WI: McClellan given another month?

[Saphroneth]

In addition I am not saying that the Confederacy can win without Virginia so don't try and make it out like I'm saying that. But expecting the war to end in the Spring of 1863 in this scenario is far too optimistic. Also in regards to desertions: First the other Armies of the Confederacy, specifically the Army of Tennessee are probably fine. There were next to no Virginian regiments outside of Virginia and the Tennesseians in the AoT stuck by for years after the loss of their state before their numbers entered a terminal decline. So while the war probably has under eighteen months left in it the fighting will not end.

It won't end immediately, but it will produce a very important psychological and political blow to Confederate legitimacy - having lost their capital and having to more or less abandon their capital state, and with the only offensive into Union territory of the Civil War consisting of the Maryland Campaign (which looks pretty disastrous in light of the subsequent capture of Richmond TTL) the Confederacy looks much less like a winner than it did OTL. This is going to combine with the loss of Virginia as a recruitment centre, and the loss of the industry of Richmond and of southern Virginia, to result in a fatally weakened Confederacy - while it may not end the war inside six months or anything like that, it will mean the South is much less able to cause damage or meaningfully contest Union advances. It also loses an important administrative centre, and is certainly not better off than OTL (or indeed in as good a shape).

At the same time, it's no longer necessary to blockade Hampton Roads, and Washington functionally no longer needs defending - this frees up huge chunks of the Union army and navy, and indeed a lot of the heavy artillery from the Washington forts becomes available. This means that while Lee's army may be the same size as it was OTL in early 1863 or indeed larger (counting the troops withdrawn from Richmond), it'll have to deal with an enemy army which is itself larger.

OTL the Confederate army peaked in size in 1863; much of that recruitment won't take place TTL, and to achieve the same relative industrial productivity per military man it'll prove necessary to allocate much more manpower to production rather than to the armies. It simply won't be possible to generate the same volume of productivity.

If you measure in terms of iron produced in 1860 to get a proxy for heavy industry, Virginia (largely via Richmond and environs) is two thirds of the productivity of the CSA and Tennessee is two thirds of what's left.


Of course, if capturing Richmond wouldn't be a massive boon for the Union, it does raise the question as to why everyone tried to do or prevent it so much...

And yet still an issue. And a terrible result to have.

While true, it doesn't really have any direct bearing on whether capturing Richmond at that time would be a good thing, unless we want to excuse any mistakes made in the first half of the Civil War by claiming they brought Uncompensated Emancipation closer.

For what it's worth, McClellan's original plan for the war was essentially to bring it to a swift close by explicitly rejecting emancipation as irrelevant to the issue of the war, as this would indicate to the Confederates that their fears were unjustified; this of course from our modern view would raise questions, but it's worth asking oneself how many lives earlier emancipation is worth in the first place. If the Civil War had seen only 80,000 dead but Emancipation was delayed by a decade, that's a trade which is worth weighing rather than dismissing out of hand as one-sided.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

For what it's worth, McClellan's original plan for the war was essentially to bring it to a swift close by explicitly rejecting emancipation as irrelevant to the issue of the war, as this would indicate to the Confederates that their fears were unjustified;

First, that was a political question, and therefore well over his pay grade. His job was to lead armies and fight battles.

Second, that was essentially Lincoln's position at the start of the war, and well into 1862. Note his revocation of the local emancipation decrees issued by Frémont in Missouri and T.W. Sherman in South Carolina.

Third, it was ultimately a fool's errand, because the controlling faction in the South had decided that any such professions from the North were of no real value, and that the only way to preserve slavery was by secession; and they had gotten the South irrevocably committed to that policy. The only value of it was to avoid provoking secession declarations by Border States in 1861. (Frémont's proclamation threw Unionists in still-"neutral" Kentucky into a panic; they telegraphed Lincoln

"THERE IS NOT A DAY TO LOSE IN DISAVOWING EMANCIPATION OR KENTUCKY IS GONE OVER THE MILL DAM".

