WI: a SR Russia and Long America - The Century of the Common Man

[Shevek23]

I forgot to mention how I like Samuels and the Liberal ascendency, though I do think that Labour ought to have a long time in the sun too. I especially enjoy how Samuels is Jewish and what that must do to Hitler's blood pressure!

You sure Hitler won't do something very very stupid with a provocation like that in his face all decade?

I'm not sure a Polish/Czechoslovak alliance will do the trick to keep Hitler in check--certainly if this alliance is in turn strongly backed even if only by Britain. Russia and Poland are unlikely to play nice together even without Stalin, unfortunately. I actually was wondering if it might be better if Russia did somewhat better versus Poland in 1920, pushing to the Curzon Line and annexing OTL interwar east Poland into Belarus early, because that would put the Russian border onto the Czechoslovak border, and allow the Russians to offer to come to CS aid directly.

But if we have OTL borders and Poland is strongly backed by at least Britain then Hitler would be a great fool to try something against an allied CS. Maybe he'd go pick a fight with Yugoslavia instead? But there too Entente elements are likely to check him and the benefits of winning would be much more petty.

All that is really needed is a resolutely anti-Nazi France; the trouble is the French were very badly burned by the last war.

I'd rather see Hitler and the Nazi regime destroyed than contemplate any cold war, no matter how pathetic the Reich is by the end of it. Because that is what containment means for Germany. No foreign markets, no ability to import global resources, selfish and greedy leadership by fanatical sociopaths--it is a hell of a fate for the Germans. I am quite serious when I say that it would be better for Germany to be defeated again, the sooner the better. But it would also be wrong to start a war preemptively, so as long as he can keep his cool, the Reich will grind on.

I need to carefully read over the situation in East Asia to understand it.

 

[galileo-034]

I thank you for that interesting lecture on economic and social theory.

If our thinking may be similar over the approach, we may diverge on the end. In this TL, it's less about enforcing Long's vision than to set up an environment where he'd try, and depict how realistic that could go, how far, etc. I don't intend for a socialist dystopian, but I would be satisfied with Long and the commonwealth/progressive (I've not yet decided the term) setting the US towards a more 'progressive' mentality, more in the vein of the Nordic model perhaps, to develop an American brand of 'welfare capitalism'.

The coup attempt will not make Long or his allies all powerful nor destroy the opposition. It would be led by a small number of 'concerned' important figures, but you would find enough congressman and statewide officials to ensure both Republicans and Democratic survival through the crisis. What the coup attempt gives to Long is a shot, a window of opportunity that is not going to last forever, just for the time Republicans and Democrats are 'disorientated', 'scared' by the fallout of the conspiracy, before they eventually bounce back and they will. They would do the "these people were misleaded, they don't represent what this party stand for, etc".
As for the progressive coalition in power along Long, their primary base would be essentially rural, blue collar. Their inroad into the middle class is essentially born out of heavy unemployment and disaffection for traditional parties (especially after the perceived failure of Smith administration), and though there is potential for Progressives to expand their electoral base into urban middle class, its support isn't granted for Long; he would be I think to many a 'necessary evil' that finally get some progress done, but these people could wake one day and decide what he has done by then is enough and switch back to more moderate traditional parties. Long coalition may be strong, and almost have a free hand for two or three election cycles after the coup attempt, but they are by no mean absolutely powerful. Long Democrats face opposition back in South from conservatives (which would make elections more competitive ITTL than under past Democratic or now Republican hegemony with the primary being the actual election, at least until the civil rights get into play, but we are not yet to that time), Farmer-Labor and Non Partisan League are not immune to local Dem-Rep coalitions, ...

As for Russia, the civil war as it plays out for SRs involve less of tsarist officer as you may think, or so I think based on my understanding. SR victory is essentially the work of the Czechoslovak legion combined with disgruntled SRs from the dissolved Constituent Assembly (which they dominated) rising up and forming a powerful militia force. It wouldn't until after the fall and winter of 1918 that the importance of former tsarist cadres would be felt as a common anti Bolshevik would be formed. By September 1918, the opposition is actually divided between several factions that are all fighting Reds when they don't fight between themselves, and at Kazan and Sviyazhsk, it's one of them that gave the deadly blow.
For instance, the early victory of the Czechoslovak-People's Army of Komuch means the Volunteers Army in Caucasus never get foreign support: for Entente powers, the civil war is already over and they got rid of dangerous Bolsheviks.
Based on the legitimacy from the election of November 1917, the Constituent Assembly would be probably aknowledged by Entente nations as the legitimate government of Russia, especially when we consider SRs' denounciation of the treaty of Brest-Livotsk; if not for that, the left SR uprising and the assassination of the German ambassador are speaking high enough of SRs opinions on what relations should be with Germany, and the Entente would be more than ready to get Russia back into the fray.
Probably, the Constituent Assembly government would spend a couple years before pacifying the Russian territory.
A precision on the relations of SRs with the breakaway states, I think that diplomatic pressure from Entente powers would have them more amenable to aknowledging various independences: Finland, Baltic countries, Poland albeit within borders closer to the Curzon line, Armenia and Georgia. I'm not sure about the viability of Belarus so I can't speak on it. As it comes to Ukraine, between Petliura and Makhno, there is enough of a case for independence, but keeping Crimea and Sevastopol in Russian hands (as it wasn't yet part of Ukraine then), and for Azerbaijan, independence may last a time, but I am of the opinion that even SRs would value too much Baku oil to give it up and would invade at some point on some pretext. As for Turkestan, except for the Basmachi insurgency, there is not yet a local government to make that claim and it would eventually die down during the pacification.

