A Glorious Union or America: the New Sparta
- Thread starter TheKnightIrish
- Start date
This is the Lee I like. Lee the risk taker. Leave Longstreet to bluff and delay Kearny as long as possible, while taking Jackson off on a long march to attack the Yankees in force where they least expect it.
With Butler, Burnisde, McDowell and Hunter on one side you'd think Lee stand a good chance. But the temporary corps is an unknown - Edward Johnston is a real fighter, but Smith and the others are unknown quantities in a fight of this size.
If Lee gets beat he can retreat to Petersburg and the seige begins early. If he wins he must hope that Butler withdraws to base, and he doesn't loose a lot of men so he then take on Kearny.
Even if Lee whips Butler I don't think Kearny will retreat.
With Butler, Burnisde, McDowell and Hunter on one side you'd think Lee stand a good chance. But the temporary corps is an unknown - Edward Johnston is a real fighter, but Smith and the others are unknown quantities in a fight of this size.
If Lee gets beat he can retreat to Petersburg and the seige begins early. If he wins he must hope that Butler withdraws to base, and he doesn't loose a lot of men so he then take on Kearny.
Even if Lee whips Butler I don't think Kearny will retreat.
Its plausible. Its classic Lee - Lee ignored McClellan in OTL to attack Pope. Or the flanking march at Chancellorsville which was mad but brilliant. Lee was a gambler.
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Oh, no, you're absolutely right. That's why I love this timeline...it's radically different, but completely plausible.
Chapter Seventeen Deep in the Black Stuff
Chapter Seventeen
Deep in the Black Stuff
General John J. Peck and staff at Suffolk
From “The Life and Letters of John J. Peck” by John Watts de Peyster Jr.
Buffalo 1892
“…My own division was at the rear of McDowell’s column just passing by Surry Court House. It was about 5 O’clock. General McDowell passed a message down the line that Burnside’s scouts had spotted a small rebel force to the south west. I understood that Burnside’s column had got as far as Waverly, but that Butler and the bulk of that corps were still around Wakefield Station…We received no communications from Butler or Burnside indicating concern about the rebels. Indeed Butler went into camp, as far as I can tell, exactly where he planned – at Wakefield…
General McDowell summoned me to his headquarters about 8. Getty and Corcoran were there. McDowell had ridden as far as Dendon with the intent of seeking out General Butler, but he had found David Hunter instead. McDowell confirmed that Hunter believed that a strong force of rebels was on their left flank – between Reem’s [sic] Station and Sussex Court House. Hunter anticipated a battle in the morning…
McDowell had no orders from Butler but he confirmed we would march through Spring Grove in the morning to be in a position to support Butler if needed. God knows that Irvin McDowell deserves credit for that…In the morning Getty was to lead off, then Corcoran and finally my own division…
The head of the column had been on the march for perhaps an hour or more when I heard the first indications that an engagement was taking place…
From “The Battle of the Blackwater” by Francis Hemmingway
Osprey 2001
“East of Ream’s Station Smith had drawn up his troops on some rising ground. The line ran from north west to south east, parallel to Butler’s line of march. From north to south the divisions were Johnson’s, Cobb’s, Evan’s and Colston’s. Burnside quickly began to shake his line of march out into a line of battle.
A portion of "Shanks" Evans line
Terry, Palmer and Foster quickly formed. Negley found the ground between his division, at the rear of Burnside’s column to be flanked with impassable swampland. Gordon, whose division led Burnside’s column, had the dubious honour of having David Hunter ride with him. Hunter’s interference meant that Gordon was slow getting his division into line.
Butler’s scouts confirmed what he could see from Smith’s dispositions: Burnside's Corps alone outnumbered the Confederates, whose position, while good, was no compensation for what they lacked in numbers.
Butler sent a message to McDowell confirming he was to come up quickly but could expect to remain in reserve. Burnside’s corps could deal with the Confederates.”
From “The Life and Letters of John J. Peck” by John Watts de Peyster Jr.
Buffalo 1892
“The battle, such I could tell from the rear of our line, from the first sound of cannon fire had gone on for about an hour. Thank heavens that either McDowell or Getty had thought to put out flankers, for they came running in from our right about that time – [from] the direction of Brandon Court House and beyond that Petersburg. Two of them had got turned around in their haste and finished up in my division - Rebs – thousands of them was the report. I barely credited it at first. Butler was likely facing troops from a North Carolina command diverted to slow us down, and the Petersburg garrison would not simply march out to face us in the open field. It did not occur to me that Lee would have abandoned his lines before Kearny to march on us…
Those Rebs on the flank were not long in appearing in numbers. The roads from Brandon and Prince George Court Houses were choked with them. Those on the road from Prince George’s were going to fall on Burnside’s open flank…
From “The Battle of the Blackwater” by Francis Hemmingway
Osprey 2001
“Once Butler had deployed and committed his line of battle to engage Smith, Jackson launched his two pronged attack. Dick Ewell followed by A.P. Hill marched down the road and rail bed from the direction of Prince George Court House. This was in order to bring them down behind Burnside’s line. Charles W. Field followed by D.H. Hill marched down the road from Brandon Court House. Their objective was to prevent any interference by McDowell’s command…
Fully engaged on his front, Gordon, with David Hunter, could only look on in horror at the approach of Jackson’s foot cavalry…”
Jackson's Corps bursts upon the flank of the Army of the James
From “The Life and Letters of John J. Peck” by John Watts de Peyster Jr.