And we know how important Kentucky was to Lincoln.

If the Civil War had seen only 80,000 dead but Emancipation was delayed by a decade, that's a trade which is worth weighing rather than dismissing out of hand as one-sided.

I suppose it is... It ought to be noted that an awful lot of black people died as a result of the War. Many escaped slaves had nowhere to go, or were put in disease ridden refugee camps; the terrible economic damage to the South bore on them.

 

[Fiver]

Regarding McClellan

I posted this in another forum but it is applicable here

In the end it is results that matter, and a commander who fails to work successfully with his superiors and his subordinates to the point where he loses their trust cannot be kept in command. In the real world battlefield results are not enough, it is the campaigns that matter and how those campaigns bring about the successful conclusion of the war (or prolong it if you are trying not to lose). Lee, Grant, Joseph E Johnson, Sherman, Thomas, and at sea, Farragut, brought success (or held off disaster for as long as they could) for their respective governments. Which is why they are high on the pantheon of successful American commanders and McClellan, who won a single campaign decisively (West Virginia, where he had all the cards), was defeated in a major offensive campaign, and achieved a narrow victory at Antietam that was important more for its political impact than its military one, is not considered one of the great captains of American history.

He deserves his place his history, but he most definitely did not earn another month in command and his relief and replacement was justified. That Burnside and Hooker failed in their campaigns as commanders of the Army of the Potomac is true, but their failure has little bearing on the reasons why McClellan was sacked. Meade and Grant won their campaigns and the war, in spite of setbacks and painful losses.

I agree your points except "McClellan, who won a single campaign decisively (West Virginia, where he had all the cards)". McClellan was plucked from West Virginia before the campaign was over. McClellan won battles in West Virginia, but Rosecrans won the campaign.

 

[galveston bay]

I agree your points except "McClellan, who won a single campaign decisively (West Virginia, where he had all the cards)". McClellan was plucked from West Virginia before the campaign was over. McClellan won battles in West Virginia, but Rosecrans won the campaign.

true, although McClellan got all the credit as far as the Administration was concerned.

 

[Saphroneth]

First, that was a political question, and therefore well over his pay grade. His job was to lead armies and fight battles.

And if there'd been an overarching strategy in place, that would have been fine; without one being in place, he was obliged to fill in the gap.

Second, that was essentially Lincoln's position at the start of the war, and well into 1862. Note his revocation of the local emancipation decrees issued by Frémont in Missouri and T.W. Sherman in South Carolina.

True, as far as it goes, but Lincoln's approach missed the other half of what McClellan wanted to do - the military component to the military-political strategy.
McClellan's military plan was what he called his "strategy of overwhelming" - raise as many troops as possible before the campaign season opened, then mount an offensive across the continent and along the coasts to pin Confederate troops in place and prevent them reinforcing Richmond, and deliver a psychological blow to the Confederates by taking their capital. In combination with the position on emancipation it assures the CSA that they can't win and don't need to win - that continued resistance is both futile and unnecessary.

 

[Fiver]

If the Civil War had seen only 80,000 dead but Emancipation was delayed by a decade, that's a trade which is worth weighing rather than dismissing out of hand as one-sided.

Total Civil War fatalities had passed 80,000 before McClellan started the Peninsula Campaign. The majority of these deaths were from disease, which killed about 5000 Union and 3000 Confederate troops every month.

 

[SsgtC]

And if there'd been an overarching strategy in place, that would have been fine; without one being in place, he was obliged to fill in the gap.

This is ABSOLUTELY false. Serving officers in the US Military are prohibited BY LAW from making political policy. By even attempting to make policy, McClellan should, by rights, have been arrested and court martialed

 

[Saphroneth]

This is ABSOLUTELY false. Serving officers in the US Military are prohibited BY LAW from making political policy. By even attempting to make policy, McClellan should, by rights, have been arrested and court martialed

Going by this logic, McClellan should have done precisely nothing, while Fremont and all other generals who advanced emancipation should have been court martialed.