 

[galileo-034]

I forgot to mention how I like Samuels and the Liberal ascendency, though I do think that Labour ought to have a long time in the sun too. I especially enjoy how Samuels is Jewish and what that must do to Hitler's blood pressure!

You sure Hitler won't do something very very stupid with a provocation like that in his face all decade?

I'm not sure a Polish/Czechoslovak alliance will do the trick to keep Hitler in check--certainly if this alliance is in turn strongly backed even if only by Britain. Russia and Poland are unlikely to play nice together even without Stalin, unfortunately. I actually was wondering if it might be better if Russia did somewhat better versus Poland in 1920, pushing to the Curzon Line and annexing OTL interwar east Poland into Belarus early, because that would put the Russian border onto the Czechoslovak border, and allow the Russians to offer to come to CS aid directly.

But if we have OTL borders and Poland is strongly backed by at least Britain then Hitler would be a great fool to try something against an allied CS. Maybe he'd go pick a fight with Yugoslavia instead? But there too Entente elements are likely to check him and the benefits of winning would be much more petty.

All that is really needed is a resolutely anti-Nazi France; the trouble is the French were very badly burned by the last war.

I'd rather see Hitler and the Nazi regime destroyed than contemplate any cold war, no matter how pathetic the Reich is by the end of it. Because that is what containment means for Germany. No foreign markets, no ability to import global resources, selfish and greedy leadership by fanatical sociopaths--it is a hell of a fate for the Germans. I am quite serious when I say that it would be better for Germany to be defeated again, the sooner the better. But it would also be wrong to start a war preemptively, so as long as he can keep his cool, the Reich will grind on.

I need to carefully read over the situation in East Asia to understand it.

On Poland's border, you can read post 16 on it.

Anyway, Poland and Russia getting along is not really needed. First, Russia is more valuable to Paris and London than is Poland, and then it's not like Poland had much choice given that it was partly carved out of Prussian territory that Germans would want back. Also, with Czechoslovakia, Russia and France get a serious ally in central Europe, strong enough on its own, so as far as it matters checking on Germany, even Czechoslovakia is more of a priority; at this stage, Poland is just the country London and Paris would prefer remain friend with but not ready to sacrifice the alliance with Russia over it.
In the worst case scenario, you might even get Poland (in the more Curzon-esque border) allying with Nazi Germany against Russia.

As of how Germany makes it through that 'Cold War', you may look at MSZ's TL. Here, though there is less room on the continent for Germany, that doesn't mean Germany will be bereft of allies.
Right now, you get potentially Italy (as OTL), Hungary (a republic with strong fascist movements and a bad feeling about Trianon borders), Ukraine (anti semitism and nationalist anti Russian feelings), Poland (as cited above), Turkey (revenge against Greece and Entente for the carving up of Anatolia), Japan (as cited earlier) to cite the closest. We can also count on a number of fascist sympathizing regimes such as Portugal or some South American countries ...


As for Samuel, that's a suggestion of Pipisme, and though he is Jewish, I'm told he was not practicant but that Hitler anti semite rhetorics would stir up in him serious concern and help to stand to Germany.
On another note, I plead guilty of wanting Liberals back 'under the sun' as you say (I'm an 'extreme centrist' after all).


On Hitler, you may notice I opened a thread some time ago to see how far he could get, given how dangerous he was.
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/hitlers-parkinson-disease-condition.419148/
It seems that with his condition, he would not make it past the early 1950, my current estimate for TL purpose being around 1949-1950. He would then be succeeded by Himmler, Goering and all the military related power circles having fallen out of favor in the aftermath of the 1938 coup attempt.
Given that nuclear weapons wouldn't appear until at least the 1950s (the UK would be the first), you have with Himmler a more pragmatic leader than Hitler, so the risks of nuclear apocalypse are much reduced (not counting limited access by Germany to uranium ore).
At some point in the 1980s, I would see the Nazi regime being overthrown in a 'revolution', though more a military coup.

 

[galileo-034]

All that is really needed is a resolutely anti-Nazi France; the trouble is the French were very badly burned by the last war.

On that point, there may be an opening if I avoid Foreign Minister Louis Barthou's assassination in 1934, since he was considered a hawk on foreign policy issues.
I'm not yet sure how I can use ripples to justify it reasonably, but the Greek Civil War I'm planning for the 1930s ( post 14) may alter the context largely enough to do that, as Yugoslavia, bordering Italian coveted Albania and Greece will have probably a role in that civil war.

 

[galileo-034]

To set the Long presidency into perspective, there a recap of the conflicts I see breaking over the 1930-1936 period.
I mention external participants that come into the play at one point or another, not necessarily from the beginning.


