Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

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18 December 1941. Alor Star, Malaya

South of the River Kedar the 6th Brigade had been doing their best to hold up the Japanese advance, using the river to anchor their positions. The 2nd Bn, East Surrey Regiment had the role of rear-guard, as the Brigade withdrew through 15th Brigade at the next line of defence. As usual the withdrawal had discovered a roadblock set up by Japanese troops who had infiltrated around the edges of the battle. It was now so familiar a tactic, that the first unit to pull out always had one of the tanks to upend the Japanese force, and once the soldiers had been cleared, the infantry pushed the roadblock materials out of the way to prevent the tank throwing a track or being disabled if the Japanese had used landmines or explosives as part of their roadblock. Two Matilda IIs had been lost in this way, and they couldn’t afford to lose any more.
11th Indian Division now had two Squadrons of Matilda II tanks, the second squadron coming from the Australians who had their own M3 Stuart tanks. With thirty-two working Infantry Tanks, each brigade now had the resources to make sure the roads would stay open.

The East Surrey’s waited for the barrage from 155th Lanarkshire Yeomanry Field Regiment’s 4.5-inch guns that would cover their retreat. Unfortunately for the East Surrey’s, Japanese aircraft hit the gunners’ positions just when that timed barrage was due. Communications between the East Surrey’s Battalion HQ and the Brigade had been cut, and so the delay to the barrage wasn’t communicated to Lieutenant Colonel George Swinton. The plan had been when the barrage started that all units that had them would use smoke bombs to cover them as they pulled out. As time passed and the barrage didn’t happen, Swinton realised that something must have gone wrong, and gave orders for the smoke screen and for the Battalion to move by Companies down the road towards Gurun.

The problem with that order was that three of the Companies were in close proximity to the enemy, and neither B or D Companies received the order. As sections and platoons were being overrun, the Lieutenants and Captains began to try to save their men, but then fighting broke out where the Battalion Transport and RIASC lorries were waiting to carry the men. A large party of Japanese troops had managed to bypass the defenders and get in among the Motor Transport. Between the Carrier Platoon and the tank waiting to lead the Battalion south, along with the drivers fighting for their lives, the Japanese force was pushed back, but nearly all the lorries were either destroyed or damaged. As the East Surrey units arrived, it was clear that they would have to march to the next position. The tank radio was able to get through to the other tank with the rest of the Brigade and informed them of the situation.

The Japanese were harrying the British soldiers all the way, the wounded often having to be left by their mates, with the terrible expectation that they find no mercy from the Japanese. Some wounded men were loaded into the universal carriers of the Carrier platoon, and even on the back of the Matilda II tank. This became a death trap for them, as once again any Japanese soldier in range would shoot at the tank as it reversed up the road trying to cover the infantry as much as possible. Men of the 1st Bn 8th Punjab Regiment advanced up the road they had just recently retreated along, to try to support the East Surreys. Since the Motor Transport Company could only lift one Battalion at a time, and it had been destroyed, as many of the Battalion transport vehicles of the 15th Brigade that could be sent forward to hasten the retreat of the East Surreys arrived at the Punjab’s positions and carried the men back to their own lines.

By the time the survivors got back to friendly lines, sixteen officers, including the Battalion CO, and 169 NCOs and Other Ranks were missing, believed Killed In Action. When the rest of the Brigade had pulled out, Lt Col Swinton had sent much of the HQ and admin troops back, so that the four rifle companies, with the mortar and carrier platoons were all that had to use the RIASC Company. The plan had always been that this would be the last action for the Brigade, which would retire and regroup around Ipoh. When they reached there and were joined by the 1st Battalion, Leicestershire Regiment from 15th Brigade, which had also suffered many casualties in the following days, the two Battalions were merged and became known as the British Battalion.

 

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19 December 1941. North Atlantic

The storm that HMS Duke of York had weathered over the previous few days had lessened, and so the Prime Minister Winston Churchill was able to sit down with his advisors to prepare for the upcoming conference with President Roosevelt. The British Chiefs of Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, The First Sea Lord; Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, with their staffs had been going through everything that Britain needed and wanted from the United States of America now that it was a co-belligerent. Hitler’s declaration of war on the United States on 11 December had been the final piece of the jigsaw, now the USA was at war against both Germany and Japan, and all their friends.

Sir Dudley Pound’s main concern, as the First Sea Lord was the Battle of the Atlantic. While the Japanese threat in the Pacific was terrible, it was the Atlantic Ocean that really mattered. Japan was a bit like Italy, its navy was impressive, trained of course by the Royal Navy, and its army was reasonable. But its economy wasn’t large enough to cause real problems. It seemed their attack on Pearl Harbour, the Philippines and Malaya were all just to open up the path to the Dutch East Indies’ oil, as seen in Borneo. The loss of HMS Barham was regrettable, but not a disaster. The rest of Force Z, which would soon be reinforced from the Mediterranean and another two carriers would be a good basis for a combined British, American, Dutch and Australian force to confront that southward advance.

Pound’s worry was that the Americans wouldn’t cooperate with the need to organise a convoy system all along the Eastern Seaboard. If the German U-Boats got among the tankers coming up from Texas, it could be very dangerous. The attack on Pearl Harbour was a disaster, and it would immediately focus the mind of the USN to concentrate on the Pacific, but Pound needed them to keep enough strength in the Atlantic. Now that he had responsibility for the PQ convoy route to northern Russia, his ability to provide enough escorts across the Atlantic was even more desperate. If, as muted by the Prime Minister that the old R Class Battleships were to go to Ceylon, that would put even more pressure on escorting the high value convoys. Getting some kind of escort carriers to provide air cover in the mid-Atlantic gap was something else he had set his heart on.

The Fleet Air Arm was very happy with the Martlets they were getting from Grumman, and now that the folding wing variety were becoming available, he wanted the three carriers working in Force Z to have these as their main fighter aircraft. Pound had also spoken to ACM Portal about increasing the effectiveness of Coastal Command with long range aircraft and more Catalinas.