If there is no official position on a subject (e.g. the conduct of the war with respect to emancipation) to which a solution is required, the logical approach is to assume the least disruptive policy; this is what McClellan did.

 

[galveston bay]

Going by this logic, McClellan should have done precisely nothing, while Fremont and all other generals who advanced emancipation should have been court martialed.

If there is no official position on a subject (e.g. the conduct of the war with respect to emancipation) to which a solution is required, the logical approach is to assume the least disruptive policy; this is what McClellan did.

Fremont was removed from his position commanding a major theater and sent to a minor one and then sacked after that because he was trying to make political policy without permission (and was also inept as a commander as well).

Grant, in the same position as McClellan, specifically asked for political instructions from his superior (the President)

which is how things work in the US Military

 

[SsgtC]

If there is no official position on a subject (e.g. the conduct of the war with respect to emancipation) to which a solution is required, the logical approach is to assume the least disruptive policy; this is what McClellan did.

That's not how the US military works. If a military officer is in a position that required a political policy, they are to request instructions on how to proceed. That's why commanders are given political briefs so that they can align THEIR actions to official policy. It doesn't work the other way around, where a general makes the policy then the government conforms to it.

 

[Saphroneth]

That's not how the US military works. If a military officer is in a position that required a political policy, they are to request instructions on how to proceed.

Then explain Fremont's emancipation measures, or Hunter's ones, both of which were reversed when they reached the news. (If what McClellan was apparently doing was beyond the pale, he was not the only one.)

Of course, the true course of events was:

1) When McClellan arrived in Washington, Lincoln asked him for his strategy.
2) McClellan devised one (the "strategy of overwhelming") and presented it to Lincoln.
3) Lincoln did not either confirm or deny that the strategy should be followed, and did not countermand it.
4) McClellan began implementing his strategy, as the Union had no other and he was commanding general.

I think we can agree that, trivially, McClellan needed to do something, and with a strategy devised which Lincoln had not objected to it was a reasonable assumption to follow it.

 

[Fiver]

And if there'd been an overarching strategy in place, that would have been fine; without one being in place, he was obliged to fill in the gap.

McClellan's letter of July 7, 1862 did not confine itself to military strategy, it also advocated political policy, which was clearly exceeding McClellan's authority. Even when dealing with strategy, McClellan's words were not subordinate.

True, as far as it goes, but Lincoln's approach missed the other half of what McClellan wanted to do - the military component to the military-political strategy.
McClellan's military plan was what he called his "strategy of overwhelming" - raise as many troops as possible before the campaign season opened, then mount an offensive across the continent and along the coasts to pin Confederate troops in place and prevent them reinforcing Richmond, and deliver a psychological blow to the Confederates by taking their capital. In combination with the position on emancipation it assures the CSA that they can't win and don't need to win - that continued resistance is both futile and unnecessary.

When did McClellan ever call his strategy a "strategy of overwhelming"?

Let's look at McClellan's memorandum of August 4, 1861.
* It says "no capable general will cross the river north of this city when we have a strong army here ready to cut off his retreat". Lee would prove him wrong about this.
* It calls for a 273,000 man army to invade Virginia
* McClellan planned to use this 273,000 man army "not only to drive the enemy out of Virginia and occupy Richmond; but to occupy Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans". The logistics for this march would be staggering.
* It assigns minimal forces to all other theaters, leaving one to wonder how they were supposed to overwhelm anything.
* It calls for a strong movement to be made on the Mississippi, driving the Confederates out of Missouri.
* East Tennessee was to be seized, but the forces there were not to advance towards Richmond.
* It calls for "an advance through the Indian Territory upon Red River and West Texas", possibly supported by an advance from California into West Texas, traveling through New Mexico and Mexico.