Greek Civil War

Main protagonists

Republicans (government) vs Royalists (insurgents)​

Indirect participants

On Republicans' side

_ Great Britain, France, Yugoslavia, Albania, Russia, Armenia, Ottoman Sultanate*​

On Royalists' side

_ Italy, Germany, Turkey, Bulgaria, Hungary **
​

Context

The monarchy came out of the victorious war against Turkish Nationalists, and thus avoided to be overthrown as IOTL. However, Republican sentiment remained strong, and in the aftermath of the crash of 1929, they ride on heavy popular discontent over the management of the economic crisis. However, after a few year and lack of progress, Royalists under Ioannis Metaxas launch an uprising.
Under Mussolini, Italy is actively seeking to expand in the area, but is countered by a French-British-Yugoslavian front. Also, out of a desire to maintain the status quo over the Straits, Russia and its Armenian ally, are standing along French and British Middle East against Nationalists' designs over the Sultanate and the Greek Anatolian lands.
* The Ottoman Sultanate which govern the straits (except for Greek Eastern Thrace), leftover from partition of the Caliphate (both the Sultanate and the Republic are theoretically part of the Caliphate within a legal fiction created to settle the peace), is heavily reliant on international protection and very paranoid about being absorbed into Republican Turkey (the sultanate has also become a shelter place to opponents to the Nationalist regime).
** Hungary is eager to support Italy and secure its own position in the Balkans, notably against Yugoslavs, Czechoslovaks and Romanians.
Germany under Hitler is siding along Mussolini over the matter and is eager to train its military and industrial forces through such a proxy conflict. Bulgaria is looking for an opportunity to reverse WWI losses, and provides limited support for Royalists, but is refraining to make a committment as open as the fascists and take heavy diplomatic precautions.
The Greek civil war in that context is set to be a proxy conflict between Entente powers and the nascent Fascist bloc, with the control of the Eastern Mediterranean sea potentially at stake.
​

Second Pacific War

Main protagonists *

Bolivia vs Chilean Republic , Paraguay vs Chilean Socialist Republic​

Indirect participants *

On Paraguay's side
_ Argentina
On Bolivia's side
_ Italy, Germany​

* I've not yet drawn out the exact context, so there may be other active participants.

Context

By the summer of 1932, Chile has collapsed into civil war after a Socialist Revolutionary inspired junta has taken power and proclaimed a Socialist Republic (it's OTL, but ITTL, instead of a quick collapse, we get it lasting).
Meanwhile, in Bolivia, which the Depression has hit hard, the government is looking for a foreign war to provide relief from domestic tensions. A war with Paraguay over the Chaco region has been considered first, and indeed, the tensions have been rising here, but the breakout of the Chilean civil war has opened another window of opportunity, that of getting back lands lost to Chile in the half a century earlier and an access to the sea with the port of Antofagasta. That target is considered better suited than Chaco due to shorter supply line involved, less difficulties for aboriginal infantry to adapt the local climate, and a more favorable situation with Chile embroiled in a civil war and theoretically unable to resist much.
However, though the situation in Chaco hasn't yet devolved into an open war as Bolivia refrained itself at last moment, tensions have not disappeared and likely to cause the war to break out sooner or later, especially if the Bolivian invasion of Chile creates a false sense of confidence within Bolivian leadership.
Also, latent Germanophilia within Bolivian leadership is opening opportunities for German and Italian involvment, especially if Bolivia succeed in taking Antofagasta to open a sea route.​

Second Russo-Japanese War

Main protagonists

Russia, Fengtian China* vs Japan​

Indirect participants

On Russia's side

France, United Kingdom, KMT China*, Mongolia**​

On Japan's side

_ Fascist bloc​

*Depending on how I settle the Chinese reunification or no-reunification, KMT China might be a direct participant (if it takes over Manchuria). Otherwise, KMT will side with Russia against Japanese expansionist designs, even if it means supporting Fengtian China.

Context

Coming into the 1930s, Japan has turned more and more towards militarism and ultranationalism. Eventually, radical faction within the Imperial Army will provoke a war to take over Manchuria. However, against them is arrayed a coalition of nations decided to maintain the status quo in China, led by Russia which has been since the 1890s the primary contender of Japan expansion.
The fascist bloc is naturally inclined to support Japan to gain a powerful international ally, especially against Russia.
More than Manchuria, depending on how fares the Japanese army against the Russian army and its local allies, Korea may be also at stake.
** Meanwhile, the Mongolian Khanate is courted by both sides, but its government heavily influenced by exiled Russian Whites is seeking to maintain its independence both from China and Russia, but the balance of forces in the regions compells it to Russian friendly neutrality (mainly through transit rights).
​

 

[GohanLSSJ2]

So... will Germany still go Nazi, or will it have other possibilities? I always wanted to see someone develop a Strasserist Germany...

 

[galileo-034]

I have still to look into the details of post 1920 civil war German politics, but I'm on a course towards Nazi Germany, no WWII and a cold war between fascist and democratic blocs.

 

[GohanLSSJ2]

I have still to look into the details of post 1920 civil war German politics, but I'm on a course towards Nazi Germany, no WWII and a cold war between fascist and democratic blocs.

