Something to do with Jackson and Religion, and i am guessing him leading Confederates into, maybe, Mexico, or Cuba?
A Glorious Union or America: the New Sparta
- Thread starter TheKnightIrish
- Start date
If Kearny took Rodman's corps at north to hit Lee from the rear (it reminds me the move of Sérurier at the battle of Castiglione), he could trap the entire ANV striking towards the western end of the Pipe Creek Line, placing itself between Lee and Virginia.
Does Kearny know he will run into Lee before Reynolds? That might come as a surprise. If Kearny, Rodman and W.Birney are on the march do they have any cavalry to scout ahead?
If Kearny stumbles on Lee, and Reynolds isn't pressing the Pipe Creek Line, as some have suggested be shouldn't, Kearny might get a hard time of it on his own.
If Kearny stumbles on Lee, and Reynolds isn't pressing the Pipe Creek Line, as some have suggested be shouldn't, Kearny might get a hard time of it on his own.
Stuart and Rodman
Interesting. Three commands spread out along a twenty mile front. Good troops but plenty of action lately. They should be better rested than the Army of the Potomac, but still they have been doing a lot of marching and a fair bit of fighting.
It sounds as though the approaches from the south could and should be under observation. With Reynolds up, even if Lee sees Rodman's Corps, unless Reynolds has been shattered, can Lee detach sufficient forces against Rodman's Corps? If Lee does shatter Reynolds how much would it cost him? A pyrrhic victory? Like Grant OTL, Kearny is willing to take a beating and give it back in spades. Lee has his Cavalry on the left in reserve, are they available in sufficient strength to screen all possible directions that Rodman's Corps might come from?
Interesting. Three commands spread out along a twenty mile front. Good troops but plenty of action lately. They should be better rested than the Army of the Potomac, but still they have been doing a lot of marching and a fair bit of fighting.
It sounds as though the approaches from the south could and should be under observation. With Reynolds up, even if Lee sees Rodman's Corps, unless Reynolds has been shattered, can Lee detach sufficient forces against Rodman's Corps? If Lee does shatter Reynolds how much would it cost him? A pyrrhic victory? Like Grant OTL, Kearny is willing to take a beating and give it back in spades. Lee has his Cavalry on the left in reserve, are they available in sufficient strength to screen all possible directions that Rodman's Corps might come from?
Hmm. I was wondering about this myself. Rereading, I think I breezed over TheKnightIrish's description of the ground. Even if you penetrate the line, breaking it is no small matter. Each hill has the potential to be its own strong-point - as long as the food and ammunition last. There is nice network of roads, no more than five miles behind the line at any place, and that intersecting directly with the Littlestown Pike.
Meade's OTL plan is here: http://www.civilwarhome.com/map2.htm Sedgewick with VI Corps (here Johnson's III Corps), Slocum with V and XII Corps (Longstreet's I Corps, less the divisions of French and Picket), and Reynolds with I, III, and XI Corps (Jackson's II). In reserve Hancock's II Corps (French, Picket, and the artillery & cavalry reserves). Meade planned to hold with 68,000 men on the line, with Hancock in reserve with 11,000+ (per one Order of Battle)
A deep penetration will take time, and the deeper you go the more open the ground becomes of the Army of Northern Virginia. The approach from the north is disrupted by Big Pipe Creek and smaller streams. So, if the line is penetrated, how fast can the Army of the Potomac redeploy to exploit it and how fast can the Army of Northern Virginia move against them. The reserve of two divisions is not tied up on the line, at present.
Nasty situation from the Union perspective. I am imagining something like the Western Theater or the Wilderness being fought-out on the Piedmont in Northern Maryland.
Lots of questions. Lee has one good fight left in him. It looks like it will be a doozy.
Do you have your internet connection back yet? You have spoiled us with regular updates and now I must know the outcome of the Battle of Pipe Creek!
Internet disaster continues at home. Opportunities at work to write are limited! Hopefully full service will be restored this week!
Chapter Seventy-Six Up a Creek
Chapter Seventy-Six
Up a Creek
Up a Creek
From “A Guide to the Pipe Creek Battlefield” by Otis R. Mayhew
Sword & Musket 1998
"Why did Reynolds attack? Its a question the guides here get asked a lot when visitors have seen and walked the ground. It is hard for them to conjure up the competing pressures that John Reynolds was exposed to.