 

[hasdrubal barca]

Regarding McClellan

I posted this in another forum but it is applicable here

In the end it is results that matter, and a commander who fails to work successfully with his superiors and his subordinates to the point where he loses their trust cannot be kept in command. In the real world battlefield results are not enough, it is the campaigns that matter and how those campaigns bring about the successful conclusion of the war (or prolong it if you are trying not to lose). Lee, Grant, Joseph E Johnson, Sherman, Thomas, and at sea, Farragut, brought success (or held off disaster for as long as they could) for their respective governments. Which is why they are high on the pantheon of successful American commanders and McClellan, who won a single campaign decisively (West Virginia, where he had all the cards), was defeated in a major offensive campaign, and achieved a narrow victory at Antietam that was important more for its political impact than its military one, is not considered one of the great captains of American history.

He deserves his place his history, but he most definitely did not earn another month in command and his relief and replacement was justified. That Burnside and Hooker failed in their campaigns as commanders of the Army of the Potomac is true, but their failure has little bearing on the reasons why McClellan was sacked. Meade and Grant won their campaigns and the war, in spite of setbacks and painful losses.

I'll leave the political aspects aside, i'll let others debate that controversy. From a military standpoint though I can't view McClellan anything less then one of the most competent commanders on the Union side. The best generals of the war on Union side were Grant, Sherman no doubt but they had time to develop. This is what I think Grant meant in the qoute I posted earlier McClellan should not be held to 1864 standards but to 1862 standards. If McClellan had the same amount of time as them to develop he would have probably come out about even. If you look at Grant-Sherman in 1862 they were worse then McClellan, especially in battlefield feats. If Grant was in command during the Peninsula Campaign or at Antietam I either see him preforming the same or worse to McClellan. Grant had the same issues as McClellan in 62, overestimating enemy forces, rusty on the battlefield and not pursuing enemy vigorously. Grant-Sherman got the experience of 62 and developed into great commanders in 63-64. Lincoln I think went through this maturing process as well his military decisions in 62 weren't very good and got better in 63-64. McClellan by contrast simply didn't last that long but seems to be held to later standards.

Can you met me half way on this?

 

[galveston bay]

I'll leave the political aspects aside, i'll let others debate that controversy. From a military standpoint though I can't view McClellan anything less then one of the most competent commanders on the Union side. The best generals of the war on Union side were Grant, Sherman no doubt but they had time to develop. This is what I think Grant meant in the qoute I posted earlier McClellan should not be held to 1864 standards but to 1862 standards. If McClellan had the same amount of time as them to develop he would have probably come out about even. If you look at Grant-Sherman in 1862 they were worse then McClellan, especially in battlefield feats. If Grant was in command during the Peninsula Campaign or at Antietam I either see him preforming the same or worse to McClellan. Grant had the same issues as McClellan in 62, overestimating enemy forces, rusty on the battlefield and not pursuing enemy vigorously. Grant-Sherman got the experience of 62 and developed into great commanders in 63-64. Lincoln I think went through this maturing process as well his military decisions in 62 weren't very good and got better in 63-64. McClellan by contrast simply didn't last that long but seems to be held to later standards.

Can you met me half way on this?

Yes I can, as I have seen this argument from a number of historians. From a purely military perspective, McClellan was competent enough. His problem was outside of that however, and like Macarthur 90 years later a fatal flaw.

