Oadhya
Alilat Triumphant

The Prophetess Fadia would die in 654, and, according to Saihist tradition it was not a tragedy but a miracle - an ascension to oneness with the God. With her passing the religion changed fundamentally. Without the one "pure center of revelation", as she was sometimes known, there was no central unity, no organized hierarchy of who should claim the mantle of her holy authority. She was by no means a sole prophet - others, including her husband Abdulilat, claimed to receive messages from Alilat during certain states of ecstatic meditation.

The conquests of Nu'maan ibn Mundhir had politically united the northern Hejaz under Saihism, but he was a legalist, a tribal patriarch in a very different mould from the mercantile clans of al-Ta'if. The fanaticism of his followers and his victories attested to the utility of the religion. Rightly, he claimed to the Commander of the Believers (Amir al-Muminin). In the south, in the city of the goddess, the local priesthood claimed doctrinal authority, and was led by Abdulilat. He and Fadia had been childless, but his relations, the influential and powerful Banu Thaqif were eager to ensure their own position in whatever structure emerged out of the death of the Prophetess. Both of these factions realized that if their community was to survive, surrounded as they were by unbelievers, compromise would be necessary.

Nu'maan ibn Mundhir was, more than just a military leader or a religious figure, a reformer. Part of what made his message appealing is that he brought to the mysticism of the Suwar a set of empowering legal and societal reforms. In the example of the Prophetess Fadia and the female priesthood of Alilat, he sought to elevate the status of women, end female infanticide and rape, and allow women the right to divorce by the simple affirmation "I divorce you." That he enacted these reforms with often strict and brutal commandments was merely a sign of the times. He mandated charity among the believers, taking Fadia's message of the equality of all souls to heart. However, as a tribal leader he did not make a clear break with his culture in many respects - he defined masculine virtue as heroic bravery in warfare, femininity as meditative closeness to the divine, and he saw slaves captured in war as incapable of being part of the community of believers.

It would be Nu'maan who shaped the practical side of the religion most strongly. At the Council of al-Ta'if, better known as the Council of the Partisans, the organization of the new faith was solidified. Nu'maan ibn Mundhir received important concessions. His formulation of the Suwar as a holy book oHHwas declared divinely chosen (and thus official). His position as a sort of first among equals, or Amir, was solidified, and his son Khalid married the daughter of the Thaqif patriarch, Hasan ibn Muttalib. In return, he conceded that he was a purely secular leader - divinely inspired, perhaps, but secular nevertheless. "I am not a Prophet, but a humble servant of the God and the Absolute" he told the assembled. Thereafter, the assembled tribal leaders pledged their loyalty to Nu'maan and the Banu Ghatafan.
Beyond merely resolving this dispute of authority, another important decision was made. It was declared incumbent upon the faithful to share their revelation. Missionaries would have to be sent forth. Every Saihist had an obligation to share the revelations of Fadia.

These revelations, now codified, began to become a coherent set of six steps, each building upon each other in pursuit of the Absolute. To fail in these steps was to find oneself far from the gods in the next life. Unlike the Dharmic religions one was not incarnated again into this world but rather into another one, the specifics of which were uncertain. Those who came close to oneness with the would be reborn close to gods and thus live in sensual bliss, while those who failed would exist far from the bliss of the gods, or alternately fall into oblivion depending on the magnitude of their sins. The steps were:

Abstaining from falsehood, dishonor, theft, and violence. (except when necessary in defense of the faith)
Giving charity and comfort to all.
Prayer and veneration to the gods and foremost among them Alilat.
Understanding of the Suwar.
Meditation to understand the Absolute.
Attain oneness with the Absolute. (Paradise)

Even those who accomplished even a few of these steps would not be so far from the abode of the Gods. Those who accomplished all were held as figures of great holiness, and elevated by the community to the status of "saints" - a concept adopted relatively later, certainly after the life of Fadia. Figures such as Nu'maan would eventually receive this honor.

Even as the Saihists consolidated, the Hadhramut Kingdom to the south continued to unravel. The Malik, Qahtan ibn Amar (651-673) had little authority outside of Shabwa. Certain cities, such as the Christian community of Najran felt the need to express autonomy as Indian ideas and religions such as Buddhism and Jainism drew increasingly larger numbers of devotees. However, as they did so they became easy prey for the Saihists, who struck south with increasing impunity. Khalid ibn Nu'maan would conquer Najran in 668, and finally, in what was a crushing blow to the Hadhrami spice trade, Sana'a in 672. Shortly thereafter, Qahtan would be overthrown, replaced by his son Imru, who attempted to counteract the southwards spread of the now unified community of the believers.

The impetus for the Saihist attacks is unclear, but can possibly be traced to the Hadhrami slowly orienting their trade once more towards maritime activity. As their caravans became less profitable and less frequent, the Saihists were forced to go to war to gain plunder. Once they realized the weakness and decentralization of the Hadhramut they would capitalize on these raids.

The Hadhrami military at this point was significantly atrophied. It had never been exceptionally powerful - the mercantile kings of South Arabia relied on control over water supplies, tariffs, and the spice production to retain their dominance. They were not significantly militaristic, and this explains the appeal of nonviolent creeds such as Buddhism and Jainism among the South Arabians. Where the latter Eftal and Turks always had to reconcile their faith and the endemic warfare in which they participated, it was easier for the urban, "civilized" Hadhrami to do so. Saihism by contrast allowed far more justifications for war and plunder, and the people of Hejaz had always been more warlike, needing to defend themselves against the Bedouin of the interior.

As such, the eventual fall of the Hadhrami was not unsurprising. Khalid finally conquered them in 687, placing a believer, a member of the Thaqif named Mansur ibn Ali on the throne. However, over time this new dominion would be loose. So long as the Malik sent tribute and a portion of the trade north, he was allowed to handle his affairs as he chose. While the Malik did promote the Saihist faith, he did not persecute others for their own beliefs, seeing them as merely on alternative paths to righteousness. As such, the Hadhramut maintained their relative monopoly on trade in southern Arabia.

The Saihists spread north as well. The Christian tribes of the Tayy, under al-Harith ibn Yusuf, fought hard to avoid the same fate as their southern coreligionists of languishing under a "pagan" king. Fortunately, they were numerous and capable of mobilizing a large population and many federate allies to war. The Saihist penetration northwards was thus continually thwarted. While the Tayy were not urban, and indeed were rather poor, lacking any major trade routes, they nevertheless were able to style themselves as defenders of Christendom, and cultivate a rough alliance with the Heshanids, despite being Nestorian.

As such, the particular details of Saihism and the Suwar never reached the Eftal world or the Mediterranean in any great numbers. Sporadic missionaries found themselves rebuffed, but there was no mass transmission of ideas. Saihism remained a primarily Arab phenomenon, and even within the peninsula limited in scope to some degree.

Two Years of Anarchy and Betrayal - the end of the Mahadevist moment - rise of the new empire

After the battle, when the dead were burned or left for the birds of the air, Tengin Shah and his picked retainers crossed the sweeping scrubland plains south of Yazd to meet with the mercenary captains - especially the so-called Shah Sefandiyar. While Tengin might have felt some lingering caution and uncertainty about the results of the battle, he could not help but feel the elation of a clear victory. This was his triumph. These mercenaries would not take that credit from him.

