Sorry All. Work and research held me up. I will post further updates this week.
A Glorious Union or America: the New Sparta
- Thread starter TheKnightIrish
- Start date
Chapter Eighty-Six We Shall Drown Sheridan...
Chapter Eighty-Six
We Shall Drown Sheridan...
From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953
Edison 1953
“Grant’s decision to pause before the rebels’ work at Selma was a logical one. While many have subsequently referred to Prince John’s “bluffs” in the Peninsular Campaign, Grant had seen little evidence of these theatrics in the West. Magruder had captured Galveston through force of arms, and Grant’s direct assault on Magruder’s works at Port Gibson had netted him a defeat. Assaulting the works would have been of little benefit as the rebelas could not remain supplied there for long. It was also an opportunity to pause to allow Kimball’s III Division of XVI Corps to catch up on its march from Vicksburg…
Grant’s decision seemed to bear fruit when the rebels abandoned Selma on 27th September, 10 days after the Battle of Arcola. Having occupied Selma, Grant paused further to make preparations for the dispatch of the “Army of the Alabama” under McClernand…
It was the 8th October before Grant set out from Selma to pursue Bragg’s army, little realising at this point that he pursued only Magruder and three divisions (Maury’s, Walker’s and Lovell’s). Bragg had left Magruder on 23rd September to march north east. Magruder had been replaced by Richard Taylor in command of First Corps which now numbered three divisions (Stevenson’s, M.L.Smith’s and Forney’s), while Loring remained in command of Second Corps now also made up of three divisions (Polignac’s, Mouton’s Salamanders, and Marmaduke’s)…”
From "The Lessons of the Civil War" by Professor Martin Edgars
Hutchinson Press 1975
Hutchinson Press 1975
“One cannot ignore the fact that Grant’s single mindedness of “not caring” what the enemy was likely to do, but concerning himself with his own plans very occasionally seemed to make him blind to the movements of the enemy. At Shiloh and again at Selma, Grant seemed heedless of evidence that enemy forces were not where he expected them to be nor where they behaving in the way he expected them to behave. Grierson suspected a large element of the rebel force had split off. Grant, and Sherman too it must be said, believed this might be a force to shadow the Army of the Alabama as it moved south, despite Grierson’s evidence that the troops were moving north…”
Sheridan's Corps was defeated by one of the greatest surprises of the Civil War. Only Lee's attack at Blackwater compares.
From “Army of the Heartland” by Col. J.T. Starke
University of Tennessee
University of Tennessee
“Hardee evacuated Chattanooga over the 15th and 16th October, the days after Richardson’s victory at Lookout Mountain. Hooker’s troops pressed on. On 18th October [as Stuart and Buford clashed near Gettysburg] there was a skirmish at Davis Crossroads between the Union cavalry division of Lawrence P. Graham and the Confederate cavalry division of Abraham Buford. It would be followed on 19th October by a more substantial skirmish at Lee’s Mill which erupted again on the second day in a more serious affair between Lovell Rousseau’s division of Thomas’ XIV Corps and Preston Smith’s division of Cleburne’s Corps…
As Hardee’s Army of Tennessee retreated beyond Chickamauga Creek and Lookout Mountain, Hooker paused to concentrate his army. General Thomas and Hooker’s chief of staff, Dan Butterfield, had convinced Hooker not to pursue multiple axis of advance against a foe as aggressive as Hardee, Cleburne and Churchill. Hooker’s intention was to gather Thomas’ XIV Corps and Richardson’s XXI Corps at Lee’s and Gordon’s Mills before advancing on the Ringgold Gap. Granger’s XXIII Corps would act as his reserve, while Sheridan’s XX Corps would screen Hooker’s exposed right flank…
Hooker received a telegram with the details of the victory at Union Mills in Virginia [21st and 22nd October] on 24th October. Although Hooker ordered a salute to Kearny’s victory, he resolved to himself and in the presence of Dan Butterfield to “whip Hardee before the month was out”. As the cheering among Thomas’ and Richardson’s men died down, all could hear the sound of cannon fire coming from the south. Sheridan was under attack at Pond Spring…”
Taylor's troops emerge from the treeline to assault de Trobriand's hastily formed line