 

[Johnrankins]

I'll leave the political aspects aside, i'll let others debate that controversy. From a military standpoint though I can't view McClellan anything less then one of the most competent commanders on the Union side. The best generals of the war on Union side were Grant, Sherman no doubt but they had time to develop. This is what I think Grant meant in the qoute I posted earlier McClellan should not be held to 1864 standards but to 1862 standards. If McClellan had the same amount of time as them to develop he would have probably come out about even. If you look at Grant-Sherman in 1862 they were worse then McClellan, especially in battlefield feats. If Grant was in command during the Peninsula Campaign or at Antietam I either see him preforming the same or worse to McClellan. Grant had the same issues as McClellan in 62, overestimating enemy forces, rusty on the battlefield and not pursuing enemy vigorously. Grant-Sherman got the experience of 62 and developed into great commanders in 63-64. Lincoln I think went through this maturing process as well his military decisions in 62 weren't very good and got better in 63-64. McClellan by contrast simply didn't last that long but seems to be held to later standards.

Can you met me half way on this?

Nope, Grant won the Battles of Fort Henry and Fort Donnellson capturing both. He won the Battle of Shiloh , driving the CSA Army off the field. He won the Siege of Corinth taking the town. These battles were all before the Seven Days not talking Antietam. In none of these battles did Grant treat victories as defeats , he kept on going. McClellan wins six out of the Seven Days battles and treats them as defeats by retreating instead of just keep going on. He fails to "pull the trigger" time and time again at critical moments. Grant keeps advancing while Mac retreats time and time again.

 

[daveg1967]

I'll leave the political aspects aside, i'll let others debate that controversy. From a military standpoint though I can't view McClellan anything less then one of the most competent commanders on the Union side. The best generals of the war on Union side were Grant, Sherman no doubt but they had time to develop. This is what I think Grant meant in the qoute I posted earlier McClellan should not be held to 1864 standards but to 1862 standards. If McClellan had the same amount of time as them to develop he would have probably come out about even. If you look at Grant-Sherman in 1862 they were worse then McClellan, especially in battlefield feats. If Grant was in command during the Peninsula Campaign or at Antietam I either see him preforming the same or worse to McClellan. Grant had the same issues as McClellan in 62, overestimating enemy forces, rusty on the battlefield and not pursuing enemy vigorously. Grant-Sherman got the experience of 62 and developed into great commanders in 63-64. Lincoln I think went through this maturing process as well his military decisions in 62 weren't very good and got better in 63-64. McClellan by contrast simply didn't last that long but seems to be held to later standards.

Can you met me half way on this?

I think you are partially right. Grant speaks well of McClellan in his autobiography. He posits that Mac's problems stemmed from going from Reserve officer to General in Chief with no steps in between. Grant had the advantage of commanding a regiment, brigade, and division before getting an army.
Grant's learning curve was better the McLellan. His fundamental character was better suited to command as well. Look at 1862. Grant captured Forts Henry and Donelson in Feb, 1862 and fights Shiloh in April.
Let's compare Shiloh, April with the Seven Days June 25 - July 1. Grant takes a beating on the first day of Shiloh and after barely keeping the army together has the famous response "We'll lick em tomorrow."
Joe Johnston and R. E. Lee attack the Army of the Potomac. The battles are tough but the AOTP more then holds it's own. Mac's reaction is to abandon his campaign and retreat.
McLellan was skilled. His handling of the army during the Antietam campaign was excellent. Temperamentally, he wasn't a fighter. He wasn't going to win the war which meant he would eventually lose the war.

 

[Johnrankins]

I think you are partially right. Grant speaks well of McClellan in his autobiography. He posits that Mac's problems stemmed from going from Reserve officer to General in Chief with no steps in between. Grant had the advantage of commanding a regiment, brigade, and division before getting an army.
Grant's learning curve was better the McLellan. His fundamental character was better suited to command as well. Look at 1862. Grant captured Forts Henry and Donelson in Feb, 1862 and fights Shiloh in April.
Let's compare Shiloh, April with the Seven Days June 25 - July 1. Grant takes a beating on the first day of Shiloh and after barely keeping the army together has the famous response "We'll lick em tomorrow."
Joe Johnston and R. E. Lee attack the Army of the Potomac. The battles are tough but the AOTP more then holds it's own. Mac's reaction is to abandon his campaign and retreat.
McLellan was skilled. His handling of the army during the Antietam campaign was excellent. Temperamentally, he wasn't a fighter. He wasn't going to win the war which meant he would eventually lose the war.

