WI: McClellan given another month?

[Saphroneth]

1) Sears does not claim that there was any forgery in the fair copy given to Lincoln. Sears does show that the primary copy and its carbon showed 12M. Sears also shows that the copy made of it that was sent to Lincoln says 12Midnight, with Sears believing the added letters were in a different hand. You claim that 12M does not mean 12 Meridan (noon), offering no evidence for your claim. Even if you are correct, that would prove that Sears was mistaken, not "making things up to fit his narrative".

What, that the copy sent to Lincoln had added letters in a different hand? He said:

Third, 12 M is standard Civil War telegraphese for 12 meridian, or noon. Midnight would be rendered 12, or 12 p.m. No telegrapher would ever time-mark a telegram 12 midnight.

But there was no standard system as he describes, and he had the other copy which showed "12 midnight". If he was mistaken after that, it's wilfully done.
Sears:

That evening the general would dine at Commander Rodgers's table aboard the Galena where, the Comte de Paris noted appreciatively, the linen was white and there was "a good dinner with some good wine."

Paris:

"Lorsqu'on à mène pendant quelques jours une vie aussi rude, l'on se sent tout dépaysé en arrivant sur un navire ou tout est propre, ou les officers ont ligne blanc et ou l'on trouve subitement un bon dîner et du bon vin."

Google translate, which I admit is flawed but I don't have a French speaker on hand:

"When you lead a life like this for a few days, you feel totally lost when you arrive on a ship or everything is clean, or the officers have white lines and you suddenly find a good dinner and good wine."

The quote is from Secretary of War Stanton, who started as a McClellan ally - "If he had a million men, he would swear the enemy had two million, and then he would sit down in the mud and yell for three."

Do you have a specific page, out of interest? That's a book with no ebook so we can't confirm.

If McClellan thought it was possible to go to full offensive operations after three months, then why did it take him from July 1861 to March 1862 to begin offensive operations?

Because the attempt resulted in Balls Bluff, which showed (after the fact) that it was not in fact possible for the army at the time.

And speaking of the Comte de Paris, who was a member of McClellan's staff, he said that Magruder had "eleven thousand men" and that "on the arrival of McClellan before Yorktown with his fifty-eight thousand men, not a single soldier had as yet been sent to reinforce Magruder" and that "A vigorous attack upon either of the dams, defended by insignificant works, would have had every chance of success". "When, therefore, after eleven days of reconnaissances and preparatory labors, McClellan determined at last to attack him, his [Magruder's] forces were doubled, and his line of defence completed. The numerical disproportion between the two parties, however, was nearly as great as before; for the one hundred thousand men embarked at Alexandria were at last assembled on the narrow extremity."

If nothing else they didn't even know about one of the dams when they arrived, but McClellan actually ordered an immediate attack as soon as they reached the line - "if only with the bayonet". It didn't work, but not because McClellan was anything other than emphatic about the need to attack promptly - his big mistake here was probably not being with the western column, which settled down to counter-battery and lost. (He was with the eastern one, and Yorktown was too strongly defended to take at a rush.) If he'd been with the western one he might have been able to keep them moving, but it's hardly a vast error.

But Paris was simply wrong on the concentration of force, too.
To get 100,000 troops PFD for McClellan's force you have to add Franklin, who didn't arrive until late April. Meanwhile Magruder had over 50,000 effectives by the 16th of April (note effectives - converting from effective to PFD you roughly add another 20%) and certainly had many more than 22,000.


As for the attack on the 16th you mention, that was made before the plan called for it - it was a lower level commander pushing troops forward without orders, with McClellan planning for a fully supported assault once there were troops in place to offer immediate support. Instead the chance was lost because the enemy was alerted, and by that point there were tens of thousands of troops in the Yorktown line so it was easy to defend.


I'm sorry I've not been very active on this thread - suffice to say it's bloody exhausting doing the McClellan-go-round because it seems like people are content to repeat things I've already addressed...

 

[galveston bay]

But Paris was simply wrong on the concentration of force, too.
To get 100,000 troops PFD for McClellan's force you have to add Franklin, who didn't arrive until late April. Meanwhile Magruder had over 50,000 effectives by the 16th of April (note effectives - converting from effective to PFD you roughly add another 20%) and certainly had many more than 22,000.


