Wrapped In Flames

It goes without saying that as soon as the Confederate regime knows of the British attack on the Union Navy, they will be moved to act. I have to leave it to real Civil War buffs to know just where they were disposed at this point, and with what reserves, but obviously a hard strike now will weaken the Union's ability to resist the RN coming in to aid the Rebels on the Chesapeake. Is it in their power to take DC themselves? I'd guess not or they'd have done so OTL. But Maryland and Delaware are both teetering the balance, being slave states. Obviously Lincoln will be watching their official state governments very closely but how likely is it that rival "free" governments of secessionists can form there, and sabotage Union control, and in so doing make the Unionists appear as alien interlopers to the two states' populaces at large (not counting the slaves of course...)

And meanwhile, much of my obvious enthusiasm for the Union cause comes from knowing that OTL, in the course of prevailing, they did eventually vindicate the claim they were fighting to end slavery. They got the support of much of the African-American populace behind Confederate lines long before making that clear, even after Lincoln took some steps to rebuke premature action along those lines IIRC.

But for the moment, Lincoln is still having to consider the importance of keeping the support of Marylanders and Delawarians (or whatever the right word for residents of Delaware is--my spell checker sure doesn't like that one!) so he's probably going to have to keep equivocating on the question of whether he plans to free any slaves or not.

Note that while we might from our safe uptime perspective condemn his hesitation, at least while he does so he is not violating his own word hitherto. He always was a relative moderate among the Republicans--condemning slavery in principle but making it clear he didn't think he came into office with a mandate to strike it down.

Slavery was not what the Union was fighting for from 61-62 and only in 63 did the Emancipation Proclamation take effect. Here though is it worth the risk he must ask, and if men weren't willing to fight for the Union against their own countrymen, will they do so against foreign arms?

That to me seems like some pretty good oratory ;)

One reason I despise the secessionists is that he probably would have kept his word on the matter, had the Southern states remained in the Union--probably taking actions they didn't like much that would tend to restrict and slow the spread of slavery, maybe arresting it completely, but leaving it untouched in the South where it was strong. They jumped the gun because they were accustomed to controlling the Federal government and using it to advance their own agenda and would not be content with the status quo. Which is why there were so many Republicans, many more than there were Abolitionists--it was one thing to have a crusade to free people not everyone in the North, few people actually, regarded as true equals, but quite another to be beholden to men whose power rested on slavery and have the whole machinery of the USA turned to their advantage.

There's no doubt the men who planned secession were some of the most loathsome creatures to walk the earth considering their reasons. How they will use this sudden advantage remains to be seen.

So, if Lincoln is not persuaded to come to terms and a solid majority in the North backs him, and if the Union can stand a while, eventually when the tide turns I expect the Abolitionist agenda to come to the fore and if the war against the South is won I expect it to happen with the help of African-Americans, as much as OTL or perhaps even more. Eventually there will be Emancipation, if the Union wins, and anyway on soil the Union then controls.

Well Emancipation at some point is a given, especially with the Radical Abolitionists in Congress, and even if they lose would they want to be seen as the same as their southern neighbor?

But while control of the Chesapeake teeters in the balance, I suppose Lincoln must equivocate. Perhaps he will turn to African liberation early if he judges holding the bay to be a lost cause, writing off Maryland and Delaware, or even hoping to multiply loyal forces to hold on there by emancipating and enlisting Africans. But odds are, for a while, anything like the Emancipation Proclamation will have to wait until the Union clearly has the upper hand--as it did OTL.

The game is somewhat changed now of course; OTL Lincoln's timing in that matter waited until he judged he would not look too hypocritical and desperate to British public opinion. Here the opinions of Britons have already gone by the board; he needs to focus on mustering American opinion pretty much exclusively.

Well will the average white fight for the Negro is the question? If Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri and Delaware see the Union as a lost cause and decide to cut their losses and jump ship is it worth it?

All questions Lincoln must consider...

I don't think Lincoln has any big opportunities in the way of sowing discord in European Great Power politics to tie down and distract both Britain and France. Had the French Emperor dithered, probably Palmerston would not have moved so decisively in the first place, foreseeing trouble in Europe (as the author noted and dealt with). With both those powers on the same side for now, I don't think even say the King of Prussia will see opportunity or temptation to jump into the breach on behalf of a bunch of republican rabble-rouser Yankee hypocrites. France in particular is in an optional war, free to send as much force or as little as the Emperor thinks he can spare; they aren't likely to weaken themselves so much as to lie open to a sudden move against them in Europe. Britain is more committed, but the power she has is naval, not so immediately relevant on the Continent anyway. Russia is, oddly, a long-time American ally of sorts, but that is mainly a matter of they and us having few points of contention or even contact. One hardly expects them to ride gallantly to Lincoln's rescue!:rolleyes: At best they will stay diplomatically friendly as long as the Union enjoys independent status. I daresay a fair number of fair-weather friends will congratulate the Americans if they can give the Lion a black eye--if and when they can manage to do so, and certainly not with European help. If the tide ever turns strongly against Britain, the vultures might start circling, but if that day comes the Yankees won't need their help all that much.

Lincoln has about as much power to bestir the nations of Europe as Jefferson Davis does :p

The nations of Europe are going to be very interested to see what England and France get up to, but they aren't exactly going to rock the Continental boat when there's trouble brewing in Poland, and none have any serious disputes with either power.

Now I do still have some hope that British public opinion might still be a factor, but every shot fired from a Union cannon on British warships or armies will tend to erode that resource; simple patriotism and love of the Queen, and her fallen soldiers and sailors, will quench flames of sympathy for the Unionists.

British public opinion is going to matter, but not so much on the issue of slavery as people would think. It's mildly surprising to read about but you find people in England and Canada at the time who thought neither the North nor the South was any better than the other in that contest. Though there are people like the Duke and Duchess of Argylle (though even they couldn't support the Union during the Trent Crisis and thought Seward had gone mad) but they won't be quite ready to step in to defend a nation that here has committed what would basically be murder on the high seas.

In early 1862 the Union still had legal slavery, and is not making the freedom of enslaved peoples a war aim. So any charges that Britain is fighting with slavers would be laughable from the British perspective (especially since they haven't allied with the CSA) and would simply harden attitudes towards the North.

However, war weariness is going to factor in. If Britain is seen as winning on the seas, but her sons are dying on land...well that was the case in Crimea after all...

If it comes out rather in a mess, but having not surrendered except to overwhelming force and still retaining its own autonomy though in straitened circumstances, I can see a school of American Marxists softening the proletarian-revolutionary message and focusing on Marx's nuts-and-bolts analysis of Capitalism itself to devise pragmatic machinery for a republican semi-command economy, enlisting capitalists and organized workers alike in a semi-military fashion to maximize US economic power and fashion a mighty war machine facing north and south and obsessed with getting command of the sea as well.

I guess I hope for better than that, at least an end to the threat from the south. But I will have to see.

That's some long time speculation! I haven't gotten quite that far yet but I'll think about it :p Thanks for the reading and the comments! Hope you continue to enjoy this!
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Geez, you got two smileys

EnglishCanuck - This is some kind of joke right? Where in God's name would the British have used wireless? Dunlop has received orders from Milne roughly two weeks after Milne received a telegram from Lyons. Orders he's been expecting?

They can get word from Halifax to the Gulf of Mexico faster than the Americans can get word from the Chesapeake to the Gulf of Mexico. Sounds like magic to me...

So without even knowing what Farragut's fleet is composed of (its gunboats and a few fast steamers as a heads up) and reading a chapter specifically about Dunlop's fleet from Vera Cruz you assume that they're sending all their heavy ships to the Gulf to be defeated in detail?

Of all the possible US strategies in the event of an Anglo-American conflict in the winter of 1861-62, sending any steamers towards Florida would be one of the more questionable ones - what are they going to do, attack Bermuda?

And to boot Lincoln and the War Department are hyper-competent geniuses who can accurately predict every move the British will undertake and instantly assume they will be attacked like the Danes in the Napoleonic Wars? I'm sorry nobody is that competent or can somehow interpret British actions from 3000 miles away. Lincoln certainly couldn't OTL.

They were smart enough to foresee the obvious; the British desire to control the seas in the event of conflict since (oh, I dunno, 1775?) has not been that difficult to suss out...part of that is to try and destroy the enemy's forces - especially commerce raiders - before they put to sea.

As another point what purchases would those be? The powder that has stopped flowing from Britain? The guns and cannons that have stopped coming from France and Britain since December?

The US purchasing missions bought small arms from Belgium, Saxony, and Austria in 1861 that were delivered in 1862. Presumably, even if the British and French had stopped selling in the winter of 1861-62, they aren't quite in a position to tell the rest of Europe what to do, are they?

Um where exactly did I say Burnsides expedition has been launched (oh right I explicitly state they haven't gone to North Carolina)? Where have I mentioned Butler's men have sailed for New Orleans? Where is the fleet of mortar boats that Farragut was supposed to be escorting if this is his original flotilla? Ah yes I didn't mention Butler, and I also explicitly said Farragut's orders had changed.