Field Marshall Dill knew that his tenure as CIGS was coming to an end, he was going to be staying in Washington to head the British Joint Staff Mission. He knew that the American Army was at an early stage of development, and that the tanks and guns that were being produced didn’t meet their own domestic needs, never mind that of the British and Soviets. Dill had been trying to talk the Prime Minister out of his fixation with helping the Soviets at the cost of British forces. The tanks that the Americans were supplying to Australia and to India had taken pressure off the build-up of British Armoured Divisions but promising 500 tanks per month to the Soviets was just impossible to achieve, unless the Americans could supply about 300 of them, and not at the expense of the Empire’s own needs.

The danger was that the success in North Africa could be undone by moving the focus from the Mediterranean and Middle East to some kind of Second Front long before the Americans, or indeed the British would be ready. Currently he had the support of the First Sea Lord in putting off Churchill’s notions of invading mainland Europe. They barely had enough landing ships to support a Brigade sized force, it would be summer before the Navy could support landing a Division across a beach. Dill also had approved Wavell’s plan to use the amphibious assets he had to clear some Italian islands, in the hope of eventually opening the Mediterranean up for cargo ships to pass through safely. Dill knew that Wavell’s plans would be the basis for learning some of the skills needed for an invasion of Europe. Dill didn’t want to dilute Wavell’s command to stop that from happening, which was the danger of giving everything to Auchinleck, where the supply situation was even worse. Dill needed the American Army to grow and develop so that when the invasion came there would be enough Divisions to be able to take on the Germans with a reasonable chance of success.

Getting the Americans bloodied against the Germans was also going to have to be looked at. Dill knew that General Marshall would be less than happy with his men going to the Mediterranean, but Dill knew that invading somewhere like Sicily would be a good place to start. If Auchinleck wanted all the support needed for Malaya, Burma and to help the Dutch, having the Suez Canal route open would make life a lot easier.

With regards the Soviets, Dill had already fought Churchill over sending British troops to either the northern or southern fronts. Building up 10th Army in Persia was all very well, but 8th Army was needed where it was, not swanning off to Southern Russia. Dill was open to 10th Army taking over responsibility for the defence of Baku, to keep the oil flowing. If the Germans did get over the Caucasus Mountains, then the threat wouldn’t stop at Baku.

Air Chief Marshall Charles Portal had two priorities from the RAF’s point of view. The build-up of heavy bomber squadrons wasn’t progressing as fast as he wanted. The largest number of bomber aircraft he had been able to throw against the Germans at any given point was about 250. Rhubarb and Circus daylight operations over France and the Low Countries were disappointing in results and costly in terms of pilots and aircraft. The Prime Minister’s commitment to supplying aircraft to Russia meant that he only had about 100 more fighter aircraft defending British skies than at the height of the Battle of Britain.

Portal’s first priority therefore was the desperate need to get more aircraft. While the situation in the Middle East had improved dramatically, AM Tedder knew that 1942 would be a time for even greater efforts. He wanted Spitfires for Malta, more bombers to support the navy and its plans for an island hoping campaign to remove Italy from the picture altogether. In the light of the situation in Malaya and Burma, the decision to send 200 Tomahawks to the Far East rather than Russia, was prophetic. However, it would take time for them to become operational, and the arrival of the Kittyhawks (P40E) couldn’t come soon enough.

The first Airacobras (P39D) that had been delivered to Britain were considered very unsatisfactory. Portal wanted them all sent to Russia. The North American Mustang Mark I (NA-73) looked like a better bet for Army Cooperation squadrons than the Airacobras. Of the American fighters bought so far, the Brewster Buffalo was very poor, the Curtiss Mohawk was obsolete, only the later Curtiss aircraft could be considered first line aircraft. The order for the Lockheed Lightning (P38) had already been cancelled, at least now, with the USAAF taking possession of the Lightning I for their own use, would halt Lockheed’s somewhat bitter attempt to hold the British to their order for 15 million US Dollars.

The Boeing B17 would be a good addition to Bomber Command, but the Americans were taking all the new builds for their own USAAF, especially in the Pacific. The new Consolidated Liberator (LB30A) was also a potentially excellent aircraft to supplement Coastal Command. In addition to adding American bombers to Bomber Command, Portal wanted to see a commitment from the Americans to provide bombers and escort fighters to Britain to hit the German war effort. He also wanted as many medium bombers as he could get his hands on. The Blenheims were suffering badly, and the Martin Maryland and Baltimore were obvious replacements. The B25 and B26 were likely to be even better than the Martins, and Portal wanted early access to these. The Douglas Havoc/Boston (DB7/DB7B) were useful, but probably of more use to the Soviets.

The second priority was to make sure that the British orders, especially those bought and paid for before Lend-Lease would be fulfilled. The American aircraft plants were still being developed and there weren’t enough aircraft being built to satisfy the demand for the USAAF, the British orders, and Lend-Lease to both Britain and the Soviet Union. Portal knew that Churchill wanted to show the Soviets that Britain was sacrificing its own build up to support the Red Army as much as possible. There was no real prospect of a Second Front anytime soon. Portal thought that was all very well but increasing the bomber fleet would cause the Germans problems, and make the Luftwaffe divide its strength between the Eastern and Western Fronts.

The Prime Minister had heard all these points rehearsed again and again. He for one would be glad to be rid of Field Marshall Dill, the man had had the cheek to suggest that his idea of a strong force raiding France was akin to another Gallipoli. There were political as well as military aims in this war. While the Chiefs of Staff would all fight their own corners, Churchill had to woo Roosevelt and placate Stalin. Churchill knew just fine that an invasion of the continent would be impossible before spring or summer of 1943. The thought of trying to get thousands of American soldiers over the Atlantic with the U-boat menace as it currently stood was a nightmare. He agreed with Dill in so far as it would take time before the American army was properly trained and equipped.