Buffalo 1892
“I rode up the column to find McDowell. He was with Getty directing him into line to blunt the [Field’s] attack…I then rode back with him to Corcoran’s Division…another division [D.H. Hill's] quickly came up to flank Getty’s boys. Corcoran’s troops arrived just in time to form line on Getty’s right…It was the third division [A.P. Hill’s] that came up on Getty’s left that decided the matter. My division was still coming up was would arrive to the right rear of Corcoran – on opposite flank to where the threat was…Getty’s boys bore it well, but when Getty was seen to fall his brigades began to break…”
From “The Battle of the Blackwater” by Francis Hemmingway
Osprey 2001
“Ewell’s troops “seemed not to break their stride” (Edward Johnson)when they made contact with Gordon’s flank. Gordon was shot and killed instantly in the first few moments of this attack. At the same time Johnston, with his three brigades, who had so far stood on the defensive, attacked with his full force. Garnet and Echols struck Gordon’s front, while MacKall’s brigade hit the end of Terry’s line. Edward Johnson, rode in with the attack, and is widely reported to have struck an Union officer from horseback with his walking stick “like some gallant lord of old, striking down his foes with his wooden mace from horseback” (Richmond Examiner)…
Gordon’s division simply disintegrated under this double assault, and General Hunter was captured. Terry however had managed to disengage a brigade and refused his right flank. He hoped to hold Ewell and Johnson, at least for awhile. In the distance Getty’s division could be seen contending with an ever increasing rebel force…
The collapse of Getty’s division released a tidal wave of Confederates troops into the Union rear. Field swung his left wing around Corcoran’s flank, while A.P. Hill’s troops raced into Burnside’s rear beyond Terry’s refused line and directly into the rear of Palmer’s division, still fixed in place by its contest with Cobb and Evans…
A one point there was literally not a soul between Butler and his staff, in the rear of Palmer’s division, and A.P. Hill’s charging troopers…
From “The Life and Letters of John J. Peck” by John Watts de Peyster Jr.
Buffalo 1892
“McDowell directed me to lead my men south towards Foster and Negley. He kept saying it was Pope all over again, we needed to form some semblance of a line and attempt to retreat beyond the Blackwater. He said he had had no instructions from Butler [note in side margin – It was chaos in the centre. Who knows what messages went awry]. He would use Corcoran’s division as best he could to hold up the rebels…
Burnside had had the same idea. Negley had evidently got into position and had mauled Colston on the extreme left, so Burnside had space to disengage both Negley’s and Foster’s divisions. Palmer managed to pull out one of his brigades as well. I made contact with Palmer’s flank as we four formed something of a line withdrew south towards the Blackwater…
Terry was swallowed up by rebels. I could no longer see where his command stood. But my vantage point did allow me to see one of the most stirring sights this war has produced. Corcoran had held his Legion in reserve. When the rebels washed over his first line [Field and D.H. Hill], Corcoran counterattacked. I could see the green banners and the flash of bayonets as they went in. It was a grand hopeless dash. I could feel the rebels stagger at the blow… It slowed the rebels long enough for us to form a line and withdraw in the direction of Wakefield Station. Once we had the Blackwater on our right and the [Seacock] swamp on our left we began to feel secure…Few of Corcoran’s Irish made it back to our lines…
The death of Michael Corcoran as he climbed over a wall
There was a pursuit, and I had several stiff skirmishes, but with my flanks secure we were able to manage a fighting retreat, though I had a very brisk night time scrape with the rebels. My division was kept as the rearguard as we were freshest. It was a trying night…”
From “The Battle of the Blackwater” by Francis Hemmingway
Osprey 2001
“Lee’s victory was comprehensive. Four divisions of the Army of the James had effectively ceased to exist – Getty’s, Corcoran’s, Gordon’s and Terry’s. The toll among the Union’s senior officers was also high. George H. Gordon, George W. Getty and Michael Corcoran were dead. David Hunter and Alfred H. Terry were captured. Irvin McDowell had been shot twice. Though perceived to be mortal wounds, General McDowell would ultimately recover. Benjamin Butler himself had come close to capture and was slightly wounded. The Confederate’s had also bagged a large haul of prisoners. The fate of General Hunter and the 35 men of Gordon’s divisional pioneers were to have repercussions that would last long beyond those of the Battle of the Blackwater…”
Major General David Hunter
From “Kearny and the Radicals” by Hugh W. McGrath
New England Press 1992
“General John Peck was the primary force behind the criticism of Butler’s performance at the Blackwater. In his own words “Butler found an enemy force he thought he could whip. Pitched into it with his whole force. Thought nothing of a reserve; nothing of his flanks; nothing of why Smith was there, daring an attack; and had nothing left when Stonewall appeared”. Although Peck saw himself as standing up for McDowell and the troops of VII Corps, his friendship and ties with Kearny (his Chief of Staff was Kearny’s cousin), meant many saw his later attacks on Butler as sanctioned by Kearny…
Butler’s allies among the Radicals in Congress were quick to support Butler’s line – that McDowell had been ordered to protect the exposed flank and had failed to do so. The Radicals pitched into McDowell and the performance of VII Corps. Peck was derided as a coward as he did not get his men into the fight until the evening during the retreat. Corcoran was derided as a Democrat and a foreigner. Getty as a southerner…
Though no evidence has ever been found to support Butler’s assertions about the “McDowell Order”, this was not clear either at the time or for decades afterwards. In the short term few would pay much attention – Butler’s and McDowell’s injuries would remove them from the Army of the James and the Hunter incident would drown out everything else for months, but the Butler/Peck feud would have serious long term implications for the Republican Party…”
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Its implied in earlier posts that the Army of the James does indeed come a-cropper.