My point is the amphibious expeditions of Burnside and Butler were not launched until after Trent was put to rest, historically; if you are suggesting the US would put more forces in harm's way in the event of a threatened Anglo-American war, I'd suggest you're tossing the idiot ball to them.

Please either be civil, politely critical, actually read the material, or don't waste my time.

The above is impolite? Cripes, I gave you two smileys and a good luck...

Best,
 
They can get word from Halifax to the Gulf of Mexico faster than the Americans can get word from the Chesapeake to the Gulf of Mexico. Sounds like magic to me...

Yes the US can inform the Gulf Squadrons of danger (which I point out they did) but what else would they say? "Hey everyone pack up and come home? We're expecting a declaration of war from Britain in three to four weeks so just abandon the garrisons and blockade!"?

Military and political genius that.

Of all the possible US strategies in the event of an Anglo-American conflict in the winter of 1861-62, sending any steamers towards Florida would be one of the more questionable ones - what are they going to do, attack Bermuda?

Those frigates, cruisers, and gunboats have to either be replaced with less useful ships, have to escort/evacuate the constantly moving chain of supply ships, and Bermuda and Nassau are the next best thing to next door if war breaks out making those defenseless vessels and men trapped without support. So unless they either send a relief squadron to escort all those boats home and relieve the frigates and cruisers they're stuck or are forced to abandon the pretense of blockade (politically not going to happen) and the men, equipment, and ships they are supposed to be protecting.

Or the ever present threat of Confederate raiders appearing to harass Union shipping and withdrawing forces. Especially considering the rather embarrassing defeat the Navy suffered at the Head of the Passes OTL.

Now that would be pure idiocy.

They were smart enough to foresee the obvious; the British desire to control the seas in the event of conflict since (oh, I dunno, 1775?) has not been that difficult to suss out...part of that is to try and destroy the enemy's forces - especially commerce raiders - before they put to sea.

The same government that made absolutely zero plans for war with Britain in this period despite Britain making obvious military reinforcement to their forces in North America and the Atlantic? They could suss it out and prepare, but forgive me if the research points to the British doing everything in their power to ensure they weren't caught flat footed by such a conflict while the USA did nothing.

Here they're not exactly navel gazing or twiddling their thumbs, and its not as though they have the luxury of being able to only think about the British either. But unless the Americans have magic they aren't going to come up with a plan of attack, evacuate all their ships and forces, and get all their ships to home waters before Milne can order Dunlop to action.

With a month of planning and time to issue orders? Sure its reasonable they could get most out, but with the same weather, similar time, and comparably long distances to find/inform every ship of what's going on in two weeks? Give me a break.

The US purchasing missions bought small arms from Belgium, Saxony, and Austria in 1861 that were delivered in 1862. Presumably, even if the British and French had stopped selling in the winter of 1861-62, they aren't quite in a position to tell the rest of Europe what to do, are they?

Considering that (IIRC) most of these purchases are either on their way across the Atlantic already, and Lincoln has no reason to believe they will be interdicted without a formal declaration or war, and that by scattering his forces across the Atlantic makes them vulnerable to defeat in detail by RN warships...

My point is the amphibious expeditions of Burnside and Butler were not launched until after Trent was put to rest, historically; if you are suggesting the US would put more forces in harm's way in the event of a threatened Anglo-American war, I'd suggest you're tossing the idiot ball to them.

What forces are they putting in harms way exactly?

The above is impolite? Cripes, I gave you two smileys and a good luck...

Snark and writing comments which read like you haven't even read the material in front of you invite comparisons to incivility.
 
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I was assuming there were a few transAtlantic cables in 1862--not really. Some had been laid but failed, the first successful one was finished in 1866. So while I quite understand Palmerston had the Admiralty send out sealed orders to various RN elements in the Atlantic to be opened and read upon receipt of the right order or in certain circumstances (say, to confirm or deny rumors that Britain had indeed gone to war), I do have to wonder how signals got from Halifax to the Caribbean.

The trouble with using the Confederate telegraph network is, the Union blockade tends to make getting messages from Southern points to anywhere, even somewhere nearby, very risky. Nor did Britain have consuls in the Confederacy whose credentials the Union Navy officers would respect--the very fact of such a consul is evidence they have taken the other side already.

So I guess it comes down to how fast a message could be couriered by sea from Halifax southward.

Regarding British public opinion--I've read Marx's contemporary writings on the subject, which quoted from an Economist article where that magazine, ever Tory as it is, came down against the Union. But he claimed, not implausibly to me, that the feeling among the working classes was that Lincoln was just temporizing, but the Republicans would ultimately bring slavery to an end. They looked past the rhetoric. Or so Marx believed anyway; could be he was listening very selectively to those saying what he wanted to hear I guess.

The working classes mostly did not vote of course. But they could do things like strike (with dubious legality, but they were not unused to being on the wrong side of the law) and agitate.

You wouldn't find many of their letters published in the Economist, or in the Times.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Amazingly enough...

EnglishCanuck - Yes the US can inform the Gulf Squadrons of danger (which I point out they did) but what else would they say? "Hey everyone pack up and come home? We're expecting a declaration of war from Britain in three to four weeks so just abandon the garrisons and blockade!" Military and political genius that.

TFSmith121 - Amazingly enough, the US was quite capable of making the strategic calculus necessary in this era; there's a reason the various historical war scares - Trent, Laird, St. Albans, Chesapeake - did NOT end in war. Shocking, I know, but Lincoln et al were not idiots mindlessly blundering their way through the war ... as far as coming home, certainly the ocean-going steam warships (the screw frigates, sloops, and large gunboats) and ocean-going sidewheel steam warships and liners (excellent commerce raiders, for various reasons) would be the obvious vessels to order home, and the USN's sailing warships and the converted coastal steamers could maintain the basic legal blockade until the diplomatic situation stabilizes; the rebel navies were not going to break the blockade, certainly not in the winter of 1861-62.

Those frigates, cruisers, and gunboats have to either be replaced with less useful ships, have to escort/evacuate the constantly moving chain of supply ships, and Bermuda and Nassau are the next best thing to next door if war breaks out making those defenseless vessels and men trapped without support. So unless they either send a relief squadron to escort all those boats home and relieve the frigates and cruisers they're stuck or are forced to abandon the pretense of blockade (politically not going to happen) and the men, equipment, and ships they are supposed to be protecting.

The larger ships coming home (see above) would escort the larger transports; those that could not would scatter and proceed independently, as is/was common practice, and as witness multiple incidents in WW II where a raider encountered a weakly-escorted convoy. Basically, the strongest escort throws itself at the raider and everyone else runs in multiple directions. Not exactly astrophysics.

Or the ever present threat of Confederate raiders appearing to harass Union shipping and withdrawing forces. Especially considering the rather embarrassing defeat the Navy suffered at the Head of the Passes OTL. Now that would be pure idiocy.

The rebels had one ocean-going raider in the winter of 1861-62, Sumter; the British had yet to supply them with more. Not much to worry about there, at least not yet.;)

The same government that made absolutely zero plans for war with Britain in this period despite Britain making obvious military reinforcement to their forces in North America and the Atlantic? They could suss it out and prepare, but forgive me if the research points to the British doing everything in their power to ensure they weren't caught flat footed by such a conflict while the USA did nothing.

You really might want to consider the differences between the historical war scares - Trent, Laird, St. Albans, Chesapeake -and your cascade here; obviously, the threat level is much higher here, and even you conceded in an earlier chapter the Americans were not stupid enough to not send troops to the frontiers with BNA (IIRC, "Heintzelman" and "Burnside", correct?) Yet apparently its all quiet on the Western Front for the USN...

Here they're not exactly navel gazing or twiddling their thumbs, and its not as though they have the luxury of being able to only think about the British either. But unless the Americans have magic they aren't going to come up with a plan of attack, evacuate all their ships and forces, and get all their ships to home waters before Milne can order Dunlop to action.

With a month of planning and time to issue orders? Sure its reasonable they could get most out, but with the same weather, similar time, and comparably long distances to find/inform every ship of what's going on in two weeks? Give me a break.

Consider the Blockade/Strategy Board as the obvious place to refer the planning; as has been noted, it's a joint (USN and USA) planning body with flag officers (including some with experience on the BNA frontier) and civilian experts (Coast Survey, who just happens to be a USMA grad), they're co-located with the NCA, and, oh yeah, they include men who have fought the British in 1812-15 ... but, yeah, in 1862 they're all idiots. Cripes, historically, Winfield Scott was already back from Europe in December, John Wool was available, and a host of others, including two of the three (in 1861-62, Delafield was deputy chief of engineers AND McClellan was the general-in-chief, for crissakes) who had seen the British and French up close and personal in the Crimea, and the third one (Mordecai) was at the West Point Foundry, all of a day's travel by train from Washington. And then there's Kearny, who had fought with the French as recently as 1859, much less de Joinville et al...but yeah, they're all going to have faith in the good offices of the British, after (what) three months of rising tensions?

