A Glorious Union or America: the New Sparta

*raises hand*

After 1862 and 1863, what kind of peace could the remaining states of Confederacy hope to gain? With the rash of successess experienced by the Union, wouldn't it be likely that the voters in the North would want to see the job done?

GE: Its definitely a valid question. I think you have to get into the Confederate mindset. Even at this point in the war the evidence is that a majority of pro-Confederate citizens believed the war could be won militarily. Many still expected foreign intervention. It is hard for us in this era to understand how poorly informed people in the Confederacy were both about hardening attitudes in Europe and indeed in the North. Many leaders in the Confederacy were also blind to the reality of their situation, though some willfully so. Others, the realists, were concerned about the fate that awaits them. Many expect to be tried for treason and hung so fighting on doesn't seem that illogical. Peace may have been a false hope for some, but in those dark days it persisted nonetheless.

JAW: But you are right than anyone reading Northern newspapers, talking to Northern soldiers should have seen that talk of a negotiated peace was hopeless. The radical spirit was abroad in the north. Memorials to David Hunter could be found in even major town. The question was not truly whether the Democrats might win the presidential election, but rather which wing of the Republican party would be ascendant in Congress - the conservative conciliators who would support Lincoln's plans for reconstruction or the radicals who meant to put the south down for all time.

One other thing - I would like to see a President, Lincoln or Seymour, tell Kearny "The War's off". Though it is perhaps an exaggeration to suggest Kearny or any other army leader would disobey the order directly, I suspect the Union army would not have been happy at all about such an order when victory was at hand. 3 years of war had radicalized it to an extent no one could have predicted. And as for Kearny's attitude, well its not for nothing that Bismarck would later call him "perhaps the most dangerous man I have yet met".

[More both in that quote and about that quote will appear post war...]
 
*Raises Hand* Forgive me for my ignorance on this; I'm an exchange student, so a lot of this is new to me. Can any of you gentleman comment on the idea that the Confederacy might have won the war--or at least won a better peace--by freeing those slaves who were willing to fight? It's been a couple of years ago since I've read this, but I think one of the Generals serving under Hardy--Cleburne maybe--made a suggestion to that effect sometime in 1864. So was there any chance of that suggestion being adopted in this dark hour, and would it have helped them at all?
 
*Raises Hand* Forgive me for my ignorance on this; I'm an exchange student, so a lot of this is new to me. Can any of you gentleman comment on the idea that the Confederacy might have won the war--or at least won a better peace--by freeing those slaves who were willing to fight? It's been a couple of years ago since I've read this, but I think one of the Generals serving under Hardy--Cleburne maybe--made a suggestion to that effect sometime in 1864. So was there any chance of that suggestion being adopted in this dark hour, and would it have helped them at all?

GL: I'm not aware that Cleburne made any such suggestion though his later military career does suggest he carried a lot less racial baggage that many Confederates. However, prior to the Charleston massacre, the suggestion would have been treated as an eccentric one at best and outright treachery at worst by the more firebrand elements in southern society. After the massacre I don't think anyone in the Confederacy would have risked arming negros at all. It would have been suicide!

[In OTL it was Cleburne who made the suggestion and actually Hardee wasn't particularly opposed to it].
 
GL: I'm not aware that Cleburne made any such suggestion though his later military career does suggest he carried a lot less racial baggage that many Confederates. However, prior to the Charleston massacre, the suggestion would have been treated as an eccentric one at best and outright treachery at worst by the more firebrand elements in southern society. After the massacre I don't think anyone in the Confederacy would have risked arming negros at all. It would have been suicide!

[In OTL it was Cleburne who made the suggestion and actually Hardee wasn't particularly opposed to it].

[Yeah, got a bit into character there, but wanted to know if the Cleburne memorial still happened; thanks.]
 
*raises hand* Gentlemen, I am curious abour Confederate troop morale at this point; we know that both armies had to deal with deserters, how bad was the situation in the CS Army? That is, were there a lot of deserters from the Army?
 
GL: The "lack-of-will" thesis, which blames Confederate defeat on rot from within, prevailed among Liberal, with a capital L, scholars for a while, and it was strongly rooted in the "social history" half of the Civil War bookshelf. In the quest for evidence of a want of commitment by Southerners, authors used military statistics to support a social argument. These were often inaccurate.