When he arrived at the meeting-place, two mornings after the battle, he could not have been more baffled by the claims of the man who had named himself the leader the mercenaries - Sefandiyar of Komis, the man who would be Shah. Sefandiyar claimed to be the descendant of the first Shah Akhshunwar, the legendary conqueror of Iran himself. Tengin naturally was skeptical. The Persian chronicler Farrokh claims that he derisively replied that "every horse-thief from Edessa to Kabul" claimed ancestry from Akhshunwar. Sefandiyar, quick-witted, replied that Heshana himself began his career as a horse-thief, and ultimately became a great conqueror. He offered to work with Tengin - together they could carve out an empire for themselves before the Mahadevists had a chance to recover.

Tengin, unimpressed, turned and left. Why should he share the spoils of the Mahadevist Empire? Especially with a cabal of men who had proven themselves untrustworthy by their very actions in the previous battle? By the time he reached his own camp, Sefandiyar's army had broken camp and was riding north. Meanwhile, Husrava's column was trailing south, and Tengin had dispatched Shah Vinayaditya, the leader of the Kidarite, or Red Eftal, to pursue and harass the retreating army. An accomplished commander in his own right, and a masterful leader of horse, Vinayaditya would ultimately catch Husrava near Belabad. The abortive battle would see thousands of the "Green Banners" captured and Husrava himself, badly wounded and with a spreading infection, taken into the custody of the Shah.

Rather than allow any among them to become martyrs, Vinayaditya ordered the sickly Shahanshah paraded past a line of the captured Green Banner soldiers. When he reached the end of his parade, he was beaten savagely before being returned to a cage. Subsequently, each one of the captive Mahadevists was blinded except for one in a hundred, who was given the responsibility of leading his comrades. When the self-proclaimed Saosyant passed away of his infection three days later, the news was related to every soldier in the army and they were sent off back towards Susa with a bare minimum of provisions.

These actions broke the will of the Mahadevists. Cities began to surrender en masse, particularly in Pars, where a large proportion of the population were not believers in any case. The Zoroastrians loudly denounced Husrava as false, and the Mahadevists themselves begged for leniency and generally received it. With subsequent years, an anti-messianic faction within the Mahadevists would gain prominence, and they would be relegated to an influential but nevertheless fringe sect within the Middle East.

But for now, Vinayaditya had larger problems than religious factionalism. With the Mahadevists subdued, it was his forces that effectively controlled the core of their short-lived empire. Tengin Shah, racing to catch up, had already been bled badly in battle. Furthermore, he was suffering mass desertions: the Asvha had left to defend their own homelands, leaving him leading mostly his own Turkic troops, which were relatively few in number. When he finally met up with Vinayaditya roughly a week after Belabad, Vinayaditya organized a grand banquet to celebrate their victory. He cheerfully announced to Tengin that together, they had restored the Eftal Shahdom. He proposed a marriage between Tengin and his daughter, that might seal their alliance. Tengin, in good spirits and feeling triumphant in spite of his personal setbacks, agreed. That night, however, as Tengin's soldiers became drunk, a contingent of the Eftal who had remained sober fell on them and began a vicious, one-sided massacre.

Tengin himself fled, but most of his retainers were captured or killed, sacrificing their lives to allow him to escape Vinayaditya's royal tent. He stumbled, wounded, through the avenues of his camp. Because he was not in his distinctive armor but rather casually dressed, he escaped notice for some time. He witnessed the annihilation of his army and Vinayaditya's triumph and abandoning all hope, he took his own life.

Vinayaditya, however, had little time to enjoy the spoils of war. Sefandiyar was carving out a kingdom for himself around the ancient city of Ahmatan in the north. Furthermore, word had finally reached him that Syarzur was in open rebellion, led by Mihiraban Oadhya. If he had acted quickly, he might have nipped both threats in the bud, but after arriving in Susa, the Shah of the Red Eftal fell into a deep depression. He was wracked by guilt over his actions, and he did not ride against either of the pretenders. Mihiraban, having gained the loyalty of Syrazur and an alliance with Toramana of Syria, swept south. He captured Tesifon in the summer of 686, and from there grew only more bold. The subsequent year, Mihiraban would make a secret pact with Sulukichor, granting him and his men large tracts of Mahadevist-owned land in the south in exchange for his allegiance, and critically, his betrayal of Sefandiyar.

The new Syarzuri army, led by Mihiraban struck directly at Ahmatan, and when Sefandiyar met them, the betrayal happened just as planned. Sulukichor, just as at Yazd, fell back rather than engaging, allowing a contingent of Toramana's Syrian cavalry to flank Sefandiyar and put his army to rout. By the year's end, Ahmatan had been brought under the Syarzuri yoke. Perhaps wisely, Mihiraban made no further use of the Turkic mercenaries, preferring to keep them on as a garrison unit only - where Sulukichor could not betray him at a critical moment as he had done to both his former employers.

With this, Vinayaditya was finally spurred into action. He rode west to Kaskar, from where he planned to strike at Tesifon, retaking the ruined city which he could use as a base of operations from which to attack Syarzur and regain the initiative. However, Tormana was waiting for him with some ten thousand men. Vinayaditya lost his nerve and attempted to retreat, but realized that he would need to cross the rain-swollen Tigris, now with an enemy at his back. He ordered his forces to scatter, believing more of them would be preserved that way, but ultimately it merely allowed the Syrians to single out the royal companions and target them in isolation from the main body of his troops.

Vinayaditya's body was never recovered. It is believed he drowned in the Tigris, and while many of his troops escaped, the Red Eftal would flee back to Kerman, their ambitions thwarted. In 688, Mihiraban was crowned Shah in Susa, as sole ruler of a much diminished Eftal Empire.

Mihiraban was left with a problem no different from that faced by the Mahadevists, but unlike the Mahadevists he was able to utilize the literate Christian and Buddhist populations of his empire in governance. Monks were called upon to train the latest generation of Imperial bureaucrats, and for once a sense of order was restored. Relative peace prevailed from Constantinople to Tokharestan.

Rather than the old Satrapal system, Mihiraban divided the provinces into many smaller territories, typically centered around a single urban area or a cluster of towns. These were given as hereditary fiefs to various aristocrats who had served with him, typically from prominent Iranian Eftal clans. Known as Vayan,(Lords), each Vaya was responsible for raising troops in times of war, providing taxes to the central government, and maintaining order in his territories, being allowed in exchange a reasonable degree of autonomy in how they managed their fiefs. Above these local lords in rank was a higher layer of nobility - the Padivayan, whose dominions did not overlap with the Vaya, but were granted more important border territories, where they effectively served as Marquisates with an even greater degree of autonomy.

The next five years were ones of consolidation. The Mahadevist priesthood was lucky to escape at all the purges visited upon them - the faith was in many locations driven underground, with many of its practitioners beginning to give devotion to other Indian or Eftal gods so as to appear less sectarian. Those fringe sects which claimed that Husrava would be reborn were massacred. Others would subsequently claim to be Zoroastrian, a religion which itself would never quite recover from the trauma of the "false Saosyant" - but it would largely escape persecution and as such would simply slowly become a minority faith in the face of the prevalent synthesis of dharmic and Eftal beliefs.