Considering that (IIRC) most of these purchases are either on their way across the Atlantic already, and Lincoln has no reason to believe they will be interdicted without a formal declaration or war, and that by scattering his forces across the Atlantic makes them vulnerable to defeat in detail by RN warships...

No reason? These are the British, the same people who - in your own story - fired on a US warship and provided sanctuary for rebel raiders operating against US soil from BNA. And who, of course, have minor acts like Copenhagen and the Leopard-Chesapeake incident within the memories of living men. Much less burning the White House ... Yep, he's going to trust them to play by the rules ... and its not "scattering them across the Atlantic" it's standing by off (say) Montauk, Block Island, etc - the approaches to Lower New York Bay and Long Island Sound; you know, unimportant places like that...

What forces are they putting in harms way exactly?

Any ship that's not a) readying for sea with sealed orders regarding commerce warfare; b) preparing to defend US coastal/inshore waters and ports and harbors; c) convoying troops and transports home from Port Royal and the Gulf; etc. Again, this is not rocket science. The US made a point of getting the navy to sea in 1812 before war broke out; it's not like that lesson is going to be lost on men like Paulding et al, since they were on active duty in 1812.

Snark and writing comments which read like you haven't even read the material in front of you invite comparisons to incivility.

You have a low bar for incivility.;)

Best,
 
EnglishCanuck - Yes the US can inform the Gulf Squadrons of danger (which I point out they did) but what else would they say? "Hey everyone pack up and come home? We're expecting a declaration of war from Britain in three to four weeks so just abandon the garrisons and blockade!" Military and political genius that.

TFSmith121 - Amazingly enough, the US was quite capable of making the strategic calculus necessary in this era; there's a reason the various historical war scares - Trent, Laird, St. Albans, Chesapeake - did NOT end in war. Shocking, I know, but Lincoln et al were not idiots mindlessly blundering their way through the war ... as far as coming home, certainly the ocean-going steam warships (the screw frigates, sloops, and large gunboats) and ocean-going sidewheel steam warships and liners (excellent commerce raiders, for various reasons) would be the obvious vessels to order home, and the USN's sailing warships and the converted coastal steamers could maintain the basic legal blockade until the diplomatic situation stabilizes; the rebel navies were not going to break the blockade, certainly not in the winter of 1861-62.

Those frigates, cruisers, and gunboats have to either be replaced with less useful ships, have to escort/evacuate the constantly moving chain of supply ships, and Bermuda and Nassau are the next best thing to next door if war breaks out making those defenseless vessels and men trapped without support. So unless they either send a relief squadron to escort all those boats home and relieve the frigates and cruisers they're stuck or are forced to abandon the pretense of blockade (politically not going to happen) and the men, equipment, and ships they are supposed to be protecting.

The larger ships coming home (see above) would escort the larger transports; those that could not would scatter and proceed independently, as is/was common practice, and as witness multiple incidents in WW II where a raider encountered a weakly-escorted convoy. Basically, the strongest escort throws itself at the raider and everyone else runs in multiple directions. Not exactly astrophysics.

Or the ever present threat of Confederate raiders appearing to harass Union shipping and withdrawing forces. Especially considering the rather embarrassing defeat the Navy suffered at the Head of the Passes OTL. Now that would be pure idiocy.

The rebels had one ocean-going raider in the winter of 1861-62, Sumter; the British had yet to supply them with more. Not much to worry about there, at least not yet.;)

The same government that made absolutely zero plans for war with Britain in this period despite Britain making obvious military reinforcement to their forces in North America and the Atlantic? They could suss it out and prepare, but forgive me if the research points to the British doing everything in their power to ensure they weren't caught flat footed by such a conflict while the USA did nothing.

You really might want to consider the differences between the historical war scares - Trent, Laird, St. Albans, Chesapeake -and your cascade here; obviously, the threat level is much higher here, and even you conceded in an earlier chapter the Americans were not stupid enough to not send troops to the frontiers with BNA (IIRC, "Heintzelman" and "Burnside", correct?) Yet apparently its all quiet on the Western Front for the USN...

Here they're not exactly navel gazing or twiddling their thumbs, and its not as though they have the luxury of being able to only think about the British either. But unless the Americans have magic they aren't going to come up with a plan of attack, evacuate all their ships and forces, and get all their ships to home waters before Milne can order Dunlop to action.

With a month of planning and time to issue orders? Sure its reasonable they could get most out, but with the same weather, similar time, and comparably long distances to find/inform every ship of what's going on in two weeks? Give me a break.

Consider the Blockade/Strategy Board as the obvious place to refer the planning; as has been noted, it's a joint (USN and USA) planning body with flag officers (including some with experience on the BNA frontier) and civilian experts (Coast Survey, who just happens to be a USMA grad), they're co-located with the NCA, and, oh yeah, they include men who have fought the British in 1812-15 ... but, yeah, in 1862 they're all idiots. Cripes, historically, Winfield Scott was already back from Europe in December, John Wool was available, and a host of others, including two of the three (in 1861-62, Delafield was deputy chief of engineers AND McClellan was the general-in-chief, for crissakes) who had seen the British and French up close and personal in the Crimea, and the third one (Mordecai) was at the West Point Foundry, all of a day's travel by train from Washington. And then there's Kearny, who had fought with the French as recently as 1859, much less de Joinville et al...but yeah, they're all going to have faith in the good offices of the British, after (what) three months of rising tensions?

Considering that (IIRC) most of these purchases are either on their way across the Atlantic already, and Lincoln has no reason to believe they will be interdicted without a formal declaration or war, and that by scattering his forces across the Atlantic makes them vulnerable to defeat in detail by RN warships...

No reason? These are the British, the same people who - in your own story - fired on a US warship and provided sanctuary for rebel raiders operating against US soil from BNA. And who, of course, have minor acts like Copenhagen and the Leopard-Chesapeake incident within the memories of living men. Much less burning the White House ... Yep, he's going to trust them to play by the rules ... and its not "scattering them across the Atlantic" it's standing by off (say) Montauk, Block Island, etc - the approaches to Lower New York Bay and Long Island Sound; you know, unimportant places like that...

What forces are they putting in harms way exactly?

Any ship that's not a) readying for sea with sealed orders regarding commerce warfare; b) preparing to defend US coastal/inshore waters and ports and harbors; c) convoying troops and transports home from Port Royal and the Gulf; etc. Again, this is not rocket science. The US made a point of getting the navy to sea in 1812 before war broke out; it's not like that lesson is going to be lost on men like Paulding et al, since they were on active duty in 1812.

Snark and writing comments which read like you haven't even read the material in front of you invite comparisons to incivility.

You have a low bar for incivility.;)

Best,

So let me get this straight, your bar for holding the idiot ball is:

A) the Americans who have no reason not to believe time is on their side and are expecting an official declaration of war (which they know takes roughly two weeks normally to cross the Atlantic) know that this is not the season for an Atlantic campaign, have no idea of the conditional British orders, and aren't expecting the outbreak of war until spring are idiots for operating under the assumption

B) sending ships to relieve the more important ships/escort the soldiers and suppl barks and equipment home (especially at New Orleans where thre is a major Union facility and a known ironclad and gunboat flotilla waiting) is stupid

C) unless they've devised an immediate brilliant plan to counter Britain already on the seas they are bumbling idiots.

Basically unless the Americans predict perfectly and counter every potential British move in days regardless of any preparations the British have already made they are drooling inept sluggards?

Ok then, sounds perfectly reasonable.
 
I was assuming there were a few transAtlantic cables in 1862--not really. Some had been laid but failed, the first successful one was finished in 1866. So while I quite understand Palmerston had the Admiralty send out sealed orders to various RN elements in the Atlantic to be opened and read upon receipt of the right order or in certain circumstances (say, to confirm or deny rumors that Britain had indeed gone to war), I do have to wonder how signals got from Halifax to the Caribbean.

Well since no telegraph network would exist connecting the various British outposts in the Caribbean (much less Dunlop at Vera Cruz) the RN kept a number of fast courier boats on hand to send out orders to the various bases.

At need you can just detach a sloop or corvette to speed off a message.

So I guess it comes down to how fast a message could be couriered by sea from Halifax southward.

Roughly 12-15 days depending on the weather.

Regarding British public opinion--I've read Marx's contemporary writings on the subject, which quoted from an Economist article where that magazine, ever Tory as it is, came down against the Union. But he claimed, not implausibly to me, that the feeling among the working classes was that Lincoln was just temporizing, but the Republicans would ultimately bring slavery to an end. They looked past the rhetoric. Or so Marx believed anyway; could be he was listening very selectively to those saying what he wanted to hear I guess.

The working classes mostly did not vote of course. But they could do things like strike (with dubious legality, but they were not unused to being on the wrong side of the law) and agitate.

You wouldn't find many of their letters published in the Economist, or in the Times.

