A Glorious Union or America: the New Sparta
- Thread starter TheKnightIrish
- Start date
Fascinating TL! You have done excellent work with the butterflies and write this so well I can read it for hours! I've just become caught up now and I'm looking forward to more!
If I was Lincoln, I would seriously consider such a descent: after all the Union already has a foothold thanks to the Battle of Hatteras Inlet. Such an expedition, similar to OTL's Burnsides' Expedition, would not only secure those slaves as manpower, it would close off the NC coast to blockade running as well. In addition, the Union could use such a foothold to attack the ANV's supply lines in NC. Maybe also attack Fort Fisher and close off Wilmington as well?
Butler might be finished after the Blackwater debacle but even if he isn't I'd see him as already having made the transition to Radical Republican.
I hadn't thought about Andy Johnson (I was thinking Seymour like others). How would Johnson's platform differ from Lincoln's? Would Johnson find himself in the same position as McClellan with a party still confused/divided over its war goals?
And would Hamblin still be on the ticket now in'64 with Lincoln? The war might have changed but Lincoln doesn't seem to have. I can still see him go with the National Unionist mantle to braoden support. Thoughts?
The problem with an amphibious attack on NC now is that with the confederate coast condensed you'll have what's left of the ANV closer to any landing, and all those NC regiments that were sent north are now back in state. They'll probably have more than 2000 men defending the Roanoke area with many more not too far off to drive off or contain any union beach head.
It'd probably make more sense to attack further south and force the ANV or other districts to detach forces to another front entirely. After all, the Union has the manpower to spare for such an effort, the south doesnt.
It'd probably make more sense to attack further south and force the ANV or other districts to detach forces to another front entirely. After all, the Union has the manpower to spare for such an effort, the south doesnt.
With the Union being more successful in the war plus Confederate atrocities, I suspect that Peace Democrats are few and far between. I see the Democrats being split between War Democrats and out-and-out Copperheads. The thing here is which faction gains control of the party. I suspect though most War Democrats will support a Lincoln-Johnson ticket or something similar.
With the losses the ANV suffered, would Longstreet want to release those regiments? He needs every man he's got to hold off the AotP. If he has to divert men to contain any amphibious attack, it makes the AotP's job easier. At the least, I would consider seizing Roanoke Island and maybe Plymouth (Map of Eastern NC.) This would give the Union suitable bases for the Navy to blockade the coast and prevent supplies from reaching the ANV. Also, Plymouth would be a handy place to rally and support Union sympathizers and slaves. Between this and the ANV's "Army-Ants", maybe the NC government might be persuaded to at least consider leaving the CSA?
This is excellent stuff sir. I have to admit due to a lack of knowledge of the ACW I was at first overwhelmed by your level of detail but I've just spent a few hours with a pot of tea bowling straight through thirty pages of excellent story telling. I'm not even much of a fan of military history but you've managed to season all the troop movements with anecdotes and interesting characters, plus the intriguing the political butterflies across the globe.
I look forward to much more!
I look forward to much more!
Thank you all for your kind comments.
I am just swotting up on the characters of the Western commanders and the campaigning grounds (I am an Easterner at heart so I need to do more work to write the western bits). Next update will appear in the next couple of days and flow from there...
Actually, those are good points that I hadn't really considered. I'm just wondering if the Union could land enough men quickly enough to establish a real defene before the Rebs can react, shift troops, and push them into the ocean. I'm not sure what the road/rail network in NC was like at this time so I'm not sure how quickly Longstreet could move.
I am suprised though that with things not going so well for the south that the successionist movement hasn't begun to pull the CSA apart even more. In OTL if I remember correctly, seveal southern state governments witheld supplies, troops, and even considered leaving the CSA due to what they felt was incompetent management by Davis and the CSA government. With the Confederates doing worse I think those elements would get much worse faster... possibly a Texan CSA succession?
This is why the Union should seize Roanoke Island first. (OTL Battle of Roanoke Island) The Union Navy can isolate the island preventing reinforcement and any troops stationed there would be cut off and forced to surrender. Once the Union has the island, it can act as a base for ships blockading the Eastern NC Coast and a staging area for troops to launch raids
on the coast. The island can also be used to rally and train locals who join the Union Army.