From “On the Road to Armageddon” by Hunter McCook
University of Ohio 2009
“Sheridan’s three divisions were encamped along Chickamauga Creek around Pond Spring, around 7-10 miles march from Hooker’s main encampment at the Mills. A messenger had just arrived from Hooker with news of the Pipe Creek victory but Sheridan probably just folded it up and put it in his pocket. For the last 20 minutes increasing waves of gunfire could be heard from the south. It sounded like Graham’s cavalry at Davis Crossroads was heavily engaged. Sheridan had dispatched gallopers to establish if Graham needed help but as yet had heard nothing in reply. He had also ordered Regis de Trobriand’s III Division to be prepared to march to Graham’s relief. Sheridan had reason however not to be too concerned. Hooker’s scouts on the left flank of the army (Minty’s cavalry brigade among others) had confirmed as late as the previous evening that Cleburne’s and Churchill’s Corps remained concentrated but on the defensive opposite Hooker’s main body…
“Suddenly waves of gray and brown emerged from the scrub on both banks of the stream. I assumed Cleburne or Churchill were seeking to flank us” [de Trobriand]. Little did Sheridan know that the forces rapidly advancing on him were not from the Army of the Tennessee at all. Bragg had arrived with the bulk of the Army of the Mississippi and was unleashing his six divisions against Sheridan’s lonely three…
Sheridan dispatched word to Hooker that he was under attack by at least one corps, whether Cleburne’s or Churchill’s he could not say. It was a confusing report for Hooker’s headquarters to receive. Hooker’s own patrols confirmed Cleburne and Churchill were before him. General Robert H.G. Minty swore that both formations were still encamped opposite Hooker’s main force. Hooker and Butterfield concluded, having spoken at length to Minty, that at most Hardee may have dispatched two divisions to harass Sheridan. Sheridan’s Corps could easily deal with such a force. Neither Hooker nor Butterfield knew Phil Sheridan well. They assumed he was “panicked by the sudden appearence of rebels” (Memoirs of a Scoundrel – The Life of Dan Butterfield). Had either known Sheridan better they would have realised their terrible mistake…
It was de Trobriand’s division that faced the initial assault from the rebels on the “union” side of the creek. Luther P. Bradley’s brigade formed alongside that of Bernard Laiboldt’s. William H. Lytle, eminent poet, Cincinnatian and Democrat, formed his brigade in reserve. De Trobriand’s Division would do the lion’s share of fighting that day…
Hiram Berry, fresh from the East, would rush his forming brigades to hold the west bank of the creek from the rebels seeking to cross it to the east of his camp. Mahlon D. Manson’s brigade would be rushed in first and would almost as quickly be gobbled up by William Loring’s advancing troops. Manson’s brigade stood little chance against Mouton’s Salamanders or Polignac’s wild Texans. The brigades of Joseph B. Dodge and Philemon P. Baldwin formed a makeshift line in the time bought for them by Manson’s brigade. By now de Trobriand and Berry’s had formed two perpendicular lines (one facing south and the other east), while Sheridan rushed to get his remaining division, William P. Carlin’s, into battle where it could do the most good…
While leading Hans Heg’s brigade into a gap that had opened in the angle between Berry’s and de Trobriand’s lines, Sheridan was struck in the side of the head with a bullet believed fired by one of the many sharpshooters in Loring’s Corps. He died instantly. When his body was found later by the rebels and identified, the note from Hooker about the great Union victory over Lee at Union Mills, that was found folded in his pocket, was the first word either Bragg or Hardee had received about the defeat (It is now on display at the Union Mills United States Army Museum)…
Sheridan rallies Heg's brigade moments before his death
Command passed to William P. Carlin in time for him to receive Hooker’s reply “The disposition of the bulk of enemy forces remains unchanged. I suspect you are engaged by no more than two divisions. Please confirm by return”. It was a dispatch that would later cause Hooker a great deal of consternation. With no word of re-enforcements, which would have been but a few miles away, Carlin decided to retreat. It was a retreat attempted in the face of a closely engaged superior force. It can best described as a shambles…