In 694, Shah Khalinga would die. He had reached a great age and would remembered fondly by those who chronicled his reign. However, he left an unclear succession - having never had the heart to do away with his co-Shah, now a thirty-year old man named Freduna. His chosen heir, Khauwashta, had the support of the majority, being middle-aged and quite capable himself, but when Freduna refused to step down as Shah and retire to a spacious estate, tensions flared - Mihiraban chose to intervene. Knowing Freduna had few other options, and might well die if push came to shove against Khauwashta, the Shah offered Freduna his late father's satrapy (a position which would effectively make him the sole Satrap in the new Eftal Empire) and promised to deal with Khauwashta. As his options evaporated and his companions began to abandon him, Freduna took the deal.

The subsequent invasion would be rather hard-fought. Gilan had many strong fortresses and though Khauwashta could not bring a great army against Mihiraban, the war would take four years of on-and-off sieges and counter-sieges before finally Khauwashta himself accepted terms, being reduced to the rank of Padivaya.

While the Oadyan Empire certainly claimed to be inheritors of the Eftal legacy, in truth they should rightly be regarded as something distinct. Their court culture resembled more strongly the provincial culture of Syarzur than the high culture of the old Eftal Royals. The elite, and almost all of the new lords were to some degree Buddhist or pagans deeply influenced by Buddhist teachings - unlike the multitude of religions among their predecessors. All spoke the same Syarzuri dialect and most were at least distantly bound together by blood. A much greater portion of their population, especially within the low echelons of the military class, was Turkic and identified as such. Nomadism and pastoralism, particularly in the east, were much more pervasive.

The Oadyan furthermore moved the capital to Ahmatan [Hamadan, or Ecbatana] the old Sassanid summer residence, it was renovated and new temples and palaces were built to accommodate the royal clan. A smaller city than Susa (which remained to a large degree the administrative center) Ahmatan became a new Piandjikent. Centrally located in comparison, it reflected the fact that threats to the new Empire could come from essentially any direction - the roaming tribes of the East, the more settled Eftal states of the west, or the patchwork of Alan and Turkic warlords who ruled in Armenia.
 
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Rzpcp9A.jpg


Map of the current Oadhyan Empire, the decline of the Mauri, and more!
 
Seeing the map puts into stark perspective how precipitous the Mauri decline has been. I thought they would lose some territory, but wow, that's horrific. At this point, the only thing that's left is to mop it up...

I'm also interested in finding out if any of the Berber semi-nomadic societies would be able to make that transition to be able to last for the long term.

As the Mauri disintegrate, could we also see the phenomenon of nominally independent city states developing like it has in Western Anatolia? The big difference of course, is that there is a powerful Italy to potentially rejoin with.

As for Persia, I'd be genuinely surprised if they would be able to maintain any real long term period of stability.

This new Persia seems to have really delved into the feudal structure. Combined with the large number of enemies they have on their border, I'd be genuinely surprised if they're still around more or less in a recognizable form by 750AD.

In any case, bring on the 8th Century!!
 
Seeing the map puts into stark perspective how precipitous the Mauri decline has been. I thought they would lose some territory, but wow, that's horrific. At this point, the only thing that's left is to mop it up...

I'm also interested in finding out if any of the Berber semi-nomadic societies would be able to make that transition to be able to last for the long term.
They still control the coastal cities, which are populous, well-defended, and the source of most of their wealth. But yeah, the decline is shocking. To someone who didn't understand the broader trends at work here, it would seem like it was overnight, but the climate and demographic shifts made it inevitable. Berber population is growing in a place that can't sustain it, the Mauri population is going abroad and moving to the cities...

It will be something interesting to see what happens next, I think. The Mauri were a sort of plug, keeping the non-Romanized Berbers out until there were just too many and the whole system fell apart. I think the same sort of situation is going on with the Sahu. When it breaks its going to break hard.

As the Mauri disintegrate, could we also see the phenomenon of nominally independent city states developing like it has in Western Anatolia?
Possibly, but like you say, Italy is looming awfully close. It depends what Sergius and his successors do - although I don't like their chances if they try to hold more than a thin strip along the coastlines.

As for Persia, I'd be genuinely surprised if they would be able to maintain any real long term period of stability.

This new Persia seems to have really delved into the feudal structure. Combined with the large number of enemies they have on their border, I'd be genuinely surprised if they're still around more or less in a recognizable form by 750AD.
Their particular blend of feudalism provides a decent system re-establishing order in the short term. It rewards those who fought alongside the Oadhya in a way not dissimilar from the old Eftal land-grant system - but with way more autonomy for the landholders because the Oadhya aren't building off of the Eftal model, but rather more off the tribal confederations they're used to, and those tribal lords expect it. It's also not unprecedented because the Eftal palace-fortresses make good local seats for the new lords.

The problem obviously is that the Oadhya are centrally weak in comparison. Not necessarily a great thing to be when you're surrounded by enemies. It will be tough for them to expand or even maintain their borders.
 
I know that it is going to be a while before the region begins to have an impact, but is anything different from OTL going on in Britain and Scandinavia?

The Vikings were raiding the Baltic for a good part of mid-8th century and really exploded outwards over the next couple of centuries so how are they going to interact with the very different circumstances in the mediteranean. At the same time in Britain you have the Heptarchy going at it and the different minor kingdoms fighting it out.

For that matter what is going on in Western Europe as a whole? France without the Arabs to worry about and build a reputation against? Germany with powerful Slav neighbours? Spain?
 
Different, yes? Substantially different? I don't think so. I'm currently working under the assumption of a rough parallel still altered by not insubstantial butterflies.

There are five major kingdoms in Anglo-Saxon Britian - Northumbria, Mercia, Wessex, Essex (larger than OTL by some degree) and East Anglia. Historians OTL will probably speak of a "Saxon Pentarchy". They still follow the Celtic rite, but are pretty thoroughly Christian by this point. The names and stories of their Kings are different, but not substantially so.

Scandinavia is even less changed from OTL - some naval raiding and commerce in the Baltic has already occurred, although it won't get started in earnest for some time now. Interacting with a stronger, more unified Slavic world will likely encourage them to start their expeditions sooner as returns will be higher earlier. Once the Vikings start, a whole whirlwind of fresh butterflies will be unleashed.

The Franks will be covered shortly, once I get around to my next big Western Europe update. I know a lot of people are curious about what's been happening there. I can say that the Franks too will parallel history in some ways - although without a major existential threat (as scary as the Slavs are to the Germans, they just don't rank on the level of the Arab invasions of OTL) things will be different. There will be less necessity for unification. I have big plans for Spain as we go into the Viking era, but its' not too exciting right now. Just a heavily Romanized kingdom that's relatively secure from all comers - and as such is still prospering in a dark-agey sort of way. Still, they're militarily weak (the nobility isn't very martial compared to say, the Franks) and mostly lucky to have no neighbors capable of exploiting that.

One of the best things about the Norse is that there's a lot more easily available sources on them than there are for the various Slavic tribes.
 
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Emperor
The Succession of Kings - Troubled States in the Christian West

The Frankish Kingdom would find it hard to reunify after its collapse in 636. The trend within the petty kingdoms that emerged in its aftermath was one of centralization, but this merely established local centers - Paris, Aachen, Bordeaux, Lyon - which became pre-eminent. This was a double edged sword - benefits included it making traditional Frankish succession wars relatively brief and more easily settled, and making vassals more easily controlled, but on the other hand it also ensured each local ruler had a strong base of power and thus prevented any easy reunification of the Kingdom.