Look some Confederates did desert. The reasons soldiers left, included poor equipment, food, and leadership. Some acts of desertion have also been described as a form of political protest. And that's part of the reason why the information gets confused. In the post-war environment, many former rebels were keen to establish their "Unionist" credentials by claiming they were forced into uniform and deserted when the opportunity presented itself. This served to massively inflate the numbers of so called deserters later scholars identified.

The stats on Confederate Virginians in the Army of Northern Virginia in December 1863-March 1864 are that they fled military service at a rate of between 10 and 15 percent, more or less comparable to the desertion rate among Union troops in the Army of the Potomac, which stood between 9 and 12 percent during the same period. Bear in mind Virginia was occupied by the Union and many wished to return to wives and loved ones, and also, up to that point Sedgwick's regime in Virginia had been particularly lenient.

What that says to me is that morale was still comparably high among the rebel fighting man.
 
Ok Kearny and Bismark? How long do I have to wait for that?

I wonder why Liberal scholars wanted to inflate Confederate desertion? Is it just to suggest they were cowards or it was a rubbish cause? Why just Liberals?

Also what is the Charleston massacre? Did I miss it?
 
*raises hand*

*Indulges in a bit of a monologue, showing off what I know, and inadvertently revealing how ill-advised many of my notions are.*

Moderator [interrupting]: What's your question, please?

Me: Oh, um, my question. Yeah. So, uh, if a negotiated peace wasn't possible, that's on the basis of a negotiated peace with some kind of Confederate independence, right? What about a negotiated peace on the basis of submission to the Union and maybe some compensation for emancipation or at least gradual emancipation, and amnesty? From a Southern point of view that would be better than what actually happened, wouldn't it? With Longstreet in an important position and Davis suppressed, why was the South still so hard-line?
 
*Raises hand*

If you don't mind I have to questions. The first is for the General. I've read that the Confederate logistics were a shambles and it was a near miracle that they were able to field armies at all. So my question, I'm in the ROTC btw, sir, is there any relevant lessons that we can learn from a logistical sense from the Confederate efforts that can apply today, or was it just momentum and the kind of weapons they were fielding that let them do it at all?

Second question is for Mr. Lowe or Professor Enterton. I have also read a research paper by a Dr. Marion McConnell that the coastal rebellion in South Carolina that kicked off a week before the surprise naval invasion by slaves was not as pro-Union as they like to claim today. That it was actually an attempt at creating a solely African descent nation in the region at the time. But with the area suddenly flooded with Union troops, ships, etc. that they quickly changed their tune. Is there any validity to her claims or is it as the descendants of those who pulled off the short lived rebellion claim?

Thank you.
 
*raises hand*

*Indulges in a bit of a monologue, showing off what I know, and inadvertently revealing how ill-advised many of my notions are.*

Moderator [interrupting]: What's your question, please?

Me: Oh, um, my question. Yeah. So, uh, if a negotiated peace wasn't possible, that's on the basis of a negotiated peace with some kind of Confederate independence, right? What about a negotiated peace on the basis of submission to the Union and maybe some compensation for emancipation or at least gradual emancipation, and amnesty? From a Southern point of view that would be better than what actually happened, wouldn't it? With Longstreet in an important position and Davis suppressed, why was the South still so hard-line?

GE: First of all you have the image of Robert Toombs on the end of noose which remains at the forefront of the mind of every Confederate Government official. The radical newspapers in the north are calling for the execution of Davis, his cabinet and their generals. For many in the south the war has become literally a life and death struggle. Defeat is a death sentence. Yet a compromise might only buy, in the words of William Porcher Miles "life at the price of freedom; liberty at the price of subservience to the slave race in a south remade by Black Republicanism".

GL: Yes even the compromise that President Lincoln might have been open to was simply to radical, to abhorrent to Southern leaders at the time. Also many feared peace would be survival at the expense of their wealth - bear in mind the shear amount to capital value tied up in slaves at this point was staggering. Lincoln would now only have been on the terms that emancipation was an established fact. So there remained a huge financial disincentive to a peaceful return to the Union. Its distasteful for us but it was a clear motivating fact.

And you also can't ignore simple southern pigheaded pride. It played it's part. In a death struggle with their enemies, many would prefer to die than surrender and apologize!
 
*Raises hand*

If you don't mind I have to questions. The first is for the General. I've read that the Confederate logistics were a shambles and it was a near miracle that they were able to field armies at all. So my question, I'm in the ROTC btw, sir, is there any relevant lessons that we can learn from a logistical sense from the Confederate efforts that can apply today, or was it just momentum and the kind of weapons they were fielding that let them do it at all?