The stream of wounded and dejected troops coming into camp had alerted Hooker that Sheridan’s situation was considerably more serious that he had believed. General Hazen’s division of Richardson’s Corps was immediately ordered southwards. Before long Hazen encountered large numbers of Union troops. “Disorganised” was Hooker’s later description. Hazen’s was likely more accurate “Utterly routed”…
Of Sheridan’s nine brigades that had mustered that morning, only five could muster more that a battalion by nightfall. Carlin’s division of Woodruff’s, Post’s and Heg’s brigades was “bloodied but unbowed” according to Carlin’s upbeat assessment. Both Hiram Berry and Regis de Trobriand, who had both borne the brunt of the fighting, could only muster one effective brigade each, Dodge’s and Lytle’s respectively. Mahlon D. Mason was dead on the field with Sheridan. Baldwin, Bradley and Laiboldt were all shocked to find themselves prisoners of an army they thought a 100 miles away…
Confusion reigned at Hooker’s Headquarters. How could Sheridan have let himself be routed by an element of Hardee’s command? Thomas looked grim but largely remained silent. It was Richardson who offered Hooker the comfort he sought – if Hardee was fought Sheridan today, his army would no doubt have taken serious casualties. Even with the reduced state of Sheridan’s division, the Army of the Cumberland outnumbered Hardee. Therefore, proposed Richardson, ought not the army strike out rapidly and aggressively at Hardee come the morning. A weakened or divided rebel force might just have overextended itself attacking Sheridan. Hooker brightened considerable. His rival victory to Union Mills might be close at hand…”
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Its back and so am I after a period of work (my employers don't appreciate my need to write) and research.
I have also been thinking about other international events. Expect further updates soon on Mexico and events in China...
I have also been thinking about other international events. Expect further updates soon on Mexico and events in China...
Yes, geography dicates transportation nets (road, rail, water) which dicates population moves and concentration, which dicates network nodes (towns, junctions, et al) which dicates decisive points, which dicates objectives and decision points, which dicates miltary movement and concentrations for both sides, which leads to battles....
Example if moving into cental PA, the places were the roads meet is a magnet for armies.....the more roads the stronger the magent.
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I am using the standard wikipedia maps for reference during the Battle of Chickamauga...
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cf/Chickamauga_Sep18.png
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cf/Chickamauga_Sep18.png
Chapter Eighty-Seven ...and Bury Hooker Part I
Chapter Eighty-Seven
...and Bury Hooker
Part I
Part I
From “Army of the Heartland” by Col. J.T. Starke
University of Tennessee
“Hooker’s plan for the morning was simple. He would assault all the fords before him and hold a sufficient reserve to support any breakthrough:
· Buell’s Division at Reed’s Bridge
· J.J. Reynolds’ Division at Foyle’s and Lambert’s Fords
· J.S. Jackson’s Division at Alexander’s Bridge
· Rousseau’s Division at Thedford’s and Dalton’s Ford
· Palmer would stand in reserve near the Winfrey House to support Buell, Reynolds or Jackson as appropriate
Sheridan’s battered corps was, perhaps surprisingly given the previous day’s events, given the role of screening the right again. This time the corps would be braced up with William B. Hazen’s division of Richardson’s corps. Much to William P. Carlin’s disgust, he was not granted even temporary command of the remains of XX Corps. Instead his nemesis, the unfortunately named, Jefferson C. Davis, was given command.
Hooker’s use of Granger’s “Reserve” Corps was to be flexible. A division could be used to firm up the right flank if necessary while the remaining two could be added to Palmer’s Division as a reserve to reinforce breakthroughs…
It was all for naught. As the light of dawn broke over Chickamauga Creek the rebel yell was heard all along Hooker’s front. The Confederacy had struck first…”
...where Mouton's "Salamanders" crossed the creek.