The real wild card here is what Kearny manages to do in the meantime.
Chapter Eighteen The Hunter is Himself Trapped Part I
Chapter Eighteen
The Hunter is Himself Trapped
Part I
The Hunter is Himself Trapped
Part I
From “The Life and Letters of John J. Peck” by John Watts de Peyster Jr.
Buffalo 1892
“We have heard the most dreadful rumors here about the execution of prisoners taken but a few days ago at the Blackwater. One cannot give credence to every rumor one hears here but the stories about General Hunter and some of our Negro pioneers have a ring of truth about them. I pray god the rumors prove false…”
The Illustrated London News reports the executions
From “The War Between the States” by Otis R. Mayhew
Sword & Musket 1992
“Three days after the battle Major-General David Hunter was taken from the Kemp Farmhouse, where he had been kept since his separation from General Alfred Terry the previous day. Taken to the open yard of the farmhouse, General Orders Number 60 and 111 were read to him. The General was bound and blindfolded. He was the shot by a firing squad of 10 South Carolinians from Roswell S. Ripley’s Brigade of Colston’s Division. Later that afternoon 35 African American pioneers of Gordon’s Division of the Army of the James were likewise put to death. These are the only undisputed facts of a series of executions that would change the face of the war…”
From “The Martyr - The Biography of David Hunter” by Ambrose E. Edward Sr.
New England Press 1927
“There can be no doubt that David Hunter was put to death on the orders of Jefferson Davis. Were not the General Orders signed by the so called Southern President himself. General Hunter, had himself indicated his belief that “the social relations” between the two men in their pre-war service allowed them “to understand each other thoroughly”. For that reason General Hunter believed Davis was “capable of carrying out the threat” made in General Order 60...
The 35 men of the Pioneer Company, mostly former slaves and North Carolinians, were put to death, again on the orders of Jefferson Davis. Whether the unarmed pioneers had taken up the arms of their fallen comrades in the chaos of the Battle of Blackwater is utterly irrelevant to their fate. These brave men were enlisted soldiers in the service of the United States Government and deserved by all the rules of war to be treated as prisoners of war…
The South reveled in the news. “The cold-blooded abolitionist miscreant who, from his former headquarters at Hilton Head, and then from Suffolk, engaged in executing the bloody and savage bequests of the imperial gorilla [Abraham Lincoln] is dead, and justly so” (Savannah Daily Morning News)…
The murders of the noble Hunter and the 35 heroes who dedicated their lives to freedom would not go unavenged…
From “A Day That Will Live in Infamy - the Hunter Controversy” by Prof. J. K. Lang
LSU 2003
“From the moment that Abraham Lincoln confirmed the executions in his great “Blackwater Speech” to Congress, and coined the phrase “a day that will live in infamy” accusations and conspiracy theories have swirled around the deaths. Few in Davis’ government or Lee’s army have not been accused of being complicit in the executions. However no entirely objective investigation has ever taken place…
Although Jefferson Davis had authorized General Orders 60 and 111 no evidence has ever been produced linking Davis or any member of his cabinet to a direct order to execute General Hunter or the pioneers. Indeed the surviving correspondence indicates Davis was incensed by the execution. “Does not the order say that such men are to be held in close confinement for execution as a felon at such time and place as the President shall order?!” Davis is supposed to have exclaimed to his cabinet “I have given no such order. My authority has been usurped.”…
General Robert E. Lee was accused of complicity by the Radicals, yet exonerated by the post-war Wallace Commission. Yet it is unlikely, given Lee’s later standing orders that no officer in the Army of Northern Virginia was to put any man to death, whether Federal or Confederate, slave or free, without a signed order from Lee’s Headquarters, that Lee knew or was consulted about the execution. Indeed by the time of the execution Lee was already north of Richmond on the way to oppose Kearny’s advance…
The three individuals who bare the most responsibility for the execution were Major-General Gustavus Smith, Brigadier General Roswell S. Ripley, and Colonel Robert Barnwell Rhett….
Colonel, later Brigadier General, Robert Barnwell Rhett
If not complicit in the act General Smith certainly made little effort to identify those responsible. “If Congress will issue incendiary orders, it must expect officers of a political persuasion to act zealously in the execution of those orders”. Little of the credit in the jubilant south accrued to Smith, but the hostility of Davis and Lee certainly did. Lee made it clear to the Secretary of War that, if General Smith was unable to maintain a strict compliance with orders among his subordinates, he had no place in a position of military responsibility. It was a view with which President Davis concurred. Upon the re-organization of the Temporary Corps, Smith would languish without orders for 8 months before he tendered his resignation…
General Ripley almost certainly did know that the executions were about to take place. However the General’s poor performance in the Seven Days Campaign had meant he had been sidelined. In his own correspondence he outlines his need for allies to “advocate for my preference". The fact that Robert Barnwell Rhett of South Carolina had accepted a temporary commission in the South Carolina militia following his disillusionment with President Davis and the Confederate Government had been an opportunity that Ripley could not afford to miss. Ripley had not been prepared for the force of nature that the newly minted Colonel Rhett had proven. Ripley had effectively lost control of his brigade from the date Rhett and his South Carolinian “Fire-Eater” Regiment had brigaded with his other troops. The correspondence of Colston's and Ripley's officers and later testimony to the Wallace Commission clearly indicate Ripley deferred entirely to Colonel Rhett…
No doubt can remain that one conclusion of the Wallace Commission was wholly correct. To quote General, later Senator, Lew Wallace “there can be no doubt as to the villain of the piece. The prime instigator of the separation of General Hunter and the pioneers from the other prisoners was Colonel Rhett. The order to draw lots for a firing squad was Colonel Rhett’s. The order to fire was given by an officer on Colonel Rhett’s orders. In thought, in preparation, in deed and in execution the murders were the work of Colonel Robert Barnwell Rhett…”
The body of Major General David Hunter
From “The War Between the States” by Otis R. Mayhew
Sword & Musket 1992
“It would be several weeks before the news of the executions was confirmed, though rumors began to circulate within a few days of the deeds. In the interim Generals Lee and Jackson marched north from the Blackwater to the relief of General Longstreet who stood alone against the full might of the Army of the Potomac…
[Note: I will return to the reaction to General Hunter’s execution after updating on the campaign north of Richmond…]
The body of Major General David Hunter
Where the hell did you find THAT picture?