Right now, Churchill could see that the Soviets, who were at the throats of the Nazis at the very gates of Moscow, needed to be supported. If Russia could once again to do the current European dictator what they had done to Napoleon, then the German menace would be defeated, once and for all. If that meant delaying the equipping of British Armoured Divisions, then so be it, as long as they were ready by 1943. Churchill was a bit surprised by Wavell’s plan. He’d never been a fan of the man, but what he and O’Connor had achieved in Africa was exceptional. Clearing the lesser Italian islands in 1942, until enough shipping could be made available for an assault on Sicily was just the kind of thing that the public needed to see. Holding up the Japanese in Malaya; being on the offensive in the Mediterranean; winning the Battle of the Atlantic; supporting the Soviets; bombing Germany; these were the things that would keep the sacrifices that were being asked of the British peoples from being resented.

Churchill knew he had to keep the Soviets in the fight. America however was the key. Only with their full economic might being brought to bear would tip the balance wholly in favour of the United Nations. All the Sterling investments in American industry to build planes and tanks and trucks would eventually be recouped. Yes, it would be painful, but with the forces of the British Empire, the might of American production, and the sacrifice of the Soviets, Hitler and Tojo would be consigned to the dustbin of history. Between September 1939 and December 1941, twenty-seven months of war had been endured. It would take at least that long again to win. With an American mother, Winston Churchill was sure that going to Washington and trying to boss them about, as his Chiefs of Staff seemed to think they could, would have the opposite effect.

The Americans were being asked to support a Communist country, something that innately went against the grain. They were also being asked to support an Empire of which they had once been thirteen colonies of and had fought a war against to ‘throw off the shackles.’ If King George VI’s Government was to present itself as if it were King George III’s, then any kind of ‘special relationship’ that Churchill was trying to build with Roosevelt would be torpedoed. While they weren’t coming to Washington as beggars at the table, Churchill wanted to make sure that the Chiefs of Staff didn’t think of the United States of America was to be at the beck and call of the British. Teamwork, cooperation, compromise would all be needed, otherwise the conferences were likely to be as stormy as the North Atlantic they were passing through. The ship could not be allowed to flounder, that was Churchill’s obsession.

 

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20 December 1941. Luton, England.

Vauxhall Motors was looking at the Churchill (as the A22 was now known) production figures. The delays that had slowed its introduction of the Infantry Tank Mark IV were finally resolved, or at least, mostly resolved. The first fourteen that had been built as pre-production models and delivered in June had been tested to destruction. The companies in the Vauxhall Group had all been gearing up to begin production of a tank that would be fit for purpose. Vauxhall, Beyer Peacock, Gloucester Railway and Broom & Wade had been producing the first production Mark I at about thirty a month between them. By the end of December, it was expected that Vauxhall’s group would begin producing 80 Mark II tanks per month. Once full production in all plants was achieved, 140 tanks per month would be handed over to the army, reaching that number probably around April 1942.

The original order for 500 tanks had been expanded to 1200 to provide six Tank Brigades, with enough spares for battle replacements. The Soviets had had chance to examine the Churchill, a delegation from their London embassy had spent time with 33rd Tank Brigade. They were completely unimpressed and had no desire for it to be sent to Russia. The Valiant was now the only tank they were interested in. Unless the War Office changed its mind, the complete order for Churchill tanks would be fulfilled sometime early in 1943.

The feedback from 33rd Army Tank Brigade, the first unit equipped with the Churchill tank wasn’t particularly enthusiastic. As a successor to the Matilda II, it didn’t really improve on it much. The 3-inch howitzer in the hull was badly positioned for the job it was meant to do. The armourers had been experimenting with moving the 3-inch howitzer into the turret mounting, which worked better. They were happy enough to have a BESA Machine Gun replace the howitzer in the hull. A few had just changed the two guns position, but the limited traverse of the 2-pdr in the hull made it very inefficient. The three Tank Battalions being equipped with the Mark I decided to go with a mix of 2-pdr tanks and 3-inch tanks in each Squadron, almost fifty-fifty.

Vauxhall had been preparing the Mark II which would be produced from the outset with the BESA in the hull. The Mark II would also have track covers and strengthened plates at the front horns. The engine intake louvres would be redesigned with the intake on the top rather than the side which was to prevent the engine being flooded when the tank was wading through water. These improvements were all very well, but the fundamental problem remained, it was terribly slow and with poor firepower. A Mark III with a new turret to take the 6-pdr was being looked at, but it would probably be a welded turret, and would take a few months to be ready for trials, longer before entry into service. This would at least make for better firepower, but would add more weight, putting more strain on the already struggling engine.

The managing director of Vauxhall, C J Bartlett had been consulted by Lord Beaverbrook about founding one or two tank factories under the control of Royal Ordnance. Rather than seven firms each building 20 tanks per month, having one large factory with the capacity to build 200 tanks per month was clearly a good idea, the idea of mass production was well established. It would mean the relocation of men and machinery, and therefore the loss of some production in the short term.

Bartlett was aware that Vauxhall hadn’t been invited to tender for designing another tank. They had offered various ideas based on the A22 Churchill, both a lighter ‘cruiser’ type and an even more heavily armoured version. It was becoming obvious that once production of the Churchill was wound down, Vauxhall would be asked to move to building someone else’s design. He knew that Nuffield were working on a Crusader replacement, and that Vickers were almost ready to put the Victor into production. Vulcan Foundry’s Matilda II production was beginning to wind down, both North British Locomotives and London, Midland & Scottish were completing their orders and hadn’t received any more orders for the Matilda. Springburn would be concentrating on the Light Tank Mark VII and LMS at Crewe were joining Vickers to produce the Victor.

There had been times that Bartlett had feared that the A22 project would be cancelled altogether. The attempts to get the product right, and tested properly had taken longer that hoped, but was still less than the two years that such a project would normally take. By late 1942 the Army would have most of their order for a replacement for the Matilda II. By the end of 1942, Vauxhall’s foray into tank design and manufacture would likely have come to an end. That being the case, Beaverbrook’s idea for a couple of large tank factories under the auspices of Royal Ordnance would make a lot of sense. Bartlett was happy to recommend to the Board of Directors that that heavy engineering department put together in a hurry to build tanks should be handed over to the Government, and let Vauxhall concentrate on doing what they do best.