From “The Most Hated of Men – Braxton Bragg in the Civil War” by Grafton Lowe
University of Kentucky
“Many consider Bragg’s Fall Campaign to have been the most daring of the Civil War. On the morning of the 25th October, the first day of the battle, he had succeed in bringing together both the Army of the Mississippi and the Army of Tennessee. For perhaps the first time the Confederacy had been able to use its interior lines successfully to bring a numerical advantage to bear against an unsuspecting Yankee army…”
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
“From his headquarters near the Brotherton House Hooker received reports from all along his line. From Buell on the left to Hazen on the right, those reports were of Confederate attacks. The cacophony of battle at every point was clearly audible from Hooker’s headquarters. It’s was clear to all, Richardson, Thomas, Butterfield and most of all Hooker that something serious was amiss. Hardee simply did not have the numbers anymore to launch aggressive attacks in force at all the points reported. It was a galloper from General Minty, whose cavalry had been transferred to the right overnight, who brought an answer. Bragg was on the battlefield with at least a corps and perhaps two. It was stunning news for Hooker, quickly confirmed by a staff officer sent by Davis…
For the briefest of moments, as Hooker was to acknowledge himself only after his public life was over, he was filled with doubt and indecision. For a moment “Joe Hooker lost faith in Joe Hooker” (Dan Butterfield). However General Hooker was not alone at headquarters. He was supported by two of the best corps commanders in the Union army: steadfast George Thomas and the pugnacious Israel B. Richardson. But it was his chief of staff, Dan Butterfield, who broke the moment of doubt. He offered his flask (allegedly filled with whiskey) to his commander “First of the day?”. Hooker took the flask, drank, and returned it with “Last of the day Dan I think”…
Hooker immediately directed Thomas to commanded the left: his own three divisions plus Palmer’s in reserve. Richardson would have the right: his two remaining divisions, plus Davis’ Corps (such as it was), and Hooker would forward Granger with Cox’s and Baird’s divisions to him with all haste. Hooker would hold Steedman’s division of Granger’s Corps in reserve at headquarters…”
Major-General Daniel Butterfield, Chief of Staff and close friend of Hooker's
From “On the Road to Armageddon” by Hunter McCook
University of Ohio 2009
“Hooker was surprised. But for the wet weather over the last few days the Union troops might have observed the dust raised by the marching Confederates, and thus anticipated an attack. Although Bragg had achieved surprise, he was not initially in a strong position to exploit it, particularly in Hardee’s sector…
Hardee’s troops were attempting to cross the Chickamauga Creek at a number of limited fords and bridges which, because of Hooker’s own plan to attack that morning, were all fully guarded by large formations of Union troops. General J.J.Reynolds commented that, at Foyle’s Ford, John T.Wilder’s brigade alone could hold the ford against all comers, with their Spencer repeating rifles. Anson G.McCook’s brigade too were armed with Spencers, and General Lovell Rousseau left him to guard Thedford’s Ford against the rebel division of McCown, while he deployed his two remaining brigades (King’s and Starkweather’s) to hold Dalton’s Ford…”
Another rebel assault on Alexander's Bridge
From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965
“It was a frustrating day for Hardee on 25th October. Churchill’s attacks (McCown’s at Thedford’s Ford, Johnson’s at Alexander’s Bridge and Liddell’s at Foyle’s Ford) all failed throughout the morning to gain any foothold on the western bank. Indeed in the firefight between J.J.Jackson’s and Bushrod Johnston’s division Alexander’s Bridge erupted into flame which neither side could extinguish...