1. Washington was cutoff - Lee's movement south had been preceded by Stuart's cavalry who had cut all the telegraph wires. The Army of Northern Virginia now sat astride all the roads into Washington from the north. It certainly felt to many loud and influential people in the north, governors, newspapermen, errant senators and congressmen and not a few generals that the capitol was in danger. We know now that this is palpably untrue. Lee had no plan to assault the forts around Washington. Furthermore Washington was in communication, all be it slowly, with New York by sea. Ironically the capitol was in telegraphic communication with the South - Richmond and Petersburg. However the pressure on Reynolds from powerful figures in the north to drive Lee from Maryland and re-establish communications with Washington was great.
2. Lee's Line was vulnerable - Lee might have three corps, but to defend 20 miles of lines with the forces at Lee's disposal was a difficult task. Lee would have to be prepared to defend the whole line. Reynolds conversely could decide whether his hammer blows would fall. It was hard from the commanders of the army not to see an opportunity here if they could but break through Lee's lines.
3. The right victory - Lee was in Maryland with the forts of Washington at his back. If Reynolds could break through Lee's lines or turn them there was an opportunity to cut all or part of Lee's force off from retreat to Virginia.
4. Reynolds was a Pennsylvanian - We tend to think of the Rebels in terms of loyalty to their state and Union men as Union men only. That is wrong. John F. Reynolds was a proud Pennsylvanian. His family lived just a few miles up the road in Carlisle. It is easy to underestimate his desire to attack the Rebels who had just pillaged and threatened his home state.
Henry J. Hunt rode with Reynolds looking for the best locations for his artillery
From "Always The General - The Life of John Fulton Reynolds" by Jed Bradshaw
Penn State 1999
"Following his arrival at Taneytown Reynolds rode the ground from the Frederick Pike to the Hanover Pike with a small party (Hunt, Barnard, Buford, Howard and his staff). Although he did not express it at the time he must have been dismayed by what he saw. Although the rebels sought to screen a line almost twenty miles in length, it was extremely defensible. Reynolds vaguely knew this party of the country and a number of officers in the Army of the Potomac knew it well. It was not long before Reynolds' unspoken fears would be confirmed. Reports held that the south bank of the creek had several roads running parallel to the creek itself, making redeployment by the rebels easier. There were few such roads on the north bank...
Not much would get past Jackson who could see as far as Taneytown from his position
Had Kearny or Hooker been in charge of the army, many observed, an immediate attack would have been the order - an assault on Lee's line probably from the direction of Taneytown Pike and Trevanion Road. Reynolds was not such a commander. The remainder of the day was spent deploying the army for the bloodiest battle in the Eastern Theatre. All the while Lee's troops continued to dig in, preparing fixed defenses in depth, and improving the roads behind their lines..."
From "In Column to Battle - The Army of the Potomac in the Battle of Pipe Creek" by George Cresap Ord
MacMahon Publishing
"At dawn Sickles III Corps supported by elements of the cavalry would begin an attack down the line of the Frederick Pike and Mount Union Roads on Lee's extreme left. That would shortly be followed by Von Steinwehr's XI Corps attacking down the line of the Trevanion Road. This is where Lee might naturally expect the weight of attack to fall. However at 9am Williams was to lead the XII Corps over Dug Hill in the direction of Manchester where Lee's extreme right sat. Williams' attack was to be supported by the bulk of the cavalry to give the impression of a major push to unhinge Lee's line at Manchester.
These attacks were to distract and confuse Lee into deploying his reserves to the flanks. Reynolds' main attacks would come in the centre in two huge attacks: Humphreys' V Corps supported by Stevens IX Corps would attack along the Stone Road and Arters Mill Road; Hancock's I Corps and Wallace's IV Corps would attack along the Hanover Road and Littlestown Pike respectively, converging on the rebel line at Union Mills.
Williams planned to push Confederate skirmishers off Dug Hill before pressing on towards the Manchester Road
Although much of Reynolds' deployment took place at night (and not perfectly) one flaw, and a serious flaw in Reynolds plan, was that Lee's generals could, beyond dawn, see most of Reynolds' movements from their own positions south of the Creek..."
