@galileo-034
I like your general outlook, and I hope you don't mind if you'll see quite a few of these thoughts turning up in my own TL, too.
Just a couple of quick thoughts:
The Bolsheviks could much more easily just "forget" to come up with a new law against homosexuality than any more parliamentarian regime. If SR Russia has a proper (even if heavily SR-dominated) Duma (or some other-named parliament), such a silent procedure is much less likely, as there's always going to be someone bringing the topic up and forcing the factions to position themselves.
You are certainly right on liberal urban culture. The countryside may or may not react with a politically relevant shock (see the KKK revival in OTL's 1920s US...).
I think you're most probably right about opening up to foreign exchange first, and more protectionist attitudes later (also cf. @Shevek23 's comments on the matter in this thread).
Regarding Christian Orthodoxy, what I was thinking about was, for example, the "Union of the Democratic Clergy and Laity" and other reform-oriented Renovationist groups. While OTL's "Living Church" was a government and secret service puppet, that doesn't mean there weren't religious reform movements upon which it tried to seize.
 
... ah, and on the question of protectionism, that's a complicated matter of course as it depends on how other states act, too, just one thing: Russia is traditionally a grain exporter. If protectionism is aimed at helping to build up domestic industry, it still threatens to undermine these agricultural exports as other governments are sure to retaliate with tariffs on them. I'm not saying SR Russia isn't going to go protectionist (I would see it drift in that direction, too), I'm just saying that's probably being an intra-party tug-of-war, with more traditionally agriculturally oriented factions opposing it and others, probably even allying with (I suppose mostly still social-democratically oriented?) trade unions from outside of the party and maybe even their parliamentary representatives.
Regarding corruption, I agree with you, it's mostly "power corrupts" in a general sense.
 
Also, how a number of countries / regions, especially Ukraine, develop ITTL depends a lot on how the rest of the Russian Civil War after Kazan pans out. The Red Army collapses? But what of its remnants, no further Bolshevik trouble anywhere at all? Also, if Kolchak breaks out towards the North, that makes (at least) two White forces in the Pontic-Caspian space. Ukraine's fate could depend to a great extent on how their interaction goes. Do they fight it out for predominance? Then the Ukraine is left in peace (well, except for the Poles, and anarchist groups, and other roving bands of demobilised soldiers... and I still think Bolshies of both Russian and Ukrainian persuasion, too) for another while, or might side with one of them. Do they integrate peacefully? (That's an awkward legacy for SR Russia, it wouldn't be so much of an exclusively SR Russia then...) In that case, they could "help" the Ukrainian National Army in putting down Makhno's Black Army (and possible Bolshie revolts here and there) together... which would throw their independence into question again.

So, to put it back into context, most of the breakaway countries we are talking about are products of German occupation following Brest-Litovsk. Meanwhile, the SRs-Czechoslovak offensive breaches through Kazan and Nizhny Novgorod to Moscow while the Great War, even if nearing its end, is still raging. The fall of Moscow and the Armistice are about the same time I'd say, more or less a couple weeks. From that point, even if they technically won by toppling the Bolsheviks (their leadership dead or on the run, the Red Army shattered), they have not yet won it all.
Due to the victory at Kazan, it's not even guaranteed Kolchak ever becomes minister of the SR provisional government, less even he overthrows it. So, the other White factions are mostly Denikin's Volunteers Army and Krasnov's Don army. Petrograd has not yet been subjugated, Semyonov terrorizes the Transbaikal and is a serious trouble to deal with, the Tashkent Soviet needs to be suppressed. In that context, the restoration of control over the breakaway states on the western border and in the Caucasus is not much a concern. So here, the SRs are adopting a policy of aknowledging the fait accompli. They are far less willing to gamble their recent victory by embarking into an all out campaign and want to consolidate their position, and in this regard, they are far less adventurous than were the Bolsheviks of Lenin IOTL.

So, at it goes for Ukraine, the SRs, Denikin and Krasnov are way too much concerned with each other to bother about. The only exception is Crimea whose autonomous government ends up asking Denikin protection against a potential Ukrainian attempt at annexing it.
Then begins a series of uneasy negotiations under Franco-British mediation at Versailles as the Allies wants to speed up the civil war conclusion. Krasnov is less sure to be compromising and may be continuing northwards (after capturing Tsaritsyn in september) while he believes the SRs conquests are so fragile and recent he can dislodge them, but that would be without Denikin who prefers to negotiate (IOTL, he seems to have been very keen to compromises, perhaps too much as it cost him much authority over feuding and warlording subordinates of very diverse political sensibilities, all while demonstrating a certain lucidity) while he still has some bargaining power (more lucid than Krasnov, he sees it futile to try go north after the SRs victory, especially if the Franco-British allies refuse to lend further support for his army to advance) not to mention that desertion rates will rise as there is no more clear enemy to defeat after the Bolsheviks' demise.

You're right that with all these demobilized Red soldiers around, it's going to be a mess. I'd say most conscripts will simply try returning home, but for some, as in the case of the Latvian Rifles, that's not going to be all peaceful.
I cite the Latvians' case because it's the only one I have an almost clear idea of. The Red Latvian regiments were among the most loyal units of the Bolshevik regime, and politically compromised as they are, they cannot just go home and disband. That means they could try to take power in their newly independent home country. As the German troops have departed sooner as there is no Bolshevik threat to justify them staying, it looks Latvia is ripe for a civil war of its own, just different to the one the local Germans played IOTL.
Ukraine, caught between the Poles and Makhno, will too have its own civil war, but I doubt the Nationalists of Petliura are going to let any Russian close (they seemed adamant enough about their independence IOTL, plus roving communist bands of ex red army soldiers (but a pretty minor foe at this point since the Reds didn't have much base locally besides Red Army support). I still think the Nationalists have a good chance of winning in this context. The departure of Germans and the limited involvement of Russians could cut short Makhno supporting base; it's even likely to see the Nationalists signing peace with the Poles, give up Lwow/Lvov to focus on the home front (a peace they would be helped in by the "mediation" of Allied powers who would be trying during the Conference of Versaille to enforce the Curzon line and more generally restore peace in the former Russian Empire lands.

