Chapter Twenty-Two
The Battle of Ashland
Part V
From “Two Days and Three Fights - The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU
“From left to right Lee’s line was made up of Field, D.H. Hill, Evans, Hood, Anderson and Pickett. The balance of Walker’s division still faced Couch’s immobile Corps at the Railroad Bridge. Jackson had placed A.P. Hill’s division athwart the Hugher’s Road, with Branch, Brockenborough’s and Archer’s brigades in front and Pender’s and Gregg’s behind. Behind A.P Hill came Ewell’s Division, Lawton and Trimble (only back from Northern imprisonment a few weeks) in front and Early and Hays behind. Jackson had also “borrowed” the brigades of Fitzhugh and W.H.L Lee which waited behind Ewell’s lines near Beaste Hill.
Lee and Jackson before Jackson's assault on the Almshouse Salient
Jackson’s plan was simple. While the other divisions kept Hooker’s line engaged, Jackson would bring overwhelming force against the west end of Richardson’s salient, by pushing A.P Hill and Ewell straight down Hugher’s Road. He would split Hooker’s wing in two…”
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
“Very shortly after first light the contest reignited all along Hooker’s lines. Kearny arrived early at Hooker’s makeshift headquarters next the ruins of one of the Lumpkin’s Farmhouses. Reynolds had been left in command of both his own corps’ attempts to reinforce Doubleday and break out at Elliot’s Bridge and to spur Couch into action. Kearny approved Hooker’s dispositions and saw no reason to interfere…”
From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962
“Kearny’s concerns about Richardson’s salient could not be acted upon at that moment as Evans troops had renewed their attack on Richardson. Hooker’s men had built up defensive barricades from the branches and timber of the woods all about them. Only along Richardson’s line, where there was little nearby woodland, did the troops have to rely on the meagre protection offered by the few feet of the “sunken” roadbed…
It was a cautious Kearny who placed Hancock in reserve at the Lampen Farm and Rodman at the Dillard House…”
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
“Having sought and received Kearny’s approval for his dispositions Hooker left Kearny at Lumpkin’s Farm. Kearny would see to the deployment of Mansfield’s two divisions as they crossed that morning, in taking the offensive against Pickett.
Hooker was to ride over to the Union right, towards Dillard House near Rodman’s position, and manage the line from there…”
From “Two Days and Three Fights - The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU
“William French’s section of Richardson’s line had been quiet for the first hour of the morning. D.H Hill was attacking Whipple’s Division of the III Corps on his right and Evans’ troops had engaged Gibbon’s Division on his left…
When Jackson’s attack struck the salient, it hit French’s line like “
a runaway freight train” (Isaac R. Trimble). In the first 15 minutes of the attack, of French’s three brigade commanders, Max Webber had been shot in the right hand, Nathan Kimball had been wounded and captured, and David Morris was dead…
Brigadier Max Weber quickly sought a return to combat
French rode his horse back to Hancock at Lampen Farm. “
Come up Hancock. For god sake come up for my position is lost”. As he spoke to Hancock, his horse was shot for the fourth time and collapsed underneath him…
Despite what the biographers of Hooker and Kearny claim, Hancock’s own staff assert that he made the counterattack on his own authority before orders arrived…”
Hancock's Division blunts Jackson's first wave
From “Stonewall – Jackson in the Civil War” by Isaac T. Medway
LSU 1967
“A.P. Hill’s attack had smashed the Almshouse salient. Richardson was desperately trying to refuse Gibbon’s right, despite Shanks Evans' renewed attack upon Gibbon’s front. But Hill’s attack had been blunted by Union reinforcements. Hill’s men were fighting bayonet to bayonet with the troops of Hancock the Superb’s Division. Jackson had expected a Union reserve behind the salient, which was why his attack was an attack in depth. Ewell was about to strike Hancock’s reserves and Whipple’s left…”
From “Isaac Peace Rodman - Soldier, Statesman, Quaker” by Leonard H.K. Wool
Empire 1918
“Rodman often said afterwards that when Jackson’s second line struck, it felt it physically as Whipple’s leftmost brigade, Bowman’s Pennsylvanians and New Hampshirites, crumpled.
Rodman’s Division was tired. It had marched hard the day before and done the bulk of the hard fighting during Smith’s fighting retreat, but it did not falter as Rodman led it into battle to stem Ewell’s breakthrough…”
Rodman's exhausted men go on the offensive
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
“
If Lee can put in one more division we cannot hold him” Dan Sickles report to Hooker.
From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962
“Kearny only had two of Alpheus Williams’ three brigades to hand, the last was still crossing the river and behind them, Augur’s Division. Yet Kearny was quick to send Williams to Richardson’s relief, himself at their head…”
From “The Gray Fox - Robert E. Lee” by R. Southey-Freeman
Orange & West 1958
“Doctor Maguire raced towards Lee with Jackson’s message. “
Give me Johnson now and I can defeat these people”. Maguire had arrived moments after Captain Grenfell of Hampton’s staff. Despite the crescendo of noise along the battle line gunfire and cannon fire could be heard in the east…
Hampton was under attack at Wickham’s Station, initially by Davis’ Division of cavalry which had crossed at Littlepage ford, which concerned Hampton not at all. Union infantry however was pouring across Carter’s Bridge (Stevens’ Division of Reno’s IX Corps). Hampton was already falling back along the road to Ashland. Reno’s whole corps might be behind that attack and Sedgwick too (Sedgwick was miles away and Reno’s other two divisions of Wilcox and Sturgis were crossing at Maury’s Ford)…
Lee had reached a crisis. If Jackson was reinforced a great victory could be won over Kearny and Hooker, but there was a real threat that Lee would soon have two fresh Corps in his rear, either cutting off the route of retreat via Ashland, marching up the other road into Pickett’s rear, or perhaps both…”
From “Two Days and Three Fights - The Battle of Ashland” by Eppa H. Taylor
LSU
“Long will the what-ifs of Lee’s decision to send Johnson to support Hampton’s retreat be discussed. As Lee said “
I can beat those people a dozen times and they will have legions to spare. If they defeat me but once I may loose this army and thus our country”…
Jackson was ordered to pull A.P Hill and Ewell out of the maelstrom around the Almshouse…Field and D.H. Hill withdrew by way of the Old Mountain and Plank Roads to the railroad line. Walker and Pickett were the first to withdraw on the right, directly down the line of the railroad. The remaining divisions withdrew under cover of Fitzhugh Lee’s and W.H.L Lee’s cavalry…
Kearny would not let Lee withdraw unchallenged and Meade’s and Patrick’s Divisions of Reynolds Corps were quickly brought across the now unguarded Elliott’s Bridge to pursue the retreating rebels…
Edward Johnson and his division, with the support of the two Lees and Hampton, would give Marsena Patrick a bloody nose at Langfoot’s Crossing, before Lee’s rearguard withdrew…
Confused and dejected Confederates retreat towards Richmond
There was nothing between Kearny and Richmond now but Lee’s bloodied army and Brook Creek…”