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Ouch. The nature of the ground makes me think of the Western theater. Great potential for units to stand and slug, if they have the belly for it. Reynolds plan feels like any of a host of uphill assaults that went badly OTL - and I don't see an OTL Chatanooga here.
Twenty miles. A lot of front for Lee to defend but also a lot of ground that Reynolds will have to cover if either of his secondary assaults makes any headway. And Reynolds will have to do it in full view of the Army of Northern Virginia, with the good roads on Confederate side. It also sounds as though Reynolds is primed to press home his attacks. Reasonable, logical, inevitable, but a pity. I wonder what Lee could do if Reynolds declined to attack. Raid, I suppose, but for how long would his supplies allow him to remain concentrated along Pipe Creek?
Twenty miles. A lot of front for Lee to defend but also a lot of ground that Reynolds will have to cover if either of his secondary assaults makes any headway. And Reynolds will have to do it in full view of the Army of Northern Virginia, with the good roads on Confederate side. It also sounds as though Reynolds is primed to press home his attacks. Reasonable, logical, inevitable, but a pity. I wonder what Lee could do if Reynolds declined to attack. Raid, I suppose, but for how long would his supplies allow him to remain concentrated along Pipe Creek?
McClellan tried to avoid it and was critised as weak; Burnside did it and was a fool; Meade wouldn't do it at Gettysburg or Mine Run and was talked about in terms of lost opportunities; Thomas did it and was bloody lucky though it truth he was not responsible; and Grant did it and people call him a butcher.
The direct attacks of the Union Army in the Civil War. I can't think why Reynolds would be any different than many of his contempories in choosing a direct assault especially ITL where the AoP has had a lot more success. Its a bit like Lee's plan in OTL Gettysburg compressed into one day.
The direct attacks of the Union Army in the Civil War. I can't think why Reynolds would be any different than many of his contempories in choosing a direct assault especially ITL where the AoP has had a lot more success. Its a bit like Lee's plan in OTL Gettysburg compressed into one day.
Chapter Seventy-Seven A Day of Seven Battles
Chapter Seventy-Seven
A Day of Seven Battles
From "In Column to Battle - The Army of the Potomac in the Battle of Pipe Creek" by George Cresap Ord
MacMahon Publishing
"On the Union right Sickles had given Charles Field and Jubal Early bloody noses. David Birney’s Division had found a ford near the Mount Union Bridge which coincided with the meeting of Field’s and Early’s flanks. In the words of General Sickles “bloody mayhem” ensued. Ultimately Jackson pulled two brigades from A.P.Hill’s section of the line to reinforce his left and plug the gap. Sickles attack was supposed to be a demonstration, and without reserves, Birney pulled his troops north of the creek.
The reason Jackson was able to pull troops from elsewhere in his sector of the Rebel defensive line was because von Steinwehr’s demonstration petered out before midday. The XI Corps had been severely tested at Gettysburg and marched hard to Pipe Creek. XI Corps was in no condition to mount a major demonstration on the Trevanion Road. Dick Ewell was more than able to cover any moves made by the XI Corps while A.P.Hill loaned troops to the rebel left…
On the Union left, ironically where many felt the ground least favored the Union, Williams XII Corps made good progress. General Zealous B. Tower’s brigade was deployed entirely as a skirmish line and aggressively advanced on Dug Hill. Dug Hill was forward of the rebel defensive line, and therefore the handful of rebel skirmishers from D.H.Hill’s Division (Johnson’s Corps) were quickly pushed off the hill. As soon as the hill was secured General Barnard had his engineers and laborers cutting back the woods to clear space for artillery positions. In the meantime Williams prepared his three divisions, Geary Greene and Ruger, for an assault on the sector held by Shanks Evans, D.H.Hill and Robert Rodes. Williams was supported by General John Buford’s cavalry (2 divisions of Pleasanton and Devin) which attacked towards Manchester. The road to Manchester was blocked by Ransom’s North Carolina Brigade and Carnot Posey’s Mississippians…
A contemporary presentation of the Battle of Pipe Creek
Allegheny Johnson’s sector was particularly hard pressed. With Buford attacking towards Manchester on his right. Williams’ 3 divisions attacking aggressively towards his centre, and with Trimble exposed on the left to the attack on Union Mills Johnson’s full force would quickly be committed to the battle. By mid-afternoon Johnson’s sector was in trouble. General Greene had stumbled on an unguarded farm road that ran down from Dug Hill and crossed Pipe Creek via an unknown ford. One Greene’s troops were across they tenaciously held onto their bridgehead in the centre of Johnson’s line. Henry H. Lockwood, at the head of Greene’s second brigade would particularly distinguish himself in breaking up Johnson’s (mainly D.H.Hill’s) counterattacks. However the nature of the ground meant that Greene could not push much beyond the creek bank…
Johnson had no choice: a galloper was sent to General Lee to request reinforcements. General Lee’s response was prompt. General George Pickett’s Virginia Division was dispatched to Johnson’s aid. Although it would take a few hours to reach him, Johnson was confident that, come the morning with Pickett’s help, he would throw the Yankees back across the creek…
In the centre, and under Reynolds own watchful eye, four Union Corps attacked en masse. The defending Confederates consisted of three of Longstreet’s divisions: Anderson, Wilcox and Hood with Trimble’s Division of Johnson’s Corps holding the right of the threatened sector. Many historians of the battle treat these engagements as two separate battles: the Battle of the Stone Road, with Humphreys and Stevens attacking Anderson and Wilcox, and the Battle of Union Mills, with Hancock and Wallace attacking Hood and Trimble….
