And he deserved to be sacked a good 20 years before he actually was. That's not because the system was different, he was just politically invincible for some reason.
WI: McClellan given another month?
- Thread starter Saphroneth
- Start date
And he deserved to be sacked a good 20 years before he actually was. That's not because the system was different, he was just politically invincible for some reason.
Kinda OT, but how do people hear react to my opinion that Sherman was head and shoulders above all other Union commanders, probably the best on either side? The usual response for the first part is to concede that he was the greatest strategist/tactician the Union had, but not emotionally stable enough to be put in overall charge...a position which Sherman himself might have taken.
Obviously the second part leads to discussions about Lee, etc.
Obviously the second part leads to discussions about Lee, etc.
I have no problem with that, although by 1865 Sherman could have stepped into Grant's shoes if something happened to Grant.
Hmm Sherman was very good. I think he had an edge in strategy/planning over most of the other generals. I'm not sure he was that good with tactics, see Kennesaw Mountain, when compared with say Thomas or Lee. I've also heard the criticism though that he gave let the AoT off too many times and could have cut it off an destroyed it much earlier such as at Snake Creek Gap. Though I think alot of this with hindsight and from armchair generals which Is why I defend McClellan on the same account.
I would be fine giving him the nod myself.
McClellan may have wanted to take Richmond but given the chance he failed to do so. The Key to taking Richmond was the Richmond and York River railroad. The AOTP was advancing on that road when the 7 days happened. Lee expected McClellan to fall back on that road when attacked because that preserves his campaign. McLellan abandoned his campaign objective and retreated to the James River when attacked. His army won most of the fights but Mac retreated. McLellan was beaten. His army wasn't. If at any time Mac had ordered a counter attack, had he shown any fight at all, I believe that Lincoln would have supported him. He would have won the war then and there.
Lincoln saw that Mac was beaten and reinforcing him would mean sending good money after bad. Reinforcements would mean more troops sitting in Harrison's landing.
Grant wasn't perfect but he fought. He wasn't afraid to take existential risks. That ability with basic competence make a successful general.
The Philippines would have happened anyways IMO, just under a different commander. It was the most important US possession in Asia outside Hawaii . For prestige reasons alone it pretty much had to be liberated by US troops.
I think Sherman's best ability is he kept his eye on the ball. He knew what the goal was and achieved the goal. Lee was probably better at running a battle. Lee was not good at executing a campaign. He got the bit in his teeth and would win the fight at the expense of larger term goals.
I concur, though the move to Harrison's landing did save the army AoP according to Lee. The AoP was somewhat exposed and Lee was concentrating against weaker points in Seven Days. I see no problem with pulling back to supply base, digging in on high ground, concentrating his men and preparing for the next lurch towards Richmond. Though I guess its debatable if he could have bashed his way in at that stage, according to Cozzens if he had McDowell's Corps he would have been more comfortable and in a better position.
With hindsight though very stupid move, McClellan kept Lee pinned guarding Richmond. I just read an article by Sears on Pope and he was panicked when he hear McClellan was being pull out. It freed Lee up to come smash him....
I agree with this but I don't agree that McClellan didn't take risks. The entire Urbana Plan-Peninsula Campaign concept is super risky. He also divided his army often which its what a safe commander does.
I agree certainly (I did write a timeline to that effect after all) but the cost of American and Filipino lives can be directly laid at his feet, and there was an immense amount of anger about the USAFFE being caught on the ground back in the United States.
Yeah, he'd straightened out a bit by then, though you can understand the reservations some had at the time. He and Grant formed a formidable partnership, a la Ludendorff/Hindenburg etc. I have this half-baked theory about how those kinds of odd couple parternships, ie the brilliant but mercurial guy and the less gifted but iron-willed guy that seems to crop up so much in military history. Maybe quarter-baked, as I can't even really articulate the theory itself...maybe eventually. Anyways, it's interesting which of the two ultimately becomes the top dog and how that works.
SsgtC
Banned
Ugh. Don't remind me. How he never got court martialed is beyond me. It an officer today pulled even a QUARTER of the crap he pulled, he'd be cashiered, tossed into Leavenworth and the key conviently thrown away
Yeah, I'm a bit on board when it comes to the Little Guy. My position is that he suffers greatly from having a well documented tempestuous relationship (which honestly got a bit weird at times) with a guy who shortly thereafter became a martyr and was eventually replaced by a guy who eventually won. I mean, he does come off pretty insufferable in his own correspondences, I'll admit, but that shouldn't really be significant. Anyways, my point on him is that even if you accept the criticisms of him re: wasted opportunities, I think a balanced view that also look at what might have happened in the war if he hadn't been there to develop the army itself gives one pause. People tend to look at what he formed as a given and then think what might have happened if better commanders were wielding it at a given moment without sufficiently acknowledging that the weapon itself probably wouldn't be nearly what it was without him. That's kinda wordy, I know.