A last note as I mentioned Petrograd.
After Moscow's fall, that's the next target of the Czechoslovaks and SR combined forces. The city proper may not be hard to take, but given the Krondstadt sailors OTL performance in 1921 and before through the civil war, it's likely the Royal Navy will have to lend a hand in retaking both Petrograd and Krondstadt. If the sailors are fanatic enough to refuse offers of surrender and amnesty, I don't know if an assault is possible by the Royal Navy in the midst of winter if ice is thick enough to keep them at a good distance of Krondstadt guns, potentially allowing the sailors to focus on landward defense through the winter before entrenching on the island.
 
@galileo-034
I like your general outlook, and I hope you don't mind if you'll see quite a few of these thoughts turning up in my own TL, too.
Just a couple of quick thoughts:
The Bolsheviks could much more easily just "forget" to come up with a new law against homosexuality than any more parliamentarian regime. If SR Russia has a proper (even if heavily SR-dominated) Duma (or some other-named parliament), such a silent procedure is much less likely, as there's always going to be someone bringing the topic up and forcing the factions to position themselves.
You are certainly right on liberal urban culture. The countryside may or may not react with a politically relevant shock (see the KKK revival in OTL's 1920s US...).
I think you're most probably right about opening up to foreign exchange first, and more protectionist attitudes later (also cf. @Shevek23 's comments on the matter in this thread).
Regarding Christian Orthodoxy, what I was thinking about was, for example, the "Union of the Democratic Clergy and Laity" and other reform-oriented Renovationist groups. While OTL's "Living Church" was a government and secret service puppet, that doesn't mean there weren't religious reform movements upon which it tried to seize.
I don't mind at all. Go ahead as you wish.

Russia's transition to a properly established regime will be quite shaky politically. The provisional government will essentially be relying on the number of former CA deputies that have gathered around it to rubber stamp its decrees. And there won't probably be an election for a new Constituent Assembly before internal peace is restored to a degree; I'd say that will be some time in the late summer-early autumn of 1920. Waiting that, the provisional government is led by a restraint number of SR figures who tend to decide for their fellow party members what is good and expedient. You can consider that in this 18 months period of early 1919-mid 1920, the PG isn't really a parliamentarian driven regime, but that won't prevent it from legislating as much as it needs for reconstruction and pacification purposes.

That said, there will be certainly marginal voices to call for it, but if many would share this opinion, they will refrain so to keep intact the "progressive" image of socialism they want to display (again, there is image and there is reality). Plus, though the opposition parties are almost irrelevant as a minority (either ethnic minorities or Kadet and Mensheviks in cities and suburbs), I don't imagine the SRs are going to let any political space free of their presence, even urban areas.



... ah, and on the question of protectionism, that's a complicated matter of course as it depends on how other states act, too, just one thing: Russia is traditionally a grain exporter. If protectionism is aimed at helping to build up domestic industry, it still threatens to undermine these agricultural exports as other governments are sure to retaliate with tariffs on them. I'm not saying SR Russia isn't going to go protectionist (I would see it drift in that direction, too), I'm just saying that's probably being an intra-party tug-of-war, with more traditionally agriculturally oriented factions opposing it and others, probably even allying with (I suppose mostly still social-democratically oriented?) trade unions from outside of the party and maybe even their parliamentary representatives.
Regarding corruption, I agree with you, it's mostly "power corrupts" in a general sense.

Tariffs are mostly going to be on industrial goods, but retaliations matter of course, even though the US just enacted their own 1922 Fordney-McCumber Tariff.
At this point, much like the low tariffs were here to prop up reconstruction efforts, raise tariffs would be a way to restore the position of local industry and agriculture on the internal market. The low tariffs would have had this adverse effect of taking market shares out of reach of local producers and factories. To perennize the reconstruction efforts, make them sustainable and profitable on a longer term (also, it would take some time before agricultural production returns to pre war volumes and profitability levels without the breakaway western provinces no longer in), tariff increase would be necessary, but considering how low the tariffs would have been lowered during the reconstruction, it remains to be seen if we can call it a hike or a readjustment.
Politically, there would be also pressure to move away from the economic influence of foreign capitalism and protect/prop up the socialist economy with clear state support.
All in all, you're right to assume the tariff issue is going to generate inter factional debate, but within the context of a de facto one party state, that's going to be a silent one, one of backrooms and factions, to maintain a public face of concord and unity (not quite the party discipline stuff, but not quite far), not unlike the post Stalin Soviet communist party or the Chinese communist party after Mao and before Xi Jinping.

As for the relations with the unions, I couldn't yet say as I don't have enough info to build upon yet.
But as a matter of power control, I doubt that there would be trade unions independent of the SRs for long. As I said, the SRs won't tolerate any rival to their party's monopoly on power, so I imagine they would progressively subordinate these unions to their party, infiltrate, buy, coerce (as you say, they distribute jobs, money and subsidies) or even ban if necessary.
 
After the IIIrd Reich : Austro-Bavaria ?
That's a bit far into the future, but that's an idea that keeps popping up whenever I think of what kind of counter-culture and democratic underground groups might appear in Nazi Germany without WW2.
Indeed, in a great irony, Bavaria may have been the cradle of a IIIrd Reich founded by an Austrian born man, it may also be its deathbed.

A prominent feature of Nazi ideology IOTL was its strong anti-clerical tendencies, lingering between atheist and neo-paganist lines.
Though persecution would never go as far as it would with Jews, the open practice of Catholicism, the culture and political movements associated with it, were suppressed, the autonomy of the Church was frequently violated. The reason I mind saying that is the strength of Catholicism in Germany southern region, and moreso in the annexed Austria, adding to the longstanding cultural particularism of these regions (even as of today IOTL) to make a large part of the Bavarian and Austrian identities by distinction/opposition to the Great German one.