Humphreys approach was extremely difficult. His troops had to cross one creek before getting into position in the waterlogged ground beyond prior to his attack across the main Pipe Creek. The Stone Road itself was in the words of Stevens “a death trap covered by several masked batteries of the rebels…the first hundred men to set foot on the bridge were certain to fall”. Humphreys instead focused on trying to ford the creek along a broader line on either flank of the bridge...
Humphreys would make strong headway across the creek but the main rebel works were several hundred yards to the rear. The battle would be defined by the struggle for two "prominences" Perry's Hill and Mahone's Hill. The battle for Mahone's Hill was fierce as Anderson's division resisted attacks by Sykes' Division. The attacks would costs George Sykes his life and no man from V Corps would put a foot atop Mahone's Hill that day. Cadmus Wilcox's defense of Perry's Hill was more haphazard and the position more exposed. Further Stevens' attack down the Arters Mill Road threatened to flank the rebel position...
Barnes division (Humphreys' Corps) supported by Harland's division of Stevens Corps attacked Perry Hill. All three brigade commanders of Barnes' division would be injured, Charles Griffen, Strong Vincent and Henry Prince. In the end it was a former professor of rhetoric at Bowdoin College who would lead the remains of Vincent's brigade in an uphill bayonet charge that would rest Perry's Hill from the rebels...
Further progress in exploiting this break in the line between Anderson and Wilcox was prevented by the arrival of two brigades of rebel cavalry under Fitzhugh Lee who fought them as dragoons, quickly moving between the threatened points of breakthrough on horseback before dismounting to repel the next attack. Lee's plan to use the ground to defend in depth was working..."
Hancock's attack on Union Mills
From “Yankee Dawdle - the Memoirs of a Private of Pennsylvania” by Anonymous
"I have been in many a shooting match, but none to compare with a day at Union Mills. We were fair ground down in that mill...
The old 1st Corps marched on one road towards the rebels, and the 4th on another. But didn't both roads meet at the rebel line at a place called Union Mills. Our Superb [General Winfield Scott Hancock] and the Shiloh Dodger [General Lew Wallace] were hell bent on breaking that rebel line and it was into hell they sent us. The worst damn ground I ever saw. Credit though to them both - they were fool enough to ride with us in the front line like two men in search of death. No one called Wallace the Shiloh Dodger after Union Mills..."
From "In Column to Battle - The Army of the Potomac in the Battle of Pipe Creek" by George Cresap Ord
MacMahon Publishing
"Reynolds main attack was on Union Mills and down the Littletown Pike. If he could breakthrough in the centre he could march right down the pike and split the rebel army. He relied on his own old command the I Corps and Wallace's IV Corps to make the attack. It alone might have ensured the Battle of Pipe Creek's place as the bloodiest battle during the War in the East had even the second day's fighting not occurred...
Hancock and Wallace worked admirably as a team that day, a glimmer perhaps of the roles they were to place in our country's political future. Their converging attack pierced the rebel line between Hood's right and Trimble's left. Hood fought his division admirably. He and his men would slow Wallace's assault dramatically, but Trimble's piecemeal counterattacks were swallowed up by Hancock's aggressive push, though that aggression would cost the bad tempered martinet Marsena Patrick his life...