Preston Smith, of Cleburne’s Corps, initially crossed Reed’s Bridge before the Union division of George P. Buell had got into position. Buell, however, would quickly cap this bridgehead and spent the day pushing hard at Smith’s brigades to attempt to retake the bridge. President Lincoln’s brother in law, proud Confederate General Benjamin Hardin Helm, performed conspicuously at the head of his brigade in holding the tenuous rebel bridgehead…
Hardee had held Cleburne and his remaining two divisions (Stewart’s and Withers’) in reserve to reinforce any breakthrough. Smith's limited success was insufficient to accommodate Cleburne’s remaining troops, but Cleburne, after a reconnaissance of his own, confirmed to Hardee in mid-afternoon, that the Dyer’s Ford and Dyer’s Bridge on the extreme Confederate right was unguarded. Hardee saw the opportunity Cleburne had identified and ordered him to lead his two divisions by that route to flank the Union army…”
Cleburne's two division march around the left flank of the Union army in the failing light
From “The Most Hated of Men – Braxton Bragg in the Civil War” by Grafton Lowe
University of Kentucky
“While Hardee’s troops were held up on the line of the Creek, it was the Army of the Mississippi that made rapid progress, with the exception of Marmaduke held up at Dalton’s Ford. Alfred Mouton’s Salamander division, supported by Polignac’s small Texas Division might have been held up by Carlin at Lee and Gordon’s Mill, but Bragg had three more divisions on the west side of the creek already, which he drove northwards towards Hazen’s division, assembling in the fields below Osborn’s Farm and Carlin’s flank at the Mill. On Hazen’s right flank the remains of Berry’s and de Trobriand’s divisions covered the Crawfish Springs Road…”
From “On the Road to Armageddon” by Hunter McCook
University of Ohio 2009
“Hazen was a cautious commander and he had ensured his brigades had entrenched their positions the previous evening before encamping. At the first sound of battle that morning he pushed out George Wagner’s brigade to the southern edge of the Osborn Farm fields in skirmish order while Harker’s and Opdycke’s men took the opportunity to improve their defences further north at the farmhouse itself which conveniently sat behind a little stream on the edge of the treeline…
When Richardson realised Hazen’s main defensive line was over half a mile north of Carlin’s flank he had no option but to order Carlin’s division to pull back, surrendering the ford. Retreating to the treeline, Woodruff’s brigade would cover the LaFayette Road and Post’s the Alexander Road. Carlin would hold Hans Heg’s brigade in reserve. Carlin’s rearguard, under Post, and Hazen’s skirmish line under Wagner, would be heavily engaged by the men of M.L.Smith’s division which had Forney’s in reserve. Mouton’s and Polignac’s troops too quickly began to cross the creak as Carlin withdrew. However Hazen and Carlin had their troops well in hand, and Hazen’s defensive position in particular was very strong...
No, the threat to Richardson’s defensive line would come on his right, on the Crawfish Springs Road. Jeff Davis had found the remains of Sheridan’s division in a disorganised mess the previous night. Neither de Trobriand nor Berry, as Easterners, was yet particularly well known to their men and, although both sound commanders, they both had difficulty in reconstituting their commands overnight. It is therefore surprising that they were assigned to defend a critical element of Hooker’s perimeter: the extreme right flank.
Horrified by what he had been assigned to command, Davis had little time to do anything about it that morning before Carter L. Stevenson’s Confederate division, spearheaded by the Alabama brigade of Steven D. Lee, roared up the road towards his lines...
Jefferson C. Davis ("Jef")
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I'll finish off the fighting in the southern sector on 25th October tomorrow or Saturday, and then the second day of fighting. Then we move onto Grant's and Bragg's next steps and the legendary Battle of Four Armies...
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I'm keen to press on into 1864 so I can look in more detail at the political developments in the US...
. I'm keen to press on into 1864 so I can look in more detail at the political developments in the US...