The question is how many troops could Longstreet spare to attack any Union incursion without leaving the AoNV vulnerable to attack; also I would assume NC would insist that some troops be stationed on the Eastern coast to protect against attacks by the Army of the James.
Texas is very pro-CSA so I see succession as unlikely, although since the Trans-Mississippi theater is isolated, those states will as IOTL, be largely self-sufficient. North Carolina however, is another story; with the "Army-Ants" (love that phrase KI!) running amok and many NC citizens ambivalent about secession and the CSA anyway, maybe Lincoln could persuade Governor Vance to leave the CSA in exchange for protection?
Also I saw a thread on the board about Confederate Insurgency that has some useful insights. If anything considering the way the war is going and some of the CSA's actions, I could see an anti-CSA insurgency forming, aided by the Union.
Chapter Eighty-Four Hooker best Lookout
Chapter Eighty-Four
Hooker best Lookout
From “Army of the Heartland” by Col. J.T. Starke
University of Tennessee
University of Tennessee
“Following Rosecrans’ campaign in Middle Tennessee in the summer of 1863 and subsequent replacement by Hooker, Hooker prepared to move out from Stevenson, Tennessee, to maneuver Hardee out of Tennessee altogether and force him to abandon the city of Chattanooga. General-in-chief Major General Henry W. Halleck and the President were insistent that Hooker move quickly to take Chattanooga. Seizing the city would open the door for the Union to advance toward Atlanta and the heartland of the South. Chattanooga was a vital rail hub (with lines going north toward Nashville and Knoxville and south toward Atlanta), and an important manufacturing center for the production of iron and coke, located on the navigable Tennessee River. Situated between Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge, Raccoon Mountain, and Stringer's Ridge, Chattanooga occupied an important, defensible position. Interestingly Kearny’s orders to Hooker emphasized the need to bring Hardee and his Army of Tennessee to battle as well as the seizure of Chattanooga…”
Harpers Weekly notes the appointment of "Fighting Joe" to command of the Army of the Cumberland
From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965
Bison 1965
“The transfer of Benjamin Cheatham to the East Tennessee department following the illness of Major General Simon B. Buckner, allowed Hardee to completely reorganize the army, while also extending his command responsibilities northward to the Knoxville area. From three corps of two divisions each, Hardee now consolidated his troops into two corps of three divisions under his best commanders: Major General Patrick Cleburne and Major General Thomas James Churchill. Cleburne’s I Corps would contain the divisions of A.P.Stewart, Jones M.Withers, and Preston Smith. Churchill’s, John P.McCown, Bushrod R.Johnson and St.John R.Liddell.
The Confederate War Department asked Hardee in early August if he could assume the offensive against Hooker. He demurred, concerned about the daunting geographical obstacles and logistical challenges, preferring to wait for Hooker to solve those same problems by attacking him. He was also concerned about a small Union force under Major General George Stoneman (the District of East Tennessee having been removed from General Burnside’s Department of the Ohio) that was threatening Knoxville. Hardee withdrew his forces from advanced positions around Bridgeport, which left Hooker free to maneuver on the northern side of the Tennessee River. He concentrated his two infantry corps around Chattanooga and relied upon cavalry to cover his flanks, extending from northern Alabama (where his cavalry sought to link up with Bragg’s) to near Knoxville…
The appointment of Breckinridge as Secretary of War and Joseph Johnston as Chief of Staff caused an immediate change of emphasis. Lee had already embarked on his march into Virginia and beyond, but Breckinridge and Johnson were both strongly of the view that the war would be lost in Tennessee and Alabama in the struggle against both Gant and Hooker. The Confederate government decided to attempt a strategic reversal in the West by reviewing a radical suggestion by the commander of the department, Braxton Bragg. Bragg’s suggestion involved a large scale Confederate movement of troops from one state to another with the aim of achieving a period of numerical superiority and gaining decisive results over both Union armies. Hardee was to slow down Hooker, but give ground where necessary until the forces of the department were ready to strike their first target, the Army of the Cumberland…”
General Hooker and staff at Stevenson. Hooker is 6th from the right.