Second question is for Mr. Lowe or Professor Enterton. I have also read a research paper by a Dr. Marion McConnell that the coastal rebellion in South Carolina that kicked off a week before the surprise naval invasion by slaves was not as pro-Union as they like to claim today. That it was actually an attempt at creating a solely African descent nation in the region at the time. But with the area suddenly flooded with Union troops, ships, etc. that they quickly changed their tune. Is there any validity to her claims or is it as the descendants of those who pulled off the short lived rebellion claim?

Thank you.

GE: Firstly on the Gullah I think you are confusing two issues. Firstly the Gullah of the Sea Islands had been largely liberated from 1861 and indeed many fought in the Army of the James in the First South Carolina Regiment. You are correct that the reduction in Union forces in South Carolina in 62/63 did mean that the Gullah maintained what Isaac Rodman would call an odd relationship with the Union Army. Robert Milroy's small command based on the Sea Islands had caused him to make common cause the Gullah while largely ignoring any declarations or actions designed to assert any level of independence from the Federal government.

The issue of the so called rebellion is largely Confederate propaganda. What we have are a series of bread riots in Charleston alongside couple with the murder of white port official by a slave, Robert Smalls, in the process of escaping Charleston. The result is a massive anti-slave riot in Charleston that is subsequently recast by the Confederate Government as the suppression of a major servile insurrection. The reality is a massacre of slaves but a panicked and angry, and largely poor, southern white mob. But to answer your question there was no rebellion or insurrection and such events as there were were totally unrelated to the Gullah of the Sea Islands.

JAW: You know if we had more time I could talk a long time about the logistical lessons of the Civil War, though personally I always found more inspiration on that subject from Napier and Hancock in the Abyssinian Campaign...
 
IC: Question for the whole panel. What impact do you think the campiagn of 1864 and the resulting peace had on the actions and thoughts of American policy makers that came afterwards. In particular, what about the demand for Uncondition Surrender that the western allies made of its enemies in the Second World War. Did the example of 1864 play a role in that?

OOC: This question of course assumes a second world war that was somewhat similar to OTL. If that is not the case, feel free to ignore/delete the question.
 
IC: Question for the whole panel. What impact do you think the campiagn of 1864 and the resulting peace had on the actions and thoughts of American policy makers that came afterwards. In particular, what about the demand for Uncondition Surrender that the western allies made of its enemies in the Second World War. Did the example of 1864 play a role in that?

OOC: This question of course assumes a second world war that was somewhat similar to OTL. If that is not the case, feel free to ignore/delete the question.

WWII is well and truly butterflied away.
 
I was thinking - with Longstreet's promotion and assuming the ANV keeps two corps, who will get the first corps? I was thinking Anderson or one of the two Hills as they are all still alive I think. But then I thought that the last time and I didn't see Edward Johnson coming!
 
I am getting there. I have my new Orbats for the eastern theatre and some decent plans. Just finishing scoping out the campaign. I should have the first post up early next week. That and I am considering a Union Mills address by Lincoln...and other thoughts...?
 
I was thinking - with Longstreet's promotion and assuming the ANV keeps two corps, who will get the first corps? I was thinking Anderson or one of the two Hills as they are all still alive I think. But then I thought that the last time and I didn't see Edward Johnson coming!

I am thinking either Dick Ewell or Richard Anderson. Anderson stands out a bit more for me in this TL. I liked his good sense at Trevillion Station when McLaws fought against his advice. I suppose Jackson could always Stuart as a Corps commander. Stuart did take command of Jackson's Corps at Chancellorsville in OTL and did a good job surprisingly. Yes Stuart is not a mad suggestion either...
 
How much was David Hunter's death and the leaking of his letters a moral turn point?
While it may of been more pragmatic choice on Union soldiers to fight to death or else they risk execution, it feels more like the those events help turn the Union Army and the rest of the Union into radical abolitionist while publicly and overtly linking the Confederacy to slavery.

And with the greater number of heroic Union Generals and no string of Union defeats(or death toll), I can see the Union Army gaining a much greater respect and pride. And with Kearny at the helm(along with the lack of OTL defeats as mentioned), Europeans appear to respect the US military far more.
 
