hello
new user here so while it may be a tad bit late
Turkish victory against Armenian forces OTL was thanks to former Ottoman army left over from the WWI commanded by Karabekir
the Turkish victory was complete, by treaty Turks had the right to station troops in Armenian land etc
this was soon revised with the new soviet government though.
your idea of a greater armenia/georgia is in fact the opposite: Turks gave away Batum for the soviet help. (treaty of moscow 1921)
OTL soviet help was mostly used in the western front against the greeks, as the southern front was mostly dealt with by local militia
Soviets also provided a large force to Enver(or so the Turks believed) to cross to Turkey and that kept the entire eastern army stuck where it was for the Turks until the end
so with Enver off to wherever, those troops can be sent west. I believe they can offset any Greek advantage as they are well-trained, well-equipped and experienced.
With less Enverite meddling I can see Mustafa Kemal being more comfortable dealing with the front, instead of the parliament. Does that give him an additional six months of life due to reduced stress?
It's a conflict that I have worked the draft several times, but I have managed to clear my plan.
My difficulty was to ponder the importance of Soviet influence, and the more I saw into it, the later I had to reconsider their absence being significant on the events, not enough to prevent an offensive into Armenia.
But the new assumptions I'm working under is that the Turks under Karabekir and Kemal would refrain from launching a major offensive into Armenia because of the presence of a Russian regime that is somewhat allied to Armenia ITTL, instead of Turkey IOTL.
Regarding the independences of the Caucasus republic, Russia would likely aknowledge that of Armenia and Georgia, but not Azerbaijan; in fact, I think Russia would probably still invade Azerbaijan at some point in 1920, essentially in order to retake possession of the Baku oil fields. While the Nationalists would be wary of potential Russian meddling in favor of Armenia, the invasion of Azerbaijan would confirm their fear.
Plus, Armenia would be the recipient to some extra war material that ended up IOTL to the Whites, including clothing, rifles, ammunitions, and possibly a few British Mark V tanks.
This situation would prevent Nationalists from stripping too much forces from that area. But since they had about 3:1 numerical advantage, I guess there could be still some room for sparing some troops for other fronts.
But another difference from OTL is that without having to intervene in the Russian civil war, the Entente powers have also some troops to spare, notably France which sent troops to South Russia. ITTL, these troops would eventually be sent in Cilicia to impose French authority over the contested Syrian Mandate northern borders, especially in the aftermath of massacres committed by Turks against local Armenian communities that would receive a larger echo in France since the government would be willing to send in troops. This too will prevent Turks from diverting too much forces to the Greek front.
Of course, I would still to look into the effect in the Turkish Order of Battle of keeping an important forces on the Armenian border into 1921, to see what forces won't be able to end up on the Greek front like they did IOTL and possibly result in the capture of Ankara in the fall of 1921.
So far, I'm not sure the capture of Ankara by the Greeks alone would be enough to compell the Nationalists to peace. That's also why I also wonder about which moment I will have the Armenians launching an offensive of their own into Turkey.
The reason the Turks wouldn't have launched one would be about the same the Armenians would do it, namely Russian support (plus British and possibly American) and more equipment.
The minimal objective of the Armenians is to get a port of their own on the Black sea to avoid being dependent on Georgia, so the target is Trabzon. Secondary, though largely played by the propaganda, would be the enforcement of the Wilsonian borders.
The first part would be diversion raids into the region of Lake Van in order to draw Turkish troops away from Sarikamish during a winter. Then, into the spring, an lightning offensive along the railroad to Erzurum (built by Russians during their ww1 occupation of the area) supported by the Mark V tanks. From Erzurum, the Armenian army divided in two parts. The first go towards Bayburt and then through the Pontic passes to Trabzon, while the second force, likely the strongest one, advances towards Erzincan, to control the important road hub there is here and cover the rear of the Trabzon force.
The only thing I'm still unsure of is whether I make it happening in early 1921 or in early 1922 after the Greek capture of Ankara.
The latter scenario would have the Turkish capital moved to Sivas, with the Turks enacting a hardline stance, hoping to draw Greeks into overextending their lines and eventually catching them isolated. Here, the Armenian offensive would come unexpected and break Turkish resistance for good.
In early 1921, the conditions would be less favorable with stronger and less demoralized Turkish forces opposing them.
As for the postwar settlement, I've still not definite plans. I don't think we're still going to get Sèvres, as I expect the determined resistance of Turks could impress enough Entente powers to renegotiate and sign a treaty that is, without being as favorable as Lausanne, would be less harsh than Sèvres.
The main feature of this treaty would be the establishment of some early version of "On country, two systems" with the Ottoman Sultanate retaining control over the Straits area that are to be neutral and under international protection, and the remainder of Turkey, minus territorial concessions to Greek Asia minor, French Syria and Armenia, under a Republican regime, the whole theoretically united under the rule of the Ottoman Caliph (caliph for the whole of Turkey, but only Sultan in the Straits area).
I doubt this legal fiction would last long, but it would be an interesting geopolitical feature.
Due to the political fallout over the war and the "defeat" of Nationalists, I expect the Turkish Republic to become a much more authoritarian regime than it was IOTL. In this context, the Sultanate would become a refuge for many political and intellectual figures, potentially redeeming the reputation of the Ottoman Sultanate, still a constitutional monarchy with what looks the closest to a democracy in Turkey.
It may relevant to note, for the cultural development of such a Sultanate, that the Sultan would be Abdulmejid II, a renown painter and collector of butterflies, a great patron of arts.
As for Enver, I think he would still be around, but being persona non grata by the Turkish Nationalists and Kemal, he would still probably end up supporting the Basmachi insurgency in Russian Turkestan, though this time, he wouldn't have been invited by Russia. It's also probable that he ends up the same way as IOTL as his behaviour wouldn't change, perhaps at a different time, but in a not much different context.
PS: I have planned on these development with help and important suggestions from
@Nassirisimo .