As years would go and the first generation that hasn't known the Great War and Weimar years would mature by the 1960s, I'd expect counter-cultures to grow in Germany.
One of these I imagine is "Austro-Bavarian separatism".
This would be a movement that would arise, first to restore the independence of Austria, but that would grow and expand over Bavaria as the persecution of Catholic culture and the centralization of government in Berlin would deepen the cultural then political divide between southern Germany and the north, to repudiate the pan Germanist position and return to the long gone independence as a way of restoring freedom.
Such a movement would have a pretty clear and strong idea to rally around and at the time the IIIrd Reich would end (possibly the late 1990s or the 2000s but no sooner than Himmler's death), it would probably be the most powerful faction in Austria and Bavaria and so, probably be in control. As it would no longer trust a united Germany to guarantee its freedom, it would then break away (if the secession has not been previously the very cause of the IIIrd Reich ultimate collapse).
Also, given regional and cultural proximity, I think the Austrians and Bavarians would be part of a single movement, ie no separate separatist movements, to join forces and fate.


74c9969d8cfc75fb128e7a5b474dd816.png

Above is a deviantart work of arminius1871 on the idea of an Austrobavarian "Greater Bavaria" federal state that, except for South Tyrol Italy isn't going to give up anytime soon, gives a good idea of what's I'm thinking of here.

 
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@galileo-034
Interesting idea!
But I, for one, would guess that anti-Nazi resistance and counter-culture, even where predominantly Catholic, would also be pro-democratic, pro-liberal etc., as all these groups are oppressed, too, and liberal democracy is going to be a powerful trend in your 20th century, too, which Germans and Austrians (including Bavarians) would feel they're missing out on (much like Spaniards and Portuguese felt in great numbers in the 1970s as they overcame the dictatorships long run by Franco and Salazar respectively). So, I think they would look to the West, not (primarily) to the past (or even to the 7th century when that kind of region was united as the Duchy of Bavaria...).
Or, for an inspiration closer by, they might look to Switzerland. So, whatever the outcome, I don't think it's going to be an ultra-Catholic Austro-Bavarian sonderweg...!
 
That I knew of course :biggrin:. But the reason I didn't push further than Bavaria is that Bavaria has had, and still has, the strongest separatist movement of note in southern Germany, and the most noticeable nationalist political movement. From what I could read quickly, Bavarian nationalists had a high time after the Great War, there being talks of unifications with Austria already, foiled monarchist coup by Kahr, and around ww2 end, talks of independence. Though I haven't properly backed these up by further research, there is OTL precedent to back this TTL idea. In Baden, Wurtemberg and else, I have not yet seen or read info about such local nationalist and separatist movement.
Meanwhile, the Austrian case is pretty obvious as its independence from Germany has been longstanding and effective since the days of the Austro-Prussian War and the War of 1870.

Austro-Bavarians wouldn't really be missing the liberal democracy movement, but they would prefer part ways with a united Germany.
That is essentially because Austro-Bavarians for a reason or another (among many others), don't feel they can be safe and free within a united German state, even if that is a democratic one (the precedent of the Weimar Republic and its end is a good argument for that).

As for the fall of the Spanish and Portuguese dictatorships, I wouldn't use the OTL schedule.
The context is different, and their nature likely to change.
The context is not one of isolation. Unlike IOTL, if Spain and Portugal among others, still go about the same way, they won't be isolated between western nations pressure for reforms and the communist bloc. They would be part of a Warsaw Pact style fascist alliance, with likely (as I imagined them in the chapter about the wars of the early 1930s) Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ukraine, but also Turkey, Portugal and Spain (as for the Balkans, I don't know yet what is going to happen after the Greek civil war), and at distance, Iran, Japan and Thailand, Bolivia ...
That's a larger market to trade in, and an alliance that allow to keep the political system the way it is with less external pressure for change.
And in the Spanish case, Franco is likely not going to reach the point he got to IOTL, and I'm thinking more of a progressive fascist takeover following an electoral victory of Gil-Robles and a resulting civil war started by a left-wing uprising there (1934 strikes and Catalan secessions on steroids).
 
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BigBlueBox

Banned
I’m skeptical over Russia not invading Ukraine. With a victory at Kazan, the SRs should still have enough strength to take Ukraine after defeating the Bolsheviks. Invading Ukraine is also something both the SRs and Denikin would agree on.
 
That would suppose SRs and Whites are cooperating if on anything, but that's quite not what is going to happen.
To the SR provisional government, Ukraine and the breakaway states are a very secondary concern. Their first concern is consolidating.

Moscow and Petrograd are still a very long way from Kazan, and after a victory in early September, there is to take Nizhny Novgorod before making it to Moscow, and the logistics of that would be more of a problem than a rump Red army defense, so they won't breach the Kremlin walls before 5 or 6 weeks after Kazan at least and then there is to take Petrograd and Krondstadt, which is not going to be an easy thing, again with distance involved, so that will take us to the middle of winter.
Meanwhile, Krasnov would have taken Tsaritsyn at last and with Denikin, they would too make a run for Moscow. And because they don't arrive first don't mean they will quietly sit down and concede graciously. So, for a good deal of time (until SRs manage to get an upper hand over Krasnov and that the Entente powers mediate), SRs and Whites would be far too busy being at each others' throats to bother about Ukraine. Thereafter, it's a fait accompli.
 

BigBlueBox

Banned
Why is it a fait accompli? There is nobody who is both willing and able to force Russia to accept Ukrainian independence. The Entente won’t insist on it, as far as they are concerned Ukrainian nationalists are just German collaborators. They can speak about “national self-determination” all they want, but they won’t back those words up with boots on the ground. If the French back Russia (which they will) then Poland isn’t sticking its neck out for the Ukrainians either. The only way I can envision Ukraine surviving is as a rump state west of the Dniepr, with Poland owning all of Galicia and much of if not all of Volhynia. Maybe they get to keep Volhynia if they submit to being a Polish puppet state.
 