This was a potential disaster for Lee's army, but the attack had been anticipated. Hancock's and Wallace's preparations had been fully visible to Longstreet. French's Division had already been dispatched from the reserve by Lee sometime earlier in anticipation of Hancock's attack...
As Robinson's Division broke free of the rebels the pike opened up before them. This was the breakthrough Reynolds had hoped for. But John C. Robinson's boys were not alone. A gray and butternut line was shaking out before them. Samuel Gibbs French and his four brigades launched themselves at the Yankees and Robinson's troops fixed bayonets and counter-charged. All seemed to fight as though this were the deciding conflict...
Robinson fell wounded. Conrad F. Jackson inherited command for no more than 6 minutes before he too was injured. Command of the division devolved on George Stannard of Vermont. He rallied the division before unleashing his own Vermont brigade in another attack...
Sam French was killed resisting the Vermonters attack. Junius Daniel rose to command the division but the rebels fought by brigades not knowing French was down...
In end Hancock himself had to give the recall order for Stannard would not. As Hancock withdrew his troops to Union Mills and the hard won heights around it Stannard is said to have wept..."
From "Always The General - The Life of John Fulton Reynolds" by Jed Bradshaw
Penn State 1999
"As night fell and the attacks petered out men of I Corps recognized John Reynolds as he rode through Union Mills. "Let us try again General!" "One more try General and they'll break!". "Men" said General Reynolds "come the morning you'll get your chance. We'll not leave this field until it is ours..."
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This is the only decent map I could find which I think someone else has already referenced:
http://www.civilwarhome.com/map2.htm
http://www.civilwarhome.com/map2.htm
Chapter Seventy-Eight The First Rays of Sunlight
Chapter Seventy-Eight
The First Rays of Sunlight
From "In Column to Battle - The Army of the Potomac in the Battle of Pipe Creek" by George Cresap Ord
MacMahon Publishing
"Alpheus Williams got little sleep that night. A courier arrived from General Reynolds – the attacks would be renewed in the morning. However of Williams’ command only Greene would remain in position south of the creek to annoy the rebels. Ruger’s and Geary’s divisions were to march as soon as possible to the centre to act as a reinforcement to Hancock and Wallace.
Williams’ night was further complicated by a staff officer from Buford. Buford’s vedettes had made contact with General Canby who had marched south from Harrisburg and was now on the Manchester Pike behind Williams’ position. Canby had brought up all three of his brigades, leaving the Harrisburg defences in the hands of Sigel’s worn down brigades…
Williams had no intention of committing Canby’s militiamen to the battleline, “it would amount to no more than murder on this ground”, but it would look to Johnson in the daylight as though another division had been left in reserve and this might cause him to hold back troops from the centre…
All things considered Williams was lucky that both required divisions were ready to march a little before dawn. The troops had not marched far however when the crackle of massed rifle fire could be heard. That in itself should not have been unusual given Reynolds’ commitment to renew the battle that morning. What was unusual was that Williams and his men could clearly identify that the sounds came from the south beyond Pipe Creek and Allegheny Johnson’s lines, from the direction of Parr’s Ridge. It was then that another courier arrived from Buford with momentus news…”
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER SEVENTY EIGHT
The Ride of Phil Kearny by Edmund Clarence Stedman
So that soldierly legend is still on its journey,
That story of Kearny who knew not to yield!
'Twas the day when with Rodman, fierce Brookes, and Birney
Against thirty thousand he rallied the field.
Where the red volleys poured, where the clamour rose highest,
Where the dead lay in clumps through the dwarf oak and pine,
Where the aim from the thicket was surest and nighest,
No charge like Phil Kearny's along the whole line.
That story of Kearny who knew not to yield!
'Twas the day when with Rodman, fierce Brookes, and Birney
Against thirty thousand he rallied the field.
Where the red volleys poured, where the clamour rose highest,
Where the dead lay in clumps through the dwarf oak and pine,
Where the aim from the thicket was surest and nighest,
No charge like Phil Kearny's along the whole line.