As for the attack on the 16th you mention, that was made before the plan called for it - it was a lower level commander pushing troops forward without orders, with McClellan planning for a fully supported assault once there were troops in place to offer immediate support. Instead the chance was lost because the enemy was alerted, and by that point there were tens of thousands of troops in the Yorktown line so it was easy to defend.


I'm sorry I've not been very active on this thread - suffice to say it's bloody exhausting doing the McClellan-go-round because it seems like people are content to repeat things I've already addressed...

General Macgruder has a command so small that it was incorporated into the Army of Northern Virginia as a division command. It is unlikely that he ever had authority over the numbers you are quoting. Now Johnson and Lee had the rank and position, but not Macgruder.

The quote by General JE Johnson on how he regarded the position is instructive and in this thread.

Fiver refuted your assertions regarding Sears already, as well as providing numerous other sources.

Addressing a point does not mean you have won the point should probably be added

 

[Fiver]

As for "skimpy garrison", it was already 15,000 in early March and was 20,000 by the 1st of April (both in Effectives). That's hardly skimpy, especially as it included over 2,000 artillerymen (enough for 100 or more guns) right at the start.

"I cannot bring into the field more than 6,000 men to meet some 30,000, leaving insufficient garrisons in the works, and have not more than 10,000 in all for duty in the Peninsula and at Gloucester Point. " - J Bankhead Magruder, Yorktown, March 24, 1862

""It is the unanimous opinion of twenty of the principle officers of my command, assembled together this evening for a council of war, that in view of the known forces of the enemy the best positions which can be assumed by this army are untenable without heavy re-enforcements - at least 10,000 immediately, and 10,000 more as soon as they can possible be sent." - J Bankhead Magruder, Yorktown, March 25, 1862

"But from the accounts received nothing less than 20,000 or 30,00 men will be sufficient, with the troops already in position, successfully to oppose them." - RE Lee, March 25, 1862

"I have made my arrangements to fight with my small force, but without the slightest hope of success." - J Bankhead Magruder, Yorktown, April 5, 1862

"I have thus about 23,000 men on a a line 14 miles long to meet an enemy estimated between 100,000 and 200,000." - J Bankhead Magruder, Yorktown, April 11, 1862

"I find this place totally unprepared for a siege. There are only 65 rounds per gun for each of the heavy guns, and there ought to be at least ten more heavy guns on the land side." - DH Hill, Yorktown, April 13, 1862

"But with our present inadequate supply of troops we have no men to spare for outside operations." - DH Hill, Yorktown, April 13, 1862

"I am in great want of guns, and desire that you will have them sent to me at once. I am very scarce of ammunition for the rifle 32-pounder, our main dependence." - J Bankhead Magruder, Yorktown, April 14, 1862

"The army is diminishing most fearfully by sickness from fatigue, exposure and stampedes." - DH Hill, Yorktown, April 15, 1862

"We are no match for the Yankees at an artillery play with our wretched ordinance, poor in quality and feeble in quantity."- DH Hill, Yorktown, April 15, 1862

 

[Fiver]

You see this in instances like people quoting from novels or fabrications as if they were real. The "if McClellan had a million men" quote is not actually a real ACW-era saying, it's from a novel written in the 1920s, but it gets repeated without checking.

"If he had a million men, he would swear the enemy had two million, and then he would sit down in the mud and yell for three." appears in a 1906 biography of Lincoln, so it cannot have started from a novel in the 1920s.

 

[Fiver]

To repeat a question I asked someone else earlier, would the cavalry in general during this war have done better if used to harry retreating enemies more than they were? Armies did seem to get away unmolested rather often.

I believe the failure of Bragg to do this after the Battle of Chickamauga led to NB Forrest adding Bragg to his hate list. There are a lot of battles where this would have been possible, but pursuits also got stopped by competent rear guard actions and/or weather. Then there's McClellan's inexplicable decision to put his cavalry in the center at Antietam, which made them useless for pursuit, scouting, or covering the flanks.

 

[hasdrubal barca]

I believe the failure of Bragg to do this after the Battle of Chickamauga led to NB Forrest adding Bragg to his hate list. There are a lot of battles where this would have been possible, but pursuits also got stopped by competent rear guard actions and/or weather. Then there's McClellan's inexplicable decision to put his cavalry in the center at Antietam, which made them useless for pursuit, scouting, or covering the flanks.