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Why is it a fait accompli? There is nobody who is both willing and able to force Russia to accept Ukrainian independence. The Entente won’t insist on it, as far as they are concerned Ukrainian nationalists are just German collaborators. They can speak about “national self-determination” all they want, but they won’t back those words up with boots on the ground. If the French back Russia (which they will) then Poland isn’t sticking its neck out for the Ukrainians either. The only way I can envision Ukraine surviving is as a rump state west of the Dniepr, with Poland owning all of Galicia and much of if not all of Volhynia. Maybe they get to keep Volhynia if they submit to being a Polish puppet state.
Realpolitik if you prefer.

The SRs just don't care of national pride as much as they do about reconstruction. Russia at this point is broke and unlike the Reds, they have no desire or capacity to implement their own version of war communism to keep their military on. Their objective is secure their power and put an end to the civil war as soon as possible, then demobilize the hundreds of thousands of soldiers roaming through the country, let peasants return to the field...
The nationalist argument you put against letting Ukraine independent is one which is no longer of relevant (I'm not saying not significant) strength since the Tsarist regime was overthrown and the Provisional Government of 1917 was discredited. And contrary to Lenin and the Bolsheviks, the SRs are not up for an international revolution and the all out westward offensive that it gave way to.

So the SRs are willing to do one year early what Lenin did with Poland, the Baltic countries and Finland IOTL. Actually, the problem with your point on Ukraine is that you consider it separately. As it goes ITTL, the SRs are just letting Ukraine go amidst all the other western breakaway provinces in a broad yet single move.
The only country that remains willingly is Belarus that would be looking to escape the predating ambitions of its Polish and Ukrainian neighbours.


As for the Entente intervention, their main interest is restoring peace and stability there and get a friendly government in charge, no matter the internal settlement, and since the Bolsheviks signed a separate peace with the Germans in early 1918, they don't exactly look to Russia as an equal partner.
The French are going to safekeep their investments in Russia, the British are content with weakening the Russian bear (the Great Game is still meaning something), and they both care more about what the Americans have to say than what the Russians do, and the Americans under Wilson are insisting on the self-determination of peoples quite importantly and that went pretty far IOTL even if effect didn't always follow. Oh, and the Russians too need American funds and industrial output for their own reconstruction. So Ukraine is at the proverbial bottom of their list of priorities.

Realpolitik all over. That inclusion of self-determination of people is included in the SRs' platform (at least since that of 1905) may be well genuine, or not, the relevant thing here is that this provides them for a ready and convenient excuse to aknowledge the independence of Russia western breakaway provinces.
In the end, they are not losing face in the matter.
They are keeping Crimea (which has had its autonomous government even through German occupation and has sought Denikin's protection after their withdrawal), and so keep their most important strategic bases in the Black Sea, and the polities of central Asia have been opting for the autonomy course.
The only significant exception is Azerbaijan, but this is motivated by the desire to control Baku oilfields and the revenue it provides and part by the war between Armenia and Turkey. Armenia is probably not going to relinquish its hard fought independence anytime soon.


EDIT : And to speak of German collaborators, you're mistaking Skoropadsky's Hetmanate with the Nationalists of the Central Rada and the People's Republic. Long story short, the Nationalist (and left-wing) government set up in spring of 1918 after Red Army withdrawal was overthrown in a German backed coup by Skoropadsky who fled as soon as the Germans departed and whose rule was followed by a restoration of the Nationalist Ukrainian regime, which was again overthrown by the invading Red Army IOTL in early 1919.
 
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After the IIIrd Reich : Austro-Bavaria ? - Crown Prince Rupprecht
I missed in the last post about an Austro-Bavarian independent state to mention Crown Prince Rupprecht who never gave up his claim on the Bavarian throne.
He is worth of mention as his claim on the throne at least provides a wider basis for a Bavarian separatist besides cultural, historical and religious ground. His opposition to the Nazis makes him a figure who has potential to provide a federating figure for disparate opposition groups suppressed by the Nazis.

364px-Rupandlux.jpg

PS: I probably will make other installments to discuss further features of a possible post IIIrd Reich Austro-Bavarian independent state.
 
After Long : a new consensus and the American Social Model
A quick reflexion.

Whether or not Long does more than the three terms and lasts as president into the 1950s, three terms being what I can see for sure as of now while I still don't know about further terms, the United States would have gone through an intense period of socio-political upheavals.

Politically, this is the insurgent rise of the third party under Long blasting away for good the two-party system that prevailed most of the time since Independence, and in a not less dramatic tone, the fallout of the coup attempt of December 1938.
Socially and economically, this is the setting up of a huge welfare state, of extensive healthcare, paid leaves, facilitated access to higher education.
Socially and culturally, this is setting the transition from an individualist philosophy driven consensus to a more collective, social solidarity consensus. That is akin to an American version of the Scandinavian model perhaps (but I wouldn't dare an open parallel due to the huge differences of context I see), hence my naming of an "American Social Model".




This social model would appear to last since as Long would go from the White House, his immediate successors wouldn't challenge, or fail to roll back, Long extensive reforms which would then have time to become a firmly established consensus.

First, I would see the Republicans returning to power while moving more firmly to the moderate to liberal center under a Dewey presidency, all while the conservatives are driven out towards the Democrats who would be instead drifting more decisively to the right in a firmly conservative standing.
Incidentally, I would see ITTL see liberal northeastern democrats switching to Republican because of this conservative drive of the Democrats, leading to the "Kennedy Republicans" faction as I would call it (the name is way too iconic not to have it showing up ITTL), after perhaps having been for a time known as the Dewey Democrats (in the way there were Reagan Democrats IOTL).