When the battle went ill, and the bravest were solemn,
Near the eminent Parr Ridge, where we formed without sound,
He rode down the length of the bustling column,
And his heart at our war cry leapt up with a bound;
He snuffed, like his charger, the wind of the powder,
His sword waved us on and we answered the sign;
Loud our cheer as we rushed, but his laugh rang the louder,
"There's the devil's own fun, boys, along the whole line!"
Near the eminent Parr Ridge, where we formed without sound,
He rode down the length of the bustling column,
And his heart at our war cry leapt up with a bound;
He snuffed, like his charger, the wind of the powder,
His sword waved us on and we answered the sign;
Loud our cheer as we rushed, but his laugh rang the louder,
"There's the devil's own fun, boys, along the whole line!"
How he strode his brown steed! How we saw his blade brighten
In the one hand still left, and the reins in his teeth!
He laughed like a boy when the holidays heighten,
But a soldier's glance shot from his visor beneath.
Up came the Sixth Corps to the melee infernal,
Asking where to go in at the gray Rebel swine?
"O, anywhere! Forward! 'Tis all the same, General:
You'll find lovely fighting along the whole line!"
In the one hand still left, and the reins in his teeth!
He laughed like a boy when the holidays heighten,
But a soldier's glance shot from his visor beneath.
Up came the Sixth Corps to the melee infernal,
Asking where to go in at the gray Rebel swine?
"O, anywhere! Forward! 'Tis all the same, General:
You'll find lovely fighting along the whole line!"
O, great was the day, though costly and bloody ,
When he led the Sixth Corps: his brave men and tried!
Ne’er will we see such courage and glory,
The flower of our knighthood, the whole army's pride!
Yet on they must march through the slaveholders’ region
To raise through the South our glorious ensign,
Phil Kearny rides on down the length of his legion,
And the word is still Forward! along the whole line.
When he led the Sixth Corps: his brave men and tried!
Ne’er will we see such courage and glory,
The flower of our knighthood, the whole army's pride!
Yet on they must march through the slaveholders’ region
To raise through the South our glorious ensign,
Phil Kearny rides on down the length of his legion,
And the word is still Forward! along the whole line.
My God in heaven. That was magnificent. You told me to look for Kearney's Ride and you delivered.
The action indeed reminds me of Cozzen's descriptions of the fighting in the West. Battles reduced to a series of division and brigade strength engagements. Says something about the quality of the men involved that under such circumstances they attacked and counter-attacked. I am reminded as well of the description of French infantry under the Republic. Descriptions of just how effective inspired men can be as light infantry.
Wonderful account with "In Column of Battle." The first day's fighting suggested tremendous punishment meted out on both sides. I was caught between the strong impression that the Confederate's ability to observe Reynolds nullified any surprise concentration, and the sense that Lee had gotten himself stuck in a position from which he could not retreat as long as the Army of the Potomac was in the field. Even a victory against the Army of the Potomac, less Kearney and Rodman, might well have gutted them, especially if food and ammunition was exhausted.
Still more to be seen. Commanders can and have gone down. It looks as though Jackson at least may be in a position to withdrawal, but in which direction and with what remains to be seen. And also, Jackson might be disinclined to withdrawal as long as his force can make a fight of it. Von Clausewitz should have seen this field.
P.S. - Kudos for giving us Bayonets!
The action indeed reminds me of Cozzen's descriptions of the fighting in the West. Battles reduced to a series of division and brigade strength engagements. Says something about the quality of the men involved that under such circumstances they attacked and counter-attacked. I am reminded as well of the description of French infantry under the Republic. Descriptions of just how effective inspired men can be as light infantry.
Wonderful account with "In Column of Battle." The first day's fighting suggested tremendous punishment meted out on both sides. I was caught between the strong impression that the Confederate's ability to observe Reynolds nullified any surprise concentration, and the sense that Lee had gotten himself stuck in a position from which he could not retreat as long as the Army of the Potomac was in the field. Even a victory against the Army of the Potomac, less Kearney and Rodman, might well have gutted them, especially if food and ammunition was exhausted.
Still more to be seen. Commanders can and have gone down. It looks as though Jackson at least may be in a position to withdrawal, but in which direction and with what remains to be seen. And also, Jackson might be disinclined to withdrawal as long as his force can make a fight of it. Von Clausewitz should have seen this field.
P.S. - Kudos for giving us Bayonets!