I thought the cavalry was needed their to secure the Middle-Upper bridges and screen the forces coming across? I know the cavalry engaged in some fighting on the 16th to keep the Confederates away from the bridges. I agree with you cavalry should have been used to more effect in the campaign but I'm not sure they could have done much more on 17th. They had to race to the field, secure those bridges beat off the Confederates I think they were tired.

In regard to Forrest, If I'm not mistaken he basically threatened Bragg's life. A scary fellow...

 

[Saphroneth]

I thought the cavalry was needed their to secure the Middle-Upper bridges and screen the forces coming across? I know the cavalry engaged in some fighting on the 16th to keep the Confederates away from the bridges. I agree with you cavalry should have been used to more effect in the campaign but I'm not sure they could have done much more on 17th. They had to race to the field, secure those bridges beat off the Confederates I think they were tired.

At Antietam there were about ten regiments of Federal cavalry on the field, and they were pretty low in numbers. The force in the middle was about 1,500 effectives (8th Ill, 1st Mass, 3rd Ind - total about 700; 4th and 6th Penn and 5th US - total about 800) and there were about 900 effectives on the right flank as a screen (3rd Penn, 8th NY and a detachment of the 15th Penn) and one regiment on the left (6th NY) with about 250 men.


The problem with concentrating effective cavalry at Antietam is twofold. Firstly, a lot of them have been heavily worked during the pre-battle phase (McClellan's army having just marched quickly westwards and the cavalry having been worked heavily supporting it) and secondly a fair amount of the (not very numerous) cavalry McClellan has under his command is busy elsewhere. There was a brigade doing a recon towards Gettysburg, who got back on the 18th, and one regiment each were in the Pleasant valley and guarding the POWs.

 

[Fiver]

But there was no standard system as he describes, and he had the other copy which showed "12 midnight". If he was mistaken after that, it's wilfully done.

You have claimed that there was no standard system of transcription, but you have provided no evidence to back your claim. The earliest copy of the message and its carbon say 12M, not 12 midnight, so you have provided no evidence that Sears was "making things up to fit his narrative".

Sears: That evening the general would dine at Commander Rodgers's table aboard the Galena where, the Comte de Paris noted appreciatively, the linen was white and there was "a good dinner with some good wine."

Paris: "Lorsqu'on à mène pendant quelques jours une vie aussi rude, l'on se sent tout dépaysé en arrivant sur un navire ou tout est propre, ou les officers ont ligne blanc et ou l'on trouve subitement un bon dîner et du bon vin."

Google translate, which I admit is flawed but I don't have a French speaker on hand: "When you lead a life like this for a few days, you feel totally lost when you arrive on a ship or everything is clean, or the officers have white lines and you suddenly find a good dinner and good wine."

If your unsourced quote in French is correct, it shows that Sears provided an accurate translation, not that Sears was "making things up to fit his narrative". What is your source?

Do you have a specific page, out of interest? That's a book with no ebook so we can't confirm.

Is there something wrong with your computer? Follow the link I gave:

The quote is from Secretary of War Stanton, who started as a McClellan ally - "If he had a million men, he would swear the enemy had two million, and then he would sit down in the mud and yell for three."

It takes you to Google Books - the work is Lincoln, Master of Men: A Study in Character by Alonzo Rothchild, page 275 and GBooks gives a link to a free ebook of the title.

Because the attempt resulted in Balls Bluff, which showed (after the fact) that it was not in fact possible for the army at the time.

Are you saying the only possible point that the Union could attack in October of 1861 was Balls Bluff? The same month that Union forces won at Bolivar Heights, Camp Wildcat, Frederickstown, the First Battle of Springfield, and in the Big Sandy Expedition?

But Paris was simply wrong on the concentration of force, too.
To get 100,000 troops PFD for McClellan's force you have to add Franklin, who didn't arrive until late April. Meanwhile Magruder had over 50,000 effectives by the 16th of April (note effectives - converting from effective to PFD you roughly add another 20%) and certainly had many more than 22,000.