Chapter Eighty-Eight ...and Bury Hooker Part II
Chapter Eighty-Eight
...and Bury Hooker
Part II
...and Bury Hooker
Part II
From “Army of the Heartland” by Col. J.T. Starke
University of Tennessee
“Jef Davis was a brutally efficient commander and an aggressive independently minded officer. He knew however that he was stranger to his troops. Troops that had been “thoroughly demoralised by their defeat” (Memoirs of Regis de Trobriand). If Davis was to stem the Confederate tide with this motley troops he had to impose his will, and do so in a matter of minutes…
Major Samuel F. Gray of the 49th Ohio was one of only 5 officers in that regiment to escape the previous day’s fighting. His regiment was down to the strength of two weak companies. He was clearly very agitated by the exposed position of his regiment (as Hazen’s men on the flank began to move to the rear). As Davis appeared Gray approached him and requested authority to withdraw. Davis, the unforgiving Indiana Democrat, had little time for the perceived cowardice of the Ohioan (and “Black Republican” Gray). A fierce argument erupted between the two men in the midst of the Ohio regiment’s lines. Gray was heard to utter “Damn you sir. I will remove my men to the rear”. Davis’ words are reported, probably censored, as “The hell you will” before drawing his pistol and shooting Gray. “I’ll shoot any man who means to run” was Davis’ parting missive to the Ohio regiment. As word spread rapidly along the slim lines of blue, the brigades of Dodge and Lytle would fight longer and harder than any than any commander had any right to expect, though Davis, riding constantly behind the lines with pistol drawn, expected it…
Davis, with the aid of Berry and de Trobriand, would hold up Stevenson for over an hour, but as Stevenson eventually got his whole division in line (5 brigades) they overwhelmed Davis’ weak line. However their isolated stand had allowed Jacob D. Cox’s division of Granger’s Corps to form up on Hazen’s right flank. As Davis finally gave the order to retreat, a solid line of Union troops existed from the Weathers House at the foot of Missionary Ridge to the creek bank – Cox, Hazen, Carlin with Baird’s troops filing in between Carlin’s troops and the creek bank…”
Cleburne's flank attack
From “On the Road to Armageddon” by Hunter McCook
University of Ohio 2009
“Richard Taylor would spend much of the afternoon of the first day directing the five divisions now across the Chickamauga Creek (Stevenson, Smith, Forney, Mouton and Polignac) against Richardson’s hastily formed line…
Hazen’s section of Richardson’s line contained a huge salient, the apex of which was manned by the brigade of Emerson Opdycke. Opdycke realised his was the weak spot, and set his reserve regiment to constantly work on preparing defensive positions to the rear. Although Taylor’s troops would “hammer the salient flat” during the course of the afternoon in the words of William Hazen, “our lines was at no risk of breaking”. The security of Richardson’s line as night fell on the 25th has been oft debated. Already Taylor had directed Stevenson to probe for Richardson’s right flank. That flank (Cox’s Division) was indeed “in the air”. Come the morning Stevenson planned to send the brigades of Generals Seth M. Barton and Alfred Cumming, every man a Georgian, sweeping around Richardson’s flank…”
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
“On 25th October the Army of the Cumberland had performed well under Hooker’s guidance, in many ways atoning for the failures of the previous day. Davis had bought time for Richardson to establish a solid defensive line on the right, while Thomas had had little difficultly in holding the creek against Hardee’s attacks. There were still reserves in the form of Palmer’s and Steedman’s divisions and indeed many of Thomas’ troops had not yet come into action because of the limited frontage of the fights for the fords. On 26th October Fighting Joe would need everyone of them…”
From “The Irish Corporal – The Life and Battles of Patrick Ronayne Cleburne” by James Fitzgerald Maguire
Trinity Press
"The Federals felt secure as morning dawned on 26th October. Hooker felt confident in his ability to hold the line of Chickamauga Creek while using his reserves to push back Dick Taylor's force in the south. Little did Fighting Joe and the men of the Army of the Cumberland know that in the woods and underbrush beyond Reed's Bridge Road lurked Paddy Cleburne with two divisions that had crossed the creek unnoticed at Dyer's Ford and Dyer's Bridge. Confusion arising from the hurried reassignment of Minty's cavalry to Hooker's right meant the crossings where completely unguarded...
A.P. Stewart's Division swung south into the rear of George Buell's Division which was focused on bottling up Preston Smith's bridgehead at Reed's Bridge. Buell quickly realised he was in trouble and pulled back across a stream at Jay's Mill. Sam Price and George Cram got their brigades across in relatively good order. Joe Cooper's brigade though was forced to fight the rearguard action against Stewart's leading brigades (Otho Strahl's and Daniel S. Donelson's) and took heavy casualties...
Alerted by Buell, Palmer moved up from the Winfrey House not knowing what to expect. Advancing northwards searching for the enemy, he would be struck in the flank by Wither's division. Staggered, Palmer's brigades fell back to the west towards Alexander's Bridge Road..."
George Thomas tries to reform the line
From “Army of the Heartland” by Col. J.T. Starke
University of Tennessee
"With Buell pulling out south and then west, J.J. Reynolds' position at Foyle's and Lambert's Fords was at risk of being flanked. Reynolds' too began to fall back westwards. As the gray and butternut clad troops of Preston Smith and St. John Liddell poured across the creek, the Brotherton Road was becoming choked with Federal troops...
