28. The war. #4. Mostly Politics. 1770-71.
28. The war. #4. Mostly Politics. 1770-71.
Successes of the 1770 greatly emboldened the cabinet strategists in St. Petersburg with a rather predictable result of their boldness being in a reverse proportion to the brain power. The boldest project was, surprise, surprise, proposed by Grigory Orlov who wrote an opinion that after capture of Benders an infantry corps must be sent to take Varna and from there sail to Constantinople by the sea.
This was a little bit too much for the rest of the court strategists who pointed out that the first step should be finding information about the vessels that could be obtained on the Dniester and about the Zaporhizian boats, how far do they go to the Black Sea and can they safely pass by Ochakov; in addition, before sending the infantry corps to Varna, it is necessary for Rumyantsev to establish himself on the Danube and set up magazines in it.
However, besides these fancy plans, there were more practical ones. Besides taking Benders general Peter Panin was assigned a diplomatic task. He had to try to get in touch with the Crimean Khanate and convince the Tatars to switch to the Russian side.
Four reliable Tatars from Kazan had been sent to the Crimea and in addition Panin got a rescript saying “We decided to test whether it would be possible for Crimea and all the Tatar peoples to shake their loyalty to the Port by instilling their thoughts to form an independent government.”
Panin on March 4, 1770 informed the Empress that the plan promises success: “Truly, not only all without exception are the Belogorsk, Budzhak and Edisan hordes with all their sultans, Murzas and elders by their law by oath, as a result of my letter sent to them, but also several Crimean officials under the Khan established themselves forever in the retreat from the citizenship of the Turkish scepter.”
On March 15 there was a discussion in the Council with a resulting document stating that:
To start with, offering of the “independence” was pretty much meaningless because the Crimean dependency from the Porte was not burdensome and also had a strong religious foundation. Moreover, this dependency was very beneficial for the Tatars because it provided their protection against Russia. Relations with the Khans were quite easy: they had been easily overthrown with a slightest pretext and the Porte usually did not interfere. The Girays had been generally loyal to the Porte: after being kicked out of the Crimea they usually went to their estates in Rumelia and there was a theoretical chance of them getting the Ottoman throne if Osmanli dynasty will extinct.
The members of Catherine’s Council had been using the generalities benefitting Russia but glossed over the details and implications. If the Tatars become completely free, it means that they have a right to define their relations with other states, make the alliances of their choice and, in the case of war, make alliance with the Ottomans against Russia. Which means that an argument about impossibility of the Ottoman attack on Russia becomes a pure nonsense.
The obvious answer would be that this independence would have to be limited by a close permanent alliance with Russia. But a treaty was just a piece of paper so such an alliance would have to be guaranteed by the garrisons in the fortresses, port on the Black Sea, and control of the Kerch Strait. Relations like that are defined by the word “protection”. Russia becomes protector of the Tatars who just change one protector to another and it will be naive to assume that the foreign states would not see this as the expansionist intentions with the resulting replacement of the Ottoman control of the North shore of the Black Sea with the Russian one. The Tatars understood this as well and the only reason for them to get along would be to avoid the obvious danger of a destruction.
Catherine also had doubts about the wisdom of the plan proposed by the Council but, in her usual style, decided, for a while, to go along until the whole situation becomes more clear to her. It was already obvious how well “protection” was working in the PLC and it was not a secret that Frederick got too cozy with Emperor Joseph II, which meant that Panin’s “system” is crumbling and that his political wisdom must be questioned. Definitely, an idea of maintaining the PLC as an ally against the Ottomans was a clear failure and this raised an obvious question if it worth trouble to preserve its territorial integrity by standing up to both Prussia and Austria or to go along with them regarding the PLC and annex the Crimea (and some nice piece of the PLC as well).
But in the early 1770 Crimea was not on the top of the list: the most important things had been happening between the Dniester and Danube and on the Med.