Marx writings on the matter are interesting. I've read a bit on what his writings were and much of what I've read has shown scholars took a dim view of his opinions on the matter (interestingly Marxists dispute this :p).

Here's a source on British public opinion as it was OTL, and there's a little section about Karl Marx right here even!
 
Chapter V


“Damn the odds. Full steam ahead and all ships to quarters, we’ll run through the bastards!” Commodore Farragut just before the Battle of Key West, as recorded by his Executive Officer Lieutenant J.S. Thornton, February 19th 1862.


Battle of Key West:

“In January 1862 the Navy Department under Gideon Welles had decided that the seizure of New Orleans was an operation the Federal Government must undertake in order to ensure their firm control of the Gulf and cripple the Confederate export economy. The news of the Battle at the Head of the Passes from October 12th had shown that the Confederates still had a base to operate from to potentially lift a portion of the blockade around their most vital city. Its capture was thus a priority. To that end Welles had recalled probably one his most able Naval Officers to take command of the forces intended to seize the city.

In January 1862 the sixty year old Commodore David Glasgow Farragut was one of the oldest and most experienced officers in the United States Navy. Born in 1801 to Spanish immigrant and Revolutionary War veteran Jordi (George) Farragut and North Carolina native Elizabeth Farragut he was the first of their seven children. However in 1808 having fallen on hard times George arranged for the children to be reared with the family friend David Porter[1], commander of the USS Essex during the war of 1812. As such Farragut grew up with a navy family and by the age of 12 he had extensive sea experience for a young man. Due to the influence of his father he was a midshipman by age 9 and come the war of 1812 he would make a name for himself as a young sailor. Taking part in the ill-fated Battle of Valparaiso he was wounded and captured by the British while serving aboard the Essex in 1814.

After the war of 1812 he continued to rise through the ranks serving in the West Indies fighting pirates in the 1820s. His most prestigious command yet came when he was placed in charge of creating the new USN naval base in San Francisco on Mare Island to base the nascent Pacific Squadron. He chose the site well and it would go on to serve the American Navy in no fewer than three wars. Serving there until 1859 he made his way back to East Coast where he would take up residence in Norfolk Virginia.

At the outbreak of the Civil War though he lived in a Confederate State he made it very clear his sympathies lay with the Federal Government and the Union, he had no desire to see slavery expand and had a fairly favorable opinion of black men having served with them in the Navy. As such he left the state shortly after the official outbreak of hostilities and was given a spot on the Retirement Board of the Union Navy. When the Gulf Blockading Squadron was split into Western and Eastern squadrons he seemed like the logical choice for command. Given the need to seize New Orleans and his years or experience it was only logical he should be appointed to the position.

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Rear-Admiral Farragut*​

He was given the 25 gun screw-sloop USS Hartford as his flag and ordered to take a fleet of seventeen ships to Louisiana to set up a tight blockade and reduce the defences surrounding New Orleans. While previously it had been standard procedure for ships to sail individually to their stations, in light of the fragile nature of Farragut’s mortar boats and the heightened tensions with the British it was decided he should sail in strength. However, due to the rejection of the British ultimatum Farragut’s mission changed. He was instead to take his squadron to relieve Flag Officer William McKean and his squadron in the Gulf and to help facilitate the withdrawal of heavier forces and the garrisons of the Union enclaves. On February 3rd his fleet sailed. He on the Hartford sailed with the screw sloop USS Seminole(9) Commander Edward R. Thomson, the paddle steamer USS Miami(6) Lieutenant Abraham Davis Harrell, converted revenue cutter USS Harriett Lane(6) under Captain H. D. Smith, the screw sloop USS Pawnee(10) under Commander H.J. Hartstene, and the gunboats USS Pinola(5) Lieutenant Pierce Crosby, USS Owasco(5) Lieutenant John Guest, escorting three steamers.

His little fleet encountered no serious trouble on the first leg of their journey south. They stopped off in Port Royal to fuel up and take on water alongside two more steamers meant to evacuate troops from Key West on February 11th and continued their journey south. The only stops they made were to send the USS Mississppi(10) and the USS Iroquois(6) home to the East Coast on Farragut’s orders.

That was when they ran into the USS Kittatinny(4).

Kittatinny had been a remarkably lucky vessel. She had sighted the column of British ships coming along the shores and her captain had made the foresighted judgement that he should run and warn someone of the approaching British fleet, despite the fact that the lookout only spotted a battle ensign as they ran. As luck would have it, the wind was with her so she managed to stay ahead of her pursuers long enough until she reached the squadron under Farragut. Her captain relayed the message of an approaching British squadron and approximate numbers with nervous energy to Farragut. The Commodore was aware that this was an event which could happen, and having fought the British before[2] he realized he had little time to react. With quick thinking he relayed the news to the steam ships under his command to run and carry the news of the British attack to Washington, the Seminole would also turn to escort them home.

His remaining seven vessels would provide a rear guard to distract the British and allow some of the ships a chance to escape. When informed of the numbers he made his famous “Damn the odds” line which has gone down in history as the unofficial motto of the United States Navy ever since. His mind made up he deployed his ships for battle…
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*Rank awarded post-battle.”
– A History of the United States Navy 1812-1914, Drew Weber, Minnesota Presses, 2000.

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USS Hartford

“As Greyhound again led the British forces into the fray she ran directly into Farragut’s little squadron. Hunter now became the hunted in the first action of Key West. Kittatinny turned on her pursuer with a vengeance, and although she suffered raking fire she provided enough of a distraction so that Farragut’s Hartford could cross the corvette’s T. Hickley found his vessel suddenly outgunned and scrambled to reorient himself. Farragut’s ship proved more masterful and raking fire tore through Greyhound’s crew and rigging, leaving carnage in her wake. A broadside at long range by the Kittatinny, while causing less damage, merely added to the confusion. Commander Hartstene led Pawnee and Pinola up the left of Hartford while Harriet Lane and Owasco moved up the left around the carnage caused by Farragut…

…At this point the sloops Rinaldo, Spiteful, and the gunship Lee appeared, and seeing the struggling Greyhound they too ran into the fray. Farragut was unrelenting on the Greyhound and the additional pounding received from Kittatinny made matters worse. After being demasted and her executive officer killed, Hickley was knocked unconscious by a falling piece of rigging and the crew took fifteen more minutes of pounding before she struck, taking a total of 69 casualties, adding to the 19 she had taken at Delta this knocked her out of commission for the foreseeable future. Farragut then turned his ship to the oncoming Spiteful. Spiteful and Lee were already engaging Pawnee and Pinola, but when Hartford joined the fray things quickly turned for the worst. Lee was pounded to splinters taking raking fire from Pawnee and Hartford, while Spiteful found herself evenly matched by the Pinola. The Lee soon sank, forcing the Pawnee to pause taking on sailors who would have drowned otherwise. Farragut again shifted his ship to the action and coming up behind Spiteful raked her from the rear completely destroying her rudder leaving her unable to steer. This became a blessing as her hazardous course meant Pinola had to veer away from her and Hartford had to make a ponderous turn to get around her front again.

Rinaldo however held her own in engaging the two American vessels. The Owasco was badly outmatched and British sloop raked her before using her considerably better maneuverability to broadside the Harriet Lane. Lane fired back, but having fewer guns meant she caused less damage than her crew would have hoped. And shot for shot the Rinaldo fired faster than the Lane and it was only after the exchange of three broadsides that Owasco was able to get around and rake her, but only one shot hit home thundering over the Rinaldo’s main deck and smashing through the captains quarters. Rinaldo then turned to unleash her guns on Owasco again, and coming alongside her aft she unleashed a devastating broadside. The Oswaco was only able to respond with one gun when the second broadside hit home and forced the gunboat to strike. Lane then raked the Rinaldo as it turned to engage, Rinaldo responded with her chase mounts and maneuvering to get around behind the Lane. The Lane was faster than Rinaldo’s 9 knots and managed to keep that speed, maneuvering just enough to stay ahead of the British sloop. However, as the fight wore on the sloop’s heavier armament caused considerably more damage than Lane’s weapons were capable of returning, and her slower rate of fire meant the sloop needed only to keep her inside her firing arc. The two ships would circle each other until the end of the battle when the gunship Steady arrived and joined the fray forcing the Lane to strike…

…the battleship Conqueror, and the frigates Tribune and Phaeton appeared shortly thereafter and seeing the Spiteful strike Conqueror charged after Hartford while Tribune and Phaeton set their sights on Pawnee. From here the action became depressingly predictable as the heavier British ships engaged. Pawnee was soon sent beneath the waves as Tribune and Phaeton hammered her, with the Pinola unable to escape Phaeton hunted her down and forced her to strike. However Hartford and Conqueror traded blows for well over an hour.