Please do.

I'm actually fascinated by your ideas. A Strasserist Germany (aka, "left-wing" National Socialists) would be a sort of wild card to your scenario. Fascistic, but with a Socialist ethos, at least rethorically.

 

[galileo-034]

Please do.

I'm actually fascinated by your ideas. A Strasserist Germany (aka, "left-wing" National Socialists) would be a sort of wild card to your scenario. Fascistic, but with a Socialist ethos, at least rethorically.

Honnestly, I don't know if I'm willing to take away with the character of Hitler whose irrational behaviour, warmongering temper and his possible Parkinson condition still make him, despite no WWII ITTL, a very attractive narrative element, especially if this means a duel of egos between Adolf Hitler and Huey Long, who once said "Don't liken me to that [SOB]".
http://www.hueylong.com/perspectives/huey-long-quotes-in-his-own-words.php#fascism

That said, given I butterflied Soviet Russia and the circumstances of the Communist rise in Germany, I have still to determine how the political scene will play out in the aftermath of the German civil war. I mind that despite no Soviet Russia, German communists may still attempt to form a Communist party, but not one at Moscow's orders, and it is not impossible that at least Otto Strasser, who I see was once in SPD then USPD (and from there, perhaps not much of a gap to TTL's KPD), could develop a separate party or embody the far left against Hitler.

 

[galileo-034]

Hi,

Though I think having made clear enough Long's anti-imperialist take on foreign policy, ie not necessarily an isolationnist, I'm thinking more to Huey Long's possible foreign policy. I would believe he could here go along Theodore Roosevelt's lines, but up to which point?

As Long goes into his first term, the three conflicts I mentionned above are over or almost so. Still, the first standoff, right on US' doorstep would be Japan. Defeated on the mainland, Japan would then still be a primary naval power, not to say superpower, in the region, turning its eyes in a more indirect strategy, targeting French Indochina, but also and especially the soon to become independent India (as an undivided dominion though) and the Philippines (strategic position in the South China Sea, but right in the middle of the American sphere). In Europe, the fascist bloc could be thought as placated by Entente powers (FR-UK-RU) so not much a priority for Americans, but Japan and its mandates across the Pacific Ocean are a much more immediate rival, both ideologically and economically.

 

[Thomas1195]

Just have some thoughts. A Progressive Republican would be a much better candidate for this period if FDR can't be elected, since such candidate, unlike a Democrat/Candidate wouldn't have to compromise towards the South regarding civil rights. My ideal candidates would be either Henry Wallace (but as a Republican) or either of the La Follette brothers. The latter were already particularly famous for "good government" in Wisconsin, with many of their policies foreshadowed the New Deal IOTL. Also, a Wallace presidency in a non-Communist world would have led to a better place for The Third World.

Long was still some kind of a left-wing Southern Democrats, who were economically left-wing but racist and generally opposed to civil rights. There was a reason why most Progressives opposed Populism.

 

[galileo-034]

My view of the 'progressive group' (ie socialists, farmer-labor, non partisan league, progressive republicans) is that it's too loose and spread as a patchwork of regional parties and factions. It fundamentally lacks a person with high enough, national, standing and appeal to make it into a winning party. La Follette Sr did the job in 1924, as did Theodore Roosevelt in 1912 with more success, but none of the other possible candidates have, Wallace or either of La Follette brothers, not yet. By 1932, Huey Long is the only one that can do the job, throwing into the ring heavy charisma, oratorical skill and populism.
The main reason of the alliance between Long and the the northern progressives are to help each other breaking the regional confinement and get national outreach, without which none of the two can achieve separately and therefore have any chance of winning the election against establishment parties as showed in 1912 and 1924 (both IOTL and ITTL).
As you may see in the 1932 map, Long wasn't able to spoil Smith's win (but that wasn't far), he did not fare as good as La Follette in the Great Plains and Rocky states (in many cases, I had Smith winning over Long due to that skepticism over Long's populist accents and southerner's status), and he won only a couple more points than La Follette nationally because of that and complete lack of appeal in Midwest and Northeast which I deem usually siding with the liberal/moderate establishment (I've not yet computed ATL 1924 numbers, but the difference to the OTL result is just under 5 points and likely to decrease as TTL La Follette numbers will be better in 1924); however, the point is to made he has indeed performed better on the popular vote nonetheless, that he made wins on national, not just regional, scale, and above else, more than doubled the electoral score.

So, that reason is the base of what I call the "Long's coalition" as this alliance hasn't yet evolved into a formal party into Long's first term; though there is a party in 1936, it's just meant to support Long's candidacy and coordinate congressional and state runs (it would be important in California 1934 gubernatorial election to avoid spoiling Sinclair's voter base), not to have a much coherent structure or platform.