Where the hell did you find THAT picture?
Its from Frank Leslie's 1880s History. A picture of a shot deserter. I looked spookily good for my purposes.
This is getting interesting.
The conspiracy theorists in TTL will have a field day with Hunter's death.
All in all, you have some very good twists.
The African-American prisoners' execution...that will lead to an interesting Reconstruction, IMO.
I also like the different points of view. Makes it interesting and a debate-like format (even with the biases of the authors).
One question:
Will you focus on the cultural and other aspects of this TL?
Hopefully, you'll take it to the present day (even though that will take a long time).
As Bart Scott said in a different context (he is a player in the NFL): Can't wait!!!
The conspiracy theorists in TTL will have a field day with Hunter's death.
All in all, you have some very good twists.
The African-American prisoners' execution...that will lead to an interesting Reconstruction, IMO.
I also like the different points of view. Makes it interesting and a debate-like format (even with the biases of the authors).
One question:
Will you focus on the cultural and other aspects of this TL?
Hopefully, you'll take it to the present day (even though that will take a long time).
As Bart Scott said in a different context (he is a player in the NFL): Can't wait!!!
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I can't help but note the phrase "Surviving correspondence" and that the phrase reads like Davis wasn't around after the war to talk about what happened. Makes me wonder how the war's final stages played out as it concerned Davis and the CSA political Leadership.
I'll say. Freaky as. Actually thought it was some high ranking officer for a moment.
I know the specifics of the country's politics until about 1890 and I have an idea about general trends until approx 1930. I plan to keep going while people are interested.
This is an overarching cultural theme which will emerge overtime...
Holy guacamole. The shots that killed General Hunter will spill rivers of blood. Absent immediate disavowals and reparation of some kind by Davis, which isn't in his character, I expect a significant amount of Union informal reprisals, not to mention the formal consequences. Lincoln won't be able to squelch this to the extent he was Ft. Pillow, both because Hunter is higher ranking and because its in the much more mediagenic Eastern theater. At the very least, Rhett will get the rope he so richly deserved.
As was said in a different context, mutatis mutandi, "Gentlemen of the South, you mistake us. You mistake us! We will not stand for it."
Or "the North is determined . . . [W]hen they begin to move in a given direction, they move with the steady momentum and perseverance of a mighty avalanche; and what I fear is, they will overwhelm the South"
As was said in a different context, mutatis mutandi, "Gentlemen of the South, you mistake us. You mistake us! We will not stand for it."
Or "the North is determined . . . [W]hen they begin to move in a given direction, they move with the steady momentum and perseverance of a mighty avalanche; and what I fear is, they will overwhelm the South"
Chapter Nineteen Parry & Lunge Kearny -v- Longstreet
Chapter Nineteen
Parry & Lunge
Kearny -v- Longstreet
Phil Kearny and James Longstreet
From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962
“As the Union juggernaut set off, beginning with Richardson’s II Corps, the army believed it faced the full force of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. In fact, as Lee took Jackson south to attack the Army of the James, only Longstreet’s Corps remained:
· Walker’s Division based around Roberston’s Tavern had the task of convincing Richardson’s IV Corps at Rapidan and the right wing of Sedgwick’s V Corps on the Rapidan that he had at least two divisions at his disposal.
· Pickett, who had succeeded D.R. Jones to divisional command, sat near the Orange Court House at the mouth of the North Anna River opposite Hooker’s II Corps.
· Lafayette McLaws’ Division screened Gordonsville with one brigade, but had the remainder of his strength at Trevilian Station. Couch had brought up his reduced strength IV Corps to Barboursville, with Pleasanton in support.
· Anderson’s Division screened Boyd and Keswick on McLaw’s left flank, opposite Baldy Smith’s VI Corps.
· Hood’s Division sat back from the Hardware Gap opposite Von Steinwehr’s XI Corps at Red Hill.
· Stuart’s Cavalry had spread themselves on Longstreet’s left/southern flank. Stuart’s headquarters were in Warminster. Reynold’s I Corps sat at Poor House. Mansfield’s XII Corps screened the Gap well west of Norwood. Buford sat at New Glasgow with his cavalry division.
· Only militia lurked on the southern bank of the Rappahannock opposite the bulk of Reno’s IX Corps at Fredericksburg. Reno also had Davis’ division of cavalry straining at the leash to attack…
· Pickett, who had succeeded D.R. Jones to divisional command, sat near the Orange Court House at the mouth of the North Anna River opposite Hooker’s II Corps.