Hartford was quicker than her British opponent and managed to rake her twice before the giant vessel could come along beside her and hit her with a devastating broadside. Hartford shot back, and despite the carnage Farragut could be seen rallying his men to greater efforts. He encouraged them to keep fighting and snarled they would board the Conqueror if they had to. Finally the ship started to slow under Conqueror’s superior fire and the British ship was able to keep pace while delivering broadside after broadside. Farragut and his men fought on like demons, and despite three quarters of the crew being killed or wounded they still did not strike. Then, the worst happened, as another broadside from Conqueror smashed over the ship a cannon ball caught Farragut in the chest, ripping his body in half. The crew were disheartened and soon the ships Executive Officer finding himself alive but wounded and Farragut dead alongside Captain Wainwright. Discovering that he was now the only ranking officer, ordered the ships colors struck. He did not however allow his vessel to fall into British hands and ordered her scuttled as the crew loaded all they could into the life boats. Conqueror would only collect some 149 survivors, only 37 of them unwounded.

Soon the remainder of the British fleet arrived off the island and seeing the results of the battle only slowed to ascertain the damage to their own ships and appoint prize crews before continuing on. The Battle of Key West was at an end.

For his steadfast leadership and courage Farragut would go on to become a legend having no fewer than four ships named after him. The USS Farragut (an ironclad monitor built later in the year), the USS Farragut, a steam battleship built 1880, the USS Farragut, or BB-30 built in 1908, and the Farragut class of destroyers which would go on to deliver the fury of the United States Navy across the Pacific nearly six decades after the day he died. He would also receive a posthumous Medal of Honor from the Navy and be promoted to Rear-Admiral.

The American crews had sold their lives dearly that day, all six ships that stayed were either captured or scuttled and in exchange they had knocked out three Royal Navy ships and left two in dire need of repair. This allowed the Mississippi to return to New York unmolested. Iroquois rescued a supply barge from capture while grievously damaging the British sloop Peterel. She then warned any American ships she could of the outbreak of war before navigating around the British squadrons on the Chesapeake. Seminole successfully escorted her charges home and would go on to an illustrious career as a raider.” The Empire’s Sword: The Royal Navy 1798 – 1930, Volume III, Alexander Churchill, Oxford Press, 1978



DuPont’s Escape:


“The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron had been formed on the 20th of January 1862 in order to make the blockading operations by the Federal Navy more efficient. Upon its creation the squadrons main duty was to prevent the supply of Confederate troops by sea, and to ensure that the Union enclaves in South and North Carolina were not expelled and properly supplied. This included the forts and posts at Cape Hatteras seized in late 1861 and the 12,000 man force in South Carolina based at Bueafort and besieging Charleston. From there it also managed the blockade up and down the Atlantic seaboard from Norfolk to Key West. During September 1861 Samuel Francis DuPont had been appointed as Flag Officer (Commodore) aboard the USS Wabash. Using this ship as his headquarters he was charged with administering the Atlantic station and did so to great effect. On November 7th he captured Port Royal and won a major victory over the Confederate forces there establishing a secure base of operations for his ships.

Samuel DuPont was one of the sons of the great du Pont family, an old family of great wealth and political clout who had left their mark on American history since 1800, most famously through the Du Pont Powder Company, which was the largest gunpowder producer in the nation at the outbreak of the war. Samuel had been born in 1803, second son of Victor du Pont, who having a failing business venture on his hands was unable to afford a formal education for his son and thus had to encourage his son to join the Navy at age 12. He did so, serving his first cruise as a midshipman on the USS Franklin in 1815. From there it was on to a fairly stellar naval career. Having no formal education DuPont taught himself the basics of navigation and mathematics while on his cruise and became a master by the time he was deployed to another ship in 1821. He would serve on a number of other cruises earning a reputation as an ardent critic of the Navy and its systems in the years he rose through the ranks.

He finally obtained his first command aboard USS Congress, sailing around South America to reach California just in time to participate in the Mexican-American War. During the war he commanded the sailing sloop Cyane in the Gulf of California where his years of experience paid off and he took or destroyed over thirty ships during the war. He would eventually command the blockade of the entire California coastline earning distinction as a man of action and bravery pushing his ship into fire so to accomplish a task. When the war ended he returned to the East Coast and was assigned to shore duty where he tirelessly worked to reform the Navy and encourage higher standards in officers and crews as well as working hard to promote his views of the Navy as an offensive weapon rather than a mere harbor defence force. His stance led him to being promoted to the head of the Navy Efficiency Board, but his earnest attempts at reforming the Navy led to political clashes with well connected officers, although he did make the rank of captain in 1855 in spite of this.

In 1857 he commanded the steam frigate Minnesota and undertook an extensive sail of the world, going to China, Japan, Arabia, and India. He would even escort the Japanese envoy to the United States and would push for the opening of Japan in later years. Then in 1860 he was put in charge of the Naval Yard at Philadelphia when the war called him back into active service.

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Samuel DuPont

Thus in early 1862 he found himself off the coast of South Carolina and in a fair quandary. Wabash only remained to command the evacuation of the remaining garrison, and while over 4,000 men had already been evacuated, there were many more who would not be. From what limited intelligence he had amassed by February 12th he realized that he was at war with Great Britain and that there were at least two squadrons of superior strength operating along the breadth of his command. He knew that the vast majority of the ships he had were unable to stand up to the vessels fielded by the British, and he was aware of how easily cut off in he was in his current position. He also knew there were 8,000 men behind him who were depending on the United States Navy to do something to keep them safe. He realized that there was precious little he could do, but he made the effort.

DuPont ordered that any available ships should load troops and supplies from Federal posts in the hopes that they should not fall into British hands. These orders would prove a rousing success as he would manage to ensure the evacuation of nearly two thousand troops from those positions before they were cut off by the British. He then ordered the remaining warships under his command to take on enough provisions that they could successfully operate for a month at sea and engage in commerce raiding.

His next act would go down in history.

Knowing that the Wabash was a powerful weapon in Union hands he realized he had to use it well. Unfortunately, to run her back to port risked her being caught up at her moors until the end of the war[3], and he simply could not do that. So he decided he would use the weapon he had in the most offensive manner possible. Taking on as much coal and supplies as the his ship could carry he burned the remaining stores at Port Royal and cast off his moorings into the annals of naval legend.

Wabash was not the first of the many raiders who would sortie to harry the British the world over, but she would prove to be the most memorable.”
The Unlikely du Ponts: American Innovators, Julius Huntley, Richmond University, 1960

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USS Wabash

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[1] Father of David Dixon Porter of Civil War fame.

[2] Alright he was only around 14 at the time but he still did admirably at Valparaiso Bay, no reason to expect he would be a slouch here.

[3] Which is what ended up happening to the American fleet in the War of 1812, and the Russians in the Crimean War. DuPont is a bit too canny to let that happen.
 
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also a step-father to David G Farragut. The two primary admirals of the Civil war are stepbrothers. Imagine that.:D

Yeah some stuff in real life is just to amazing for fiction! One can only wonder how Porter will handle the outcome of the Battle of Key West though ;) I certainly hope I haven't undersold Farragut here!
 
Your latest post, aside from being pretty gripping as story in itself, also reassures me the USA does indeed survive, and as a major power in the world too.

This doesn't totally rule out the possibility that the Union comes out of this particular war rather battered, shorn of territory, and perhaps somewhat dishonored. But it does rule out the worst fears I was having.

I can't know yet whether I'll like the USA that emerges from the double war, but anyway it's probably good to know it exists in some form!
 
Ooh! I'm liking it! What would 67th Tigers have to say?

Thanks! Hope you continue to enjoy! I'm fairly certain he would approve of the last two chapters :p

Nice sea battle. Now the British threat becomes much clearer.

The British threat on the seas is pretty obvious, and the outcome almost painfully pre-ordained for any American ships which are caught either individually or in squadron. The plain fact is that in early 1862 the USN contained an excellent number of capable officers, but a tragic lack of capable ships to give them.

Given that here the British have been prepping for 3 months to fight such a war to crush American sea power, while the US has been organizing a strategy around almost the exact opposite since summer 1861 it's pretty clear to see how the contest would go.

In the early stages at least...
 
Your latest post, aside from being pretty gripping as story in itself, also reassures me the USA does indeed survive, and as a major power in the world too.

This doesn't totally rule out the possibility that the Union comes out of this particular war rather battered, shorn of territory, and perhaps somewhat dishonored. But it does rule out the worst fears I was having.

I'm quite glad you're enjoying it! I try to make each chapter as topic specific as possible and not stretch things out too too much.

Though don't worry, the Union won't be coming out of this in any nightmare scenario, and isn't exactly on track to be brutally dismembered from coast to coast ;)

I can't know yet whether I'll like the USA that emerges from the double war, but anyway it's probably good to know it exists in some form!