Chapter One Hundred and Three Marching Through The Carolinas Part I
Chapter One Hundred and Three

Marching Through The Carolinas

Part I


From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962

“While Kearny planned to ride with the Army of the Potomac he was soldier enough to give General Reynolds a wide latitude in the organisation and deployment of his forces. There was one exception. Reynolds felt he would be able to make initial movements against the rebel positions at Salem (North Carolina) by late March. Kearny wanted action before then. He wished to ensure the rebel forces in North Carolina remained off balance. He therefore ordered a number of cavalry raids into North Carolina throughout March…

Benjamin F. Davis’ clash with Wade Hampton near Mount Airey opened the ball. John Buford would personally direct Devin’s division in a spirited clash at Reidsville against both Lee’s (Fitzhugh and Rooney). Even the Army of the James would take a hand when Elliott’s cavalry division routed Carolina militia at Garysburg near Weldon…

While the Army of the Potomac finally and slowly began to move at the end of March its target was Salem. As Longstreet sought to concentrate against this advance, Kearny would release another of his cavalry generals on a raid, this time deep into rebel territory. George Armstrong Custer, temporarily replacing the tardy General Pleasanton, would sent on a strike around the rebel extreme right flank. In an attempt to replicate Stuart’s famous ride around the Union Army on the Peninsula in 1862, Custer planned to ride around Greensboro, penetrate perhaps as far as Salisbury, before returning to the Army of the Potomac somewhere west of Rural Hall…”

cavalry-raid.jpg

Colonel Samuel P. Spear's raid on Weldon, North Carolina

From “The Blue Eyed Prophet of War” by Robert Lee Thomas
Carlotta Press 1906


“General Jackson did not seek promotion for one of his own trusted subordinates. Instead he saw great talent in the dashing and aggressive cavalry commander General J.E.B.Stuart. Jackson recommended Stuart to General Longstreet for the vacant command of the 1st Corps. Longstreet demurred. Ultimately he would reject Jackson’s counsel, and bypass Generals Ewell and A.P.Hill, appointing instead the steady Richard Anderson. Anderson’s 1st Corps would consist of the divisions of Mahone, Hood, Wilcox, Daniels and Pickett. Jackson’s 2nd Corps now consisted of Ewell’s, A.P.Hill’s, Winder’s, Early’s and Pender’s divisions…

Jackson did not take naturally to Longstreet’s defensive strategy. Longstreet had used the army and no little number of negro workers over the winter to prepare substantial defensive works on the approaches to Salem. His intension was to either force Reynolds to assault him or to retire to avoid encirclement. Longstreet's plan to entrench at every opportunity and seek to force Reynolds to attack him…”

st_phillips_church_lot.jpg

A photograph taken from the tower of St.Philips Church, Salem facing north where Longstreet would later build his first line of entrenchments

From “Yankee Dawdle - the Memoirs of a Private of Pennsylvania” by Anonymous

“Hurry Up and Wait was the order of the day. I seemed to spend more time walking sideways than foreways on the road to Rural Hall – we had to keep clearing out of the way of wagons and artillery and the delicates of the mounted arm…

March has brought poor marching weather. The rain comes in buckets and the roads are like rivers. At times like this I missed our Little Jersey Napoleon. George would never have marched us in the cold and rain on a muddy road in March…

And all the time we knew old Johnny Reb hadn’t wasted the winter on paying calls and fine dining. Bobby Lee might be dead in a Virginia ditch somewhere but Old Gloomy Pete loved the spade. One of the stalwarts in the regiment struck up a conversation with a rough looking native – a Red String. He told us Pete had been building castles in the mud up ahead. Good news to go with the weather…”

From “The Life and Letters of John J. Peck” by John Watts de Peyster Jr.
Buffalo 1892


“The roads are not as bad I understand as those John Reynolds faces. The cavalry led the way and Sam Spear did magnificent work in clearing the rebel garrison out of Weldon. I have sent August Kautz off on a raid towards Halifax. I cannot tell you my destination my love but I am sure you shall read of it soon enough…

General Kearny has told me to proceed by short marches. To save the men. But we shall reach our goal in good time. The is barely a rebel left to show his face before us. James Longstreet, who you make remember was my classmate at the Point, has stripped this part of the state bare of troops. This is perhaps a brigade of forelorn rebels nearby under a Carolina native called Anderson [J.R.Anderson] but little more…Fear not my love I shall not become overconfident or risk myself except as necessarily. We are all alert here to the fact we are deep in the enemy's country now…”

172_2.jpg

The Army of the Potomac march through March weather
 
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