· Lafayette McLaws’ Division screened Gordonsville with one brigade, but had the remainder of his strength at Trevilian Station. Couch had brought up his reduced strength IV Corps to Barboursville, with Pleasanton in support.
· Anderson’s Division screened Boyd and Keswick on McLaw’s left flank, opposite Baldy Smith’s VI Corps.
· Hood’s Division sat back from the Hardware Gap opposite Von Steinwehr’s XI Corps at Red Hill.
· Stuart’s Cavalry had spread themselves on Longstreet’s left/southern flank. Stuart’s headquarters were in Warminster. Reynold’s I Corps sat at Poor House. Mansfield’s XII Corps screened the Gap well west of Norwood. Buford sat at New Glasgow with his cavalry division.
· Only militia lurked on the southern bank of the Rappahannock opposite the bulk of Reno’s IX Corps at Fredericksburg. Reno also had Davis’ division of cavalry straining at the leash to attack…
All in all Longstreet’s Corps was spread pretty thin. It would also be impossible for Longstreet to manage the whole corps because of it’s dispersion. However the narrowness of the gaps in the hills meant Longstreet could hold up Kearny’s advance with fewer numbers. Longstreet’s greatest concern was his northern/right flank. With only a hand full of militia guarding the main fords, an aggressive advance by Sedgwick or Reno would quickly be in Longstreet’s rear. It was for this reason that Longstreet reinforced his orders to his divisional commanders. There were to be no last stands. They were to withdraw slowly towards the North Anna River. Ultimately if the line was broken at any point, the divisions were to make for Hanover Court House…”
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
Buffalo 1999
“Walker had the loan of two of Pickett’s brigades, Jenkin’s and Benning’s. With Sedgwick on the flank, Walker retreated in the face of Israel Richardson’s advance. Richardson’s leading division, under Winfield S. Hancock, could not be shaken off. The initial skirmishing flared into battle at Rhoadesville as Hancock almost snared Van H. Manning’s Brigade…
“Hooker lead his own corps east out of Orange Court House against Pickett’s remaining 4 brigades. Pickett, as Longstreet’s newest commander, remained under Longstreet’s watchful eye, that day and the next, as he withdrew steadily east. Walker and Pickett were to met at Grindstone Hill…”
General Winfield Scott Hancock
“Of the Battle of Grindstone Hill I say this: Hooker’s men were fully up to their work. I saw Hooker everywhere in the front, never away from the fire, and all the troops believed in their commander, and fought with a will. As for Hancock, he was again, simply superb.” (Harpers Weekly Correspondent).
From “Lee’s Right Hand – James Longstreet” by Geoffrey E. Turner
UNC 1993
UNC 1993
“The Battle of Grindstone Hill was much like its name. Longstreet had both divisions in line south the Hill. As Hooker and Richardson came up Hooker threw his divisions in at Longstreet, “two at a time” according to Richardson, “piecemeal” according to Longstreet. When Dana’s and Whipple’s division were driven off, in went Hancock and Sickles. It was observed to be a good attacking combination – “Hancock is pugnacious and Sickles simply knows no better than but to go straight at them” (General David Birney)…
“Hancock and Sickles both came up and got right into our lines. Having bloodied one attack, and being outnumbered and having Federal cavalry in the rear [Davis was now across the river] we gave Hancock and Sickles a good hard push back, and then began to withdraw.” (General James Kemper)…
General Sickles directs his division into line of battle
Withdrawing the face of Generals like Hooker, Richardson, and Hancock was no easy prospect, but with night falling and the Federals encamping, Longstreet was able to put some distance between himself and Hooker’s corps as he withdrew southeast towards Chilesburg. Longstreet was surprised to be given the time to get away “Hooker is a very good soldier and a capital officer to command an army corps, but I should doubt his qualifications to command a large army. But if fighting is all that is necessary to make a general, he will certainly continue to distinguish himself I am afraid”…
From “The Battle of Trevilian Station” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU 1987
LSU 1987
“When Pleasanton’s troopers crossed over at Gordonsville, they quickly fanned out. Richard H. Anderson believed McLaws had the bulk of his force at Gordonsville, and was notably horrified to find Federal cavalry in his rear at Cobham. Believing a disaster had ensued, Anderson did not wait for an advance on his front. Instead he sent word to Hood of his intention to withdraw towards Trevilian Station, where McLaws’ reserve should be. Such a movement would inevitably leave Hood isolated, so upon receipt of the message, Hood withdrew in the same direction, via Hunter’s Landing…
McLaws was surprised to see Anderson arrive with his full division at Trevilian Station. A frustrated Anderson demanded to know why McLaws was not defending the pass from a forward position as ordered. McLaws believed he was with his single brigade which had now withdrawn…
Major Generals McLaws, Anderson and Hood
“McLaws was rather a peculiar personality. He certainly could not be called an intellectual man, nor was he a brilliant and aggressive soldier; but he was regarded as one of the most dogged defensive fighters in the army. His entire make-up, physical, mental and moral, was solid, even stolid… Of his type, he was a handsome man, but the type was that of the Roman centurion; say that centurion who stood at his post in Herculaneum until the lava ran over him.” (Robert A.Styles)…
Reynolds was quick to realize that Hood was withdrawing, and although his orders were only to march in two days, he quickly got von Steinwehr on the road, with his own troops close behind. Mansfield trailed behind somewhat. Reynolds sent a galloper to Kearny – “The Rebels are retiring on my front. I will follow them and maintain contact unless otherwise ordered”…
General Hood's Division "ambushes" an overeager Julius Stahel
Julius Stahel’s Divisions caught the tail of Hood’s Division at Hunter’s Landing. Hood’s Division was quick to turn round and “bite” Stahel, before Hood put Wofford and Law back on the road to Trevilian Station…
As soon as Kearny got Reynolds’ note he got Baldy Smith’s and Couch’s Corps moving, a full day in advance of schedule. Pleasanton reported that a large force of Rebels, perhaps a full corps, was assembling near Trevilian Station…