The Comte de Paris was part of McClellan's staff so I'll take his estimated 100,000 troops for McClellan over your unsourced claim that McClellan did not have that many. You also provide no source that shows Magruder had "over 50,000 effectives by the 16th of April", while I have already shown that both the Comte de Paris and Confederate General Magruder said the Confederates at Yorktown only had about 22,000 men.

As for the attack on the 16th you mention, that was made before the plan called for it - it was a lower level commander pushing troops forward without orders, with McClellan planning for a fully supported assault once there were troops in place to offer immediate support. Instead the chance was lost because the enemy was alerted, and by that point there were tens of thousands of troops in the Yorktown line so it was easy to defend.

The Comte de Paris, disagrees with you again. "But instead of making the assault immediately after, the cannonade was prolonged for six hours, and thus Magruder was given ample time to prepare for defence wherever he might be menaced."

I'm sorry I've not been very active on this thread - suffice to say it's bloody exhausting doing the McClellan-go-round because it seems like people are content to repeat things I've already addressed...

So far you have made a lot of claims, but unless you provide credible sources that support those claims, you have not addressed anything.

 

[hasdrubal barca]

I love how this debate is so advanced were now qouting in french.

 

[hasdrubal barca]

Y
Are you saying the only possible point that the Union could attack in October of 1861 was Balls Bluff? The same month that Union forces won at Bolivar Heights, Camp Wildcat, Frederickstown, the First Battle of Springfield, and in the Big Sandy Expedition?
.

I think Ball's Bluff had that scandal factor that went with it which paralyzed the upper echelons.

 

[Saphroneth]

Anyway, dragging it back to the original topic of the thread... when I look at the situation map as of McClellan's relief (along with the marches for the next two days, which were under the orders he'd laid out) I find it hard to see why he was relieved then (because, you know, it's a good position to be in).


Looking at Lee's orders for the period, which were to send the stores back to Gordonsville as a preparatory move (the order being on the 8th), I think the evidence suggests Lee was planning to have Longstreet either stand and fight or fall back to the west (to try and stay near Jackson's wing), because he didn't know Longstreet was the force in danger. Now, since McClellan's march orders were followed up until the 9th, it's the 10th that any further movement would take place.

McClellan in his memoirs said his plan was to throw a wing between Longstreet and Jackson and attack Longstreet at Culpeper. If we assume Lee withdraws promptly then that would close on air, but it would also mean the line of the Rappahanock had been abandoned. (It'd also have to be done pretty quickly, as OTL Lee only realized McClellan's army had stopped on the 10th and he hadn't started withdrawing yet. There's every possibility that McClellan's attack would manage to catch the rearguard, but we'll assume not)

We'll assume the attack against Culpeper took 2 days to organize, so it's now the afternoon of the 12th and McClellan has Culpeper, with Longstreet's corps on the way to Gordonsville and Jackson still five to six days from a rail line (he didn't march OTL so he'd have had to start on the 10th).


At this point McClellan has a choice - either (1) follow Longstreet to Gordonsville and try to destroy them, (2) shift right to Fredericksburg and cross the undefended river there, or (3) have one wing do each. Lee also has a choice, and it's whether to have Longstreet's wing (A) race for Richmond by rail, or (B) hold where he is (i.e. along the western line of approach) to reunite with Jackson, or (C) do the middle ground and move to Hanover Junction as the first place he gets in the way of the eastern approach.


So let's look at all nine possibilities.



1A
McClellan marches to Gordonsville, getting there in force about the 16th at about eight miles a day for a methodical advance. Over the course of this time, Longstreet has reached Gordonsville and is on the way to Richmond with the trains picking his men up a bit at a time.
McClellan has managed to get between Jackson and Richmond, and can advance the short extra distance to Charlottsville to cut Jackson off completely by rail. Longstreet probably reaches Richmond first, but McClellan can then leave a corps controlling the junctions and move down on Richmond using the rail lines (and with Jackson unable to come and defend Richmond without marching all the way to Lynchburg).

1B
McClellan marches to Gordonsville, and there's a battle on the 16th. McClellan has superior force present, and if Longstreet holds for a fight he's going to get a beating. The best case scenario for Lee here is that Jackson arrives in time to help out (though his troops will be pretty tired and will be arriving one train at a time, so no massive flank attack) and that Gordonsville holds, but even then the point at which the campaign stalls is further south than the Rappahanock and there's no river obstacle to make it the bloody debacle of OTL Fredericksburg.