The post-war Union is going to be...interesting to say the least. I'm not even 100% sure what form it will take! I have some ideas, but we shall see how they are shaped by continued research and how the war continues on :D
 
Chapter VI

"I see in British North America, stretching as it does across the continent from the shores of Labrador and Newfoundland to the Pacific, and occupying a considerable belt of the temperate zone, traversed equally with the United States by the lakes, and enjoying the magnificent shores of the St. Lawrence, with its thousands of islands in the river and gulf, a region grand enough for the seat of a great empire. In its wheat fields in the West, in its broad ranges of the chase at the North, in its inexhaustible lumber lands – the most extensive now on the globe – its invaluable fisheries and its yet undisturbed mineral deposits, I see the elements of wealth, I find its inhabitants hardy, vigorous, energetic, perfected by the Protestant religion and British constitutional liberty. Jealous of the United States and Great Britain, as they ought to be; and therefore when I look at their resources and extent, I know they can neither be conquered by the former, nor permanently held by the latter. They will be independent, as they are already self-maintaining. Having happily escaped the curse of slavery they will never submit to the domination of slaveholders, which prevails in and determines the character of the United States.” – Alexander Somerville, Canada a Battlefield, 1862

“As for myself, my course is clear A British subject I was born - a British subject I will die. With my utmost effort, with my latest breath, will I oppose this treason which attempts by sordid means and mercenary proffers to lure our people from their allegiance.” – John A. MacDonald at a speech in Ottawa Canada West, 1862


“As news of the rejection of the British demands spread north the British planners in Canada had not found themselves idle. Though most had been hoping for peace the coming of war would not dishearten them. In command in North American were a number of old but capable men.

The current Governor General for Canada was the capable Viscount Monck who while freely admitting to merely being a back bencher in it for the money, oddly, did not find himself out of his depth. He put on a relatable face for Canada and found himself uncannily able to guide himself through the kaleidoscope of Canadian politics, managing to play the middle man while not pushing the government in any one direction. While his apparent aloofness did not greatly endear him to the people of the Canadas, his social skills allowed him to relate to all the leading men regardless of faction. In this he was helped immensely by the political personalities who surrounded him in the Canadas.

Leading the currently most prominent party inside the Canadas, the Liberal-Conservatives, was the fifty-seven year old (and thoroughly alcoholic) John A. MacDonald. MacDonald was a native of Scotland, born in Glasgow in 1815, his family had emigrated to the British North American possessions in 1820, settling in Kingston where a number of MacDonald relations had already settled. He began a law practice in Kingston in 1836 becoming known as a competent and well spoken criminal lawyer. Though called upon to serve in the militia during the 1838 Rebellions, his greatest act would be in defending the rebels who were tried in Kingston, where all would be acquitted. He would begin his political rise in 1844 being repeatedly re-elected to his seat in Kingston (even despite lengthy absences at times). His rise would come in 1856 where he would ease former premier Sir Allan MacNab out of power and become head of the Canada West Conservative faction.

At the time of the crisis he sat as the provincial head upon a shaky coalition of his own Liberal Conservative Party which was facing opposition from his counterpart John S. MacDonald (no relation) and as the crisis deepened it had looked as though the factional politics of Canada might again rear their ugly heads and stymy any effective response by the provincial government making them unable to reach the needed double majority in both provinces. However, it was thanks to John A.’s deep personal relationships with the men from Canada East that deadlock was avoided. John A. had long made it an important issue that his party work with the French elements in Canada East, to that end he had called upon the services of Étienne-Paschal Taché, a noted Loyalist to the crown who was able to use his not inconsiderable influence to gain French support for MacDonald’s alliance and political platforms and earning him the support of Parti-Bleus from Canada East, allowing for a solid Conservative alliance. What was more unlikely was his decision to work with the current head of Parti-Bleu in 1862, George Etienne Cartier.

Cartier was a curious figure in Canadian politics, he had been a noted reformer all his life and had actively campaigned for and even fought in the rebellions of 1837-38 and had been imprisoned for his part in the uprising. Though he had been released in early 1840 he did not drop his campaign for responsible government and was involved in the various political street battles which characterized post-revolutionary elections where mob action was the norm rather than the exception. This would all culminate in the 1849 burning of Parliament where a Loyalist mob outraged at the passage of the Rebellion Losses Bill torched the Canadian Parliament buildings in Montreal. Cartier was a member of one of the counter mobs which faced off and stared down Loyalists in the streets, but instead of turning to bloodshed he increasingly turned to the new idea of responsible government. He became an ardent supporter of Louis-Hippolyte La Fontaine and his idea of reform and responsible government and soon became a hard campaigning politician in the Reform minded circles of Canada, but on a conservative basis, which put him at odds with men like John. S. MacDonald, and his erstwhile rival from Canada East, Antoinne Dorion a noted radical.

However, he and MacDonald saw eye to eye on a number of important issues, such as the idea of uniting the British North American possessions into a single Union (which Cartier had gone to London to promote in 1858[1]), the necessity for English-French cooperation, and the need to integrate their economies into a national industry. However, the two men were becoming trapped by policies of their own making. Since MacDonald was an opponent of the Radicals it made him an easy target for men like John S. and Dorion, while his pro-French policies were making him unpopular with the majority in Canada West who opposed French integration, and his opposition to Westward expansion was making him no friends there either. In combination all of these factors came together to threatened to undo his entire political alliance and sweep him from power.

In effect the government had become split between the Liberal-Conservative Party and its Parti-Bleu alliance (who could be called Right-Wing Reformers) and the actions of the Reform Party (who could be called Left-Wing reformers) which caused an endless seesaw of one faction or another swinging moderates over to their side and causing the government to fall, the wild cards always being the Clear Grits under George Brown and the radicals of Parti Rouge under Dorion. Any minor change in political allegiance could cause a significant shift in party strength and bring down a government and cause massive shifts in policy, deadlocking the system and bringing any attempt at change to a screeching halt. This was all thanks to the incredibly poorly planned system instigated in the Act of Union of 1840 which decreed that for a motion in the House of Assembly to pass there had to be majority in both the Assembly from Canada West and Canada East, in effect one had to gain a double majority.

In a way the Border Crisis was almost a political godsend. The sudden surge of patriotism across the Canadas made the Liberal-Conservative alliance with the Parti-Bleu necessary in the eyes of most in Canada West in order to coordinate a successful defence. John. A was able to create the position of Militia Commissioner for himself and propose a bill which would enable the recruitment of 50,000 militia to defend the Province. However, he still had to gain the necessary support in both assemblies. Had the crisis only been one incident that could be resolved through diplomacy it is arguable that John. A’s government would have collapsed under the post-crisis strain from his alliance and the unlikelihood he would have gained the needed double majority, but as the crisis deepened in December and January it became clear the usual party politics were more of an impediment to any coherent colonial defense policy. However, MacDonald seemed to be trouble, as political deadlock still seemed like the only possible outcome.

It is surprising then, that one of his most vocal rivals then stepped forward to aid him. George Brown was one of the most vocal Reformers in Canada West and his Clear Grits faction held an important swing vote which kept the Reform Party under John S. MacDonald as the key competitor against the Liberal-Conservative Party. Brown was an ardent reformer, having been recognized as a leading liberal and Reform politician since 1849 when he had set in motion the termination of an allegedly corrupt prison warden in Kingston. He was also known to hold hard positions on educational reform and the separation of Church and State, referring to John A’s alliance with the Parti-Bleu as "a base vassalage to French-Canadian Priestcraft." He was also one of the most noted abolitionists in Canada. He used his paper, The Globe, as a platform to denounce the Southern United States and its policies, even attacking the Northern states for their supposed complicity. He hosted such notable individuals as Frederick Douglas and Harriet Beecher Stowe, even becoming one of the leading figures in the Underground Railroad which brought fugitive slaves to freedom in Canada. As such he was adored by much of the black population of the province, who aligned closely with his politics.

It seemed as though Brown and John A. could be nothing but enemies. The divide between the two men was so deep John A. once quipped at a heckler who called him a drunk that “Yes, but the people would prefer John A. drunk to George Brown sober.” However, the deepening crisis though had gotten him to thinking. Unlike some of his radical allies in Les Rogue or the Reform Party he was not a rabidly pro-republican man, seeing it as ‘mob rule’, and most of the senior Reform leadership were not either, with the exception of Dorion. Brown feared that war might mean the loss of potential Canadian independence and annexation into the United States, which he had campaigned against in 1849, as such the thought of war made him uneasy, and like many Canadians he was outraged by the annexationist proclamations made by the American Secretary of State William H. Seward. The seeming ambivalence of some men amongst Les Rouge and the more radical Clear Grits disgusted him. With all these factors in mind he approached the Liberal Conservatives about the possibility of forming a coalition government during this time of crisis.

This proposition was readily accepted, and Brown managed to work many reformers over to his side once he proposed the notion to John S. and both Cartier and John MacDonald fully supported it. It was in effect, a political coup which broke the potentially crippling deadlock in the Canadian Parliament and allowed for an effective way to garner the double majority necessary in both the Assemblies of Canada East and Canada West. Brown through his control of the more influential newspapers in Canada West, and Cartier through his oratory skill in Canada East presented this throughout late January and early February as a necessary act to preserve Canada from American invasion and occupation. The coalition was readily endorsed by Monck who was receiving a constant stream of advice from the elderly Tache on how to prepare the province for war. Tache also secretly felt that it could further his own vision of a United Canada, and thus by supporting a political group determined to work together they could overcome the obstacles in order to bind Canada together. In this he was also aided by Monck’s secretary Denis Godley who by all accounts seems to have had a personal agenda towards uniting the provinces of British North America as well.