On racism and civil rights, they weren't much of an issue at the time.
As far as I know, Long wasn't more racist than average southerners of the time, and of a kind of cultural racism if I can call that so; from the whole picture of Long's character, much tainted with political opportunism, I would go as far as to say he didn't care on race, nor he was necessarily opposed to civil rights else than because of a "that's not an issue today" position and avoiding to alienate southern voters. His agenda was focused on economic policies above all. In coherence with his populist and opportunist persona, I would think he would avoid at any cost such divisive issues while he can easily and widely rally around his radical economic platform.
And as I see effects of his economic and labor policies in Lousiana, it seems the African community benefited much from them; one example I have often in mind is Huey P Newton (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Huey_P._Newton) named after Huey Long as a testimony to his legacy among the African community of Louisiana.

Note I'm not trying to do the 'Huey Long' or populism apologist, just to put things back in their context, the Great Depression, and avoiding biases, as well mine as those of history and dark legends. My choice of Huey Long wasn't one from the beginning, but one I think as a logical consequence of the 1920s political landscape I outlined; one of the purposes of this thread is also to show the evolution of my thinking of the TL. Actually, I came into the 1932 election after having removed FDR from the scene (no VP spot in 1920, a defeat against Theodore Roosevelt Jr in the 1924 New York gubernatorial election and his physical condition as reasons), so I looked for high profile figures to stand up to Al Smith and fill FDR place, but I couldn't find any with enough appeal except for Huey Long.

To speak of the populism in this time, it may be useful to note that in 1932, Long was actively suppported only by the Farmer-Labor and the Non Partisan League; for Socialists, I'm not sure, but either way, as with the La Follette progressives, failing to endorse because of distate for his populism, they would keep from fielding candidates at the very least.
However, as social tensions and passions rise through Al Smith's term with heavy disappointment over government policies, those skeptical such as moderate La Follette Progressive Republicans or even Socialists would eventually join forces with Long, Farmer-Labor and NPL. Still, distrust, regionalism and factionalism would keep things this way for a long time.
Actually, it's based on this very skepticism and fractionous landscape that I argue of the guardrails against Long's would be 'dictatorial' habits as he must continuously ensure their support with compromises, concessions...
As a showcase, I plan to cover extensively the 1934 midterms and especially the California gubernatorial election to show that evolution in the web of left-wing alliances that would be the Long's coalition.

 

[dcharles]

I computed approximate numbers and adjusted the margins imagined above, taking also into account that some way, since Long embodies the radical left, Smith is perceived more moderate than FDR was IOTL and thus takes into Hoover OTL voters. Still, I used

We end up with :

View attachment 319277

Smith/Garner [D] : 272 EVs, 41.6% of PV (~ 16.5 M votes)
Hoover/Curtis [R] : 167 EVs, 37.1% of PV (~ 14.7 M votes)
Long/Olson [Ind] : 92 EVs, 21.3% of PV (~ 8.5 M votes)


EDIT : Here a map of Long's margins.

View attachment 319572​

I realize this is way late, but I just found the TL and I thought it might come up if you do more work on this period.

I think Long's greatest areas of strength are going to mirror very closely the areas that were the OTL nineteenth century populist strongholds--so Georgia and North Carolina rather than South Carolina. I also think that Wisconsin, with their strong progressive tradition, would be a likely candidate.

I'm unclear as to why the Democrats would nominate Al Smith, who's already a two-time loser, in 1932.

 

[galileo-034]

Well, I didn't set up an extensive survey of the political landscape state by state through the 1920s, but I'm working on it when I can find time.

In Wisconsin as in other states in the northwest, as I mentionned above, I counted in that Long's southerner status and populist accents would not be as well received as in more radical states as Minnesota, as Wisconsin is more influenced by the progressive republicans of the La Follette brand than the Farmer-Laborites. Also, as Democrats are still standing as the primary opposition to the Republicans and the coalition backing Long an obscure populist group, many three way races end with Smith wins.

In Georgia and North Carolina, I get your point.
In Georgia's case, I gave it to Smith on a razor's edge margin so he can secure the 266 EVs threshold (Democrats having a majority of delegations by then wouldn't have changed the outcome and I decided it was better to keep it out of the House).
In North Carolina, I think I put it in Smith column because of Republicans acting here as a spoiler.
As of South Carolina, I put it in Long's column because of the recent Tillmanite era. As I deemed Long likely appealing to what made Tillman success here in the 1890s, among the lower white poor classes against the Democratic establishment.

On Smith being nominated, not counting the three runs for nomination match the OTL ones, the defeats of 1924 and 1928 have also been considered as kind of successes for the Democrats.
At the time, there have only been two Democratic presidents since the Reconstruction, Cleveland (1885-1889, 1893-1897) and Wilson (1913-1919 [ TTL he dies of his strokes]). The big difficulty has always been breaking out of the South. And through the 1920s that were a period of Republican renewed hegemony, Smith had been consistently able to break the isolation of Democrats.

In 1924, he is nominated after a heavily contested convention. Though he would lose much of South, which would be blamed on virulent KKK anti catholic and anti Underwood campaign (events which would have huge consequences on the southern political landscape when time would come to settle scores), Al Smith made big inroads in the North and set the pattern that would be the OTL base for FDR New Deal coalition.
In 1928, he is nominated essentially because noone wants the job in what is expected as another Republican 'landslide'. Then, learning on the lessons of 1924, he would campaign better (in 1924 TTL, he would have been also handicapped by the bad campaigning he OTL did in 1928, but here, it's a second run with previous experience to begin on), take back the South solidly and even capture the New York and souther New England area.