So Peter Panin sent the letter to the Khan Kaplan-Giray who answered with the following: “You explain that your queen wants to deliver the former Tatar liberties, but such words should not be written by you. We know ourselves. We are completely satisfied with everything and enjoy the prosperity. And in the old days, when we were still independent of the Ottoman Porte, everyone knows a out the countless wars and disturbances within the Crimean region so now can you represent these times as the better ones? There is nothing in your intention besides the empty words and recklessness.”
After Rumyantsev’s victories at Lagra and Kagul situation changed and there was a split among the Tatars.
The Tatars in question were divided into:
The Nogais did not have the same motive to hold on to Turkey as the Crimean Tatars themselves, or had them to a much weakest degree. The religious aspect was less important to them. They joined Karim-Giray expecting an easy loot but starting from Khotin things were not going well and they were forced to retreat to the Prut River and stay there in the conditions quite foreign to them. They did not care too much about the independency, their ancestors had been friendly with Russia and lived well selling their horses, so if the Russians are offering possibility to return home, why not accept the offer? After Lagra and Kagul there was no reason to fear the Khan or the Turks and on July 25 Panin received a message from four Edisan and one Belgorod (Akkerman) Murzas with a request for permission to pass to the Crimean side. They declared themselves under the Russian protection, denounced the Ottomans and sent hostages after which had been allowed to return to their steppe between the Dniester and Bug. Not being too concerned with the terminology, they did not see significant difference between “being under protection” and “being subjects” so its was pretty much up to Catherine and her advisors to figure out how to treat them but the Russian Empire already had plenty of the nomadic subjects so the experience (not always good) was there.
But similar talks with the Crimean Murzas failed: the Khan managed to get to the Crimea. However, many Crimean Nogais escaped the peninsula to join the Edisans.The Crimeans loyal to the Porte decided that Kaplan-Giray is not energetic enough, asked the Sultan to replace him and got (again) Selim-Giray.
In a meantime Nikita Panin in discussion with von Solms, the Prussian ambassador came out with another grand schema. Three Great Powers would have to join their efforts for kicking the Ottomans not only from Europe but also from a big part of Asia.
“Austria should turn against Turkey together with Russia: here it will find a full reward for Silesia. Prussia will gain security through this, and its possessions should be increased by Polish Prussia and Warmia. Then it will not be difficult to put an end to the dominion of the Turks in Europe; Constantinople and the regions that would remain with the Ottomans could form a republic. "And what will Russia take?" asked Solms. "Russia already has so much land that it is difficult to cope; it only needs a few border regions," Panin replied.
“God created fools and geese to have someone to tease.”
Lev Landau
“It was pleasing to God to give humanity enthusiasm to compensate for the lack of reason.”
Edmund Berk
“In politics, stupidity is not a disadvantage.”
Napoleon Bonaparte
“Apparently, there is no such stupidity in the world that smart people would not consecrate with their example.”
A. Bestuzhev-Marlinsky
"The Crimean peninsula is so important for its location that it can really be considered the key of Russian and Turkish possessions; as long as it remains in Turkish citizenship, it will always be terrible for Russia."
Chancellor Vorontsov, 1762
“We have no intention at all to have this peninsula and the Tatar hordes adjacent to it, in our citizenship, and it is desirable only that they severe from Turkish citizenship and remain forever in independence.”
Catherine II, 1770s
“Crimea is breaking our borders with its position... You must raise the glory of Russia... The acquisition of Crimea can neither strengthen nor enrich you, but only peace it will deliver.”
Potemkin to Catherine II, 1782
Lev Landau
“It was pleasing to God to give humanity enthusiasm to compensate for the lack of reason.”
Edmund Berk
“In politics, stupidity is not a disadvantage.”
Napoleon Bonaparte
“Apparently, there is no such stupidity in the world that smart people would not consecrate with their example.”
A. Bestuzhev-Marlinsky
"The Crimean peninsula is so important for its location that it can really be considered the key of Russian and Turkish possessions; as long as it remains in Turkish citizenship, it will always be terrible for Russia."
Chancellor Vorontsov, 1762
“We have no intention at all to have this peninsula and the Tatar hordes adjacent to it, in our citizenship, and it is desirable only that they severe from Turkish citizenship and remain forever in independence.”