My current view of the end of Long presidency is that Huey Long would step down and kind of let the Republicans win in 1948, after he got much of his platform enacted, to avoid having the Progressives caught up in the turmoil of the civil rights question he would see looming, as the agressively progressist policies of his administration would have caused an earlier surge of the civil rights movement. Long may see the danger of alienating either or both of his southern base on this question if he gives too much and the northern progressives if he does nothing, a question that could rip apart the party he has built since 1934. Also, Long would return to the Senate and be able to play the kingmaker once again there.
A poisonous gift to his successors too would be a supreme court packed with liberal/progressive justices by his care, and that Long could use to force the civil rights issue on the Republicans.
This done, the drawback, if it is one, would be that the civil rights would be heralded as a Republican achievement here. Even though most progressives outside the South would support a Republican led bipartisan push for civil rights legislation, the Progressives as a party are not standing on it and leave the credit to the GOP. Though this could have serious impact on the distribution of African-American vote, I doubt it would be huge.
As things go, the Progressives in the South would be unavoidably facing a resurgence of the Democrats as a potent and competitive local opposition occupying the right conservative political space as the civil rights would create room for discontent to benefit them. In turn, the southern 'Long' Progressives would probably double down on their left-wing populism and put emphasis on economics, all while ignoring civil rights and keeping a social conservative standing. In that context, there would still be no room for Republican expansion into the Deep South, leaving African-American vote more or less a solid Progressive voting block in the same way they are for Democrats IOTL as of today.

As the Republicans move back to centrist and liberal positions, and dominate in urban and coastal areas (Northeast, Midwest, West Coast), where they are essentially dueling with the Progressives, the rural lands, Rockies and Great Plains that are red IOTL would stay as a competitive battleground between left and right wing populists of Progressive and Democratic parties.
Globally, the Progressives have not defined cultural position, as they are balanced between Rockies/Great Plains/Deep South social conservative factions and Midwest/Northeast/West Coast urban liberals, which has been the original intent of Long (who, as I mentionned in the tentative election game scenario post, could well live up to 100 as Alf Landon and Thurmond IOTL, well into the 1990s). When there is culturally liberal legislation passing the Congress, it would often be when liberal Progressives join forces with Republicans while conservative Progs look the other way (most frequently through abstention, with few if any open no), following the unspoken rule set under Long that is meant to keep the party together. That results in a paradox where liberal Progressives are actually more liberal than Republicans on cultural questions but find themselves locked in a position where they concede initiative to a moderate party; at some point, that could lead to a few liberal Progressives jumping to the GOP, but still finding themselves marginalized there, or going independent, but that would not be a frequent occurence.

Meanwhile, the Democrats are returning to their agrarian roots. While the Republicans de facto embrace the post Long new socio-political consensus, the Democrats would cling onto the pre Long consensus, individualism, being the "party of the self-made man" could we say. A conservative party at heart, they would later take more and more onto the Christian right, ultra conservatives on cultural ground, ultra liberal in economics, socially and fiscal conservatives.
That's part why in my election game scenario, I imagined Reagan under the colours of these TTL Democrats.


Past the apex of Long years, I don't think the Progressives would retain their majority in either houses of the Congress past the civil rights movement era as they would lose both south and north to Democrats and Republicans.
From the 1960s, I would see the Congress being more or less constantly without a majority, being tossed up between the three parties, pluralities changing from time to time and being rather fluid.
So, past the partisan era of Huey Long presidency and then the Civil Rights era, I would see the Congress settling into a consistent bipartisan if nor tripartisan working way as any legislation would require two of the three parties to join for it to pass anytime. These politics of coalitions makes any president unlikely to ever have a Congress firmly on its side, limiting potential partisan upsurges (but that doesn't mean there wouldn't be serious ones, just that scope and duration would be less important than they can be IOTL).


So, to return to the Social Model, Long reforms would be gradually accepted and become a consensus as they last, first because the Republicans would be unwilling to roll these somewhat popular reforms back or unable because of Progressives in the Congress retaining their majorities for a time and obstruction power for a longer time even. As we advance into later decades, the Republicans would only stand to correct abuses and improve its efficiency while only the Democrats would argue for massive deregulation and de facto dismantling.


Your thoughts?
 
Spain in 1920s and 1930s : the road to civil war
Hi. It's been a while since I last updated but here I am. My work on the thread is still slow to advance, but it advances nonetheless. I have at times, when inspiration and RL allowed it, searching through some topics. Here is one update about Spain, one due since at least two months, but that I still got to write formally. I'm currently working on a brief 1920 German civil alluded to in early updates, but I've not yet finished outlinning it.

So, this update is about the developments I see for Spain through the 1920s and 1930s, for which I had the invaluable input from @Kurt_Steiner for guidance and ideas to formulate it better. I have to admit I was searching this with a more or less avowed goal, that of having Spain within the Fascist Bloc of sorts to arise by mid to late 1930s within the Fascist Cold War narrative I'm pursuing overall in this TL. And I didn't want it to be just a copy paste of OTL Francoist Spain, a way too easy and lazy path, not original enough. However on the whole idea, I wasn't meaning to be dead set on it and was open to alternatives if my idea proved unfeasible or the result was unsatisfying, but that hasn't been the case fortunately, and with Kurt, I came out with a scenario I think is original enough, providing a path for fascist Spain without Franco ITTL, one where the Right take power legally instead of through a coup, kind of switching the OTL roles.




So, a little background, I hope not to incorrect as I make a rough summary. Spain by 1918 is not in the best of shapes, in a sense at least.
Since the Restoration, the political system has been locked and rigged by caciquismo and the two party system known as "turnismo" where the Conservatives and the Liberals would exchange power at each passing election, admittedly to ensure political stability after a period of disorder. However, in 1898, the system is shaked to its core as Spain loses its colonial empire following defeat in the Spanish-American war. Social and political agitation grow rapidly, Catalonia erupts in flame during the Tragic Week of 1909, both major parties had split up by the election of 1914 and minor movemnts, republicanism, socialism, syndicalism, anarchism, autonomism, among others, were on the rise. Though Spain had greatly profited from the Great War as a neutral nation to vamp up its exports, the social inequalities simmered under the surface, and while Russia was rocked by Revolutions and civil war, it went through a general strike in 1917 and was hit by influenza pandemics in 1918.