Strong kings in Nuestria and Austrasia, such as the Nuestrian King Chlothar II (654-663) and his Austrasian contemporary Reginald of Tournai (643-661) would find their ambitions to reconquer the broader Merovingian empire thwarted time and again. Weaker kings, such as those of Aquitaine and Burgundy, would accordingly find their dominions chipped away. Province and Narbo were lost, to the Isidorians and Visigoths respectively. In Aquitaine in particular the Gallo-Roman nobility, still predominant in many places, was disloyal at best or outright conspiring with the Isidorian Rector of Provence at worst.

It would be the efforts of one man which would provide the best hope for the reunification of the Frankish Empire. The capable and crafty Mayor Bernard of Herstal was born in 671 to the previous Mayor of the Palace, Arnulf. By 694, he would ascend to his father's position after Pepin's untimely death in a hunting accident, advising the Austrasian King Theoderic III (668-705) and later his successor, Childeric III. Beginning with Theoderic, he was able to take advantage of the Nuestrian succession crisis after the death of Reginald of Tournai's feeble and sickly son. Proposing a unification of the two realms, he persuaded several prominent nobles to support Theoderic's claim on Nuestria - uniting the twin crowns in 700.

However, this would not be sufficient to ensure the longevity of the newly forged united realm. Theoderic had two sons, Childeric and Clothair, and despite Bernard's arguments and pleading, he refused to give a lesser portion of the inheritance to Clothair, the younger, insisting that Frankish tradition and Salic law be upheld and nearly dismissing Bernard from his post for his impertinence. As such at Theoderic's death, Neustria passed to Clothair, and thus effectively into the hands of a coalition of Frankish nobles who sought to preserve their power through the disunity of the realm. Clothair was bound to powerful aristocrats such as the Doux of Soissons, whose family he married into.

Childeric's reign was preoccupied with the Saxons, who, pressed by the Slavs to their east, in turn often sought to cross into the fertile Rhineland. The Franks of Austrasia were nevertheless able to mobilize well-equipped, disciplined retainers and push back these tentative attempts. While Childeric was able to repulse the Saxons with relative ease, it ensured that Bernard's scheming would be for naught - he would not be able to arrange any additional diplomatic coups as significant as momentarily uniting the two greatest of the Frankish Kingdoms. Bernard was forced to resort to military force - attempting to overthrow Clothair in 709 without success, his campaign forced to turn back to deal with a Saxon raid on the city of Koln.

The latter half of the 7th century and the early years of the 8th thus passed with few lasting developments. The powerful landholding nobility was able to ensure that titles and rank remained roughly hereditary, and in return they provided the Franks their services in war. While this era is often seen as one of the consolidation of the various kingdoms, regional identities were still shaky at best - each group of local landholders simply preferred a local king. Against this inertia no unifying force prevailed. The Franks faced no existential threat which might have compelled unification, and as such they continued their internecine squabbles.

The closest to an existential threat was the Slavs, and to call them such is a gross overestimation of their capabilities. Yes, Hill-fort settlements and shrine-towns were blossoming across much of what earlier generations might have called Germania, it was true. But this growth was what ensured that they would make little forwards progress. Conquest was less important to the typical West Slavic chieftain of the era than raiding, and while they proved a potent threat to the Bavarians, Thuringians, and others, they were incapable of overrunning the early castles and forts of these regions and establishing permanent dominion.

The one exception to this rule was the Pyritzan Tribe, who fled into the region the Romans called Noricum to escape raids by the the growing confederacy of the Polans. They overrun the Barvarian and Avar settlements there and made the mountainous, easily defensible terrain there their home. The Pyritzans would be unique for their direct contact with the Isidorian Empire. The chief of the Pyritzans, recorded as the Dravan-Knias Drahomir had received emissaries and missionaries from Florentia and Rome by 710. While the missionaries were rebuffed, an avenue for trade between the Roman and West Slavic worlds was established.

The Emperor and the Magister

Imperator Sergius Constantinus would pass away in 687 at the age of 68. On his deathbed, he could look back on a long career, most of it spent at war, dramatically improving the fortunes and power of the Isidorians. He had every reason to be confident these successes would continue, except for the fact that Valerian Constantine, his son, was however, only twelve years of age. The Isidorians, unlike their some of the Roman predecessors, viewed dynasty as more important than the state. There could be no doubt that Valerian deserved the throne, and indeed since the age of eleven he had been co-Emperor. However, the Isidorians, much as they prized family, had a small one. Sergius was an only child, and Valerian was one as well, not to mention small for his age and sickly. He had wide, innocent eyes and lacked the defined, regal features of his parents.

But there were no other imperial candidates worth the consideration. Sergius' extended family were a host of distant cousins, many of them patricians who had fallen victim to his purges or military officers of middling rank. Valerian would have to do. But Sergius was not so confident as to trust that his generals would ensure his legacy. His Magister Militum, Sebastianus, was demoted from his position and later found strangled in his bath-tub, ostensibly by his mistress. Sebastianus' second-in-command, Anatolius, was given the new title of Regent, and allowed to choose the new Magister Militum himself. Sergius thus died imagining that he had done all he could to secure the new state for his dynasty.

In a sense, he had. Anatolius had little desire to take the throne directly - he judged that such a situation would lead to popular anarchy. It was better for him, much better, to enjoy near-absolute power for at least the next four years or so - and quite possibly beyond that. Anatolius was something of a paranoid man - he kept his generals busy with drills and plans of invading Sicily or the Balkans that never fully reached fruition. In 690, he oversaw the clearing of several pirate havens along the Adriatic coast, earning the wrath of local Avar chieftains who had a mutually beneficial relationship with the havens.

This low-scale warfare, if nothing else, helped to train and justify Anatolius' expansion of the Isidorian Fleet. As the Mauri waned, having a strong naval presence allowed the Romans to increase their own position at the bargaining table. However, in 692, Anatolius would step down as Regent, and the Emperor would take command. He had not grown into an impressive adult - indecisive and charmless among his advisors, Anatolius was capable of continuing to dominate the reigns of state as "Praeses of Rome" a position with broad authority, effectively outside of the traditional hierarchy of command. Anatolius would cultivate a close relationship with the Papacy as well, giving him both secular and religious power over the Isidorian state.

In this new position, Anatolius would raise a loyal cadre of officers around him. Those commanders who might have posed a threat found themselves surrounded by moles and disloyal catspaws. The only organization which he could not penetrate was the Xasari Guardsmen, the foreign-born bodyguard of horsemen which under Sergius had been a potent military force, and under Valerian played a largely ceremonial role. As outsiders from the political establishment, Anatolius lacked a firm understanding of how to control them. They had a certain xenophobic camaraderie which he could not penetrate with bribes or promises, and, naturally fearing what he could not control, he rarely visited Florentia - limiting his own power out of a worry that the Xasari might kill him in his sleep. However, the Magister Militum was in his pocket, and with that he could issue orders in the young Emperor's name. This would prove critical to the future success of the Romans.

