Lee’s brigade of cavalry just beyond the Ground Squirrel Court House. WHL Lee’s vedettes had been less well placed and he was lucky to get his brigade out only slightly battered. It was a poor reflection on Southern horse-soldiering that WHL Lee had almost let himself be surrounded by advancing infantry…”​

From “Yankee Dawdle - the Memoirs of a Private of Pennsylvania” by Anonymous​

“I had developed a finely tuned ear for the sound of battle. My sergeant swore by my ears. So when I said that the firing wasn’t coming from Mansfield’s boys down river, but Hooker’s on the south bank, well didn’t they just take it as gospel.​

I thought we finally had Old Gloomy Longstreet by the beard. Little did I know that Lee was about to grab us by our bayonets [a suspected editor's amendment]”.​

Generals Lee and Jackson confer on Tompkins Mound​

From “The Gray Fox – Robert E. Lee” by R. Southey-Freeman

Orange & West 1958​

“Lee, Jackson and Edward Johnson had ridden a short way from the railroad to a little hillock near Tompkins Farm, from where they could observe Hooker’s troops on the south bank. They had waited through the morning for an attack to develop. Lee’s intent was clear​

“General Jackson, those people are isolated. Kindly drive them back into the river…” ​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Twenty-Two

The Battle of Ashland
Part II​

From “The Gray Fox - Robert E. Lee” by R. Southey-Freeman
Orange & West 1958

“Field and D.H. Hill had already been set in motion. Charles Field’s Division was advancing up the Old Mountain towards Hooker’s right rear. D.H. Hill’s Division was marching up the Plank Road directly to Ground Squirrel Court House. A.P. Hill and his division were soon also on the march from Ashland west along the Court House Road. By a combination of trains and hard marching the divisions of Ewell, Johnson and Evans were not far behind. Lee had “borrowed” two divisions from the temporary corps…”

From “Two Days and Three Fights - The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU

“Hooker had not stayed put after his skirmish with Rebel Cavalry. He had taken the lead with his own corps in marching up Hugher’s Road. Smith was behind at Grove Church..."

Hooker's Corps presses on​

From “The Maverick - General D.H.Hill” by Duncan Frasier Jones
Buffalo 1988

“Hill took his division off the road to the east to form a line of battle. He was south of the Palman, Kelly and Thatcher Farms. With three brigades in front and two behind he drove through the intervening woods straight for Smith’s Corps still in column…

“He can never achieve a success, tho he might, I suppose, blunder upon one, as other short-witted people do” Josiah Gorgas.

“High and well deserved reputation as a hard fighter…seemed to go from choice into the most dangerous place he could find on the field…” John Haskell.

When Hill’s Division burst from the trees on Smith Corps, it was no “blunder”…

From “Isaac Peace Rodman - Soldier, Statesman, Quaker” by Leonard H.K. Wool
Empire 1918

“There was a time, before Kearny took charge of the Army of the Potomac, when such an attack from an unexpected quarter would instantly demoralize the troops and they would flee. A dozen victories under Kearny, Hooker and Smith had filled the men of VI Corps with a confidence that meant they stood under the initial onslaught…

Rodman rallies his division to resist Hill's attack​

Rodman took the divisional flag and planted it in the “front” line, at the edge of the road. Too closely packed in the road to form into line of battle, Rodman had his division face right, and those at the back loaded rifles for those in front. While it was difficult for Hill’s men to miss such a compact target, the volume of fire, returned by Rodman’s way of loading at the rear, was fierce…

Taking Rodman’s example, Slocum and Stoneman deployed likewise. It was now a stand up fight, with less than 30 yards in some places between Smith’s men in the roadbed and Hill’s on the tree line…”

From “Two Days and Three Fights - The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU

“Having formed a firing line of sorts, Baldy Smith rode up and down the line exhorting the men. But Smith had no better idea what to do next. Smith saw clearly that Jackson was at hand, and had sent gallopers to Hooker, Richardson and to Kearny, but as to what he should do next with his corps, Smith was at a loss…”

From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999

“Hooker could see straight down the Court House Road and knew well that at least a Rebel Division was on the road marching towards him. Sickles’ deployed the corps in line near the junction of the Court House and Hugher’s Road. Hooker set himself up on a hill behind the line next to the oddly named “Beaste” House…

But was this Longstreet’s reserve or was Jackson on the field. Smith’s message confirmed what the firing to the right had already told Hooker - Jackson had arrived in force. Now Hooker was on the horns of a dilemma. He was a good distance from the river. Jackson and Lee may very well be planning to trap him where he stood. On the other hand he was in Longstreet’s rear with 3 corps. Perhaps there was still an opportunity…

Hooker was too far from Kearny for a message to be sent and return in time. Hooker would have to rely on Hooker…”

From “Two Days and Three Fights - The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU

“Smith’s Corps was holding D.H. Hill in check. Rodman had anchored Smith’s left. However the threat to the Corps when it came, was on the right. Field’s leading brigade under Edward T.H. Warren emerged from the Old Mountain Road and pitched into Smith’s exposed flank. Slocum, who’s division was on the right rushed to the scene. In a few minutes he was down and being carried to the rear. Brigadier General Albion P Howe, who had stayed in the field despite severe bruising caused by a spent shell fragment at Trevilian Station, quickly assumed command. “General Smith I cannot maintain First Division here. I must withdraw before I can be rolled up”. General Smith concurred with Howe’s assessment. Howe’s men began to pull out through and around the Woodford farm complex, north in the direction of Richardson and the river. “Howe, do not go far. Find me a line to defend for a time” was Smith's departing instruction…

Smith's Corps pulls out in search of a better position​

Stoneman was to follow Howe, and Rodman would be left with the difficult task of fending of Hill and Field’s leading brigades with the rearguard. Smith stayed with Rodman long enough to send another message to Hooker, informing him of the withdrawal, before leaving to see what position Howe might have discovered…

Rodman remained in the mouth of the track the corps had followed with his rearmost brigade, The Old Brigade of Vermont under William T.H. Brooks. Rodman knew the timing of his order to retreat, to run, would be critical. Hill was marching to assault them now and Field's leading troops were again lapping at their flanks…”