 

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21 December 1941. Kuala Krai. Malaya

Sergeant Tommy Docherty could hardly keep his eyes open. The nightmare that had begun on the morning of 8 December just seemed to be getting worse. He’d watched his mate, Sergeant Bill Morris burn to death as fire took hold of his Matilda II tank. His own close encounters with fanatical Japanese troops had left him with a bandage round his shoulder from a sword cut of all things. The fighting along the River Kelantan seemed never ending. No sooner than one attack had been rolled back, his crew would hardly have had time to refuel and rearm the tank, when they’d be thrown into the fray to break up another attack.

The problem for Docherty was as soon as he closed his eyes to sleep, he could see that Japanese officer bringing his curved sword down towards his neck. Then he woke up screaming, he was desperately tired, but scared to sleep. The river line couldn’t be held forever, and slowly, but surely the three Brigades of 9th Indian Division were being pushed back. The railway at Kuala Krai was where supplies were brought forward and the wounded evacuated.

General Barstow had been husbanding his final reserves to hold the railhead. Docherty’s tank was one of six that had been withdrawn from the almost constant battles to with the Light Aid Detachment were waiting. For twenty-four hours everyone had worked on the tanks to make sure there were no defects, nothing that would go wrong. Like the men fighting the tanks, the machines had suffered. The Japanese had killed Bill Morris’ tank with petrol bombs. Most of the tanks being worked on had burn marks as well as dents in the armour in places where all sorts of weapons from rifle bullets to artillery shells had tried to kill the tank and its crew.

A broken track pin led to the death of Bill Morris’ crew. The track breaking meant they were immobilised, and despite the heroic efforts of the Indian troops protecting the tank, the Japanese had swarmed it, and at least six petrol bombs had been thrown over it. Docherty had watched in horror as a bottle broke on the edge of the turret covering Morris with dancing flames. Pat Currie, Docherty’s gunner had done his best to keep the Japanese off, but as the crew of Morris’ tank had tried to bale out, they’d been pulled out and hacked and bayoneted to death. Once it was clear that the whole crew were dead, then Currie made the Japanese pay, burning out the BESA barrel wiping them out.

Their own trial had been the day afterwards, and once again they’d supported an Indian counter-attack, but the Japanese didn’t back off this time. A fresh Company appeared from nowhere and hit the Indians in the flank. Docherty had the hatch open trying to communicate with the Major leading the Indians when a dozen Japanese soldiers rushed the tank. Docherty always had the machine pistol in his hand when he was out of the turret, and he fired off the full clip of thirty rounds. Still the Japanese came on, that one officer with the sword swinging down towards Docherty’s neck, until there was a great red blossom on his chest. The .455 round from the Major’s Webley saved Docherty’s life, though momentum brought the edge of the blade down on his shoulder. They’d managed to pull out, but the counter-attack had failed, and so, while Docherty was being fixed up at an aid station, the Brigade had to pull back another couple of miles.

Barstow’s reserve consisted of 2nd Bn, 18th Royal Garhwal Rifles, who’d arrived from Kuantan after a round about journey. 8th, 9th and 22nd Brigades were shadows of their former selves. The Indian State Forces had done much better than Barstow had feared, but they were now spread throughout the other Battalions as battle replacements. Lieutenant General Percival had asked Barstow to keep fighting as long as he could. The whole of 9th Australian Division were now arrived and working like mad with 8th Australian to be ready. The 18th Infantry Division were due to begin arriving within days, but those three Divisions needed as much time as possible to prepare themselves. The longer 9th and 11th Indian Divisions could hold the Japanese as far north as possible, the longer the Australian Corps had time to prepare.

The Japanese had forced a crossing near the Guillemard railway bridge and seemed to have a pontoon bridge over the river. Barstow’s plan was to use the six tanks and the fresh Garhwal Rifles to attack that position, hopefully with the tanks acting together as an unstoppable force, the Japanese foothold could be reduced or even eliminated. When Lt Col Guy Hartigan had briefed his men, and the tank crews, he noted that the RAF would support the attack. After the laughter had died down, he said he had been assured that a squadron of Buffaloes would be escorting a squadron of Blenheim bombers to try to destroy the bridge or at least give the Japanese something else to worry about.

For Docherty and most of the tank commanders, just having some friendly aircraft in the sky would make all the difference. Movement tended to happen at night to try to keep the Japanese aircraft off their backs. Promises of air support had never been kept in the past, and in their minds the British troops wouldn’t be planning on relying on the ‘fly-boys’ this time either.

With two troops of tanks, Lieutenant Bill McLennan was in charge, and he spent a good deal of time with the other tank commanders to go over how they were going to work together. All the tanks had been used singly, or at most in pairs. Having two troops was something of a novelty, but this was more like their pre-war training. All of the tank commanders wanted a bit more time to work with the Garhwal Rifles. There were a lot of lessons that had been hard learned, and the 2nd Bn 18th Royal Garhwal Rifles hadn’t had much training with tanks. The temptation was to delay the counter-attack for another day to allow more training and rehearsing. General Barstow had put a lot of effort into getting the timing for the artillery support, the RAF support, and putting as much of 9th Brigade together as possible to back up the counter-attack force and try to make sure that should the attack be successful there would be a follow-on force to hold the ground. It was the last throw of the dice, if this counter-attack failed in its objectives, then withdrawal south was the only option.

The bandage around Docherty’s shoulder meant that getting in and out of the turret hatch was always painful. The six tanks had driven the fifteen miles to the jump off point during the night. The whole Division’s artillery force were pounding the Japanese positions, hopefully hiding the sound of the tanks’ approach. Miracle of miracles, the RAF arrived on time, and the twelve Blenheim Is of 27 Squadron RAF managed to drop their bombs roughly where they were needed. Three of them didn’t return to but were victims of ground fire or were picked off by the fighters that the Buffaloes couldn’t deal with. The soldiers didn’t know it, but it was No 23 Sqn RAF that were providing cover for the attack. Both squadrons had flown the previous day to Kluang from where they had been able to fly with full fuel tanks and bomb loads. The Japanese fighters they encountered were Type 97 (Nakajima Ki-27) which the Buffalo, despite its own failings, got the better of.