In 1932, as I put FDR out of the picture, he is the only Democratic figure with enough influence to have a chance at the convention and with enough appeal and name recognition outside the South to win the election.
I've not found serious northern alternatives, but I doubt that they would match his pedigree (FDR was at least both a former VP nominee and New York governor).
It may be hard to imagine he runs three times before winning, but in my country, that was famous François Mitterand's feat (defeats in 1965 against de Gaulle, 1974 against Giscard but victory in the 1981 rematch).

 

[dcharles]

What a great response. I appreciate you putting so much time into it.

In Wisconsin as in other states in the northwest, as I mentionned above, I counted in that Long's southerner status and populist accents would not be as well received as in more radical states as Minnesota, as Wisconsin is more influenced by the progressive republicans of the La Follette brand than the Farmer-Laborites. Also, as Democrats are still standing as the primary opposition to the Republicans and the coalition backing Long an obscure populist group, many three way races end with Smith wins.

This makes sense. My counterpoint, for what it's worth, would be that Long is not a Southerner's Southerner. He speaks with a local accent, obviously, but he doesn't take every opportunity he's on a stage to start talking about "n*****, n*****, n*****," which is what a lot/most of Southern politicians did during the era. Long and Estes Kefauver, were notably (and like everything else here, debatably) the only Southern politicians with truly national profiles before LBJ. They were both very liberal racially. I think that Long is a Southerner (and probably the only one) who could carry Wisconsin at the time, but I also think your argument is reasonable, and I think this is an area where two reasonable people can disagree.

In Georgia and North Carolina, I get your point.
In Georgia's case, I gave it to Smith on a razor's edge margin so he can secure the 266 EVs threshold (Democrats having a majority of delegations by then wouldn't have changed the outcome and I decided it was better to keep it out of the House).

I see.

In North Carolina, I think I put it in Smith column because of Republicans acting here as a spoiler.
As of South Carolina, I put it in Long's column because of the recent Tillmanite era. As I deemed Long likely appealing to what made Tillman success here in the 1890s, among the lower white poor classes against the Democratic establishment.

This is exactly why I don't think South Carolina will break away from the Democrats for anything other than hardcore racism. Tillman's appeal was his racism. South Carolina was majority black until the great migration, and Tillman and his outlandish bigotry were always far more popular than the big-p Populists or small-p economic populism. Ditto Mississippi. Tillman is way more like Vardaman than he is Tom Watson. In general, South Carolina has always been a stronghold of establishment Southern conservatism. It was the most planter dominated state before the Civil War, the Southern state least vulnerable to the Populists in the 1890s (I'm pretty sure that the legislature still elected Senators until the Constitution was amended), and the state which was among the very first to break for Dixiecrats and go Republican after the Civil Rights Era. White supremacy has always been the guiding light of South Carolina politics.


I say this as someone who was raised in South Carolina and Louisiana.

On Smith being nominated, not counting the three runs for nomination match the OTL ones, the defeats of 1924 and 1928 have also been considered as kind of successes for the Democrats.
At the time, there have only been two Democratic presidents since the Reconstruction, Cleveland (1885-1889, 1893-1897) and Wilson (1913-1919 [ TTL he dies of his strokes]). The big difficulty has always been breaking out of the South. And through the 1920s that were a period of Republican renewed hegemony, Smith had been consistently able to break the isolation of Democrats.

In 1924, he is nominated after a heavily contested convention. Though he would lose much of South, which would be blamed on virulent KKK anti catholic and anti Underwood campaign (events which would have huge consequences on the southern political landscape when time would come to settle scores), Al Smith made big inroads in the North and set the pattern that would be the OTL base for FDR New Deal coalition.
In 1928, he is nominated essentially because noone wants the job in what is expected as another Republican 'landslide'. Then, learning on the lessons of 1924, he would campaign better (in 1924 TTL, he would have been also handicapped by the bad campaigning he OTL did in 1928, but here, it's a second run with previous experience to begin on), take back the South solidly and even capture the New York and souther New England area.

In 1932, as I put FDR out of the picture, he is the only Democratic figure with enough influence to have a chance at the convention and with enough appeal and name recognition outside the South to win the election.
I've not found serious northern alternatives, but I doubt that they would match his pedigree (FDR was at least both a former VP nominee and New York governor).
It may be hard to imagine he runs three times before winning, but in my country, that was famous François Mitterand's feat (defeats in 1965 against de Gaulle, 1974 against Giscard but victory in the 1981 rematch).

I understand where you're coming from, but to my way of thinking, there's two issues. One, this seems like a success compared to OTL, because OTL, the Democrats lost by the largest popular vote margins in history in '20 and '24. Compared to that, this doesn't look bad. But even if the Democrats feel they've done well in 24 and 28, the logic of the party would be "if a Catholic does this well, then if we nominate a big city Protestant, we'll win."

The 19th amendment happens in this tl, right?