So far Longstreet’s subordinates had performed well in fighting and withdrawing under pressure. As Hood and Anderson arrived at Trevilian Station, the senior major-general, Lafayette McLaws took command…and prepared to give battle…”
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Chapter Twenty The Battle of Trevilian Station
Chapter Twenty
The Battle of Trevilian Station
From “The Battle of Trevilian Station” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU 1987
LSU 1987
“General Anderson vigorously disagreed with General McLaws decision to defend Trevilian Station. Three Union Corps would be on them in the morning (Couch, Smith and Von Steinwehr), with one more close behind (Reynolds). McLaws intended to stand at the Station with three divisions, or twelve brigades in total. McLaws had the seniority however, and Hood agreed to stand on the defensive. Anderson gathered his troops about him at Trevilian Station and sent an urgent message to General Longstreet…”
From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962
MacArthur University Press 1962
“Kearny had attached himself to Couch’s Corps which advanced down the Virginia Central Railroad with Newton in front, and Casey behind. Kearny was closely co-ordinating with Baldy Smith who was advancing along the Charlottesville Road. Rodman’s division led with Slocum and Stoneman in column following down the road.
Von Steinwehr had also pressed on in Hood’s wake and was fortuitously nearby on the Green Spring Road, with the division of the now wary Julius Stahel in front, followed by Schimmelfennig and Devens columns. Stahel’s earlier experience at Hunter’s Landing meant that he was quick to form his men into line that morning at the first sound of gunfire…”
From “The Battle of Trevilian Station” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU 1987
LSU 1987
McLaws had deployed his division forward, with Semmes covering Charlottesville Road behind Poore’s Creek, Cobb and Kershaw astride the Railroad, and Barksdale on the right flank behind Hickory Creek.
General Barksdale leads his troops to their new position
Hood had deployed his two brigades of Law and Wofford on either side of the Green Spring Road to welcome the IX Corps. Anderson had lent Hood Wright’s Brigade which Hood kept in reserve at the junction of the Charlottesville and Green Spring Roads.
Anderson had only three further brigades “in reserve” at Trevilian Station. He had deployed Mahone near the Poindexter Farm on the Fredericksburg Road to warn of any attempt to flank the station. Featherston’s Brigade was far in the rear at the crossroads of the Nunn’s Creek and Gordonsville Roads. “Needless to say General Anderson expected us to be flanked and the roads in our rear cut at anytime” (General Cadmus M. Wilcox)…
From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962
MacArthur University Press 1962
“It was General John Newton who opened the battle that morning. He deployed his division with two brigades in front, and one in rear and went at Cobb and Kershaw’s brigades. General Kearny was concerned that General Couch had let Newton go in before Casey’s Division had come up. Couch reported that Casey had “a touch of the slows” that morning. He was not to be the only one…
Kearny had Couch pull Newton back and wait for Casey to deploy his brigades in two lines of two. When both divisions went in, Kearny was pleased with the results. Cobb and Kershaw were being pushed back. Casey complained that flanking fire (from Barksdale’s troops behind the stream) was decimating his flanking regiments. Kearny’s response was blunt “Stop complaining about their fire General and just damn well attack them”…
On the flank at Poore’s Creek the Rebel General Semmes was finding out how Quakers fight. Rodman had dismounted that morning at first light and crept down to the creek bank himself to establish that it was not much of an impediment to infantry. Afterwards he took his time to get all three of his brigades in line before launching an enveloping attack on Semmes. General William “Baldy” Smith, VI Corps commander, rode with him in the attack.
General Rodman thoroughly scouted his division's route
“I have never met a soldier with less thirst for military distinction, and with as little taste or predilection for military life yet he has risen by merit alone to the high rank he now holds… Patient, laborious, courageous, wholly devoted to his duties and influenced by deep religious convictions. It was a rare pleasure to have such a subordinate”.
Semmes brigade melted under the assault, and with his rout McLaws’ line was flanked. In a short time Rodman regrouped and hit Cobb’s flank as he tried to withdraw. The bulk of Cobb’s brigade would join Semmes at the rear of Rodman’s division on the way to a northern prison camp…
Kershaw and Barksdale were led from disaster by McLaws back towards the station…
At little later that morning Stahel’s line ran into Hood’s. Von Steinwehr would permit Stahel’s troops to engage in a vigorous firefight, all be it at a “respectful distance” while he brought up Schimmelfennig’s leading brigades on Stahel’s right. Von Steinwehr was always “cool, collected and judicious” according to Kearny “I need not be concerned for the 11th in his hands”…Eventually Hood was forced to pull his men back, to the other side of a clearing south of Trevilian Station. Into the gap Anderson placed Wright on the left, next to Hood’s brigades, and Armistead on the right…
Major General Adolph Wilhelm August Friedrich, Baron von Steinwehr
North of Trevilian Station McLaws had formed a new line of Kershaw, Barksdale and Wilcox. The new confederate position was in many ways two lines, parallel facing north west, with Armistead joining them in the middle as he faced southwest towards Stahel’s advance. Anderson likened the line to “an stretched S or a lightening bolt”…
Kearny now had operational control of the three corps. The attack on McLaws section would consist of, from left to right Casey, Newton and Rodman, with Slocum in reserve. Stoneman had yet to bring up his division. Stahel prepared to assault Armistead…
From “The Battle of Trevilian Station” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU 1987
LSU 1987
“It is unclear whether Kearny or Von Steinwehr stumbled in launching Stahel’s attack. It was to take place across 150 yards of open ground with the brigades of Wofford, Law and Kershaw on the flank... Stahel’s troops were cut down by the score. That was not enough for the aggressive Hood who sent Wofford and Law to the attack to ensure the route of Stahel’s brigades.