For once therefore that Indian Division’s attack went forward under friendly air cover, at least initially. The concentration of the Division’s artillery provided the tanks and men of HartForce (as the counter-attack force was named) good cover and support. At the start point, Docherty’s tank, with a platoon of Garhwals began to move forward, the timing of the barrage lifting as the tanks and men advanced to contact. The direct of attack had been chosen to give the tanks as much room as possible to push forward together. One of the six Matilda’s was a Close Support tank, with a 3-inch howitzer, and the HE rounds were put to very good use. In the second miracle of the day, the British counter-attack ran into the Japanese who were themselves preparing to attack the 9th Infantry Brigade positions. Between the British bombers, the artillery and now the tanks, the Japanese 42nd Regiment found itself ill-placed to deal with the counter-attack.

By late morning the tanks and Garhwal Rifles had pushed the Japanese back to the river. Matilda II tanks normally carried 93 rounds for the 2-pdr and 2925 rounds of 7.92mm for the BESA co-axial MG. Each of the gun tanks had halved the number of 2-pdr rounds, and doubled the MG ammunition. This was the last of the 7.92mm ammunition held by the quartermasters, and once it was gone, the tanks would be pretty useless. Part of the build up for the Japanese attack was the arrival over the pontoon bridge of a tank company of ten Type 97 tanks and two Type 95 tanks. It was probably wasn’t the largest tank versus tank engagement of the Malayan campaign, but for the six British tanks it was quite a change from their normal experience so far.

The nature of the terrain meant that the two tank forces encountered one another a close range, nullifying the range advantage of the 2-pdr over the 57mm gun on the Japanese tanks. As often the case, when tanks engaged one another the advantage was with whichever tank saw, fired and hit first. Sergeant Docherty was the first of the British tank commanders to see the Japanese tanks, and his gunner, Corporal Pat Currie, who had a 2-pdr round ready in the main gun, was the first to fire, but it was only a glancing shot off the turret. The Japanese tanks all had the advantage of being faster and more manoeuvrable, but the armour on the Matilda II was effective, unless the Japanese could score hits at close range to the rear and sides where the armour was thinner.

With the tanks engaged in point blank fighting, the sepoys of the Garhwal Rifles struggled to keep up the momentum of the counter-attack, allowing the Japanese infantry to recover and begin to move up to support their tanks. Two of the British tanks were disabled within a few minutes of the fighting, but so were six of the Japanese tanks. The British gunners found that their machine gun ammunition could penetrate the Japanese tanks at the very close range they were fighting at, and it was easier to bring the co-axial machine gun to bear on the moving Japanese tanks that it was to lay on the 2-pdr gun. A third British tank was stopped with damage to its tracks, but the fifteen minute engagement finished as the last Type 95 tank was the focus of the fire from the remaining British tanks.

Docherty found himself back on the defensive. The Garhwal Rifles’ officers were trying to get their men back into some kind of order. Lieutenant McLennan had been killed along with his crew, so Docherty was now the senior surviving tank commander. A quick radio conversation with the other two tanks, noting they were both fully mobile and capable of continuing, the problem was trying to reach Lt Col Hartigan to find out what he wanted done. While still trying to figure reach him, Corporal Currie warned him that the Japanese infantry were on the move, the warning followed immediately by the co-axial MG opening fire.

The Japanese assault was what became known as a ‘Banzai Charge’. The three British tanks acted as three hard points to the Garhwal Rifles’ positions. Just as Docherty feared they would be overrun as the Japanese attacked without thought to their losses, the weight of fire from the Indian side increased dramatically. 3rd Bn 12th Frontier Force Regiment arrived and the Sikhs were delighted to find their enemy out in the open. Once more the balance of the battle swung back in favour of the Indian troops.

Lt Col Hartigan had been wounded, and command passed to Lt Col Jeffrey Blood, CO of 3/12th Frontier Force. Blood mounted Docherty’s tank and seemed to be in high spirits. Docherty reported the state of his troop of tanks, and the Lieutenant Colonel ordered him to advance. Blood and his men had been in East Africa where a small detachment of Matilda II tanks had made a big difference. His feeling was that the time was right to keep moving forward, keep the Japanese on the backfoot for a bit longer. Because Docherty’s tanks all had radios, Blood asked if he could attach the Royal Artillery Forward Observer to one of the tanks and for one of his rifle companies to support the tanks. Docherty agreed, he could hardly do otherwise. An RA Sub-Lieutenant Philip Scholes came aboard the tank and Docherty showed him the radio set-up. Jimmy McMahon, the loader having to make room for him wasn’t happy, but told to be quiet. Within moments, the Royal Artillery was starting lay ranging rounds, followed by a general barrage. Docherty and Currie couldn’t help wonder how he managed to do it so quickly, but the order to move forward gave them other things to think about.

With only three tanks in the vanguard, the rifle companies of 3/12 FF Regt formed a wedge shape, with Docherty’s tank at the point. The turret was very cramped with four men, and Docherty and Scholes took turns looking out the hatch and periscopes. The counter-attack, having regained its momentum, was beginning to run into the Japanese gun line, the artillery which they had managed to get over the river. This posed another threat to the tanks, while difficult to achieve a direct hit on a tank from an emplaced artillery piece, it wasn’t impossible. Once more Scholes played his role, calling down the British artillery on the Japanese gunners.