In 702, King Constans of the Mauri appealed to the Papacy for aid. It was a decision not lightly taken. The Miknasa and Hawwara tribes were pushing north along the coastline, cutting the Mauri off from their Tripolitanian protectorates, and pressing hard into Byzacena, one of the few remaining breadbaskets of the Mauri Empire. After the battle of Thysdrus, (701) the Mauri lords were unwilling to take to the field. The raids contributed to a brutal famine, one of the worst in decades. The Mauri of Carthage were forced to import food from Egypt while mere miles away their Berber foes feasted.

Constans, unwilling to lose everything, hoped to preserve him own position, even if it was as some vassal-king of the Roman Emperor. His ambassador in Rome appealed to a common Roman and Christian heritage, and begged for assistance against the Berbers. "Lest we become a new Constantinople, and Carthage's Churches turned to black temples to heathen idols." Constans knew full well that such a move was effectively conceding his crown to the Emperor in Florentia, but he felt there was little other option. The Mauri King's ambassador met with Anatolius as well, and seems to have made an impression. Even before the Papacy made any pronouncement, Roman soldiers were already on the move. However, Anatolius' terms were harsh. The fabulously wealthy Berber Doux of Sicily, lost his position to one of Anatolius' nephews. Two years later, the former Doux would see much of his vast fortune confiscated on trumped-up charges and would be forced to flee into exile.

Some twenty thousand Roman soldiers landed in Carthage in 704, under the command of a general named Julius Paulus, a lackey of Anatolius. However, even in the initial skirmishes the Romans found themselves outmatched. The Berbers fought in lightly-equipped, fluid formations. They refused to be pinned down or subjected to a charge of the heavily armored Roman cavalry. While the Romans had fought such foes before, most notably the Avars, the rough terrain into which the Berbers retreated favored them to a degree that the Romans were unprepared for. Eventually, the Romans were forced to spread their army across Byzacena, a strategy which saw measured success but limited their ability to go on the offensive.

Furthermore, Constans was continually chafing under new requirements coming from Florentia. A magistrate was permanently posted in Carthage to oversee his "client kingdom" and Roman garrisons had been shipped to Sardinia, Corsica and the Baleares. He was acutely conscious that he lacked the manpower even to eject the Romans from North Africa. When famine loomed for the second year in the row, his budget shortfalls (exacerbated by the tribute demanded by the Emperor) became acute. He was forced to borrow heavily from his own merchants. One of his few remaining generals of any caliber, Amesianus [Amezyan], having realized that Constans had effectively betrayed the Mauri Kingdom, began to plot against the client king. Amesianus was one of the old Mauri aristocracy. A Christian, he did not regard himself, as many of the urban population did, as Roman. To him, and many of the remaining Mauri warriors, the Romans were invaders just as much as the Berbers. As such, this faction ignored the pragmatic considerations and launched a coup in 706 while most of the Roman army was away on campaign in the south.

Constans was murdered in the coup and the Roman soldiers within Hippo Regius were taken into custody. Acting before word of his rebellion could spread, Amesianus marched on Carthage and the city opened its gates to him. His soldiers rushed to the harbor and fell on the Romans there, slaughtering the unprepared sailors. Most of the fleet stationed in Carthage was seized, but the Roman garrison and magistrate held out in the city's fortified barracks, distracting the Mauri efforts and giving a few ships time to escape and spread word of the rebellion.

When the news reached Julius Paulus, he pulled back out of Byzacena and fell back to Hadrumentum. He would from there ship back to Rome, along with his army. While the Mauri had few forces to resist him, Anatolius had become nervous at the prospect of facing both the Berbers and the African Mauri. The Roman expedition would return home in many respects a costly failure. Securing Sicily and the other islands might well have been accomplished without the vast expenditure of manpower to try to rescue a failing state.

As the Berber vultures circled the corpse of the Mauri state, the tenuous trade connections between the European and West African worlds would become ever more attenuated. It had been the Mauri who had incentivized the limited trans-Saharan networks. Without them, the already difficult trade became less profitable. The new Berbers lacked access to the necessary markets and lacked the centralization to keep the networks safe. Economically they were far closer to mere subsistence, and were as likely to raid caravans as to sponsor them.

The Growth of West Africa

[note: I often use words like "Sahel" and whatnot to provide context. Obviously in this timeline nobody would use an Arabic word to describe the savannah between the Sahara and the "forest zone" but it helps I think, to ground the timeline. Otherwise I'd be trying to create an authentic Mandé word for everything, confusing you and diverting me from the purpose of what I'm writing.]

When the Savahilan explorer and missionary Bhadraksha of Vayubata came to the hill-forts and thatched houses of the early Rutara-Ganda civilization, his memoirs record his irritation with the peoples he encountered very clearly. "These people lack nothing that we possess save the knowledge and skill to build great things... furthermore, [the clans] are in a land of teeming abundance, with many cattle and good tools, and yet they are few in number indeed. I cannot reconcile these truths." he mused, frustrated. His travelogues are informed by an abiding sense of disappointment - he spent his life searching for the great kingdoms of the west, spoken of in rumors distorted and changed over the course of their transmission across a continent.

Were he to find the places he sought, where the earliest native states were growing and evolving, he would have had to travel far indeed, far further than he might have imagined. The Rutara-Ganda of his time were newcomers, settlers whose mastery of iron and their land was still rudimentary at best. Furthermore, their agricultural package had not yet been enhanced by the introduction of Eurasian crops. Luxury agricultural crops, such as African Tea, had not yet taken root either, leaving them isolated from the broader network of trade that had begun to benefit the Cushite tribes of the coast. It should accordingly be little shock that an explorer like Bhadraksha would see advanced civilization as an eastern phenomenon working its way west slowly and haltingly. The west to him was an increasingly wild, unhealthy, disease-ridden affair.

However, in the west, across the great savannah and dense forests that stretched from the Atlantic to the Chad basin, states were developing in relative isolation from the rest of the world, giving birth to their own, distinctly African civilization. In 600, the peoples of West Africa had founded many urban settlements and were interlinked by trade and commerce. Settled civilization had existed for millennia, based around the domestication of sorghum and millet. Ironworking as well had been known for perhaps a thousand years.

When we speak of the rise of West African civilization then, we must keep in mind this legacy. The Mandé speaking peoples of the Sahel were numerous and spread across a large region. While some historiography attributes to the Berber (specifically Tuareg) peoples a decisive role in the foundation of the first true "states" in the Sahel, it is also entirely possible to see these states as a natural outcome of growing population sizes and increasing urbanization - as urban growth reached a critical mass, it was perhaps inevitable that certain cities should surpass others and grow in power. While certainly Taureg raids (exacerbated as desertification increased) played some role in the trend towards unification, they should not be considered the sole cause for unification.

The role of the army was critical, in allowing early states such as Ghana and Kanem to establish themselves. With military force, the cities of the savannah could subdue one another. Accordingly some of the most privileged positions in these societies were those who supported the military apparatus - horse-breeders and blacksmiths. Beyond brute force, the kings of cities such as Ghana and Kaw-Kaw (Gao) cloaked themselves in elaborate ceremonial dress and expected the ritual veneration of their subjects. With this divine legitimacy they set themselves apart from the lesser kings and potentates they had conquered. The third pillar of these early states was the economy - in Ghana, the mining of gold and salt was controlled entirely by the state. In the east, the Zaghawa dynasty of Kanem, taxed their trade with the Makurians, collecting tolls from all the customary posts for merchants on the border of their territory.