Not all agreed with coalition, Dorion and his Rouges being the most vocal opponents…[2]

…obstacles were still significant however. Even though the two separate ideas of Reform had been pushed to the back burner for now, it still managed to interfere as the coalition hammered out the Militia Bill. The cost was of concern, and John S. was insistent it did not go far enough[3], he argued there was little point in paying for 50,000 men if they had no uniforms and no barracks. Cartier was in reluctant agreement as the call out of 45 flank companies of the Sedentary Militia on December 11th had already produced over 33,000 men to arms, and if the remaining 45 (in actuality 49 since a number of new companies had been unofficially created) were called to arms it would exceed the number that they had planned on.

Negotiations with Monck and the Commander in Chief of North America, Sir William Fenwick Williams, were also tense. Monck was personally fine with whatever number the government felt like equipping, Williams however was adamant that the Canadian government would bear most of the cost for these men in exchange for British equipment. The Canadian government was torn however as even paying for only 50,000 men would come to a cost of nearly a tenth of the United Provinces budget. They compromised that in exchange for paying for the total equipment of some 40,000 men for the wars duration that the British government would accept the cost for the remainder. Williams also made it a necessity that the government would agree to keep at least half of these men on as a permanent force after the war, which despite some protests from MacDonald and Brown was agreed to…”
Peace Order and Good Government: 1830-1865, Dan Howard, University of Halifax, 1970

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From left to right, top to bottom: Viscount Monck, Etienne-Paschal Tache, John A. MacDonald, George Cartier, John S. MacDonald, Antoinne Dorion, and George Brown​

“At the time of the crisis in 1861 the North American station was led by two men, the overall Commander in Chief of British North America Sir William Fenwick Williams, and the Commander of British Troops in the Atlantic Major-General Sir Charles Hastings Doyle.

Williams was an interesting character, a Nova Scotia native by birth he was the son of a quartermaster general in the garrison at Halifax born in 1800. However, persistent rumours existed that he was actually the illegitimate child of Edward Augustus, Duke of Kent, would continue to spring up around him throughout his life. Williams for his part made no effort to deny or hide the rumours, and if true he was actually the half-brother of the Queen. While this might explain why the son of a minor officer at a colonial garrison rose to such a prominent position in the Imperial Military hierarchy (and indeed Williams eternal silence on the matter may be telling) others offer a more practical explanation for his rise through the ranks.

Williams was described as a dutiful officer, polite, and full of spirit, with the gentlest heart that ever beat. He had many minor military appointments from his graduation from Woolwich Military Academy, first serving as 2nd Lieutenant in the Royal Artillery before serving in Gibraltar and Sri Lanka where he rose to the rank of brevet colonel before being appointed as the British commissioner in charge of reforming the Turkish arsenal, and worked for nine years to help define the Turkish-Persian border.

When the Crimean War broke out Williams was sent to take command of Turkish forces along the northern border of the Ottoman Empire and managed to reorganize the defeated Turkish forces there before arriving at Kars in 1855. In June 1855 a Russian army of 25,000 attacked Kars but were repulsed and forced to besiege the city where they suffered heavy losses. By December however with no reinforcements coming and supplies dwindling with sickness setting in amongst his troops Williams negotiated a surrender which allowed his men to keep their flags and their officers their swords. Williams was lionized in the presses for this success and became “The Hero of Kars” and was heaped with praise by the governments of France and England and received a pension of 1000 pounds for the rest of his life.

In 1860 he accepted the position of Commander in Chief of the British forces in North America. Upon the outbreak of war he wrote that “Our trouble begins when their war ends.” He, like most British contemporaries of the time, believed that Southern independence was going to be permanent so felt that once the war with the South was concluded they would avenge themselves of the loss of their southern territories by marching north. With that in mind he had been writing ceaselessly for reinforcements to the North American garrison and in November, with the coming of the Trent Crisis he received part of his wish. Palmerston had brow beat Parliament into accepting that there would be a crisis and so had dispatched a further 10,000 men to reinforce the barely 5,000 men in Canada. Although Williams had had the colonial governments call out the militia forces at the end of October, with even just the militia (a force of questionable utility) and regulars he had perhaps only 20,000 men at his disposal in early November, although the arrival of British regulars brought this up to 25,000 he realized he would need further reinforcements and more colonial support.

Williams-1862.jpg

Sir William Fenwick Williams. 1862

His counterpart in the Atlantic Command was Sir Charles Hastings Doyle, a career military officer as well. He was the eldest son of Lieutenant-General Sir Charles William Doyle and so was destined to a military career graduating from Sandhurst and entering the army as an ensign in 1819 and purchasing a captaincy in 1825. In the 1830s he served as aide-de-camp in Quebec before serving in the East and West Indies in the 1840s and in 1846 was on staff as a quarter-master general. He served at Varna in the Crimea before being invalidated in early 1855 due to illness and as such missed any major action.
On October 16th 1861 he arrived in Halifax just in time for the Border Crisis to break out so he could take command of the British troops there. Doyle immediately busied himself with analysis of the defensive works and the military personnel at his disposal. His first act was to order the militia in the Maritime Provinces be called out.

His command in Nova Scotia called out the militia first, and due to the compulsory nature of militia service in the province over 34,000 were called to arms. In neighboring New Brunswick only some 9,000 men were called out due to the low population, and in PEI 1,650 men were called to arms. There were also some 2200 regulars on hand, mainly in Nova Scotia. When the 10,000 men dispatched by London arrived at the end of November he was able to take some 7500 regulars into his command with over 59,000 militia from the provinces.

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Sir Charles Hastings Doyle, 1865

With Williams in overall command of the station he simply had to wait on word from London to see what was to be done while strengthening the defences at Halifax and along the border.

Williams meanwhile was not idle in the Canadas, he was bursting with energy travelling from Montreal to Toronto to see to the call up of the militia and establishing batteries at Toronto, Kingston and Montreal. In fact he was so active Monck wrote in early December that “It is difficult to keep before him any appearance that we are not already at war.” His first call up of the militia on December 11th had yielded some 32,000 men by January 1st, and with the crisis showing no signs of abating he ordered the remaining flank companies called up and armed, which would by the start of March bring the total number of enrolled militia across Canada East and Canada West to a strength of some 74,000 men[4].

However, there was at first a difficulty in arming them. Returns for the provincial armories come April 1861 showed only 17,000 arms in the Province of Canada with 10,000 of those being smoothbores and the remainder pattern 1854 Enfields. At Williams request 8,000 were shipped in June and come late December the Canadian government requested 100,000 stands of arms to be shipped. By the end of November there were 44,000 rifles in Canada, but come January the government had indeed managed to bring that number up to 90,000. Ammunition stocks were not miserable but it was known to Williams that a significant amount would be needed in the event of war and he judged the existing stocks in Canada West and East to be inadequate. He needn’t have worried a great deal however, news of the Terror-Dacotah Affair had incensed the government in London and a further 20,000 men and their supplies were being shipped across the Atlantic come the end of December.

This became problematic however as winter set it. The main trade route from the Atlantic to the interior was along the St. Lawrence River, which began to freeze over in mid-December, which would cut British forces off from the rail head in River-du-Loup, and the only other railhead connecting to the interior of the Canadas from the Atlantic was in Portland Maine, which, needless to say, was not an option for British troops to use. This was where Doyle’s significant experience as a quartermaster came in. Although by the start of December some further 5,000 British troops had managed to board the rails and head West, come December 11th the ice had closed off the head of the St. Lawrence which meant the only other route would be via St. Johns overland via the Temiscouata winter road which threaded along the Maine border. The road was secured by the 62nd Regiment of Foot come January 5th which allowed British forces to move uninterrupted along the road at that time. They were however, replaced by the 1st Carleton Militia Battalion and the 2nd Company of York Volunteers under Lt. Col William T. Baird on January 30th which freed the 62nd up for duty in the Maritimes. Doyle managed to successfully organize over 6800 men to cross along the road from December to March 5th allowing for a total of 14,000 men to reach Canada with relative ease, and they incurred only some 12 desertions along the route.[5]

This granted a total strength of 31,000 regulars in Canada and the Maritimes, 14,000 in Canada East and West, and 17,000 in the Maritimes alongside the militia by March 5th 1862, by that time London had also begun to organize them along a plan of attack.”
Canada At War 1812-1916, Paul Woods, York University, 1989

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[1] Confederation didn’t exactly spring out of a vacuum after all. It’s rather interesting when you read about personalities like Tache, Cartier, and Brown who were campaigning for Confederation. Some were really high minded, others were incredibly self-serving and cynical. Brown for instance thought that such a union would permanently disable the power of the French Catholics in Canada East, while Tache was convinced that it would grant the Canadiens total control over Quebec.