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In order : Spanish surrender at Santiago de Cuba (1898, Spanish-American War) - Barricade in Barcelona (1909, Tragic week) - Labor demonstration (1917, Spanish crisis of 1917) - Advertising for disinfinctant in Spanish street (1918, Spanish flu) - Assassination of Prime Minister Eduardo Dato (1921)

In 1919, while Spain had to suffer from the post war slowdown, another general strike would give way to an eight-hour work day among other concessions. Then, in a typical scenario, the Spanish Socialists split over the issue of the Third International, giving way to a Communist party in Spain (even two for a time).
Meanwhile in Morroco, ever since its 1898 loss, Spain had upped its investment and from 1909, intervened militarily on several occasions in the Rif to pacify a region that was negotiated and confirmed by a 1912 treaty into its influence sphere. Yet, Spanish military endeavours here were rather costly and inefficient, and in 1921, the Disaster of Annual struck. With the Spanish army under Silvestre ambushed and routed by Berber rebels under Abd el-Krim, all gains made in the previous decade were undone; yet, the war dragged on. Back in Spain, the debate between partisans and opponent of the presence in Morroco was increasingly polarized, and ultimately in 1923, Primo de Rivera took power in a coup. The stalemate in Morroco would last until Abd-el Krim committed in 1925 the fatal mistake of attacking the French who then joined their forces to the conflict. In 1926, Abd el-Krim surrendered and so went down his short lived Republic of the Rif.

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In order : Bodies of Spanish soldiers on Annual battlefield (Monte Arruit, 1922) - Franco-Spanish landing at Alhucemas (Rif, 1925) - King Alfonso XIII, Primo de Rivera and junta members

Thereafter, Primo de Rivera's dictatorship went on, smoothly at first, lavishly spending on public projects, but doing so, plunged Spain's finances into red, and eventually managed to alienate everyone. When the Great Depression struck, he was dismissed. The monarchy however didn't survive the stain of its association with the dictatorship and after a Republican breakout in April 1931 local elections, Alfonso XIII left the country for exile, yet without abdicating. Not that this non abdication or even the formal victory of pro monarchy candidates (the Republicans had broken out in cities while monarchists had won in the rural districts) mattered since the Second Republic was proclaimed not long after.

So, that's it for the little-ish background.
What's changing ITTL? In the 1920s, not much really. The late 1918 pod in Russia isn't going to change much to the Spanish domestic situation and to what's happening in Morroco. The Spanish army, eing what it was, is still going to lose it bad at Annual, Primo de Rivera is still going to take power, and there is no reason I see for Abd el-Krim not committing his OTL mistake of taking the fight to the French. So, we are still heading into 1930 then 1931 with the fall of the dictatorship and the Second Republic.
Yet, this not much contains a key development, that changes little until the Republic happens.


As in France, and elsewhere I suppose, the Communist party was born out of a split with the mainstream Socialists (PSOE) of the time. In Spain, that was because of the question of the adhesion to the Third International. Because of that split, the Socialists were rid of most radical elements. During the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, the PSOE under Julian Besteiro pursued a collaborationnist stance with the regime, endearing it little to other opposition parties, leading to Socialists being out of the Republican Alliance founded in 1926, a coalition of opposition groups to establish a republican regime, with whom the relations were often marked with distrust, especially from Alejandro Lerroux. Lerroux' Radical Republicans would then suffer a split with its left Radical Socialist wing under Marcelino Domingo, and the antagonism between Radicals and the Socialists would lead to the end of the Bienno Reformista and the OTL victory of the right wing CEDA in 1933 elections.

So, ITTL, the PSOE doesn't split. What it does mean is that the Socialists have a stronger left wing. So when come the time to elect a successor to the defunct Pablo Iglesias as leader of the PSOE, Julian Besteiro is defeated by Indalecio Prieto and others, like Fernando de los Rios, opposed to collaboration with Primo de Rivera. Then in 1926, the Socialists under Prieto join the Republican Alliance as a founding member. From that point, though antagonism between Socialists and Radicals is not butterflied away, the collaboration within the frame of the Republican Alliance lessen the tensions and delay any outburst. A first noticeable consequence is the absence of the Radical Socialist split in 1929, allowing the still united Radical Republican party to win the general elections of 1931 (IOTL, Lerroux Radicals with 90 seats and Domingo Radical Socialists with 61 seats were, with 151 seats together, outperforming the Socialists and their 115 seats).

Into the Second Republic, I make it giving way to a much different political landscape and government following 1931 elections.
The Radicals would come on top, with Socialists a strong second. At this point however, Francisco Largo Caballero would have taken over PSOE from Prieto, going hard on the left as I suspect him of political opportunism on this, given his OTL pedigree, I'd see him radicalizing after he sees his and Besteiro's collaborationist line defeated - while Prieto goes moderate. This TTL development reflects an OTL one, where in an irony of fate, during 1920s, Largo Caballero was considered the moderate and Prieto the radical, for roles to be switched barely half a decade later. Thus, when it comes to form coalition for government, the more hard left Socialists under Largo Caballero cannot be convinced into a coalition with center and center-left parties. On their side, the Radicals are strong enough on their own to get a supporting majority without the Socialists and for the Radicals' left wing under Domingo to see Socialists' demands for a coalition as unreasonable and not worth a split over the issue, yet.
Meanwhile, Manuel Azaña's Republican Action wins more seats since, with Socialists more on the left and the Radical Socialists still sticking to the Radicals and the center, there is a larger room on the center left for Azaña's party to thrive on, yet not to the point of significantly altering the balance of power.
The result after 1931 elections is a thoroughly centrist government under Lerroux.

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In order, figures of the centrist coalition : Manuel Azaña (Republican Action), Marcelino Domingo (Radical Republican), Diego Martinez Barrio (Radical Republican), Alejandro Lerroux (Radical Republican), Niceto Alcala Zamora (Liberal Republican)

The TTL 1931-1933 period that follows is marked by a much more moderate tone than Azaña's IOTL. That's primarily because Lerroux and the Radicals are in command and less prone to "radical" reforms (which is ironical given the party's name). Yet, tensions are simmering between the center and the center left, and though Domingo hasn't walked out and Azaña begrudgingly supports the government, at some point, in 1933, the tension would reach its boiling point. The lack of reform and the impact of the Great Depression eventually bring Azaña to the breaking point, and the Republican Action to quit the government coalition over some pretext, be it an early Straperlo affair or another scandal or event. This is when the descent to hell and fascism of Spain begins ITTL, with this being considered the tipping point here because of what follows.