Catherine II, 1770s
“Crimea is breaking our borders with its position... You must raise the glory of Russia... The acquisition of Crimea can neither strengthen nor enrich you, but only peace it will deliver.”
Potemkin to Catherine II, 1782
Successes of the 1770 greatly emboldened the cabinet strategists in St. Petersburg with a rather predictable result of their boldness being in a reverse proportion to the brain power. The boldest project was, surprise, surprise, proposed by Grigory Orlov who wrote an opinion that after capture of Benders an infantry corps must be sent to take Varna and from there sail to Constantinople by the sea.
This was a little bit too much for the rest of the court strategists who pointed out that the first step should be finding information about the vessels that could be obtained on the Dniester and about the Zaporhizian boats, how far do they go to the Black Sea and can they safely pass by Ochakov; in addition, before sending the infantry corps to Varna, it is necessary for Rumyantsev to establish himself on the Danube and set up magazines in it.
However, besides these fancy plans, there were more practical ones. Besides taking Benders general Peter Panin was assigned a diplomatic task. He had to try to get in touch with the Crimean Khanate and convince the Tatars to switch to the Russian side.
Four reliable Tatars from Kazan had been sent to the Crimea and in addition Panin got a rescript saying “We decided to test whether it would be possible for Crimea and all the Tatar peoples to shake their loyalty to the Port by instilling their thoughts to form an independent government.”
Panin on March 4, 1770 informed the Empress that the plan promises success: “Truly, not only all without exception are the Belogorsk, Budzhak and Edisan hordes with all their sultans, Murzas and elders by their law by oath, as a result of my letter sent to them, but also several Crimean officials under the Khan established themselves forever in the retreat from the citizenship of the Turkish scepter.”
On March 15 there was a discussion in the Council with a resulting document stating that:
- The Tatars of the Crimea and subordinated hordes will never become the useful subjects of Her Imperial Majesty because you can collect and decent taxes from them and they can’t serve to protect the Russian borders because without them nobody would attack these borders.
- Making them Russian subjects would cause jealousy and suspicion that Russia wants a limitless expansion of its territory. Such feelings must be avoided, especially when the acquisition is pretty much useless except that the Tatars will not be looting the Russian territories.
- However, it will be a great advantage for Russia if the Tatars form an independent state because the Porte will loose a tool for attacking the Russian borders.
- Which means that Count Panin must keep discussions not about them becoming the Russian subjects but about them getting, with the Russian help, independence from the Turkey. As a compensation, and as a guarantee of their security, they must accept the Russian garrisons in some of their fortresses and give Russia one of their Black Sea ports to serve as a base for our fleet, etc.
To start with, offering of the “independence” was pretty much meaningless because the Crimean dependency from the Porte was not burdensome and also had a strong religious foundation. Moreover, this dependency was very beneficial for the Tatars because it provided their protection against Russia. Relations with the Khans were quite easy: they had been easily overthrown with a slightest pretext and the Porte usually did not interfere. The Girays had been generally loyal to the Porte: after being kicked out of the Crimea they usually went to their estates in Rumelia and there was a theoretical chance of them getting the Ottoman throne if Osmanli dynasty will extinct.
The members of Catherine’s Council had been using the generalities benefitting Russia but glossed over the details and implications. If the Tatars become completely free, it means that they have a right to define their relations with other states, make the alliances of their choice and, in the case of war, make alliance with the Ottomans against Russia. Which means that an argument about impossibility of the Ottoman attack on Russia becomes a pure nonsense.
The obvious answer would be that this independence would have to be limited by a close permanent alliance with Russia. But a treaty was just a piece of paper so such an alliance would have to be guaranteed by the garrisons in the fortresses, port on the Black Sea, and control of the Kerch Strait. Relations like that are defined by the word “protection”. Russia becomes protector of the Tatars who just change one protector to another and it will be naive to assume that the foreign states would not see this as the expansionist intentions with the resulting replacement of the Ottoman control of the North shore of the Black Sea with the Russian one. The Tatars understood this as well and the only reason for them to get along would be to avoid the obvious danger of a destruction.