Thomas quickly realised the situation on the Federal left was coming apart. Accepting that the line of the creek was lost, Thomas sent word to J.S. Jackson to pull back from Alexander's Bridge as well. Thomas would try first to hold the line of the Alexander's Bridge Road, which would require only a minor adjustment of Richardson's line. Nonetheless, in consultation with Thomas, General Hooker order Rousseau to fall back to the Alexander Road...
On one hand the Army of the Cumberland would maintain the appearance of an unbroken line, but Thomas' element was hastily formed and as Buell's and Reynolds' troops fell in the rebels were hard on their heels..."
From “The Irish Corporal – The Life and Battles of Patrick Ronayne Cleburne” by James Fitzgerald Maguire
Trinity Press
"With his three divisions now breaking out from the creek Cleburne had room to fight. Paddy would face one of his toughest opponents in George Thomas that day. But Paddy had his troops well in hand from the first under proven commanders, Alex Stewart, Preston Smith and Jones Withers. Thomas on the other hand had to deal with the politician generals John M. Palmer and James S. Jackson, and the lacklustre professional J.J. Reynolds. Even the talented George P. Buell was not at his best on 26th October as he was knocked hither and thither by Cleburne's troops...
Thomas had ridden to the left to direct Steedman's division towards the left flank as he could "feel the rebel Cleburne probing for our flank" (Dan Butterfield). Cleburne had indeed directed the brigade of James Patton Anderson to swing north in search of Thomas' flank. Hooker had ridden south from his headquarters to ensure Rousseau's new line would link with both Richardson's south-facing line and Thomas' east-facing one. While Thomas fretted about his left flank, Richardson Hazen's Salient and Hooker Rousseau's line, the break through would come in the muddled middle at the three crossroads at the Winfrey House...
While Buell and Reynolds troops tried to organise themselves into position in Thomas' new line the existence of three crossroads remained something of a mystery. Orders frequently referred to the Winfrey Crossroads. Both the brigade of George Cram and regiments from the brigade of John F. Miller went awry looking for the crossroads and finding the wrong one. So it was that when Liddell launched his four brigades in a renewed assault at Cleburne's orders, the brigade of William B. Bate advanced into the air. In fact the road between Bate and Hooker's headquarters by the Brotherton House was clear...
Well through the Union lines, Ben Hardin Helm's brigade followed him into the gap, with Sterling Wood's brigade of Bushrod Johnson's joining them in exploiting the opportunity...
With Cleburne and Hardee pushing them on the exultant rebels never seemed to give the Federals any chance of refusing their line despite desperate attempts by Hooker and Thomas to do so..."
From “On the Road to Armageddon” by Hunter McCook
University of Ohio 2009
"Hooker and Thomas would repeatedly try to reform the line but they were unable to close the gap. The Army of the Cumberland was irretrievably split on the axis of the Brotherton Road. Thomas commanded the Union left. He had precious few reserves to preserve his position, particularly as elements of Buell's and Reynolds' commands started to stream to the rear. During the remainder of the day Thomas' wing would be steadily but reluctantly pushed north westwards by Cleburne's men. Steadying the fighting withdrawal with the fresh troops of Steedman and the reliable brigades of Palmer's division, Charles Cruft's and William Grose's, Thomas would ensure his line of retreat via the Alexander's Bridge Road towards the McFarland Gap was never truly at risk...
Thomas steadies the rearguard
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
Buffalo 1999
"General Hooker's task was harder than General Thomas' on the right. With the exception of Jackson's division, all of Hooker's wing (effectively Richardson's troops plus Jackson) were facing south. As Hooker pulled brigades and regiments from Richardson's line to shore up his left, so Richardson had a harder time fending off the attacks of the Army of Mississippi and element's of Churchill's Corps of the Army of Tennessee...
This was Joseph Hooker at his finest: commanding divisions and brigades in a fierce contest. Inspiring men to stand and fight when all sense said to run...