And then I also agree with you that even aside from that he's better than he gets credit for. So much of these things come down to consequentialism...Montgomery is a commander I see as comparable (a better version, but still) and because he won the same qualities for which McClellan is castigated are viewed as long-sighted wisdom.
I think it comes from what makes a successful general. Will, confidence, and nerve are more important than brilliance. If you have all of them, it's Alexander the Great but that's rare. A truly good commander is able to support and encourage talented subordinates. This works in politics as well. George Washington was not a particularly talented general but he had the confidence and will to succeed. He was also able to manage a cabinet that included Jefferson and Hamilton.
That's an interesting view. I personally rate his emphasis on movement and his reluctance to commit to frontal attacks on fixed positions as what separates him, but you've got me thinking. It's weird, I generally think about his personality as the thing you have to compensate for with his brilliance, but you raise it in another way and now I'm reconsidering. Nice point.
James,
The Army of the Potomac very much reflected its creator. A slow, cautious general, created a slow cautious army. No corps commander was ever relieved for being late until 1865. That slowness cost it throughout the war.
Since you've brought the matter up.......IMO, Sherman was a mediocre commander in all aspects, elevated to public prominence by his friendship with Grant and lucky to have commanders and subordinates to win battles for him.
While he sat and feared in 1861-2 that Union forces in Kentucky needed umpteen-thousand more troops than it had for merely defensive purposes, Thomas went forth in the east and, outnumbered, won at Mill Springs; then a couple weeks later Grant got his Forts Henry-Donelson victories (or rather, the gunboats won the first, and Pillow lost the second, but that's another matter).
His was one of the lead divisions at Shiloh, and a couple of individual brigade/regiment commanders to the contrary, Sherman personally was totally blindsided by the Confederate attack (as was Grant), however much he protested afterwards. In the fighting on the first day his men fought hard, but the division was by the end of the day utterly routed, and played virtually no part in the counterattack the following day.
He ordered a frontal attack at Chickasaw Bayou in the closing days of 1862 - for the futility of assaulting well-entrenched positions, this effort rivals Marye's Heights, Pickett's Charge, and the other famous attacks.
To be fair, he performed well during the Vicksburg campaign, but be careful not to give him too much credit for what was really Grant's operation (his finest).
At Tunnel Hill at Chattanooga Sherman failed to perform basic reconnaissance and didn't recognize on the 24th that there was 1 Confederate brigade holding the hill - outnumbering them about 10:1, he sat and waited until the 25th. By that point Cleburne's division was in place, but this still numbered only 5,000 men. Sherman had 30,000 in what would eventually number 5 divisions - he never sent forth more than 2 brigades at a time and rarely that much, had half of his men unengaged entirely, and failed to adequately keep Grant apprised of the situation. When the Army of the Cumberland made their amazing assault on Missionary Ridge and, by getting beyond their flank, forced Cleburne to retire, Sherman had played exactly 0 part in the success. Grant deserves much blame for trying to give any credit (let alone most of it, as he in fact tried) to Sherman.
As commander of the North Georgia campaign Sherman let Thomas' staff handle most of the logistics (quite understandable, as his army amounted to 2/3rds of Sherman's forces), but did not listen to Thomas at all. As a result McPherson, rather than Thomas, led the march to Snake Creek Gap, and failed to carry the position, thus failing to surround Johnston's army and end the campaign within a week, as Thomas had proposed months earlier.
Later on, of course, was the failed assault at Kennesaw Mountain. Sherman was not at all unique in having 1 disastrous frontal attack to his credit, but he is in less distinguished company for having more than 1.
Sherman admitted that, once Hood was placed in command, he would come out and quickly attack the Union armies. Having said this, he failed to predict which army Hood would strike at (which, to be fair, may be asking too much) - but operational command on the battlefields at Peachtree Creek and 2nd Atlanta fell entirely to Thomas and McPherson/Logan, respectively, with no input from Sherman.
The March to the Sea was impressive. Full stop. But it was no more than that. It was not original. Living off the land was started by Grant in falling back from Holly Springs in late 1862, and employed on a grand scale during the Vicksburg campaign. Looting and burning the homes along the march route was perfected by Hunter and Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley. Sherman's march was on a grander scale but had no original element to it. What's more, given that he faced virtually no opposition (5,000 second-tier cavalry and the home guard, at most) it was not an impressive military accomplishment - that is, any half-competent Union commander could have done the same thing. That Sherman was the commander on the ground, and so had the opportunity, can be blamed entirely on Grant favoring him over Thomas and others.