Stahel's Division are in over their heads in Hayfield Clearing
Rodman on the right flank of his own attack saw the collapse and warned his superior. Smith quickly grabbed Slocum’s leading brigades and lead them into the storm now raging before Trevilian Station. He was quickly joined by Von Steinwehr with Devens’ leading brigades, while Schimmelfennig assaulted Hood’s flank…
There were simply too many Union troops on the field. Kearny had a full division in reserve. Yet when Anderson summoned his remaining brigades only the distant Featherston marched to his relief. Mahone had himself been attacked on the Fredericksburg Road by more Union troops and had summoned Pryor to assist him. The ominous sound of gunfire could be heard in the lulls at Poindexter Farm. Anderson firmly believed another Union force has attempting to cut their line of retreat…
From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962
MacArthur University Press 1962
“Kearny had deployed Pleasanton’s brigades of Averell and Gregg to raise hell in the rebel rear. It was working as Pleasanton held down two brigades sorely needed by McLaws and Anderson at the Station…”
From “The Battle of Trevilian Station” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU 1987
LSU 1987
“As Kershaw was driven back, Armistead’s flank was exposed to Rodman’s and Slocum’s attack. Anderson was pleading with McLaws to order a withdrawal. It was not forthcoming. Anderson sent word to Mahone – withdraw to Netherland Tavern. He then rode over to General Hood. Hood concurred, it was time to go…
Anderson gathered the artillery and sent it back down the road beyond Netherland Tavern and East Crossing, to the far side of a great clearing around the Gordonsville Road and the Railroad. It was to deploy in line, but only where it could retreat at speed.
Anderson then informed McLaws that he was pulling his troops out. Hood would cover the withdrawal by making another assault on the clearing before Trevilian Station, against the “Dutchmen” with his two brigades and Wright... An engagement of this kind was in direct breach of General Longstreet’s orders and could result in disaster for the corps. McLaws gave in…
From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962
MacArthur University Press 1962
“Having thrown back the last desperate assault of Hood’s Division, General Kearny organised the pursuit of the fleeing rebels. Again Casey and Newton led, under Couch, with Rodman and Schimmelfennig in close support. Couch ran straight into the Rebel line of batteries. They did fearful execution…
Couch's divisions stand in the face of heavy artillery fire
General Kearny turned to General Smith and Rodman “Gentlemen lets us ride to that knoll so that we may draw fire from the boys of 4th Corps”. The three generals calmly sat on the knoll for 10 minutes while shot and shell descended on them. Two of Kearny’s staff and Rodman’s chief of staff were killed. Several mounted officers around the three were injured. Baldy Smith was grazed by a small fragment on his scalp. “Why sir you will have a grand scar to show the ladies and it will have done your hairline no harm at all” Kearny joked. All three generals laughed.”
From “The Army of the Potomac in Their Own Words” edited by Horace Weldon
Greeley Publishing 1907
“I saw the Kearny and Baldy Smith and Rodman roaring with laughter while sat ahorse in the worst storm of bullet and shell on the field. I am convinced our generals are clean mad!” (Private Samuel M. Cooper)
From “The Battle of Trevilian Station” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU 1987
LSU 1987
“In the narrows between two creeks just north west of the Nunn’s Creek and Gordonsville Crossroads, McLaws blocked the Union advance with four brigades – Armistead, Wright, Featherston and Pryor, while Hood and Anderson marched of with the remaining six organised brigades (and the remains of Semmes and Cobb's brigades) and most of the artillery. McLaws insisted on commanding the rearguard. He intended to hold till nightfall and then withdraw….
Anderson waited expectantly the next morning, as Longstreet arrived after a dangerous overnight ride through contested country. Armistead marched in first, reporting that Kearny had maintained the assault throughout the night and eventually the tiny Confederate line had been routed. Pryor and Wright would also march in with the remains of their brigades, which were little enough. McLaws and Featherston did not. They had both been captured…”
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For those who would like a map of the battle ground over which Kearny and McLaws have fought, I recommend the attached...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Trevilian_Station_June_12.png
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Trevilian_Station_June_12.png
Superb timeline, interesting and plausible.
General Order 111 ordered the execution of "all commissioned officers of the United States when found serving in company with armed slaves" and "all commissioned officers in the command of said Benjamin F. Butler". Rhett would no doubt be eager to execute Hunter, but I expect he would also want execute every other Union officer captured in the Battle of Blackwater based on both provisions of General Order 111. General Terry and a lot of lesser known, lower ranked officers are only going to survive if someone actively keeps them out of Rhett's hands.