Catherine also had doubts about the wisdom of the plan proposed by the Council but, in her usual style, decided, for a while, to go along until the whole situation becomes more clear to her. It was already obvious how well “protection” was working in the PLC and it was not a secret that Frederick got too cozy with Emperor Joseph II, which meant that Panin’s “system” is crumbling and that his political wisdom must be questioned. Definitely, an idea of maintaining the PLC as an ally against the Ottomans was a clear failure and this raised an obvious question if it worth trouble to preserve its territorial integrity by standing up to both Prussia and Austria or to go along with them regarding the PLC and annex the Crimea (and some nice piece of the PLC as well).
But in the early 1770 Crimea was not on the top of the list: the most important things had been happening between the Dniester and Danube and on the Med.
So Peter Panin sent the letter to the Khan Kaplan-Giray who answered with the following: “You explain that your queen wants to deliver the former Tatar liberties, but such words should not be written by you. We know ourselves. We are completely satisfied with everything and enjoy the prosperity. And in the old days, when we were still independent of the Ottoman Porte, everyone knows a out the countless wars and disturbances within the Crimean region so now can you represent these times as the better ones? There is nothing in your intention besides the empty words and recklessness.”
After Rumyantsev’s victories at Lagra and Kagul situation changed and there was a split among the Tatars.
The Tatars in question were divided into:
- Crimean, mostly sedentary (there were nomadic ones in a steppe part f the peninsula). They were, in general, attached to the Ottoman Empire by the religion, convenience of having a protector and commerce. The peninsula had well-developed agriculture many products of which had been exported into the Ottoman Empire together with the highly valued local rugs and knives.
- Nogai, who under different names wandered on the then deserted shores of the Azov and Black Seas from the Kuban to the Dniester. They were much less attached to anybody and, except for the “merchandise” obtained from the raids, did not conduct any trade with the Turks. In the past, selling big numbers horses to the Tsardom was a major source of their income (at that time they lived on the lower Volga region).
The Nogais did not have the same motive to hold on to Turkey as the Crimean Tatars themselves, or had them to a much weakest degree. The religious aspect was less important to them. They joined Karim-Giray expecting an easy loot but starting from Khotin things were not going well and they were forced to retreat to the Prut River and stay there in the conditions quite foreign to them. They did not care too much about the independency, their ancestors had been friendly with Russia and lived well selling their horses, so if the Russians are offering possibility to return home, why not accept the offer? After Lagra and Kagul there was no reason to fear the Khan or the Turks and on July 25 Panin received a message from four Edisan and one Belgorod (Akkerman) Murzas with a request for permission to pass to the Crimean side. They declared themselves under the Russian protection, denounced the Ottomans and sent hostages after which had been allowed to return to their steppe between the Dniester and Bug. Not being too concerned with the terminology, they did not see significant difference between “being under protection” and “being subjects” so its was pretty much up to Catherine and her advisors to figure out how to treat them but the Russian Empire already had plenty of the nomadic subjects so the experience (not always good) was there.
But similar talks with the Crimean Murzas failed: the Khan managed to get to the Crimea. However, many Crimean Nogais escaped the peninsula to join the Edisans.The Crimeans loyal to the Porte decided that Kaplan-Giray is not energetic enough, asked the Sultan to replace him and got (again) Selim-Giray.
In a meantime Nikita Panin in discussion with von Solms, the Prussian ambassador came out with another grand schema. Three Great Powers would have to join their efforts for kicking the Ottomans not only from Europe but also from a big part of Asia.
“Austria should turn against Turkey together with Russia: here it will find a full reward for Silesia. Prussia will gain security through this, and its possessions should be increased by Polish Prussia and Warmia. Then it will not be difficult to put an end to the dominion of the Turks in Europe; Constantinople and the regions that would remain with the Ottomans could form a republic. "And what will Russia take?" asked Solms. "Russia already has so much land that it is difficult to cope; it only needs a few border regions," Panin replied.
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