And the final nail in the coffin for Sherman being rated anything above 'mediocre' - When Sherman finally did face some (*some*) opposition, in his second march through the Carolinas, he messed that up royally. At Bentonville Johnston had 15,000 men, at most, badly armed, badly supplied, low on food, clothes, morale, including convalescents, garrison troops, and the home guard, while Sherman had 60,000 men who had been vetted twice (at Atlanta and then again at Savannah) so only the most veteran, healthiest, well-trained were left, with good supplies and sky-high morale. Sherman got over-confident and let his columns spread out, so Johnston could fall on one corps within one wing of Sherman's army for almost numerical parity. He routed 3 brigades and rocked that corps back on its heels, and almost enjoyed a fuller victory except for mismanaging where his reserve was assigned to. After this surprise, Sherman massed his troops so that 2 days later he could face Johnston with his entire force. Outnumbering the Confederates 4:1, not only did Sherman *not* crush Johnston, he utterly failed to break his line in any meaningful way (the only piercing of the line came from a Union brigade commander impetuously attacking without orders), resulting in a drawn battle and Johnston retiring in good order with his men and supplies (such as they were).
Give me Grant and Thomas any day of the week over Sherman. Heck, give me Meade and Rosecrans any day over Sherman. Maybe even Hooker and Sheridan on some days.
Think about Gettysburg. Lee was determined to win that fight, no matter the cost. He dropped the ball to try and win a fight.
You can talk about 'killer instinct' or 'pulling the trigger' all you want, but it's beating the air with vain sounds if you're leaving out the relevant facts. When people use these terms to describe the Seven Days, they've stepped wholly out of the reality of the situation and into the flat earth with no air of introductory physics courses. Mechanicsville was a tactical victory against AP Hill's command, sure, but if the posters here were in command and counterattacked, you'd be throwing one corps -the one responsible for securing the line of supply the president ordered- into the teeth of the main force of the Confederate army. Throughout the Seven Days, McClellan was facing attacks along multiple axes, and overcommitting to a counterattack in one direction would leave him vulnerable in another, and until his position was consolidated around Harrison's Landing, a powerful flank attack while one wing of the army is overextended could spell its doom. The 'missed opportunities' for counterattacks people berate McClellan for passing up during the Seven Days are mostly illusory. If you can provide a good plan for a general counterattack against superior numbers with no supply line for one of these specific battles, I'm all ears, but until then, hang up the slogans.
Once Lee had massed superior force against McClellan's supply line on the north bank, the only thing to do was to establish a new one; responsibility for the weakness of the force north of the Chickahomminy rests on everyone's favorite 'strategic genius', Abraham Lincoln and his political administration attempting to micromanage operations in the Virginia theatre. The French army had a famous saying -'Order, counterorder, disorder,' and that really encapsulates the results of amateur politicians trying to be operators, pushing and pulling McDowell's corps this way and that, to no result.
Once Lee had massed superior force against McClellan's supply line on the north bank, the only thing to do was to establish a new one; responsibility for the weakness of the force north of the Chickahomminy rests on everyone's favorite 'strategic genius', Abraham Lincoln and his political administration attempting to micromanage operations in the Virginia theatre. The French army had a famous saying -'Order, counterorder, disorder,' and that really encapsulates the results of amateur politicians trying to be operators, pushing and pulling McDowell's corps this way and that, to no result.
McClellan studied Saxe, Frederick the Great and Napoleon I'm not sure about Alexander. The thing about Alexander though is I think A.S. Johnston was the Alexander of American Civil War and that didn't seem to work. You charge into battle, get yourself killed or lose control over the battle. I like commanders who sit back and plan everything brilliantly like Manstein but that's my preference.
I agree but it was built this way for a reason. The huge siege train was needed to take fortified positions like Yorktown and Petersburg. McClellan wanted to attack Petersburg but Halleck prevented him, Grant did and what do you know Richmond fell. You are correct though for maneuver battles it could have been better but thats not what McClellan intended to solely fight.
He helped make Hancock and Meade's careers that seems pretty good to me.
EDIT: Best plans would be A) send McDowell's Corps early to speed up operations and give McClellan the manpower needed. B) Allow McClellan to attack Petersburg from his base at Harrison Landing and have Pope either send reinforcements or conduct his own offensive towards Richmond. Either would have probably won the war.
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Many years ago one of the various tabletop wargaming magazines did a pretty interesting study comparing McClellan and the Army of the Potomac with Montgomery and the 8th (and 2nd) Army. I don't seem to have that one anymore but I remember it striking me as a very fair comparison.
Both were very dangerous to the enemy on the defense or when they had plenty of time to prepare their battles. But neither are the ideal commander (or army) for exploitation or pursuit. (the premise of the article). That seems a fair assessment to me but curious if any one else sees that comparison as fair.