Ghana was the pre-eminient state of West Africa. Founded as a city-state by the Soninike people, it expanded to control the broader country of the Mandé, between the Senegal and Niger rivers. With a stranglehold on river-traffic and an advanced, semi-military apparatus based around a semi-professional caste of soldiers, its hegemony was far from loose. However, as trade from the north sputtered in the face of the decline of the Mauri state, it retained something of an inward focus. Much like a sort of African equivalent of China, the Ghanan Kings found the north impenetrable and dominated by nomads, and the south densely forested and equally impenetrable. (Although in the case of the Ghana, it was that their famous cavalry were stymied by the forests and biting insects of the south.)



However, trade could easily penetrate such barriers. As West Africa became more interlinked, one of the great trade partners of the Ghanans were the many peoples who developed a mound-building civilization around the Niger region, which, owing to geography was incapable of unifying beyond the level of city-states. These walled cities functioned according to a primitive form of democracy, where the men ceremonially elected a ruler, or Ozo, who in turn was invested with power and by the wandering priestly class. These civilizations tended to face few external threats and enjoyed some level of homogeneity. Nevertheless they based their identities not on large groups and kingdoms, as the Mandé did to a certain degree, but on locality and tribal affiliation.

It was a densely populated and fertile region, the "second center" of West African civilization. Unlike many of the other coastal peoples, such as those of the Gold Coast, large population densities allowed manufacturing to take off and a vibrant material culture to provide many opportunities for trade. While there were scattered regional capitals and commercial centers across the forest zone, it was around the Niger that a truly interwoven network of regional cities developed and competed for pre-eminence.

To the west were a similar but distinct people - the Yoruba, organized in a single kingdom based around the town of Ife. While they borrowed much of their patterns of social organization and heavy stratification from the Niger cities, owing to geography they maintained a common language and cultural identity. Ife was a ceremonial center for divine kingship and the worship of a common pantheon of gods - as such it exercised a rough political hegemony over its surroundings. The Yoruba built sophisticated walled cities and created beautiful art. Their legacy would create a template for later kingdoms within the forest zone.

These civilizations developed in relative isolation from the Eurasian trade network. As Europe, Asia, and the East of their continent maintained relatively constant contact and a steady stream of goods, people, and ideas, they were left out. Accordingly they would develop a uniquely African culture, one rather dimly aware of the world beyond the Sahara. While the educated elite Kanem and Ghana might have had some notion of what lay beyond, a notion expanded intermittently by Taureg merchants and the network of oases and waystations which connected Kanem to Nubia, generally they saw little to gain in contact with the world across the ocean and the desert.

[Despite this historical isolation, I intend that West Africa will nevertheless have a major role to play in world history going forwards. I invite speculation on that topic.

And any other topic. Questions, comments? This post took a lot of detailed research, but I might have still gotten some things wrong - especially with the Franks, who I don't know much at all about.]
 
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Seems pretty reasonable to me for the Franks.

As for trade with the Isidorians, even though the Slavs of Noricum might have initially rebuffed the missionaries, I think that there's nonetheless going to be a slow but steady Christianization process.

Amasianus seems to have ended up tying the rope around what is left of his people's noose, and while the Isidorians yoke might have been oppressive, its still worse under the Berbers. The troubles that the Isidorians would face when confronted by the fact they have a weak ruler seems to have been mitigated a little because of the fact that the Isidorians still have a strong professional and politically well connected military apparatus that can keep the institutions running. Despite the failure in North Africa (did they de-facto take over Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica as well in the process?) it seems that they'll survive more or less intact for the foreseeable future.

West Africa doesn't seem like it will have much to do with world affairs for a while. It was Islam that essentially connected West Africa with the rest of the larger world, and without it there would be a higher degree of separation, and the continual climate change that killed the Garamanteans doesn't help either.
 
Cool update.

The Isodorians certainly seem to have gotten kick in the shin. Still going strong though. I can see them getting that new navy up to bother the Mauri real soon. Maybe Hispania will provide a safe Haven for them?


Haven't got too much of an idea on France either but would it be fair to say the Gallo-Romans will have stronger influence on France? The Isodorians might help provide with this, and it seems they already are.


As for west Africa, there seems to be many routes you might be able to take without the pressure of Islam to break the Berbers and Egypt holding strong for now. In that respect, wouldn't their be another religion and peoples that might make things even more fun for North and West Africa.

:D

I was reading up the other day of Judaism among the Berbers being an old thing in both North Africa and in the Sahara. Apparently, besides paganism, and before Islam, jews of the sahara were a thing.

Maybe the Pagans recent incursions might send them fleeing south like the Islamic conquests or maybe the pagans are more used to them than Christians? I'd see a bit of both from OTL.

Actually, I'm curious about the Jews situation in the former Roman Empire and outside it as well.

Any info would be cool.

Only other thing I see for West Africa influence for the world is a lot more/ stronger contact with Eastern Africa, and probably longer lasting/stronger Sahelian states. The nomadic Tuaregs and others are gonna gain a lot from this. Fulani should be participating too or might be a troublesome raiding group.


Largest thing they'll be known for is the gold though and a lot more leverage in trade. Since Islam ain't a thing here, and the world's weaker and more divided, whoever becomes the ATL Mansa Musa will hold a lot more leverage on and off the continent when they decide to look outside the borders and the foreigners look back.


Hope I didn't write your eyes off, love the TL, and hope this was of some use.
 
I just want to see how the Slavic tribes transform into nations. Since it's unlikely that we'll see any equivalent to the Teutonic Order to bring Christianity to the Pagans we might see Slavic Paganism exist for longer. Or a syncretic version of Christianity might pop up. Either way Eastern Europe's going to be interesting. Hopefully the Poles won't be screwed by history this time around.
 
I just want to see how the Slavic tribes transform into nations. Since it's unlikely that we'll see any equivalent to the Teutonic Order to bring Christianity to the Pagans we might see Slavic Paganism exist for longer. Or a syncretic version of Christianity might pop up. Either way Eastern Europe's going to be interesting. Hopefully the Poles won't be screwed by history this time around.

The gradual conversion to some form of Christianity is likely to be present in any form of Slavic nationhood. We already see that with the Balkan coalition of Slavs gradually Christianizing and incorporating some Greco-Roman culture.

The big difference is that there is not going to be a strong Eastern Orthodox Church that can compete for influence with Rome. We could see the Buddhism of the Xasr-Sahu possibly spread to some of the far eastern Slavic tribes. As for the Polanes; its still early enough that it would be hard to say whether they would be the ones who would organize the tribes into a state, or whether it would be another Slavic tribe in the area that does so.

Military orders really didn't become prominent until the High Middle Ages, so until then we're likely to see monastic orders, but it wouldn't be a surprise if they become featured in TTL. An organized militaristic society like the Isidorians could find some appeal in the idea, in projecting Roman power far beyond their actual borders.

It also makes me speculate how tightly intertwined the Isidorian military is with the religious institutions. Obviously, we have little equivalent of fully professional Roman style armies in Western Europe persisting into the Middle Ages of OTL, so this could be a nice thought exercise. If the Isidorians survive long enough, we could see an army that has the professionalism and discipline of the old Roman Legions, combined with the religious zeal of the Crusaders of the Middle Ages.
 