1C
This is pretty similar to 1A. Lee has abandoned any hope of coordinating with Jackson effectively, and McClellan can advance on Longstreet from the west (if he holds in place he's toast, but if he retreats to Richmond it's 1A.)



2A
McClellan's left wing (the one he didn't advance west of Culpeper) has a march of about thirty miles to get to Fredericksburg, and from there there's a working rail line for it to use while McClellan's right wing follows. This essentially makes it a race, and if Longstreet gets his whole corps through Hanover Junction before the lead elements of McClellan's force block it (i.e. the best case scenario for Longstreet under this option) and Jackson gets his whole corps through as well (ditto for Jackson) then McClellan has the Confederates pinned before Richmond - and this time he does have superior numbers, along with a rail line that leads directly to Richmond to use for supply.
If Longstreet makes it through Hanover Junction but Jackson doesn't, then McClellan can guard his flank at/around Hanover with a corps or even a wing and push ahead to Richmond. From there he can open regular approaches.
And if Longstreet's interrupted or cut off, then McClellan reaches Richmond and takes it without meaningful opposition.


2B
McClellan takes Richmond, no contest, as there's nothing in his way.


2C
If Longstreet doesn't get to Hanover Junction first then it's 2B, but if he does then McClellan's able to fight at about 3:1 odds. The best case for the Confederates here is that Jackson arrives in time to help out and they make a position too strong to attack, in which case it means the campaign stalls there about fifteen miles from Richmond and McClellan can blast his way through the defensive lines with artillery.


3A
McClellan's western (right) wing follows the (1) timeline and his eastern (left) wing follows the (2) timeline. The right wing occupies Gordonsville without trouble and blocks Jackson coming to help Longstreet, then drops off a corps to defend Gordonsville or Chancellorsville and the rest can take the rail itself to Hanover Junction (once the left wing has secured it) and so most of McClellan's army arrives before Richmond with a major numerical advantage.

3B
McClellan's left wing takes Richmond with ease.

3C
Assuming Longstreet does make it to Hanover first, McClellan's right wing blocks Jackson as (3A) and then can march to outflank Longstreet at Hanover after leaving a covering force. Longstreet either faces a field battle at 3:1 and gets destroyed, or retreats into Richmond and loses slowly instead.



Based on this combination, I think the likelihood is that McClellan would take option (3) - which has the fewest bad outcomes - and that Lee would take option (C) for the same reasons. The practical upshot of this is that the best case scenario for the Confederates is pretty much that Jackson gets lucky and overcomes the Federal corps acting as a blocking force, Longstreet gets lucky and holds out at nearly 3:1 odds, and then Jackson joins in and McClellan has to retreat northwards. From there it's anyone's guess, but it's still a better position than would be reached OTL until 1864.


Of course, I think that if (3C) was adopted then Longstreet wouldn't be able to hold very easily. He'd have about 29,000 effectives (assuming the smallpox is over and that McClellan didn't manage to snap up any rearguard at Culpeper) and McClellan would have something over 70,000 (assuming the force left at Gordonsville was a huge corps of about 25,000 nearly the size of Jackson's entire wing and that all the forces defending the line of the Potomac (12th Corps, part of 3rd Corps, 11th Corps, Morell's cavalry and the big garrison of Washington) are left untouched). That has to defend against one wing of McClellan's army on a line between the North Anna and the Little River, as well as defending the North Anna itself from the other wing.
Lee might roll the dice on it, but he might also retreat into Richmond behind the fortifications.


The practical upshot of all this, however, is simple.
Not one of these options is as bad as Fredericksburg!

 

[Fiver]

McClellan in his memoirs said his plan was to throw a wing between Longstreet and Jackson and attack Longstreet at Culpeper. If we assume Lee withdraws promptly then that would close on air, but it would also mean the line of the Rappahanock had been abandoned. (It'd also have to be done pretty quickly, as OTL Lee only realized McClellan's army had stopped on the 10th and he hadn't started withdrawing yet. There's every possibility that McClellan's attack would manage to catch the rearguard, but we'll assume not)

Lee did realize that the Army of the Potomac had stopped moving on the 10th, but that was the day that the Army of the Potomac had stopped moving, after carrying out march orders given by McClellan on the 7th.