The advance with three tanks, armed effectively with only one machine gun each, was a real limiting factor. Docherty had trained on an A11 with the 2-pdr pompom gun, which he would happily have given his left arm for at the moment. Currie fired the 2-pdr occasionally, but the BESA was in danger of overheating, and every time there was a stoppage, it felt like the end of the world. McMahon began shouting out how many belts of ammo were left as he changed out the empty box. It was clear to Docherty that the forward momentum wasn’t going to last much longer. The word from the other two tanks was about the same, whenever Docherty could get through to them, which meant Scholes had to come off the link to the Royal Artillery.

Lt Col Blood reappeared on the back of Docherty’s tank. It was becoming clear that getting all the way to the river to destroy the pontoon bridge wasn’t going to happen. Casualties to the Frontier Force Regiment were mounting steadily, and even with the rest of the Garhwal Rifle’s support, there was no guarantee of success. Blood was happy enough with the spoiling attack, especially having knocked out the Japanese artillery unit. Scholes therefore called for another barrage and then smoke to cover their withdrawal. Knowing what the Japanese were like, the wedge was reformed heading back to 9th Brigade’s positions. They would likely have to fight as hard to get back as they had to get to where they were.

It was late evening before Docherty’s tank arrived back at the railhead, where instead of refuelling, the surviving three tanks were driven onto flat cars, and withdrawn towards Gemos. Whatever happened the rest of the night Docherty and his crew knew nothing about, they slept like babies all the way back to where they and their tanks could be fixed up for their next battle.

 

[allanpcameron]

22 December 1941. Gurun. Malaya.

4th Bn 10th Baluch Regiment had been keeping watch over the Ledge, to foil Japanese attempts to repair the road. There had been a number of Japanese attempts at infiltration around the Indian positions, but nothing that had seriously threatened their position. Once it became clear that the main Japanese efforts were now against 9th Indian Division at the River Kelantan, the 4th Battalion were withdrawn back into Malaya to work with the rest of 10th Indian Brigade.

Lieutenant Stan Alden was happy to see the men of the Baluch Regiment back, they’d worked well with his troop of Matilda II tanks during the invasion of Thailand. It was also becoming clear to Alden that they were going to need every man and machine available in the coming days. The men of 6th and 15th Infantry Brigades had done brilliantly slowing the Japanese advance, but it had taken a terrible toll on them. They had now passed through the lines and were somewhere south trying to sort themselves out. They had passed through the positions of 28th Brigade at Gurun, while 10th Brigade covered the possible outflanking routes to the east of the coast road.

28th Gurkha Infantry Brigade was made up of three Battalions that hadn’t had a great deal of training before arriving in Malaya, but the efforts of the other two Brigades in 11th Indian Division had given them time to create a very strong defensive position with good depth. Because 10th Brigade was a bit more mobile, and had more experience, their job of protecting the Gurkha’s flank was crucial to the next battle. Interestingly the Japanese had paused for two days, and from what intelligence could be gathered, a new formation was moving into the line. The Imperial Guards Division was taking over from 5th Division, whose casualties had left them very weakened. When Alden had heard about the Guards Division his immediate thought was to compare them to the British Guards Regiments. From what could be gleaned from whatever intelligence existed, there was some truth to the statement, but it was believed that the three Regiments that the Division consisted of had no combat experience.

Alden had managed to talk to a few of the tank crews which had be attached to 8th and 15th Brigades. They’d warned Alden and his men about some of the things that they should be aware of and complained about the lack of HE shells for the 2-pdr. There had been Japanese tanks along with the infantry, and for those the 2-pdr was more than adequate, but Alden was warned to bring as much MG ammunition as possible. The Quartermasters back in Singapore were tearing their hair out at the quantities of 7.92mm ammunition and BESA barrels being used by the tanks. A desperate call for more ammunition to be sent from Middle East Command had been made, and it was hoped for this to arrive by air. The good news was that there was plenty of captured German ammunition there but getting it to Singapore and then putting it into the 225 round belts, and then up to the tanks themselves was a worry.

The Australians were also becoming aware that the M3 Stuart tanks that their Cavalry Regiments were using in Malaya would suffer from a similar problem. The American built tank had the capacity to use five Browning M1919A4 machine guns. The co-axial and bow mounted guns had been retained, as had the machine gun on the turret roof, which was meant to be used in an anti-aircraft role. The decision had been made in Australia not to use the two side sponson positions, as the crew would have enough to do. While the M3 Stuart had the advantage of two forward firing machine guns over the Matilda II’s one, the M5 37mm gun was very similar to the 2-pdr, but did have the fixed HE shell M63, with a bursting charge of 0.085lbs (38.5g). Better than nothing, it wasn’t exactly powerful. With the way in which the British tanks had been going through ammunition, the supply of .30 MG ammunition was being looked at. Since it was coming from the United States via Australia, more was being requested as a matter of urgency. The Australian quartermasters were sending cables to Canberra to expedite more ammunition to be sent as quickly as possible.

For Lieutenant Stan Alden among the other things he had learned from the tankies involved so far, was to try to keep his troop together. When the tanks had been working individually if one was disabled, throwing a track for example, there wasn’t any help to tow the tank out. The whole of 11th Bn RTR, which arrived with 58 A12 Infantry Tanks Mark II, was now committed to the fray. Even the tanks held back on Singapore Island had been brought forward. Because the Australian Cavalry Regiments had more M3 Stuart light tanks, Lt Col Hedderwick had agreed to his Battalion being used entirely by 9th and 11th Indian Divisions. Even then, the remains of the squadron with 9th Division was being withdrawn as it was becoming ineffective.

The fear of the tanks being used up in penny packets had been realised, and now Hedderwick insisted on the tanks being used in Troops of three exclusively. No longer single tanks were be used and each troop commander and tank commander had written orders to this effect. The temptation for infantry officers to have tank support for their particular effort against the Japanese would wear out the tank battalion too quickly.

Lieutenant Alden’s Squadron Commander, Major Howard Laver, was particularly keen on keeping to this tactic. He had made it clear to the 10th and 28th Brigade Commanders (Brigadiers ‘Pete’ Rees & William Carpendale) that they each had three Troops of three tanks. He had reorganised his own HQ Troop, so that he had one CS tank and Alden’s troop had the other. Laver was working with the Gurkhas on the main road defences, while Alden stayed with 10th Brigade. Each Battalion in both Brigades therefore had a troop of three tanks assigned. Alden was back with the Baluch Regiment, on the right flank of the defensive line around Gurun.