[2] But more on that later…

[3] His objections from OTL regarding John A’s proposed militia bill were basically that with no way of billeting, equipping, or supplying these forces from within Canada they would be a useless organization. His own amended bill from 1863 called for a smaller force (35,000) but insisted on getting such basic things like uniforms and equipment supplied from within Canada rather than relying on Britain.

[4] There’s estimates of the number capable of being raised from this call up between 72,000 to 76 or 78,000 here it’s just picking a number between them. Her Majesties Commissioners Report from February 1862 mentions that they believe 65,000 men could be ‘easily raised’ and Williams believed he could get 75,000 men so I don’t find it too outlandish that such a force could be mustered. The 30,000 raised at first however, is completely historical.

[5] This is almost exactly as OTL since Doyle made this rather remarkable accomplishment it wouldn’t be exceptionally difficult here. I’ve actually increased the number of desertions along the route too, I could only find reference to nine (or three) taking place during this time. Here I suppose a larger number of disaffected Irishmen decided to make a break for it.

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Whew! And there in a nutshell is the Canadian situation at this time. Almost everything you want to know about Canadian politics and military preparations! There will be some narrative interludes coming up before Chapter VII.
 
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Really good timeline here so far. Great detail into the rise of Canada and the war could really go either way as far as current circumstances go in terms of it being a very battered and exhausted peace. Nice how you managed to build up the war slowly as well. Looking forward to more.
 
Great stuff!

Enjoying this so far!

Keep it up!

Thanks! Glad you're enjoying it!

Really good timeline here so far. Great detail into the rise of Canada and the war could really go either way as far as current circumstances go in terms of it being a very battered and exhausted peace. Nice how you managed to build up the war slowly as well. Looking forward to more.

Thank you! One of the reasons I've actually worked so hard on researching the issues here is because I've wanted to write a Canada TL which could be interesting from multiple perspectives.

I also wanted to put to rest the 'matter of marching' myth that seems to permeate the board where the US can cross the border and Canada will roll over and be easily occupied. I'm intending to quite firmly demonstrate how its not quite as easy as most assume. The unfortunate side effect of course is that Canada becomes a battleground.
 
...I also wanted to put to rest the 'matter of marching' myth that seems to permeate the board where the US can cross the border and Canada will roll over and be easily occupied. I'm intending to quite firmly demonstrate how its not quite as easy as most assume. The unfortunate side effect of course is that Canada becomes a battleground.

Well, I've given the people of Canada their due--they would not make it easy, making the cost high. And of course that is before factoring in the vengeance the British Empire would wreak.

So the wise thing is for the Yanks to do what they have done, OTL, since 1814--leave their neighbors in peace.

That said--what shall they do if it is their neighbors who will not leave them in peace?

If I think it will be tragic that the Union and the peoples of Canada will fight and bleed each other--honestly, while there are Yankees at some fault in this war with Britain, notably the impetuous captain who seized the Trent, and the arrogant posturing of Seward in the past--though your reference on "English Public Opinion" suggests he remained an ungracious buffoon in his dealings with Britain OTL even after assuming the office of the USA's chief diplomat, supposedly executing Lincoln's soft-spoken policy toward the chief power of the world (certainly chief in terms of who could marshal serious forces to affect the American part of the world).

Still and all, stepping back, the chief villain at fault for this war between Britain and the Union is in my view Palmerston. Britain, from its position of strength, could afford magnanimity and forbearance, particularly bearing in mind wrongs were done by both sides.

That Confederate raid out of New Brunswick onto New England for instance--surely I don't think any responsible party in that province's government nor even substantial private sympathizers were behind it in advance--it was entirely the initiative of some bold Southerners. But having committed their little rampage, shouldn't the municipal and provincial authorities have handled the raiders as common criminals, if they refused to see the diplomatic aspects?

Their being let go by the law of a British polity could only look very bad; it suggested that Confederate raiders could strike out of British protection at will and then return to its safety.

The contempt of the British aristocracy for the Republicans who so belatedly and equivocally cry out in the abstract for abolition but who support a law which even to this moment keeps hundreds of thousands on Union controlled soil in slavery is easy to understand if not to forgive (considering the OTL outcome we know the Republicans will in the fullness of time implement). It was more amazing to see some of your major Canadian political actors bringing up the Union's complicity in slavery--when in fact taking up arms against the Union puts them into direct alliance with the most forthright and sweeping advocates for slavery on the planet. Populist Canadians prepared to give their lives for Queen and home is one thing; shooting at Yanks because of the very crime the particular government they are fighting hoped to end is just perverse. And in the context of a Canadian court turning loose actual Confederate raiders!

Yes, I accept that the 31,000 men in arms already for Britain and Canada armed in Canada are not going to be brushed aside painlessly.

And the Yanks still aren't acting actively to interdict their movements (though winter is!)

But if I were a proper Civil War buff I'd have some idea of the size of the Union Army at this point OTL, and as your posts said, the hostility of Britain is going to yield another round of more or less voluntary troops (who may or may not actually be drafted, the point being they aren't fighting being drafted). I'd have to go back, but I thought the mere increment in extra troops war with Britain would reliably bring forward would amount to more than 31,000, IIRC 50,000 or so. Of course those recruits are hardly the ones to send north to clash with Britain's, a good portion of whom are seasoned regulars who recently saw service in the Crimean War. Lincoln needs to divert north a lot of his most seasoned men, which is very unfortunate given the Southern threat and the likelihood the Richmond government, if they are not complete fools, will seize on this moment for a hard strike, while Washington is distracted with not only Canada but the uncertain but scary threat of the RN off the Atlantic shores--particularly the danger they might drive up the Chesapeake to bombard Washington itself. At a time like this can Lee be expected to give them any respite?

(As I say--coordinated or not, declared or not--in fighting the Union now, the Canadians and their British mentors are in fact allied with the slaveholders and must wish them victory for their own sakes).

And if the Union does not do something to neutralize the worst case threat Canada poses the Union can be dissected, with strikes from Canada meeting drives from the South, ravaging the most industrialized areas and severing communications with the Midwest, which would come under the threat of random raids from the north.

My gut feeling, as I've said before, not based on any figuring of actual strength distribution, is that Lincoln needs to stop free movement between the Maritimes and the heartland of Canada West, and to do that he needs to take Quebec, or anyway key parts of it--Quebec City, Montreal. The British can concentrate with impunity in Nova Scotia, by sea, and harass New England, Maine especially--the New England militias under Federal marshaling will have to counter those moves, but if those forces can get west to support the Canadian militias defending their homes, they can wreak havoc on the whole Midwest.

I think therefore Lincoln is going to have to send rather more than 30,000, perhaps 50 or 60 thousand, north to sever Canada. The people of Quebec will not welcome them, but if they can be taken with overwhelming force, and held without too many outrages being committed, I can see how maybe the Union can buy itself time to deal with the Confederacy, however reinforced it is about to become, both by the eradication of the Blockade and probably by the actual infusion of at least token British and perhaps French units.

I appreciate how you've pointed out, Palmerston has not jumped into a deep Grand Alliance with the Confederacy. One point I did pick out of your inherently confusing Canadian politics is, the secessionists aren't very popular in Canada--nor, I gather, in Britain. But the nature of war is, one takes the allies one finds, and makes the best of them. Palmerston does not have to make any declarations of love for the slaveholder's rebellion, but it only makes sense to coordinate things with them a bit, anyway to encourage them to take advantage of opportunities the British naval attack offers them and in turn to support any bold initiatives Lee or his brother generals might undertake now.

In the light of these rather grim cumulative threats, your casual mention of the Union's surviving at all in the story of Farragut gives me hope neither Richmond nor London comes close to making the most of the opportunities this very dire moment for the Union offers them.

Lincoln of course can't know that, and has to assume the worst.

I imagine it is with a heavy heart, and a grim appreciation of how much loss both sides will suffer, that he will order an attack on Canada. He knows it will be not be easy.

But he has no choice.

If Canada is severed--I blame Palmerston, and the arrogant, smug cliques who rule the Empire. They are I fear suffering a kind of Victory Disease, the cumulative kind that is the trap of any superpower confident in its overwhelming force that guarantees victory. This blinded him to the costs he is now going to have to face, in his confidence that British will will simply be, in the end, after a few glorious victories. He did not have to opt for this--having opted, it is not going to be easy to get out of this war, and one reason for that is that for a while, it is going to go pretty well for Britain and its dependencies.

So perhaps Lincoln can't sever communications between the parts of Canada--yet. But until some kind of honorable end to the war with Britain is within his grasp, he has to keep trying, to try and keep the Midwest secure enough to win the two wars he is now stuck with.

And yes, if 31,000 is all Canada has as of this moment--sooner or later the Union will grind them down, Crimean veterans or not.

The Union cannot afford to be utterly defeated in the north as well as the south; they will keep on until either they collapse completely or one front or the other is secured.
 
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