Following the Republican Left defection, Lerroux gambles on early elections (late spring/early summer I think). But if he does not lose them technically, he does not win them either - unlike Azaña whose party has lost many seats to Socialists. Worse even, both extreme left and extreme right, the Socialists of Largo Caballero and the CEDA of Gil-Robles have surged, making it mathematically impossible for a government to exist without support from one of them, and that's a support that none are actually willing to lend. At this point, the political situation becomes chaotic. President Alcala Zamora, like IOTL, is unwilling to let the CEDA into power, while Lerroux is open to a coalition with them. The first attempt at a government is entrusted to Martinez Barrio who tries the minority government path. Yet, Republican Action is refusing another coalition with Radicals, and while Martinez Barrio is willing to extend an hand to the left, he is not willing to go too far, both because he fears losing support from the right wing of Radicals and because Socialists may look too radical yet. That causes the long delayed split with Radical Socialists to happen, then the effort collapses all together because of a military coup attempt by Sanjurjo, the OTL Sanjurjada of 1932 delayed by about a year - because the government has been centrist and moderate instead of the radical OTL one, so the coup happens only when political instability erupts. The coup attempt is defeated but Martinez Barrio quits and is replaced by a returning Lerroux who attempts a coalition with the CEDA, an option reluctantly agreed to by Alcala Zamora on condition of Radicals leading the government. Yet, Gil-Robles has been all the more emboldened by this chaos not to go along smoothly and demands a high price, purposely to get them rejected. Then, Martinez Barrio's centrist wing of the Radicals is unwilling to follow Lerroux' further on that path and in turn break away from the Radical party too (which happened IOTL with the formation of the Radical Democrat party in 1934 on similar grounds). This leaves Alcala Zamora no other choice than to dissolve again and call a second early elections later in 1933.

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In order, respective leaders of Frente Popular and Frente Nacional : Francisco Largo Caballero (PSOE), Jose Maria Gil-Robles y Quiñones (CEDA)

This second election of 1933 is marking the failure of the centrist way in Spain, a reflection of "the center cannot hold". The failure of the Radicals to reform enough the country and the economic conditions have fostered frustration resentment and the chaos between both election has seen the political landscape polarizing at a dramatic pace. While the first TTL elections of 1933 would have been on the narrative of the Center against the extremes, the narrative of the second TTL elections of 1933 is Left vs Right, Frente Popular vs Frente Nacional. The result is a clear win for the Right and Gil-Robles. Exit President Niceto Alcala Zamora. For all the efforts he put at keeping Gil-Robles and the CEDA out of power, he gets impeached the same way he was by the Popular Front IOTL, and Alejandro Lerroux gets elected president in his stead, both as a mean for Gil-Robles to get an inconvenient partner out of sight and for Lerroux to end his political carreer with prestige. The end? Not quite. The victory of the Frente Nacional inflames further the Left, and like in the so called OTL Revolution of 1934, we have the country rocked by chaos.

IOTL, revolutionary strikes and Catalonia even seceded in October 1934, when it was revealed the government was intending to include ministers from Gil-Robles' CEDA. Yet, like the Asturian Miners Strike, these were suppressed in a relatively short time, as mobilization didn't go quite far; Catalonia's secession for instance only lasted a few hours. ITTL, this is quite different. No reformist biennum and the frustration, resentment of workers and peasants, along a more radical PSOE and a polarized Left lend more energy to the general strikes and its revolutionary tones. Yet, we are not quite at the point of a full blown civil war, and the government unleashes the army to "restore order". Enter General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano.

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In order, architect of the "National Republican Dictatorship" : Gonzalo Queipo de Llano (army general), Miguel Maura (Liberal/Conservative republican)

Even though General Queipo de Llano ended up in the Nationalist camp IOTL when civil war broke out, it's good noticing he began well a decade earlier as a staunch pro Republican officer, involved in plots against Primo de Rivera. Yet, his carreer prospects dithered under the Republic, and probably out of resentment, he eventually turned his back on that regime. ITTL, he ends up differently. Queipo was a close friend and ally of Alcala-Zamora, his son marrying the president's daughter, and had a tendency to get himself involved in politics. His interference cost him his positions due to the left under Azaña getting to him, though he would recover some responsibilities with support from Lerroux and Gil-Robles IOTL, and later, Alcala-Zamora was impeached by this same leftist government that cast him out in the first instance. I mind these may explain, in part at least he would have been holding a serious grudge against the Popular Front. Yet ITTL, the situation, the context is quite different. Queipo de Llano hasn't fallen out of favor yet; since the Left hasn't been in power, his views would have been more in accordance with Lerroux and the Radicals' centrist way, avoiding friction between him and the government, for the time being. Later on however, as the first elections of 1933 create instability, Sanjurjo attempts a coup, and the Radicals' centrist direction is apparently falling out of favor, you get Queipo beginning to think; after all, he had already conspired. It so happens that IOTL in June 1936, Miguel Maura, son of a former prime minister and liberal right politician, had called for a National Republican Dictatorship to save the country from the threat of both extremes, and idea that would ITTL be formulated three years in advance and be taken up by a "sympathetic" general Queipo de Llano for consideration. However such an idea wouldn't get past the idea and planning stages before the second elections of 1933. After the second election, first the impeachment of Alcala-Zamora whom Queipo was a close friend and then the revolutionary general strikes hitting the country, and Catalonia seceding, the events are inciting Queipo de Llano to "save the Republic".

Thus, we have Gil-Robles facing a military coup by Queipo de Llano. Still not the end. Just the 'end of the beginning'. Queipo fails to achieve decisive success and arrest the government. The hard Left refuses to support him, and Gil-Robles is still free and active in rallying loyalists against the putschists. Queipo de Llano's avowed goal to set up a National Republican Dictatorship could well have succeed, with tentative support from moderate parties from center left to center right, even perhaps from Lerroux, ever a political opportunist (and potential back-stabber, but that's a development that's not decided yet), but here, it would be probably too late, or not enough. Gil-Robles' repression effort against the revolutionary strikes falters as the army split between pro government and pro junta units, allowing the Left revolutionaries to recover from whatever losses they may have suffered initially and expand control, and Queipo de Llano is caught between two factions that are equally unwilling to accept his rule. There, we begin a three way civil war.