General Order 60 specifcally names Hunter (and Phelps). An interesting "legal" point which Rhett will not care about is whether any of the pioneers were armed (bearing in mind Kearny's preference that they ought not to be)...More soon...
"Ordered, That Major-General Hunter and Brigadier-General Phelps be no longer held and treated as public enemies of the Confederate States, but as outlaws; and that in the event of the capture of either of them, or that of any other commissioned officer employed in drilling, organizing, or instructing slaves, with a view to their armed service in this war, he shall not be regarded as a prisoner of war, but held in close confinement for execution as a felon at such time and place as the President shall order"
Ironically Hunter had saved Davis life in the old army. Davis' patrol had gone without food for a week, and on its third day without water arrived at Hunter's post. Hunter saw Davis and his men fed and watered.
Chapter Twenty-One A Breather Between Annas
Chapter Twenty-One
A Breather Between Annas
From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern
NorthWestern
“…The next morning Kearny wrote to Hooker from his headquarters at Trevilian Station “We have engaged what I believe to be the bulk of Longstreet’s Corps here and defeated them. Longstreet has retreated down the south bank of the North Anna River…Confirm which elements of Jackson’s Corps oppose you…”. Within an hour of Kearny’s dispatch a day old note from Hooker arrived. “Have routed two and perhaps three divisions of Longstreet’s Corps near Grindstone Hill…With 2nd and 3rd Corps am pressing Longstreet along the north bank of the North Anna River…”.
In the words of George Armstrong Custer of Kearny’s staff, years later, “I have seen much of the world in my life, and heard many languages and strange tongues spoken across it, and I have never yet heard a word that would properly describe General Kearny’s expression that morning when he read Hooker’s dispatch and realised James Longstreet was holding off the entire Union Army on his own”…”
From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962
MacArthur University Press 1962
“Until that morning Kearny had been satisfied with his army’s performance to date and had repressed any particular concerns he had about individual performances. But when he realised General Longstreet was holding the bulk of the army at bay with but one corps, heads rolled…”
From “The War Between the States” by Otis R. Mayhew
Sword & Musket 1992
Sword & Musket 1992
“In mid-campaign General Silas Casey was relieved and replaced with General James Wadsworth, Kearny’s fellow New Yorker. The wounded Dana, of Richardson’s Corps, and Stahel of Von Steinwehr’s, were replaced by Generals John Gibbon and Francis Barlow respectively. Furthermore it was clear to everyone in Kearny’s staff that Couch’s days at the head of IV Corps were numbered…
Generals James S. Wadsworth, John Gibbon, Francis C. Barlow
Notification was also received that Reno had relieved an ill General Cox from the command of his third division and Brigadier General Orlando Wilcox had been appointed to command instead…”
From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern
NorthWestern
“Kearny quickly realised two important facts. Firstly he needed to concentrate the army. With Jackson and possibly Lee unaccounted for, a blow could fall on any part of his army at any time. He needed to gather his strength against such a blow. Secondly that while Jackson’s Corps was unaccounted for, an opportunity existed to crush Longstreet. It was an opportunity Kearny intended to seize…
Kearny would march I, IV, VI, XI and XII Corps, along the south bank of the North Anna as far as Beaver Dam Station. General Hooker was ordered to march from his current position at Brokenburg to the Station with II and III Corps. Most daringly General Sedgwick was ordered to cross the Rappahannock with Reno and march as far as Bowling Green. Sedgwick was still ordered to screen Washington, but with Davis on his left and now Pleasanton on his right, Kearny hoped Sedgwick would suffer no surprises…”
From “Kearny and the Radicals” by Hugh W. McGrath
New England Press 1992
New England Press 1992
“It was about this time that rumours began to circulate throughout the army. “We hear all kinds of wild talk from the secess prisoners, from the newspaper men, and from the darkies here about” General Sickles noted. “Corcoran has been murdered. Butler and Hunter hung. Negros put to death in Richmond and Petersburg. Wild talk is the order of the day. Human nature being what it is, I suspect some of it to be true…”.”
From “Yankee Dawdle - the Memoirs of a Private of Pennsylvania” by Anonymous
“I heard a rumour yesterday from some of Meagher’s Irishmen that I had been hung by the rebels for being Pennsylvanian. I checked with my sergeant. He said it wasn’t true…”
From “The Gray Fox – Robert E. Lee” by R. Southey-Freeman
Orange & West 1958
Orange & West 1958
“Longstreet had gathered up his corps just south of the South Anna River. He had amalgamated Cobb’s and Semmes’ Brigades and placed them under the senior surviving officer, Col. Edgar B. Montague. Featherston’s Brigade was also placed under the senior colonel, Carnot Posey…
General Longstreet and staff
With his battered corps Longstreet knew he could not retreat much further towards Richmond without offering battle. Where were Lee and Jackson...?”
From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962
MacArthur University Press 1962
“Kearny’s “officer at large” Colonel Custer had seen Longstreet’s Corps with his own eyes after a daring reconnaissance which almost saw him bagged by Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry. Just beyond South Anna Bridge…
Custer's wild ride with two aides as he escapes Fitzhugh Lee
Kearny’s plan was simple. Kearny would take half the army and seek to force a crossing at South Anna Bridge. While Kearny amused Longstreet there, Hooker would take II, III and VI Corps crossing by the Ground Squirrel Bridge and the nearby fords, hitting Longstreet in the flank. Kearny also ordered Reno south from Bowling Green to the Pamunky River. Word of his advance would hopefully confuse and unsettled Longstreet with fear of a double envelopment…”
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