The fight between the Gurkhas and the Imperial Guard on the main road was a bloody affair. There was little room for the Japanese to manoeuvre around the Gurkha’s positions, and since it was their normal tactic, the Gurkhas were well prepared for it. Since there was no room nearer the sea, it came as no surprise when elements of 4th Guards Regiment started appearing in the area that the Baluch Regiment were defending. Alden and his troop were with the Battalion HQ, where with C Company in reserve, they would be able to respond to whichever threat was identified as being the greatest danger.

The route the Japanese took brought them up the valley of the River Padang Terap. Baluch Regiment’s CO (Lt Col William Dean) believed that the Japanese would try to use the river to threaten either to move east to bypass Sungei Patani or west to hit the Gurun position from the rear. If they did this, they’d meet 2nd Battalion HLI to deal with. Dean had placed his main force of A and D Companies, along with the mortar platoon just where the first elements of the Japanese troops arrived. After a brief fire-fight, the Japanese retired, seemingly doing reconnaissance by fire. B Company, along with the carrier platoon, were further to the east, nearer the River Muda in case the Japanese tried a flanking movement in that direction. HQ Company and C Company, along with Alden’s tanks, were about 800 yards back along the road beside the River Muda. If B Company’s positions lost control of the River Muda crossing at Jeniang, Alden’s tanks would have nowhere to cross the river.

Firing from the HLI positions told Alden that the Japanese were probing to the west, but the firing was sporadic, which he presumed meant that it was again simply a reconnaissance probe. The firing from B Company’s position began in earnest. B Company’s OC used the field telephone system to report that a strong Japanese force was coming at him, including at least five tanks. Each of the rifle companies had one Boys anti-tank rifle, and while they were capable of disabling a Japanese tank, the range to do so usually was a bit close for comfort. Within a few moments A and D Companies also opened fire, and again the OC informed Lt Col Dean that a strong force was also attacking his positions, again with tanks.

Dean wasn’t keen on committing his reserve too quickly. B Company had the carrier platoon, and it was armed with another four Boys anti-tank rifles, and during their time at the Ledge, the men had become quite adept at using the .55-inch rifle to hit Japanese equipment at a distance. The firing continued from all three forward Companies, and again the sound of fire from the HLI positions increased. The Brigade had the support of two batteries each of 4th and 144th Field Regiment RA, and their Forward Observer Officers soon had the power of thirty-two 25-pdrs bearing down on the Japanese forces. The timely intervention of the artillery gave A and D Companies, along with the mortar platoon, a breather, allowing the men to replenish and improve positions. B Company were struggling, even with the assistance of the artillery. The heavy fire of the multiple Vickers-Berthier guns certainly caused the Japanese problems, but B Company’s position was compromised by a small group of Japanese troops with two tanks that had split the B Company’s platoons.

When informed of this Lt Col Dean believed it was time to commit his reserve, and order Alden and C Company forward. They were given strict instructions to counter-attack the enemy, allow B Company to sort itself out, then return to HQ. The half mile along the ‘road’ only took fifteen minutes to cover, C Company marching alongside the three tanks. 15 Platoon was to stay with the tanks, while 13 and 14 Platoon would lead the counter-attack, with the tanks and 15 platoon operating as a base of fire. There was a pause just shy of B Company’s positions while Lieutenant Alden and the Captain of C Company made contact with B Company’s OC to get the lay of the land and where exactly the counter-attack was needed. Alden could see why the Japanese tank was causing so many problems, and knew that destroying that tank was the first order of business. Once that was done, the infantry should be able to sort out the rest.

Alden gave a quick report to the other two tank commanders with a simple map of where things were, and how he wanted to engage the Japanese tank. Alden had learned that the Japanese were using two tanks which they called Type 95 and Type 97, the first a ‘light tank’ and the second a ‘medium tank’. To Alden’s gunner they were still just tin cans, but the one giving B Company trouble was a Type 97 with a 57mm gun which was mostly for infantry support, not unlike the CS Matilda II’s 3-inch gun. Alden knew that his gunner could take out the Japanese tank quite easily, if he could get to a good position. The two gun tanks would approach the Japanese position while the CS tank would use its HE capacity to support the infantry counter-attack.

Sometimes it could feel as if tank against tank engagements were a matter of stalking a foe, other times it was a melee. This was more like stalking, as Alden guided his driver to a position where the gunner could engage the Japanese tank. With all the firing and with bullets banging off the Japanese tank, Alden hoped that the tank commander would be deaf to the sound of the three Matilda II diesel engines approaching. Sure enough, his gunner reported that he was ‘on’ the Type 97 and both he and the other tank gunner fired almost simultaneously. The sudden death of the Japanese tank was the signal for the infantry to begin the counter-attack. With the CS tank and then the two gun tanks crashing into view, 13 and 14 Platoons advanced with bayonets under the cover of the many VB light machine guns from the carrier platoon. Alden spotted another Type 97 and a Type 95 on B Company’s flank. The gunners’ had 2-pdr shells flying at them within seconds of them being spotted. Another Type 95 was burning, presumably the victim of an anti-tank rifle, but the gunner fired another 2-pdr round into it, ‘just to be sure.’ The co-axial machine guns added to the fire power from B and C Companies, and the Japanese attack withered under it. Alden called a halt when the three tanks reached the road. They continued firing, supporting C Company as they pushed the Japanese back the way they had come.

Over the radio came a message from Lt Col Dean to say that A and D Companies were also requesting tank support. Alden acknowledged the order and searched out C Company’s OC. It took about ten minutes to get C Company reorganised, and for B Company to reform itself. The report from A and D Companies was that it was a very strong Japanese force attacking, so Lt Col Dean authorised for the carrier platoon to support C Company and the tanks. As they set off, one section of carriers went ahead to scout, while the tanks, carriers and infantry followed.

