Chapter Fifty-Four
Untrusted Friends
Part I
“The Confederacy of Slaves – Spain and the Confederacy in the Slaveholders’ War” by Hunter L. Bainbridge
LSU 1953
“At the outbreak of the Slaveholders War, the Union was concerned about possible European aid to the Confederacy as well as official diplomatic recognition of the breakaway republic. In response to possible intervention from Spain, President Lincoln sent Carl Schurz, whom he felt was able and energetic, as minister to Spain; Schurz's chief duty would be to block Spanish recognition of, and aid to, the Confederacy. Part of the Union strategy in Spain was to remind the Spanish court that it had been
Southerners, now Confederates, who had pressed for annexation of Cuba. Schurz was successful in his efforts; Spain officially declared neutrality on June 17, 1861…
However this was a period when Spain experienced economic growth, political stabilization, and military revival, and the country began to sense that it again could be a great global power. In addition to its desire for international glory, Spain also was the only European country that continued to use slaves on plantations in Spanish-controlled Cuba and Puerto Rico, and therefore more familiar with the issues the Confederacy faced in respect of its “peculiar institution”…
Historically, Spain never had close ties to Washington, D.C., and Spain’s hard feelings had increased as it lost Latin America to United States inspired independence movements. Clearly, Spain shared many of the same feelings as the Confederate States of America during the war, and it found itself in a unique position to aid the Confederacy since its territories lay so close to the South. Diplomats on both sides, in fact, declared them “natural allies”…”
The blockade runner Advance in the Port of Havana
From “The Rudderless Ship – The Confederate Diplomacy in the Civil War” by Aldous Morrow
Buffalo 1983
“Spain’s hesitancy to join in an alliance with the Confederacy reflected a deep ambivalence about the Confederacy. Many in Spain believed that if the South won its independence it would once again try to take over Cuba. Indeed in the decades before the war it had been the Southern politicians who had been at the forefront of the filibustering efforts to claim Cuba, as well as attacks on Catholicism…
Suspicions of each other’s motives and long-range plans were enough to prevent an open alliance, despite many commonalities in social systems and mutual antipathy towards the United States. However Spain’s perceived dependence on France and Great Britain prevented any suggestion of a unilateral declaration on the part of Spain. Indeed by the end of 1863 both nations had firmly turned their backs on the Confederacy…
“Even without formal recognition, Spain remained willing to enable Confederate blockade running through its Cuban ports, which became vital as the (British) Royal Navy closed Bermuda, the Bahamas and other British Caribbean islands to Confederate blockade runners in strict compliance with its neutrality…”
From “And The Doors Remained Closed” by Elise Van Der Horst
Berkeley 2007
“Many Spanish aristocrats, military leaders and slave owning creoles supported the South, particularly within Cuba. With the end of any meaningful access to the British or French governments the entire Confederate European effort was focused on keeping access to Spanish ports open. It’s has been suggested by American historians that a series of “gifts” were made from the remaining Confederate funds in Europe to Prime Minister Leopoldo O’Donnell. However this ignores the fact that Manuel de Pando, Marquis of Miraflores, was Prime Minister during the critical period of 1863-64 (and is thoroughly refuted by Spanish historians as an unfounded slur on its leaders)…
Leopoldo O'Donall, Duke of Tetuan
None the less the Spanish ports in the Atlantic, Caribbean and Pacific remained open to Confederate blockade runners and commerce raiders for almost another year before diplomatic pressure from Britain and France forced the Spanish to finally close their ports…”