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
Buffalo 1999
“Hooker faced significant logistical challenges if he chose to move forward. The Cumberland Plateau that separated the armies was a rugged, barren country over 30 miles long with poor roads and little opportunity for foraging. If Hardee attacked him during the advance, Hooker would be forced to fight with his back against the mountains and tenuous supply lines. He did not have the luxury of staying put, however, because he was under intense pressure from Washington to move forward in conjunction with Stoneman's advance into East Tennessee… Hooker knew that he would have difficulty receiving supplies from his base on any advance across the Tennessee River and therefore thought it necessary to accumulate enough supplies and transport wagons that he could cross long distances without a reliable line of communications. Ultimately however Hooker understood politicians, as did General Dan Butterfield, Hooker's chief of staff. Both men understood the value of being on the record endorsing the Lincoln administration's priorities and so the advance was not long delayed…
The plan for the Union advance was to cross the Cumberland Plateau into the valley of the Tennessee River, pause briefly to accumulate some supplies, and then cross the river itself. An opposed crossing of the wide river was not feasible, so Hooker devised a deception to distract Hardee above Chattanooga while the army crossed downstream. Then the Army would advance on a wide front through the mountains. The XIV Corps under Thomas would advance against the city from the west, the XXI Corps under Richardson would cross over Lookout Mountain 20 miles south of the city, while the XX Corps under Sheridan and the Cavalry Corps under Lawrence Pike Graham would advance even farther to the southeast toward Hardee's railroad supply line leading from Atlanta. Hooker would hold XXIII Corps in reserve for the initial stages of the campaign. If executed correctly, this plan would cause Hardee to evacuate Chattanooga or be trapped in the city without supplies. Furthermore Richardson could be expected to bring some element of Hardee’s army to battle at the fortified Lookout Mountain…
The difficult road conditions meant a full week passed before they reached the Tennessee River Valley. They encamped while engineers made preparations for crossing the river. Meanwhile, Hooker's deception plan was underway. General Anson G. McCook of the XIV Corps moved his mounted infantry brigade to the north of Chattanooga. His men pounded on tubs and sawed boards, sending pieces of wood downstream, to make the Confederates think that rafts were being constructed for a crossing north of the city. His artillery bombarded the city from Stringer's Ridge for four days. The deception worked and Hardee was convinced that the Union crossing would be above the city, in conjunction with Stoneman's advance on Knoxville…
The first crossing of the Tennessee River was accomplished by the XX Corps at Caperton's Ferry, 4 miles from Stevenson, where construction began on a 1,250-foot pontoon bridge under the oversight of General George P.Buell. As the campaign progress the army’s chief engineer, Gouvenor K.Warren, would call Buell the greatest “pontoonier” in the army. The second crossing, of the XXI Corps, was at Shellmound, Tennessee. They were quickly followed by most of the XXI Corps. The fourth crossing site was at the mouth of Battle Creek, Tennessee, where the rest of the XXI Corps crossed. Without permanent bridges, the Army of the Cumberland could not be supplied reliably, so another bridge was constructed at Bridgeport by General Granger’s reserve, spanning 2,700 feet in three days. Virtually all of the Union army, other than elements of the Reserve Corps kept behind to guard the railroad, had safely crossed the river within 2 weeks. They faced more mountainous terrain and road networks that were just as treacherous as the ones they had already traversed…
The three infantry corps of Hooker's army advanced by separate routes, on the only three roads that were suitable for such movements. On the right flank, Sheridan’s XX Corps moved southwest to Valley Head, Alabama; in the center, Thomas's XIV Corps moved just across the border to Trenton, Georgia; and on the left, Richardson's XXI Corps moved directly toward Chattanooga around Lookout Mountain...”
