Chapter Eighty Nine
Before the Storm
From “On the Road to Armageddon” by Hunter McCook
University of Ohio 2009
“October 30th 1864: Joseph Hooker would call it the “the longest day in American History”, Ulysses S. Grant who had fought his army all the previous day as well called it “the hardest damn couple of days of my life…of any life”, Jeff Davis would call it “the Confederacy’s Armageddon”…”
From “The War Between the States” by Otis R. Mayhew
Sword & Musket 1992
“The battles that took place on October 29th and 30th have been given many names over the years: The Battle of the Coosa, The Battles of Gadsden, Glencoe and Atalla, but the name that has stuck has been The Battle of Four Armies: the Armies of the Mississippi and the Cumberland and the Armies of Mississippi and Tennessee. It would prove to be the bloodiest battle in the Civil War…”
Grant and his "right arm" William T. Sherman
From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953
“It was October 15th before Grant realised his error. The weight of reports was too great to ignore: the force before him was small, two perhaps three divisions in size. Bragg and Magruder had bluffed him again. Grant felt the weight of his mistake and openly admitted as much to his friend Sherman “whatever the outcome it is my fault. It is all my fault…” (Sherman: A Life in Uniform). Sherman was adamant however that any failure arose purely from “the [damnable] War Department’s failure to provide sufficient cavalry; sufficient in arms and training; to act as the eyes and ears of this army”. It was an answer, or an excuse to some, that the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War would hear again and again from the officers of both the Army of the Mississippi and the Army of the Cumberland, but they would never hear it from General Grant who made no excuses for his failure…
Grant effectively ignored Magruder’s force, having no cavalry to spare and no concerns that Magruder could or would attempt to achieve anything in his absence. Thus Grant led his whole force north (now of course minus the corps now grandly redesignated the Army of the Alabama under McClernand) in the wake of Bragg…
Bragg’s forced march northwards had outdistanced several of his supply trains and had left the usual debris of a forced march in his wake, including many stragglers which Grant’s force swept up. Despite this Grant remained unsure about how far and how many days he was behind Bragg…”
Major-General, Historian, Veterans' Leader, Senator, Vice President on two different party tickets, and surprise 22nd President, Lew Wallace would set the standard for in-depth analysis of the Civil War
From “On the Road to Armageddon” by Hunter McCook
University of Ohio 2009
“Much has been said on the subject of Grant’s direct pursuit of Bragg. At the time Grant was praised by the President, by General Hooker and by General Kearny for “going straight after the enemy with the bit between his teeth” (Kearny). However in subsequent years the question as to why Grant sought a direct confrontation in this way has been questioned.
Knowing the obvious purpose of Bragg’s march would be to join with Hardee in an attempt to overwhelm Hooker, Grant could not have hoped to catch up with Bragg prior to that joining. Grant could not then be reasonably expect to join with Hooker prior to a major engagement. Many have asserted that Grant could have manoeuvred into position, indicting the supply line between Atlanta and Bragg/Hardee. The rebels would then have to attack Grant on prepared ground of his own choosing.
Historian, civil war general and the first great chronicler of the Civil War, Lew Wallace, highlighted early the major problem with this suggestion. It may have made sound military sense but it simply was neither politic nor naturally in Grant’s nature. Grant’s orders from his new commander in chief, Phil Kearny, was to engage the enemy: to pursue and engage the enemy at every opportunity. The destruction of the enemy army was Grant’s objective not towns and cities. It was an order that accorded perfectly with Grant’s own assessment of the best way to “win” the war – defeat the rebels in the field and end their ability to resist the Union militarily.
Furthermore it was neither obvious nor logical to assume that Hooker would give battle to a superior force if he obtained sufficient warning. He may be forced to withdraw back into Tennessee or to hold up, perhaps under siege in Chattanooga. Cut off from regular contact there was no way for Grant to warn or anticipate what Hooker might do…
Furthermore the suggestion that Grant might sit in static positions, in winter, in the middle of hostile territory interdicting Confederate supply lines ignores one major problem: Grant’s own logistics. So far Grant’s army had barely touched the supplies they left Vicksburg with, living off the untouched Alabama countryside. However the territory between Chattanooga and Atlanta had been scoured for supplies for Hardee’s army for several months, and in winter, there would have been serious concerns about Grant’s ability to live off the land for any period while awaiting an attack by Bragg and Hardee…”
General William J. Hardee did not have Bragg's confidence
From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965
“William Hardee was not fooled by the victory that he and Bragg had won. Hooker was not crushed. He was defeated; he was withdrawing; but his army would live to fight again and who knew how soon. Yet Hardee’s superior, Bragg, was adamant. Hooker was defeated, his army’s morale crushed. They could afford to ignore him for the time being and turn on Grant who’s army was cut off from aid deep in Confederate territory. Bragg enthusiasm only increased when Hardee’s cavalry commander, Abraham Buford, brought word that Grant was on his way north…
Bragg’s Army of the Mississippi was short on everything. Food, clothing and ammunition trailed behind it in trains abandoned to Bragg’s urgency to get to Hardee before Grant recognised the danger. Hardee did his best to provide for Bragg’s men from his own stores and from those captured from Hooker’s troops but they were “but meagre and I feared that our ambitions exceeded our ability to maintain two armies in this country” (Hardee)…
Nonetheless the enthusiasm of Hardee’s own subordinates, Patrick Cleburne and Thomas J. Churchill, for Bragg’s plan induced Hardee to participate despite his qualms…”
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
“As the surviving commanders of the Army of the Cumberland gathered just outside Chattanooga late on October 26th they were all surprised at the lack of pursuit beyond a handful of cavalry. The full realisation the
Bragg and
Hardee had effected a junction and that the Army of the Cumberland had thereby been overwhelmed by superior numbers had now begun to sink in…
The question that
Hooker asked, as indeed they all asked of each other, was why had the rebels not pursued them and where was
Grant?...
On October 27th when
Minty and
Edward McCook, who led the first cavalry to rejoin the army reported that
Hardee and
Bragg seemed to be pulling back from Chattanooga the first realisation of what must come next hit
Hooker. “
Dan, they have whipped us. They think we are a busted flush and no threat for a time. Now they mean to whip Grant together and he may not be far off. We must show that Bragg that this army is neither defeated nor disheartened” (
Dan Butterfield)…
Hooker’s orders went out to
Thomas, Richardson and
Granger. They were to get their corps, or such elements as could be made fit for battle, ready to march in a matter of days not weeks.
Jefferson C. Davis Corps was to be left in Chattanooga to hold it and reform.
Davis’ Corps (formerly
Sheridan’s) truly was “a busted flush”…
The one thing
Hooker feared most was “
that Phil will think a whipping has cowed me and that I stood by and watched while Grant fought” (Butterfield)…”