 

[galileo-034]

I understand where you're coming from, but to my way of thinking, there's two issues. One, this seems like a success compared to OTL, because OTL, the Democrats lost by the largest popular vote margins in history in '20 and '24. Compared to that, this doesn't look bad. But even if the Democrats feel they've done well in 24 and 28, the logic of the party would be "if a Catholic does this well, then if we nominate a big city Protestant, we'll win."

The 19th amendment happens in this tl, right?

As I put it in the answer, I tried to put it relatively to TTL.
In 1924, he proves he has national appeal, which he confirms in 1928 by taking New York which is still the most populous state with 45 EVs, and the bad result in the South is attributed to backstabbing KKK.

The problem is that, without FDR in the play, Smith is the only big city anything available.

And the 19th amendment still happens; there is no reason it would change.

This makes sense. My counterpoint, for what it's worth, would be that Long is not a Southerner's Southerner. He speaks with a local accent, obviously, but he doesn't take every opportunity he's on a stage to start talking about "n*****, n*****, n*****," which is what a lot/most of Southern politicians did during the era. Long and Estes Kefauver, were notably (and like everything else here, debatably) the only Southern politicians with truly national profiles before LBJ. They were both very liberal racially. I think that Long is a Southerner (and probably the only one) who could carry Wisconsin at the time, but I also think your argument is reasonable, and I think this is an area where two reasonable people can disagree.

But he is still a southerner with radical agenda. In three way races, that would be enough to give Smith a win. Still, radical Long would be the second choice after moderate Smith, and once Smith fails in his first term and see moderation result in nothing, they would massively switch to Long in 1936.

This is exactly why I don't think South Carolina will break away from the Democrats for anything other than hardcore racism. Tillman's appeal was his racism. South Carolina was majority black until the great migration, and Tillman and his outlandish bigotry were always far more popular than the big-p Populists or small-p economic populism. Ditto Mississippi. Tillman is way more like Vardaman than he is Tom Watson. In general, South Carolina has always been a stronghold of establishment Southern conservatism. It was the most planter dominated state before the Civil War, the Southern state least vulnerable to the Populists in the 1890s (I'm pretty sure that the legislature still elected Senators until the Constitution was amended), and the state which was among the very first to break for Dixiecrats and go Republican after the Civil Rights Era. White supremacy has always been the guiding light of South Carolina politics.


I say this as someone who was raised in South Carolina and Louisiana.

I also hesitated before putting SC into Long's column given that very picture I had myself of South Carolina, but I tried to set my mind in the 1930s atmosphere to avoid bias.
To me, I saw that Tillman rising to prominence against planter aristocracy with support of white poors, not unlike Long would do against another kind of aristocracy.
Plus, both times are not so long apart. Tillman rose in the 1890s and a brief look at SC politics seemed to show strong influence in the two decades after.
With one or two generations only apart from Tillman, the Great Depression on their heads, and a 'true southerner' as an alternative to the 'nothern catholic', I figured Long would have a chance, but I could be wrong.
If that's staying an unlikely perspective as I search into the political and socio-cultural landscape, I could then exchange South Carolina and Georgia.

 

[galileo-034]

Just to precise, as I explained in the post with the map of 1932 election, I computed the numbers and states by using data from 1876 to 1932 OTL, to extrapolate potential outcome of the three way races and see where Long could gain based on previous third party performances. The biggest issue with the numbers is that they don't take into account the TTL turnout evolutions; I used OTL numbers as I hadn't sufficient knowledge of each state to evaluate the impact of TTL trends on the turnout, so these will potentially change, but should still give way to the same map (more or less a few states flipped).

Now, to refer the states you mentionned, from the excel sheet I computed:

South Carolina (104 k votes)
Long (I) _ 50.1% ; Smith (D) _ 48% ; Hoover (R) _ 1.9% .
Victory margin - 2.1%, 2 k votes.

Georgia (256 k votes)
Smith (D) _ 46.3% ; Long (I) _ 45.9% ; Hoover (R) _ 7.8% .
Victory margin - 0.4%, 1 k votes.

North Carolina (711 k votes)
Smith (D) _ 37.4% ; Long (I) _ 33.3% ; Hoover (R) _ 29.3% .
Victory margin - 4.1%, 29 k votes.

Wisconsin (1,114 k votes)
Smith (D) _ 38.2% ; Long (I) _ 33.9% ; Hoover (R) _ 27.9% .
Victory margin - 4.3%, 48 k votes.

 

[dcharles]

As I put it in the answer, I tried to put it relatively to TTL.
In 1924, he proves he has national appeal, which he confirms in 1928 by taking New York which is still the most populous state with 45 EVs, and the bad result in the South is attributed to backstabbing KKK.

The problem is that, without FDR in the play, Smith is the only big city anything available.

You mentioned Albert Ritchie. I think he's a very good candidate. He's got a lot of the appeal of Smith without the baggage. Also, Vic Donahey, Governor of Ohio, and William Dever, the Mayor of Chicago. Both of the latter two were talked about as possible nominees IOTL. All three have similar advantages--big city and or big state credibility, Protestant, and not too Wet or too Dry.

And the 19th amendment still happens; there is no reason it would change.

I meant 18th, my mistake.