The Army of the Cumberland would become expert bridge builders
From “On the Road to Armageddon” by Hunter McCook
University of Ohio 2009
University of Ohio 2009
“Lookout Mountain was actually a ridge or narrow plateau that extended 85 miles southwest from the Tennessee River, culminating in a sharp point 1,800 feet above the river. From the river the end of the mountain rose at a 45° angle and at about two thirds of the way to the summit it changed grade, forming a ledge, or "bench", 150–300 feet wide, extending for several miles around both sides of the mountain. Above the bench, the grade steepened into a 500-foot face of rock called the "palisades". Confederate artillery atop Lookout Mountain could harass access by the river…
Hardee had placed General John P. McCown in overall command for the defense of the mountain, with McCown's own division positioned on the summit. The brigades of Daniel W. Adams, John C. Brown, and William Preston were placed on the bench of the mountain, with Roger W. Hanson’s off some distance in reserve. Adams later wrote about the dissatisfaction of the commanders assigned to this area, "Indeed, it was agreed on all hands that the position was one extremely difficult to defense against a strong force of the enemy advancing under cover of a heavy fire." Senator Lew Wallace, writer, historian and general critic of Hooker in later years, wrote that despite the imposing appearance of Lookout Mountain, as far as he could assess years later "the mountain's strength was a myth. ... It was impossible to hold the bench, which was commanded by Federal artillery at Moccasin Bend." Although McCown placed an artillery battery on the crest of the mountain, the guns could not be depressed enough to reach the bench, which was accessible from numerous trails on the west side of the mountain. General Churchill, new to corps command, had placed the defense in McCown’s “experienced” hands. McCown would not shine at Lookout Mountain…
Richardson had about 10,000 men in three divisions to operate against Lookout Mountain (Hazen, Palmer and Buell). General Hooker authorized a full-scale assault. Richardson was ordered to "take the point at all hazards." Richardson ignored any subtlety and at 4 a.m. ordered Hazen "to cross Lookout Creek and to assault Lookout Mountain, marching down the valley and sweeping every rebel from it."
Richardson did not plan to attack McCown's Division on the top of the mountain, assuming that capturing the bench would make McCown's position untenable. His force would approach the bench from two directions: Palmer’s division would link up with Hazen at Wauhatchie, while Buell's division would cross Lookout Creek to the southeast. Both forces would meet near the Cravens House…
Hooker’s chief of artillery, William F. Berry, arranged an impressive array of artillery to scatter the Confederate pickets and cover the advance. He had nine batteries set up near the mouth of Lookout Creek, two batteries on Moccasin Point, and two additional batteries near Chattanooga Creek all covered by elements of William Grose’s brigade of Palmer’s division.
Hooker's "Blunt Instrument": Israel B. Richardson
First to cross the footbridge was Wagner's brigade, followed by Harker's, which formed to Wagner's left and became the center of Hazen's battle line. Opdycke’s brigade then extended the Union left down to the base of the mountain. Palmer’s remaining two brigades, Cruft’s and Anderson’s, followed in the rear. From 6:30 to 7:30a.m, Hazen's skirmishers advanced through the fog and mist that obscured the mountain. Contact was made with Adams's pickets 1 mile southwest of Lookout Point. The Confederates were significantly outnumbered and could not resist the pressure, falling back but leaving a number behind to surrender. Hooker ordered an artillery bombardment to saturate the Confederate line of retreat, but the effect was minimized because of poor visibility and the fact that the two forces were almost on top of each other.
“Much of the ground over which we advanced was rough beyond conception. It was covered with an untouched forest growth, seamed with the deep ravines, and obstructed with rocks of all sizes which had fallen from the frowning wall on our right. The ground passed over by our left was not quite so rough; but, taking the entire stretch of the mountain side traversed by our force ... it was undoubtedly the roughest battle field of the war.” Colonel Nicholas L. Anderson of Palmer’s Division
The Union pursuit of the skirmishers was halted around 8:30 a.m. 300 yards southwest the point when Harker and Wagner encountered Adams' reserve southwest of the Cravens House. The two Confederate regiments repulsed Harker's first attempt at assaulting their fieldworks. A second assault succeeded, enveloping and outnumbering the Confederates 4 to 1. Despite Adams' attempt to rally his men, he could not prevent a disorderly retreat back toward the Cravens house. The Union brigades kept up their pursuit past the point and along the bench.
As Hazen's men appeared below the point around noon, Opdycke's brigade advanced across the lower elevations of the mountain, clearing the enemy from the east bank of Lookout Creek. Richardson ordered Cruft’s and Anderson’s brigades to begin crossing the foot bridge over the creek. Cruft moved east at the base of the mountain, Anderson moved up the slope. These movements isolated part of Adams' Brigade and an entire battalion was forced to surrender, along with 200 men from Preston’s picket line.