In a report McClellan gave long before he wrote his memoirs, McClellan said that his plans were:
* Move south along the east side of the Blue Ridge Mountains.
* Seize each pass through the Blue Ridge so that the Confederates could not attack Union supply lines back to the Potomac.
* If the Confederate were found to have a significant force north of McClellan in the Shenandoah Valley, McClellan planned to enter the Valley and try to strike the Confederate rear.
* On reaching the Manassas Gap Railway, it would become the line of supply and forces blocking the Blue Ridge passes would abandon those positions and march to join the main body of the Army of the Potomac.
* Attack the Confederate forces somewhere between Culpepper Court-House and Little Washington, hoping to divide those forces and defeat them in detail or at least drive the Confederates back to Gordonsville.
* If the Orange & Alexandria Railroad could supply the Army of the Potomac, follow the Fredericksburg approach to Richmond.
* If the Orange & Alexandria Railroad was not enough to supply the Army of the Potomac, which McCellan considered likely, remove the Army to the Peninsula and advance on Richmond from there.

We'll assume the attack against Culpeper took 2 days to organize, so it's now the afternoon of the 12th and McClellan has Culpeper, with Longstreet's corps on the way to Gordonsville and Jackson still five to six days from a rail line (he didn't march OTL so he'd have had to start on the 10th).

Your ideas, like McClellan',s are based on the tacit assumption that Lee, Longstreet, Jackson, and Stuart behave exactly as you want them to. A nice turn of phrase I've recently encountered is "the enemy is not a potted plant" - "one antagonist doesn’t work its will on a lifeless mass that’s unable to strike a counterblow. Rather, warfare involves an intensely interactive “collision of two living forces”—both imbued with ingenuity and with zeal for their causes." With the Blue Ridge passes unblocked, Stuart or Jackson may decide to attack Harper's Ferry, strike the rear of the Army of the Potomac, or try to cut their supply lines. (In OTL, on November 10, Jackson ordered DH Hill to advance and destroy what he could of the Manassas Gap railroad.) Longstreet would be facing no worse odds at Culpepper than Lee faced at Antietam. It could easily result in a bloody draw where the Army of the Potomac will have to spend time recovering. And there are good odds of the Battle of Culpepper lasting two or even three days. Even if Longstreet is forced to withdraw to Gordonsville, he will not just sit there passively, he and Lee will attempt counter McClellan.

At this point McClellan has a choice - either (1) follow Longstreet to Gordonsville and try to destroy them, (2) shift right to Fredericksburg and cross the undefended river there, or (3) have one wing do each. Lee also has a choice, and it's whether to have Longstreet's wing (A) race for Richmond by rail, or (B) hold where he is (i.e. along the western line of approach) to reunite with Jackson, or (C) do the middle ground and move to Hanover Junction as the first place he gets in the way of the eastern approach.

Based on McClellan's report, his plan A was a second attempt at a Peninsula Campaign. If approved, this probably gives Lee a month or two to consolidate his forces and prepare. If disapproved, which is considerably more likely, Lee will have a couple weeks to consolidate his forces and prepare.

McClellan's plan B was to cross the river at Fredericksburg, but Lee considered it a likely possibility and was watching for such a movement. An uncontested crossing could happen if McClellan could steal a march on Lee (like Burnside did in OTL) and get his pontoons when he needs them (like Burnside did not in OTL), but it is far from certain. Fredericksburg, not Hanover Junction, is the first place Longstreet could get in the way of an eastern approach. Add in that McClellan's plan was to try for a Peninsula move first and he probably only moves to Fredericksburg after days or weeks of unsuccessful wrangling with the Lincoln administration, which gives ample time for Lee to consolidate his forces and prepare.

Your other two options are things McClellan never considered doing, so why should we?

The practical upshot of all this, however, is simple.
Not one of these options is as bad as Fredericksburg!

The only one of these options that is probable is that McClellan tries to cross at Fredericksburg, just like Burnside attempted. If everything goes well, the Army of the Potomac makes an unopposed crossing at Fredericksburg and then fights a series of battles with the Army of Northern Virginia, trying to reach Richmond. if anything goes wrong, McClellan, not Burnside, will be fighting the Battle of Fredericksburg, and probably losing just as badly.