I've answered what I could without trying to spoil too much of the various surprises I have in store.

@Bmao:

As for trade with the Isidorians, even though the Slavs of Noricum might have initially rebuffed the missionaries, I think that there's nonetheless going to be a slow but steady Christianization process.
I agree that if this continues it's likely they will begin to slowly convert.
Despite the failure in North Africa (did they de-facto take over Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica as well in the process?) it seems that they'll survive more or less intact for the foreseeable future.
Yeah, they did. The next post will detail briefly some of the consolidation that occurred from there, but the Mauri lack the capacity to resist on their islands, and I doubt they'll be staging any large naval expeditions any time soon.

@Orisha91:

It's great to get so much feedback! :D

Maybe the Pagans recent incursions might send [Jewish Berbers] fleeing south like the Islamic conquests or maybe the pagans are more used to them than Christians?
The Berbers do have a Jewish population, however, like with the Gnostic sects, I'm simply not sure there's enough to make a difference, or that they'd necessarily flee anywhere. It seems to me that those clans which follow Judaism are just as likely as the pagan ones to cheerfully join in the northern exodus and raiding. Like the Jews of Arabia, while it defines their own tribal identity I doubt they're overly keen on enforcing their faith.

I may be wrong about the last bit, it's merely my impression.
Haven't got too much of an idea on France either but would it be fair to say the Gallo-Romans will have stronger influence on France? The Isodorians might help provide with this, and it seems they already are.
It would be fair to say so, yeah. Particularly in Southern France. All in all, Roman identity is lasting longer in this timeline in the West, even if there's no imperial continuity after Constantinople's fall.

Only other thing I see for West Africa influence for the world is a lot more/ stronger contact with Eastern Africa
Currently contact is limited to a long tenuous link between Kanem and the (recently-Christianized) Makuria. Patience is key here - the Savahila are very much curious what lies beyond but so far they haven't been ambitious enough. It would not be hard to connect this trade lane to the Great Lakes, and thus the coast, and it would likely be enormously profitable to those whose tribes lived nearby. The problem is motivating both parties to make the connection in the first place.

Time will tell.

@HonestAbe

I just want to see how the Slavic tribes transform into nations. Since it's unlikely that we'll see any equivalent to the Teutonic Order to bring Christianity to the Pagans we might see Slavic Paganism exist for longer. Or a syncretic version of Christianity might pop up. Either way Eastern Europe's going to be interesting. Hopefully the Poles won't be screwed by history this time around.
I'm not sure if the Lithuanians who were the main target of the Teutonic Order in the High Middle Ages were necessarily Slavic, but I'm equally excited to chart the rise of the various Slavic people into nations! :D Slavic paganism will likely endure longer, or at least be preserved better, without the influence of the Roman Empire.
 
I'm not sure if the Lithuanians who were the main target of the Teutonic Order in the High Middle Ages were necessarily Slavic, but I'm equally excited to chart the rise of the various Slavic people into nations! :D Slavic paganism will likely endure longer, or at least be preserved better, without the influence of the Roman Empire.

I still think that most Slavic Nations are going to adopt some form of Christianity eventually, that is, unless one of those pagan belief systems manages to gain the structure, patronage and the missionary zeal needed to become a 'major' religion, similar to the Saihists, that might have some appeal to a wider Slavic audience, but not really much beyond it.
 
I still think that most Slavic Nations are going to adopt some form of Christianity eventually, that is, unless one of those pagan belief systems manages to gain the structure, patronage and the missionary zeal needed to become a 'major' religion, similar to the Saihists, that might have some appeal to a wider Slavic audience, but not really much beyond it.

I agree, at least with regards to the Western Slavs. The Southern Slavs are already overwhelmingly Christian. What I meant was more that I think this timeline might have more accurate sources on the Slavic deities, as a result of the conversion happening more slowly. I'm imagining a world where Slavic mythology is preserved to at least degree similar to Norse mythology, rather than largely lost.

I get what you're saying, but I'm not sure I'd call the Saihists a major religion, either. While obviously the comparisons to Islam invite themselves, it doesn't have nearly the broad appeal - as one would expect from a religion whose main goal is to unite the paganism of the Hejaz with Perso-Buddhist influences. It's almost the inverse of Islam in that regard - rather than trying to make Christianity/Judaism Arab, it's trying to make the traditional religion relevant again. Not that relevance was the goal of its fictional founder, but that was why it worked, among the slew of other holy men from the time period. (If we continue the trends from Muhammad's life, there were indeed a slew of charismatic preachers - one of them had to catch on. A likely candidate was one whose message directly appeals to the tribal elite, IMO, while still offering reforms for the common man.)

Something like Saihism could emerge among the Slavs but I'm not sure its likely. Unlike the Arabs, the Slavs right now only have two models of "civilization" to draw upon - European Christendom and the Iranian Xasar-Sahu, and the latter are only well known to the East Slavs. Their choices will probably reflect those options.
 
The lesser extent of Christianity means that the further you go the more likely to have them retain their native religion or emulate Buddhism from the Xasar-Sasu. I seriously doubt that Christianity will go anywhere near OTL Russia or the Baltic.

With the Romans unlikely to care about the Baltic it appears likely that the Baltic tribes would either continue worshipping a form of their native religion or start worshipping Odin. Norse Paganism is likely to stay strong in the absence of Christianity. Some Slavic tribe between the Norse and the Xasar-Sasu might hit upon the unlikely combination of Norse paganism and Buddhism. And there's a greater chance of Baltic tribes rendered extinct by the German crusaders (like the Old Prussians) surviving.

I just wish that it'd be possible for knowledge of Mahadeva to make it's way through the Xasar-Sasu to the Eastern Slavs. It'd be interesting if they'd adapt Mahadeva into one of their gods like the Mahadevists adapted Shiva. Though I really wish that knowledge of Kali had spread that far so that bits and pieces were adapted into Chernobog. I just have a bit of a soft spot for Chernobog.
 

Deleted member 67076

I think international trade is going to pick up steadily, with all the impact that brings.

We've the breaking of pirates in Dalmatia, meaning that trade in the region will move at a much faster volume, in turn linking the Italian market furthermore with Egypt and the Red Sea.

Then there's the statebuilding in Eastern Europe, with Slavic groups beginning to invest in their lands and start up larger economies.

At the same time, the migrations of Berbers has finished, leading to many tribal groups settling down (or moving into Spain or Egypt) and linking with allied groups in the Sahel since there's less pressure to fight neighbors. This in turn brings the Camel to the Sahel which in turn revolutionizes the volume of trade passing through.

As well, there's going to be a massive network of Christian missionaries and monasteries sprouting up and down, which will link much of the world together and exchange their ideas and crops.
 
@HonestAbe1809 - good points, although I have two clarifications for the sake of the timeline:

Christianity isn't reduced too much from OTL. Really, it's just different. No Islam tends to have that effect. Sure, Constantinople has fallen and is populated by a load of "unbelievers" but Egypt remains Christian, and there's still a good number of Christian Mauri in North Africa. Perhaps the Church's overall position is worse in the East, but I'm not sure. The biggest changes involve a stronger apocalyptic undercurrent and a focus on Rome as the bastion of all orthodoxy. Weaker is an open question, especially going forwards. Bmao and others have given me a lot to think about with regard to Church and State in the Isidorian Roman Empire.