I also hesitated before putting SC into Long's column given that very picture I had myself of South Carolina, but I tried to set my mind in the 1930s atmosphere to avoid bias.
To me, I saw that Tillman rising to prominence against planter aristocracy with support of white poors, not unlike Long would do against another kind of aristocracy.
Plus, both times are not so long apart. Tillman rose in the 1890s and a brief look at SC politics seemed to show strong influence in the two decades after.
With one or two generations only apart from Tillman, the Great Depression on their heads, and a 'true southerner' as an alternative to the 'nothern catholic', I figured Long would have a chance, but I could be wrong.
If that's staying an unlikely perspective as I search into the political and socio-cultural landscape, I could then exchange South Carolina and Georgia.

Tillman's appeal was racism. Through the Constitution of 1895, he was one of the main architects of Jim Crow, not only in SC, but nationwide. His thesis was that barring black people from political participation would make elections cleaner. Prior to Tillman but after Redemption, it was common for the Bourbon Democrats to buy and/or coerce some black people to vote a certain way--usually for Wade Hampton. He opposed the Populists on the grounds of their racial liberalism, he only supported the bare minimum of the Farmer's Alliance platform, and really spent most of his time as governor devising ways to harm black people in one way or another. His "populism" consisted of racial pandering, opening a couple of colleges, and a tone that appealed to poor whites. He is the classic Southern demagogue, the archetype of the form, and he would have found Huey's leftism repugnant. To give this a modern context, Tillman was to Long what Trump is to Bernie Sanders. They both give vent to anger within the electorate, but their constituencies and policies are not the same.

If you're looking for a way for Smith to still get his EVs, flip Mississippi and South Carolina over to him and Georgia to Long. Georgia only went to Smith by 13 points IOTL, which was very close for the solid South. IOTL, Mississippi and SC were the two most solidly Democratic states, going for Smith by 80/20 and 90/10 percent, respectively. (even though he was Catholic and wet! that's how strong the machine was in those states!) They were the two most conservative states with the most restrictive Jim Crow laws, and left wing populists like the Longs, Ellis Arnall, Caraway, Ralph Yarborough, Big Jim Folsom, and the early and late iterations of George Wallace are mostly foreign to their histories.

 

[galileo-034]

You mentioned Albert Ritchie. I think he's a very good candidate. He's got a lot of the appeal of Smith without the baggage. Also, Vic Donahey, Governor of Ohio, and William Dever, the Mayor of Chicago. Both of the latter two were talked about as possible nominees IOTL. All three have similar advantages--big city and or big state credibility, Protestant, and not too Wet or too Dry.

Dever died from cancer in 1929 if I'm correct, and if I could butterfly a road accident if really needed, I refrain from butterflying cancers and go wild on 'natural' causes.
Ritchie might have a shot, and I'd need to study his case under the light of TTL 1920s political landscape. As of now, it looks like he could have to compete with Garner, likely still the Dems leader in the House after 1930.
I don't know much of Donahey, but he doesn't seem to have enough traction to be a relevant candidate, unlike Ritchie could be.
All in all, Smith still got the northeastern establishment and liberals as a whole on his side without FDR. And as a precedent for being nominated thrice (and losing), I can still William Jennings Bryan

I meant 18th, my mistake.

Still the same. Too close to the pod, and no underlying trend to justify changing it.

If you're looking for a way for Smith to still get his EVs, flip Mississippi and South Carolina over to him and Georgia to Long. Georgia only went to Smith by 13 points IOTL, which was very close for the solid South. IOTL, Mississippi and SC were the two most solidly Democratic states, going for Smith by 80/20 and 90/10 percent, respectively. (even though he was Catholic and wet! that's how strong the machine was in those states!) They were the two most conservative states with the most restrictive Jim Crow laws, and left wing populists like the Longs, Ellis Arnall, Caraway, Ralph Yarborough, Big Jim Folsom, and the early and late iterations of George Wallace are mostly foreign to their histories.

You're probably right, I should switch Georgia and South Carolina.
I know less of Mississipi, but it neighboring Louisiana and knowing of Long's considerable influence and charisma (as he did in Arkansas for Caraway), I'd figure he would still give a hard time for the entrenched establishment, as he did in Louisiana, enough perhaps to take a razor edge victory.

Plus, the big difference is that in TTL 1932 election, it's not like the only alternative was a northerner and Republican (Hoover in our case), we have two Democrats (Long still being registered as such, though he runs as an independent) confronting each other, one being a northerner, catholic and liberal, the other a southerner and a protestant. Plus, it's also a fight of the 'champion of New York financial elites' against the 'champion of the people', as it may sound (in Long's propaganda). In my mind, that makes big ingredients for shaking up the hold of the establishment over the region, no matter how strong it may look.

 

[galileo-034]

Also, in Mississippi, looking at numbers between 1920 and 1928, I see Republicans did 14% in 1920 and almost 18 in 1928, while Socialist/progressives had a decent score, relatively to what could be expected here and the local strength of Republican vote, even though it's only a couple points. Plus, though it may be too long in the past to be significant, we also have Weaver's 19 points in 1892.
Citing the points I exposed above, I think there could be room for a thin margin victory of Long, at least in Mississippi if not in South Carolina.