 

[Arnold d.c]

The only one of these options that is probable is that McClellan tries to cross at Fredericksburg, just like Burnside attempted. If everything goes well, the Army of the Potomac makes an unopposed crossing at Fredericksburg and then fights a series of battles with the Army of Northern Virginia, trying to reach Richmond. if anything goes wrong, McClellan, not Burnside, will be fighting the Battle of Fredericksburg, and probably losing just as badly.

Wouldn't McClellan be relying on the War Department for the pontoon brigdes to cross at Fredericksburg? Assuming the pontoon bridges are late again, I suspect that McClellan would probably give up and end the campaign there (resulting in his relief).

 

[Saphroneth]

Wouldn't McClellan be relying on the War Department for the pontoon brigdes to cross at Fredericksburg? Assuming the pontoon bridges are late again, I suspect that McClellan would probably give up and end the campaign there (resulting in his relief).

Hm, good question. The pontoon bridges were apparently already ordered, so that might not change, but I also notice that Fredericksburg is the head of navigation so it would be possible to get ships up the Rappahanock river.
On the other hand, if McClellan does take the 3 option he still has the other half of his army pushing south and blocking Longstreet from coming in to reinforce Fredericksburg - that would result in time for the bridges to come in.
There's also apparently a couple of fords, though (US Ford and Scott's Ford, both used during the Chancellorsville campaign) so that's an option in extremis and one which was considered OTL (but Burnside rejected).

But then again, a lot of the delay in the pontoon bridges was for two reasons - firstly, nobody caught the SNAFU because everyone was mixed up over the changeover to Burnside (whereas McClellan was someone who paid attention to detail, and would have noticed that the message to the engineers wasn't confirmed - they hadn't got it because the order arrived by barge instead of by telegraph as it should). If McClellan follows up on the next day, that saves five days.
Secondly, the bridge train hit a storm during the 19-24 November period, and if they're five days earlier setting off they miss the storm and get to Fredericksburg eight days earlier. They also didn't really know it was urgent, so that might save another day.

That means that they could be crossing at Fredericksburg eight or nine days before OTL, which would be too quick to get Longstreet there even if the right wing wasn't pressuring him, and it probably means the battle takes place at the North Anna. It does mean they can't get into Richmond before Longstreet does, assuming Longstreet takes an option other than maintaining contact with Jackson.



ED: even without the pontoons arriving in time, you still have a case where there can be Federal troops on the south of the Rappahannock and entrenched. This means there's no need to make an opposed crossing if a Fredericksburg battle does eventuate, but more importantly you can draw supply from Port Royal (on the south side of the Rappahannock) and that means you don't really need the bridge up- all you need is the fords to cross with. Supply from there to the R&FRR and you're done, that's you on the rail line to Richmond.

 

[galveston bay]

Regarding McClellan

I posted this in another forum but it is applicable here

In the end it is results that matter, and a commander who fails to work successfully with his superiors and his subordinates to the point where he loses their trust cannot be kept in command. In the real world battlefield results are not enough, it is the campaigns that matter and how those campaigns bring about the successful conclusion of the war (or prolong it if you are trying not to lose). Lee, Grant, Joseph E Johnson, Sherman, Thomas, and at sea, Farragut, brought success (or held off disaster for as long as they could) for their respective governments. Which is why they are high on the pantheon of successful American commanders and McClellan, who won a single campaign decisively (West Virginia, where he had all the cards), was defeated in a major offensive campaign, and achieved a narrow victory at Antietam that was important more for its political impact than its military one, is not considered one of the great captains of American history.

He deserves his place his history, but he most definitely did not earn another month in command and his relief and replacement was justified. That Burnside and Hooker failed in their campaigns as commanders of the Army of the Potomac is true, but their failure has little bearing on the reasons why McClellan was sacked. Meade and Grant won their campaigns and the war, in spite of setbacks and painful losses.

 

[Japhy]

If we're talking purely the scenario and everything going McClellan's way there are two mid term consequences that come to mind.

First that Lee is going to wind up South of the Appomattox with an intact or at least mostly intact Army. The time it'll take to secure Petersburg and Richmond meaning that Jackson can make it back to Longstreet. That will cause a lot of trouble especially considering the size of the force the Army of the Potomac loses to garrison Virginia. Even if Longstreet is bloodied it won't be good.