Second, plenty of the Eftal, even some Eftal "Buddhists" venerate Shiva as part of their traditional pantheon. The Mahadevists are the ones who venerate Shiva-Ahuramazda as the sole god and have built an ideology/cult around that. It's not impossible some version of Shiva has made its way to the Sahu cities, but it is unlikely to be popular. The Sahu pantheon is basically Tengri + ancient Iranian Gods and all of it is subsidiary to the various Buddhas and whatnot at this point.

@Soverihn

You're definitely right. Man, this timeline has rather stopped being about the "Rise of the White Huns" some time ago hasn't it?

I believe the camel is already on the scene in Africa and has been for a little while. Correct me if I'm wrong. The stage is set. However, I think it's an open question the degree to which Christianity (or any outside religion) will penetrate West Africa. There's so many intermediaries between West Africa and the Christian world that any expansion of a foreign religion will be slow at best. In some ways it seems to me that Islam got lucky - and even still it remained a religion of a small elite for a very long time.
 
Subcontinental Subtleties
Subcontinental Revolutions

If one element defined the collapse of the Maukhani, it was the persistence of state officials. The bureaucracy, standing to some degree outside of caste or perhaps as a caste all its own, did not simply dissolve with the fall of the Empire - in many ways there was simply nowhere for it to go. Even the newly-arisen rivals of the Maukhani, the Andhra and the Pallava, employed similar bureaucracies and professional guild armies. The bureaucratic class would play a critical role in helping to preserve a sense of regional unity that went beyond the local community. The vishyapatis and their legions of local magistrates and administrators would simply choose new masters - the sangha guilds. The village of the sangha/ayat was not a self-sufficient entity but part of a regional network. Regional specialization, coupled local guilds seeking to maximize production (and thus profit) saw economic growth in the villages which translated to the capacity to support ever larger urban populations.

Like the bureaucracy, numerous local dynasties survived the collapse as well - but as the Maukhani had spent most of their history undermining the trend of emergent monarchism, these dynasties were essentially powerless. Early in the eighth century, these otherwise feeble dynasties often attempted to utilize the professional soldiers left over in the wake of the dissolution of Maukhani authority to reassert their antique rights. In some localized cases, this worked, but generally the soldiers were not swayed by the promise of enormous, hypothetical land grants. The professional and guild soldiers were as much part of the Imperial system as the bureaucrats. They were accustomed to ample payment and a generally comfortable lifestyle in peacetime, and overthrowing the system which provided that appealed to them less than its continuance.

As such, many of these dynasties simply ceased to exist. The new Indian polities had no need for the old feudal dynasts whose sole claim to legitimacy was based in the defunct imperial system. What replaced them was a complex system. The Sangha, or guilds, of local cities formed associations and councils, often called the Ayat. These Ayat were essentially legislative bodies responsible for the governance of a city-state. It was from among their number that the new Rajas were chosen. The Rajas were typically the head of the bureaucracy, or a powerful military guild leader, and were responsible for day-to-day governance. Generally they ruled for life, although it was possible that they might be overthrown by a coalition of various guilds, especially if the military faction turned against them.

Military guilds retained their position of social predominance. Their necessity to the function of the state, especially in the early era of the collapse, ensured that they would have significant power in the "constitutions" of most of these early states. This power ranged from significant representation in the Ayat to outright rule through a Raja chosen from among their ranks. It was the existence of military guilds which allowed the rough leagues of cities to become early states, by consolidating and expanding their territory.

Tribal groups which had long enjoyed their unmolested privileges to exist on the fringes of Indian civilization became the first target of these nascent states. Under the Maukhani these groups had traditionally provided young men as soldiers and otherwise been left alone to practice rural subsistence agriculture. The new order, however, lacking the vast resources of a universal empire, was forced to appropriate their lands. While these tribes were often numerous outside of the most developed areas, they were unable to respond to the full power of the guilds being turned against them. Eventually, these tribal groups would find few options remained to them in the rural hinterlands. Many of the displaced would slowly find their way to the cities, further swelling their populations.

The story of the eighth century in India is perhaps most aptly defined as one of agrarian and social revolution. Subsistence agriculture was on the decline as farming became an increasingly guild driven affair based on internal export and surplus from profit. As farming became more organized, efficiency skyrocketed. Guilds sought to maximize agricultural produce both for profit and to jockey for position and favors within their state. Within the context of these agricultural guilds, what profits and benefits they gained were distributed in a shockingly egalitarian manner - profits were reinvested or distributed by popular consensus. However, it should be noted that these rural communities typically had little say in the broader affairs of the state and furthermore that hierarchies were still deeply prevalent, even in Buddhist areas.

The Sangha system would reach far beyond the old Maukhani. In south India, similar structures became increasingly popular. Tamil monarchs sought to emulate the centralization and organization that empowered their northern neighbors, while retaining their traditional privileges. They were often successful to a certain degree, owing to the prevalence of mercantile cities where Sangha-style governance was already prevalent. Curiously, the system seems to have evolved spontaneously and independently in Southeast Asia. Trade based city-states such as Srivijaya in Sumatra and Indranokura along the banks of the Mekong seem to have worked along similar principles, forming hegemonic semi-republican empires.

However, in India, the period of local city-states as the highest level of organization ended rapidly. By 730, political unification began en masse. Strong cities were able to exert their influence over weaker ones. "Kingdoms" would begin to form around powerful central cities, and conquests became more common. These new dominions typically bore the name of their founding city or region, and in a shocking break from the past are typically identified by such rather than by their dynastic name. In time, dynastic names would come into more prominent use in some regions, particularly those where some continuity of dynasty existed.



mEK1LVF.png


[Here is a map of the various cities and larger confederations around the period of 720-730. I'm not good at mapmaking so apologies if anything is blatantly wrong. Apologies also for the lack of concrete borders - that was a combination of me not being sure if defined borders made sense and also not knowing really where to put them. I hope this shows the degree to which things have fractured along regional lines.

I'm also curious what people think about the post. India is continuing to spiral off rather dramatically from OTL. The next post will focus on the Sahu and the Eftal, bringing them up to roughly 720 as well on the timeline. Is there anything people want me to focus on going forwards?]
 
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Deleted member 67076

India undergoes a republican and commercial revolution. GDP per capita must be huge.
@Soverihn

You're definitely right. Man, this timeline has rather stopped being about the "Rise of the White Huns" some time ago hasn't it?

I believe the camel is already on the scene in Africa and has been for a little while. Correct me if I'm wrong. The stage is set. However, I think it's an open question the degree to which Christianity (or any outside religion) will penetrate West Africa. There's so many intermediaries between West Africa and the Christian world that any expansion of a foreign religion will be slow at best. In some ways it seems to me that Islam got lucky - and even still it remained a religion of a small elite for a very long time.
Well, nothing says the real rise of the Huns can't come again? :p

Christianity will likely spread I think because the traders from the Sahel bringing new technologies and being the commercial intermediaries are likely to convert to curry favor with the post Mauri states. Additionally, its worth noting that for many larger states, commerce was a major source of income (African states tended to have very low taxes), so one would have incentive to maximize trade opportunity as much as possible. A common religion can be a powerful tool.
 
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