The Battle of Lookout Mountain
Preston was reluctant to take action. At 6:30 he had sent a message to McCown asking where he should deploy his brigade and McCown's reply at 8 a.m. expressed his frustration that Preston had seemingly forgotten the plan to defend the line at the Cravens house. many historians would criticize McCown’s poor performance in leading the defense…
There was bungling aplenty among the Confederate commanders on Lookout Mountain that day, but no one displayed greater negligence than did McCown. He remained glued to his headquarters on the summit. In his report of the battle, McCown tried to excuse his dereliction of duty by arguing that his headquarters was a good spot from which to receive both commands from Churchill and reports from the front line. That may have been true, but his presence was badly needed nearer the Cravens house. McCown lacked even the presence of mind to call for reinforcements.
On his own initiative John C. Brown took his four regiments from the summit to assist Adams. By this time, Preston’s troops were moving up amidst Adams' retreating men, and they fired on Harker’s advancing men from 100 yards. Unable to see the size of the force resisting it through the fog, the Union men retreated beyond a stone wall. Preston's 1,000 men took positions in the rifle pits facing the wall and waited for the inevitable counterattack. Harker's men were too exhausted to make an immediate move. As Wagner's brigade arrived, they stepped over Harker's men and rushed into the attack. Opdycke's brigade was moving up the mountain side on Wagner's left, followed by the brigades of Cruft and Anderson. Preston could see that he was being significantly outflanked on the right and chose to fall back rather than be surrounded…
On his own initiative John C. Brown took his four regiments from the summit to assist Adams. By this time, Preston’s troops were moving up amidst Adams' retreating men, and they fired on Harker’s advancing men from 100 yards. Unable to see the size of the force resisting it through the fog, the Union men retreated beyond a stone wall. Preston's 1,000 men took positions in the rifle pits facing the wall and waited for the inevitable counterattack. Harker's men were too exhausted to make an immediate move. As Wagner's brigade arrived, they stepped over Harker's men and rushed into the attack. Opdycke's brigade was moving up the mountain side on Wagner's left, followed by the brigades of Cruft and Anderson. Preston could see that he was being significantly outflanked on the right and chose to fall back rather than be surrounded…
All of the Union brigades, which were tired men, began the pursuit. Richardson was concerned that his lines were becoming intermingled and confused by the fog and the rugged ground and they were tempting defeat if the Confederates brought up reinforcements in the right place. He ordered Hazen to halt, but Hazen was too far ahead with his troops to receive the message in good time. Hooker wrote, "Fired by success, with a flying, panic-stricken enemy before them, they pressed impetuously forward."
Preston’s brigade was able to escape in the fog and Adams had adequate time to form a rough defensive line 3–400 yards south of the Cravens House. His 600 men took cover behind boulders and fallen trees and made enough of a racket to dissuade Harker's men from moving against them. By this time Brown's brigade had descended from the summit and came to Adams’ assistance…
Richardson was confident. At 1:25 p.m. he wrote that the "conduct of all the troops has been brilliant, and the success has far exceeded my expectations. Our loss has not been severe, and of prisoners I should judge that we had not less than 2,000." By sunset, a confident Richardson informed Hooker that he intended to move into Chattanooga Valley as soon as the fog lifted. He signaled "In all probability the enemy will evacuate tonight. His line of retreat is seriously threatened by my troops."