The endgame
here, without surprise as I said at the beginning of this post, is meant to be a victory for government loyalists. I've not settled the details of the how, and how long, but at least I have settled how it would break out. Ultimately, Gil-Robles will keep on a legalist path of government, but circumstances will drive him ever more authoritarian as time goes, leading to Spain becoming a quasi fascist state, not as monolithic as was Francoist Spain (Gil-Robles' CEDA was not the Falange yet, but these were allies of convenience). Italian and German support here would be even more open than IOTL as they would be supporting the official government.

So, to sum it up :
1920/1921 : PSOE doesn't split.
1925 : Indalecio Prieto is elected as PSOE's leader on anti regime platform.
1926 : Socialists join the Republican alliance.
1929 : Radicals don't split.
1930/1931 : The dictatorship collapses, the monarchy is abolished and the Second Republic proclaimed.
1931 : Radicals (Lerroux, Martinez Barrio, Domingo) win general election, make coalition government with Liberal Republicans (Alcala-Zamora, Maura) and Republican Action (Azaña).
1931-1933 : About 20 months of centrist government, with moderate reforms, fail to address properly the Great Depression and appease the people.
1933 : Azaña quits coalition; Alcala-Zamora and Lerroux call for early elections. PSOE and CEDA surge, Radicals fail to form a government and split. Sanjurjo attempts a coup. Second elections give victory to Frente Nacional and Gil-Robles becomes Prime Minister. President Alcala-Zamora is impeached. Catalonia secedes and the PSOE launches a general strike. Queipo de Llano launches a coup, fails to capture the government. Spain descends into a three way civil war between Popular Front revolutionary government (Largo Caballero, PSOE, trade unions, anarchists), National Republican Dictatorship (Queipo de Llano, with ex Radicals, Republican Action, liberal republicans) and the legal Frente Nacional government (Gil-Robles with CEDA, ex Radicals, Falange, Carlists, monarchists ...).
1934 : Meanwhile in Andorra, a Russian adventurer, Boris Skossyref convinces locals to crown him as their king ^^.

Note that I have overlooked developments, including details of what's precisely happening during the centrist period of 1931-1933 and the takeover of PSOE by Largo Caballero, but I'll probably come back to that later on.
 
I'm back
Hi,

So, it has been two years and a half since I did not post there, but for those who were interested and might still be, the TL has always been in working. To be honnest, my lack of posting there has more to do with my difficult experience of the past two years, not the least because of the pandemic induced social disruption in my personal and professional life.

Yet, I was not decided on dropping what I've come to view as my magnum opus; hell yeah, I would have already written out a proper TL if not for the perfectionnist and scientific instinct that does not tolerate any less than years of research into academic resources before writing it, sometimes at my despair of ever seeing this come to light.

Aknowledging that I'll need a lot of organization for this to proceed more or less smoothly, which I've begun to set up little by little, investing in the research of academic material to source upon, I've settled on a TL schedule I hope will allow it to be regular:
  • When it comes, I intend it to be in post of 4 months of TL per post, excluding addenda, over the course of January 1918 to December 2017.
  • That would make 300 updates, at a planned rate of 1 per week; including some room for pauses and unforeseen delays, I expect these 300 updates to span over between 6 to 8 years ( 313 to 415 weeks).
  • To ensure this production, I'll make sure to accumulate enough posts worth 25 to 30 years of TL (one to two years of updates), so I have enough time to write down the following updates ahead. That probably won't before another 5 to 6 years I think.
The outline I've worked up so far, which we discuss in this thread and that is more of a working basis to orientate my research, though with still many holes, is advanced enough for the 1920s/1930s that I have a good idea how things will go worldwide and I hope to have a more or less complete one of this period within a year, in time for my 2023 rugby world cup break ^^'. I've stacked not a few books about this period on my shelves, and if the next year is productive, I may begin actually writing after the World Cup (yeah, I'm very serious on the whole rugby thing :cool: ).

I'd like to thank those who in private messaging helped me to keep the drafting of the TL going on through these past years, especially @Salvador79 with whom I discussed the most, developed and often improved the ideas I could lay, and who convinced me at last to write here the results of two years and a half of reflection and outline work.

So, in the next couple weeks or so, I shall put out these updates, but for the time being, a rough preview of these:
  • Conquest of Space (1940s-2020s) : How from the TTL cold war, we get by the early 2020s permanent bases on the Moon and on Mars, booming space tourism, the premises of asteroid mining...
  • Dynamics and culture of urban development, transportation, and environmentalism (1940s-2020s) : Fans of railroads, here's a better world for you.
  • Rugby (1930s-1950s) : How to get a rugby union world cup three decades in advance ot OTL...
  • Weimar Germany (1920-1934) : Spoiler, Ebert lives ...
  • Hungary (1918-mid 1930s) : The return of the King, but for how long ?
  • Poland (early 1920s) : Death of a Marshall.
  • Central Asia and Muslim Democracy (1920s-1930s)
  • Western China and Mongolia (1920s-1980s) : Feudalism in the modern time, guerillas, and a couple nukes...
  • Second Russo-Japanese War (1930s)
  • Second War of the Pacific (1930s) : In Latin America, viva la revolucion!
  • Lloyd George's new deal (1930s) : Britain and Canada into the Great Depression
  • Czechoslovak Crisis (1938) : The seeds of a cold war
  • India and Southeast Asia (1940s-1950s) : Decolonization begins, but it's not a quiet road.
  • Dynamics of a united India (1950s-1980s)
I will try putting a couple ones by saturday, hopefully more.
 
I am so glad this is back out in the open forum! Hopefully, we'll have lots of interesting discussions around here!
(What is certainly going to be 100 % new to me is the parts about rugby, but then again, I wouldn't know because I really don't know anything about the game.)
 
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