Despite his desire to stand and fight, when Richardson reported rebels troops pressing Jacob Cox's exposed right, Hooker realised the Dry Valley Road was at risk of falling into rebel hands and with it Hooker's only line of retreat. Frustrated and visibly angry Hooker gave the order to withdraw...
The Spencer rifles of Anson G. McCook's brigade would do sterling and essential service as Lovell Rousseau and his division screened the retreat against the baying rebels. Rousseau, still considered then by many of his contemporaries to be a mediocre general in spite of previous performances did his duty well under Hooker's watchful eye..."
Union troops rush to the rear
From “On the Road to Armageddon” by Hunter McCook
University of Ohio 2009
"Ignoring the panegyrics written about the Army of the Cumberland in the decade that followed, it is acknowledged that the Dry Valley Road and the road to McFarland's Gap were choked with wounded and broken troops. Bragg had come within a hair's breath of crushing the Army of the Cumberland. Hooker's and Thomas' fighting instincts on the defensive had saved the army from its Cannae.
As night fell Hooker was allowed to retreat without further pursuit. Bragg had other fish to fry..."
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
Buffalo 1999
“As the troops of the Army of the Cumberland fled up two roads in the direction of Chattanooga, many might have been forgiven for thinking that Joseph Hooker was “thoroughly exploded” (James Garfield) as an army commander. However his actions on the night of 26th October and during 27th October would propel him from the depths of his defeat to a position as “the second man in the nation after Kearny the Magnificent” (Thurlow Weed) and to the highest office in the nation as its most controversial occupant in a 100 years…”
A pensive Joe Hooker perhaps remembering the two days at Chickamauga
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I was detecting a President Kearny and perhaps President Rodman. Now President Hooker!?! God help the nation! Perhaps Senator Lew Wallace can save it. I wonder if Lincoln will leave to see the nation led by its Generals.
Also I love how Jeff C Davis manages to stuff up hiis career even in TTL by murdering/shooting someone - "I don't know what to think of the rebs but Jeff sure scares the hell out of me!" to paraphrase an old line.
Also I love how Jeff C Davis manages to stuff up hiis career even in TTL by murdering/shooting someone - "I don't know what to think of the rebs but Jeff sure scares the hell out of me!" to paraphrase an old line.
Bragg's march, though obviously successful, must have left his supply train in his wake along with who knows how many stragglers. Hooker will hold up in Chattanooga, and Grant can't be far away.
I can see the Union weakness in the west - lack of good cavalry, allowing the rebels to play them like this but the end is still nigh. I foresee the outcome of the promised "Battle of Four Armies".
Great TL.
I can see the Union weakness in the west - lack of good cavalry, allowing the rebels to play them like this but the end is still nigh. I foresee the outcome of the promised "Battle of Four Armies".
Great TL.
Looks like Hooker got off lighter than I expected....at least his army is still relatively intact.
Now we will see how Grant reacts when he finds out about Bragg's movement....
Now we will see how Grant reacts when he finds out about Bragg's movement....
Hooker will be secure in Chattanooga and Grant will be behind the rebels with an opportunity to cut their supplies and put them in a vise. If Bragg goes after Hooker, rather than falling back some to regroup and resupply he will be in trouble. Although he has the field by not destroying Hooker's army he has failed, and over=estimating his victory and pressing towards Chattanooga will be his doom.
I am always surprised that Union and Confederate Generals all largely seemed to think achieving a "Cannae"-like victory was possible. I can't think of any battle where either side came close to shattering the opposing army to the extent it ceased to exist as an organised force.
Bragg's plan in TTL seems to hinge on utterly crushing Hooker with two armies before turning on Grant, but Hooker, though defeated, is probably not anywhere near crushed.
Thanks for all your comments.
It has been suggested to me that there are those who would enjoy the political elements of this timeline, but are put off by the detailed battle descriptions.
Does anyone think a secondary thread just focusing on the political and diplomatic posts, with a summary of the military campaigns, might be appreciated?
It has been suggested to me that there are those who would enjoy the political elements of this timeline, but are put off by the detailed battle descriptions.
Does anyone think a secondary thread just focusing on the political and diplomatic posts, with a summary of the military campaigns, might be appreciated?
I like the military battles, but often get confused on who is facing who and where they are.