The sound of battle alerted Churchill who rode to the scene. He responded by sending for reinforcements in the form of a brigade from Bushrod Johnson’s division. It be would used only to cover a Confederate withdrawal from Lookout Mountain, ordering McCown at1:30 p.m. to withdraw to the east side of Chattanooga Creek. McCown was reluctant to break contact until his troops on the summit could escape on the Summertown Road into the Chattanooga Valley. The brigades of Adams, Brown and Preston were ordered to hold on for the rest of the afternoon. For hours through the afternoon and into the night, they fought sporadically with the Union troops through dense fog, neither side able to see more than a few dozen yards ahead nor make any progress in either direction before retreating in the night…
After learning that Hooker had crossed into his rear, Hardee evacuated Chattanooga and moved his army south along the LaFayette Road toward LaFayette, Georgia. The Union army occupied Chattanooga. Hooker telegraphed Halleck, "Chattanooga is ours after a glorious victory." Hardee was aware of Hooker's dispositions and was tempted to attack his isolated corps individually. The corps were spread out over 40 miles (65 km), too far apart to support each other. However Bragg’s plan called for Hardee to fall back further…
Hooker was convinced that Hardee was demoralized and fleeing to either Dalton, Rome, or Atlanta, Georgia. Instead, Hardee's Army of Tennessee was encamped at LaFayette, some 20 miles (32 km) south of Chattanooga. Confederate soldiers who posed as deserters deliberately added to this impression. Thomas firmly cautioned Hooker that a pursuit of Hardee was unwise because the Army of the Cumberland was too widely dispersed and its supply lines were tenuous. Hooker, exultant at his success in capturing Chattanooga, did not completely discount Thomas's advice. He immediately took steps to concentrate his forces before pursuing Hardee. For the next four days, both armies attempted to improve their dispositions…”
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The map in the bottom left corner gives an excellent idea of the battle positions if not the elevations, and I have now added my illustrations to Chapter 84.
http://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/detail/RUMSEY~8~1~26879~1100178:Battle-of-Lookout-Mountain,-Tenn-,-
http://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/detail/RUMSEY~8~1~26879~1100178:Battle-of-Lookout-Mountain,-Tenn-,-
Not that different from Rosecrans plan but then the ground gives limited options. But you can tell Hooker, like Kearny or on his orders, is more interested in killing rebels than manouvering them out of cities. Hooker has a strong team of corps commanders (and he and his chief of staff were among the best strategists - Chancellorsville which was awesome plan that failed in the latter stages of its execution). However the hints suggest he might still be headed for a Chickamauga.
I don't know Hardeeand Churchill seems plucked from obsurity, but Cleburne is bloody good! I know that much. Should be good. I wonder what Bragg is up to and how he expects to get the drop on Grant?
I don't know Hardeeand Churchill seems plucked from obsurity, but Cleburne is bloody good! I know that much. Should be good. I wonder what Bragg is up to and how he expects to get the drop on Grant?
Chapter Eighty-Five Grant Celebrates as Bragg Calculates
Chapter Eighty-Five
Grant Celebrates as Bragg Calculates
Grant Celebrates as Bragg Calculates
From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953
“As the army encamped at Arcola on the Tombigbee River, Grant was in rare form. Bragg’s army was in full retreat towards Selma after his rearguard had been drubbed by Illinoisan John A. Logan’s leading division the previous day at the Battle of Arcola. Logan’s troops had seized the railroad bridge [Alabama & Mississippi Railroad] intact. Furthermore the army’s bummers and sackers had little difficultly in striping the Alabama countryside for sufficient supplies, dispelling the fears of the most pessimistic officers. But what Sam Grant was particularly pleased about on this evening was that he was finally riding himself of “one damned fool and one paper-pusher” in the words of William Sherman: John C. McClernand and Stephen Hurlbut…
Logan's Division celebrates the seizure of the bridge at Arcola - a Napoleonic Feat according to Harpers Weekly
Hurlbut, the commander of XVI Corps, was suffering from debilitating diarrhoea, and was finally being evacuated to Vicksburg. He was an excellent administrator and volunteer officer with no talent for campaigning in the field. Grant could now appoint a trusted regular to command. Conveniently Grant had ensured the unattached Major General E.O.C. Ord had leave to accompany the army and he was promptly appointed to the command…
Newly promoted Major Generals E.O.C Ord and Eugene A. Carr
Grant’s “nemesis” in the Army of the Mississippi, John C. McClernand bridled under Grant’s command. Grant did not trust McClernand and McClernand did not rate Grant. McClernand had continually lobbied for an independent command. Under pressure from President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton, General in Chief Kearny granted McClernand’s wish. McClernand was to be assigned Fitz John Porter’s XIX Corps for a descent down the Alabama River, once Selma had been taken, to secure the important rebel port of Mobile. McClernand was ecstatic. He gave his one corps force the grandiose name of “the Army of the Alabama” and ensured a good number of newspaper correspondents would accompany him on his “march to the sea!”…
Sherman was surprised that Grant was still pleased. “I had thought that losing a corps was too great a price for ridding ourselves of McClernand”. Grant was certain it was a good trade, “when John McClernand is at the head of corps I discount it from my plans and its numbers from my calculations”, furthermore the confirmation that the third division of XVI Corps was on its way from Nashville, via Vicksburg, to join the other three divisions of that corps would offset some of the loss of numbers…
Sherman asked Grant if McClernand's replacement at the head of XIII Corps would be "Black Jack" Logan. Grant instead sent for "War Eagle", Eugene Carr...