Secondly if even then things go perfectly well, the long term survival of Emancipation is put into major risk with a war ending considerably quicker and the Thirteenth Amendment is DoA.

 

[Fiver]

Wouldn't McClellan be relying on the War Department for the pontoon brigdes to cross at Fredericksburg? Assuming the pontoon bridges are late again, I suspect that McClellan would probably give up and end the campaign there (resulting in his relief).

Good point, McClellan was not as aggressive as Burnside. If the pontoons didn't arrive in time, McClellan would probably go into winter quarters instead of attack.

 

[Arnold d.c]

Good point, McClellan was not as aggressive as Burnside. If the pontoons didn't arrive in time, McClellan would probably go into winter quarters instead of attack.

Indeed. Out of curiousity, were there any alternative fords Burnside could have crossed in OTL? The lower Rapphannock fords (the path Joe Hooker took) were impassable due to the rain and any Union force that crossed the U.S. Ford would be completely isolated if the rain continued (As it turned out, the rain actually continued. Burnside was right about his decision not to cross there). Was going to winter quarters really the best choice for the Union by the time Lee got to the heights of Fredericksburg?

 

[Saphroneth]

If we're talking purely the scenario and everything going McClellan's way there are two mid term consequences that come to mind.

First that Lee is going to wind up South of the Appomattox with an intact or at least mostly intact Army. The time it'll take to secure Petersburg and Richmond meaning that Jackson can make it back to Longstreet. That will cause a lot of trouble especially considering the size of the force the Army of the Potomac loses to garrison Virginia. Even if Longstreet is bloodied it won't be good.

Secondly if even then things go perfectly well, the long term survival of Emancipation is put into major risk with a war ending considerably quicker and the Thirteenth Amendment is DoA.

For the first one, the Confederacy without Virginia is dead in the water. Virginia provided almost all the industry including most of their cannon, most of the armour, most of the rifles and from memory the only rolling mill able to make rail iron. And desertion is likely to be pretty horrible as Virginia was the link to the Revolution and legitimacy.

With Richmond taken the next viable defensive line is functionally the border with North Carolina, the rail lines permit little else.

Secondly, well, yes. That's not an upside but it's also not an OTL objective at that time.

Indeed. Out of curiousity, were there any alternative fords Burnside could have crossed in OTL? The lower Rapphannock fords (the path Joe Hooker took) were impassable due to the rain and any Union force that crossed the U.S. Ford would be completely isolated if the rain continued (As it turned out, the rain actually continued. Burnside was right about his decision not to cross there). Was going to winter quarters really the best choice for the Union by the time Lee got to the heights of Fredericksburg?

Crossing at the fords and then shifting supply to Port Royal VA would have been fine, as would fortifying to defend the bridge point while bridges got established. The key here is that the Union, even with the delay associated with switching to Burnside, could have taken the heights with a corps of observation before Lee arrived in force.

Once Lee is present in force, of course, the best option is probably regular approaches and resting the men while bridges are built under the cover of the guns.

 

[Japhy]

For the first one, the Confederacy without Virginia is dead in the water. Virginia provided almost all the industry including most of their cannon, most of the armour, most of the rifles and from memory the only rolling mill able to make rail iron. And desertion is likely to be pretty horrible as Virginia was the link to the Revolution and legitimacy.

With Richmond taken the next viable defensive line is functionally the border with North Carolina, the rail lines permit little else.

Virginia alone was not the link to the Revolution and anyone form the Carolinas or Georgia would have something to say about it.

In addition I am not saying that the Confederacy can win without Virginia so don't try and make it out like I'm saying that. But expecting the war to end in the Spring of 1863 in this scenario is far too optimistic. Also in regards to desertions: First the other Armies of the Confederacy, specifically the Army of Tennessee are probably fine. There were next to no Virginian regiments outside of Virginia and the Tennesseians in the AoT stuck by for years after the loss of their state before their numbers entered a terminal decline. So while the war probably has under eighteen months left in it the fighting will not end.

Normally if we're considering what a North Carolinian campaign would consist of after a fall of Virginia it's in a context where Lee's Army has been broken, all I'm noting is that in your scenario that would not be the case.

Secondly, well, yes. That's not an upside but it's also not an OTL objective at that time.

And yet still an issue. And a terrible result to have.