Yep, his main problem is he lacked the "killer instinct" needed in a general. He didn't have the temperament to lead an army to total victory.,

 

[hasdrubal barca]

I think you are partially right. Grant speaks well of McClellan in his autobiography. He posits that Mac's problems stemmed from going from Reserve officer to General in Chief with no steps in between. Grant had the advantage of commanding a regiment, brigade, and division before getting an army.
Grant's learning curve was better the McLellan. His fundamental character was better suited to command as well. Look at 1862. Grant captured Forts Henry and Donelson in Feb, 1862 and fights Shiloh in April.
Let's compare Shiloh, April with the Seven Days June 25 - July 1. Grant takes a beating on the first day of Shiloh and after barely keeping the army together has the famous response "We'll lick em tomorrow."
Joe Johnston and R. E. Lee attack the Army of the Potomac. The battles are tough but the AOTP more then holds it's own. Mac's reaction is to abandon his campaign and retreat.
McLellan was skilled. His handling of the army during the Antietam campaign was excellent. Temperamentally, he wasn't a fighter. He wasn't going to win the war which meant he would eventually lose the war.

Nope, Grant won the Battles of Fort Henry and Fort Donnellson capturing both. He won the Battle of Shiloh , driving the CSA Army off the field. He won the Siege of Corinth taking the town. These battles were all before the Seven Days not talking Antietam. In none of these battles did Grant treat victories as defeats , he kept on going. McClellan wins six out of the Seven Days battles and treats them as defeats by retreating instead of just keep going on. He fails to "pull the trigger" time and time again at critical moments. Grant keeps advancing while Mac retreats time and time again.

Yep, his main problem is he lacked the "killer instinct" needed in a general. He didn't have the temperament to lead an army to total victory.,

I agree with you mostly but I'll add it seems to be a common perception that McClellan gave up the Peninsula campaign. This is not true he never gave up and wanted the campaign to continue to the bitter end he made that clear. He would have stayed south of Richmond forever if necessary. McClellan wanted to take Richmond in 62 and win the war. McClellan would have taken the city in my opinion had he been reinforced its just a question of math. Lincoln instead opted to pull him out and give Pope a chance. That was his decision as CinC but I don't think a good one. It really should have been like 1864 with McClellan being Butler's army and Pope playing Meade's role.

Not to hit on Grant who I have alot of respect for but Henry-Donelson seems to have been largely due to gunboats, Shiloh he was saved to an extent by Buell's reinforcements and A.S. Johnston death and he also got roughly handled at Belmont, Iuka and Corinth were to an extent incomplete victories might be more Rosecrans then Grant, they argue about that matter. Not a perfect general but yes a good one. McClellan as well had plenty of good moments and some bad ones.

EDIT: I would say in 1862, McClellan is superior in tactics and strategy while Grant has edge in operational art.

 

[James XI]

That's not how the US military works. If a military officer is in a position that required a political policy, they are to request instructions on how to proceed. That's why commanders are given political briefs so that they can align THEIR actions to official policy. It doesn't work the other way around, where a general makes the policy then the government conforms to it.

And yet McArthur's entire career happened.

 

[galveston bay]

And yet McArthur's entire career happened.

Playing that game got him sent to the PI to begin with, eliminated any chance of him getting the ultimate prize of supreme command in Europe, and ultimately got him fired. He was competent enough to produce victories when it mattered the most for him personally (Buna) and his prestige managed to make the Liberation of the Philippines happen. But his refusal to accept the direction of the President got him fired in the end. Deservedly so too. Only his prewar prestige and the need for American heroes kept him from being sacked after Bataan. The wisdom of not sacking him after Bataan as been debated fiercely in print for decades.