Aside from feeling sympathy for General Fitz John Porter who would now effectively have to act as McClernand’s second in command, Grant’s only concern that night was predicting in which direction Bragg’s retreat would continue. Reports and logic suggested the original Confederate capitol of Montgomery. With supplies and a railroad, it seemed an obvious point at which Bragg might regroup as well as a point of pride to the South…”
From “The Most Hated of Men – Braxton Bragg in the Civil War” by Grafton Lowe
University of Kentucky
"Bragg had scraped nine divisions together: Carter L. Stevenson, John H. Forney, Martin L. Smith, the now one legged Dabney Maury, William H.T. Walker, John S. Marmaduke, Alfred Mouton, Camille Polignac, and Mansfield Lovell. His two corps commanders were both "characters" - John Bankhead Magruder and William Wing Loring...
General Braxton Bragg - The South's Greatest Strategist?
Grant had had the best of most of the clashes since Bragg embarked on his retreat into Alabama. A feeling of despondency was settling upon the army. Desertion was rising, particularly among the western troops. Bragg fiercely enforced discipline. Captured deserters were frequently hung. Bragg couldn't afford to waste ammunition on executions...
Bragg foresaw the campaign as winter progressed. Grant would press him east through Alabama. First Montgomery would fall and then, depending upon which railroad line he retreated along he would be pushed back towards Atlanta or towards Columbus. Both Confederate armies in the west were outnumbered by the Union armies dogging their heals. Bragg realized that unless the nation took a great risk, its new born independence would die in the cradle...
Bragg's proposal to Secretary Breckinridge was that Magruder, master of military deception in Virginia and along the Mississippi, would be tasked, with three divisions, to lure Grant westwards, while Bragg would lead the other six divisions north to fall on Hooker's flank...
Bragg proposed using the Alabama & Tennessee Railroad to move some troops quickly to Talladega and beyond. The army would then march via Jacksonville north to the Coosa River and Hooker's right flank. Then both Hardee and Bragg would fall on Hooker. Having "smashed" Hooker the combined armies could turn south west, leaving a minimal force to cover Chattanooga, to attack Grant...
It was a desperate strategy that relied on the South's creaking infrastructure and Prince John Magruder's ability to fool Ulysses S. Grant..."
Major General John B. Magruder
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Good stuff KI.
I think Bragg is depending far too much on a plan where everything has to go right. These types of plans usually end up in nothing but disaster.
I think Bragg is depending far too much on a plan where everything has to go right. These types of plans usually end up in nothing but disaster.
I see Grant having a few problems:
1. He loosing a full corps as soon as he hits Selma.
2. He might choose to wait for this divison coming from Nashville via Vicksburg.
3. Pushing on Montgomery is a tempting target (I know Grant has said Bragg's Army is his target).
4. The last time Grant assumed Magruder was play acting - at Port Gibson - he got a very bloody nose.
That all said sooner or later Grant will realise Bragg has marched off. And Grant will follow as fast as he can.
From Arcola or Selma I wonder if the fastest route to re-inforce Hooker is simply to march after Bragg or is there a railhead handy that Grant can use to redeploy quicker than marching there on foot in a straight line?
Another update will be posted on Monday. I am in Edinburgh on holiday for a few days til then. Just found Volumn 1 of Braxton Bragg by Grady McWhiney signed by the author in a second hand book shop! Excellent timing.