A few minutes later Alden saw that one of the carriers was burning and that the other two had withdrawn. The Subaltern, second-in-command of the platoon, who had gone ahead with the first three carriers jumped up onto Alden’s tank to give him a quick briefing. They waited for a couple of moments until C Company’s Captain arrived to hear what was going on. As the three carriers had rounded a bend, there was a roadblock, with some kind of anti-tank gun covering it. The first carrier hit a mine, and then was hit by the anti-tank gun and there were at least two light machine guns also in action. The other two carriers had reversed back around the bend and the VB guns were covering the sides of the road in case of Japanese infiltration.

Mines were a worry, and the chances of throwing a track on the roadblock was obviously not something he wanted to do. He outlined an idea to the infantry Captain who was a bit surprised, but happy to agree. Alden gathered his two tank commanders and gave them their orders. The CS tank was to approach the bend and begin laying a combination of smoke and HE rounds on the roadblock, a few VB teams from the carrier platoon and a platoon of C Company would join them to keep the Japanese’ heads down.

When they had stalked the Japanese tank, Alden had found that the ‘jungle’ while thick wasn’t really a hinderance to the Matilda II. He would take his tank off the road and towards the roadblock position from the left-hand side, the other gun tank would go off on the right. Each tank would have a platoon of C Company following the tank through the jungle and then attack the roadblock from the flank. Alden thought that about 100 yards off the road would be sufficient to give the Japanese a real problem.

With the carrier burning in the centre of the road there was already something of a smoke screen. The CS tank approached the burning carrier until one side of the roadblock was visible and began lobbing HE shells at it. The infantry closed up with the CS tank and began rapid firing towards the Japanese positions.

Lieutenant Alden, remembering the stories from the Great War, walked in front of the tank for the first 100 yards making sure that there weren’t any problems hiding in the undergrowth. He was pleased to have a very large Naik and four sepoys walking with him as he guided the tank driver through the jungle. Once he had paced off 100 yards he ordered the tank to turn, and with the NCO and half a section still proceeding the tank they set off towards the Japanese. Alden watched from the turret as the tank crushed the bushes and small trees out of the way. The five soldiers kept their distance ahead of the tank, occasionally holding up a hand to halt the tank. A few times the men from the Baluch Regiment chose an easier path, but it didn’t take long for them to come upon the Japanese outpost protecting the roadblock’s flank. As soon as the sepoys and the Japanese started trading fire, Alden ordered the driver to advance with as much speed as he could, the gunner opened fire with the co-axial and Alden noted that the men of 14 Platoon supporting him were fanning out on either side of the tank, moving through the jungle, pausing only to fire and keep moving.

Alden had guessed right. The distance of 100 yards off the road wasn’t the thickest jungle, and the Naik who had led them had brought them to a perfect position to attack the roadblock from the flank. The gunner identified the Japanese anti-tank gun and covered it with a ten second burst from the BESA, followed by a 2-pdr shell which actually managed hit the axle of the gun. As Alden’s tank pulled into the road the Japanese troops were in full retreat but being picked off by the fire from the tank and infantry. About three minutes later the second gun tank arrived, but the roadblock had already been overwhelmed by then. Signalling back to the CS tank, the rest of C Company and the carrier platoon moved forward, having carefully checked for more mines, and the men cleared the trees and other material the Japanese had used to create the roadblock.

There was a flurry of communications through Alden’s tank radio with Lt Col Dean and the C Company OC. The latest news from A and D Companies remained grim, artillery support was helping, but they were being pushed back by superior numbers. Dean wanted the tanks and infantry to hit the Japanese in the flank as quickly as possible. Both Alden and the Captain of C Company knew that their attack on the roadblock would have alerted the Japanese that they were coming down the road and would likely have put out a further flank guard. Alden wondered about doing the same again. Having the three tanks crash through the jungle off the road, with the infantry and carriers following in their wake. The Japanese generally seemed to think, with reason, that the British were tied to the roads. Giving them a taste of their own medicine seemed like a good idea. Alden’s experience of having the half section walking the route ahead of the tank was probably slower, but more likely to avoid getting stuck.

The C Company Captain agreed but wanted a larger arrowhead of men ahead of the tanks. He ordered 14 Platoon to take the lead, with the Naik who’d previously led Alden’s tank leading his rifle section at the point of the arrowhead, the other two rifle sections to left and right. The Platoon commander would ride on the back of Alden’s tank, trying to keep an eye out for any trouble. Once more Alden walked with the Naik and his section guiding his driver about 100 yards off the road on the left hand side, moving westwards towards the Japanese flank. At about 100 yards the jungle did start to thicken, so Alden got back on his tank, but not before shaking the hand of the Baluch Naik, and wishing him well.

The going was tough, but they kept to a decent walking pace of about three miles an hour, which brought them to the edge of the battle within ten minutes. The three tanks had been travelling in single file, with the carrier platoon behind them taking advantage of the flattened undergrowth. When they drew near the leading section held up their hands to stop the tanks. Alden ordered the driver to switch off the engine and ordered the other tanks to do the same, the carriers followed their example so that the jungle had gone silent. 14 Platoon’s commander went forward, with Alden, joined presently by the Captains of C Company and the carrier platoon. They decided the easiest way to advance would be for the three tanks to go line abreast, with the carriers following, and when the jungle thinned, for the carriers to go out on the flanks to provide crossfire with their VB light MGs. Each of the three rifle platoons would support one tank each, and work alongside it. Alden put the CS tank in the centre, while he would go to the left and the other gun tank to the right, with spacing between them of no more than thirty yards. Once everything was agreed, they agreed they would start off in ten minutes to let everyone be told what their job was, and to get in place.

When ten minutes had crawled by on his watch, Alden ordered the driver to go, and keeping to marching pace, led the counter-attack into the Japanese flank. His guess had been right, the Japanese had prepared another roadblock and had the strength of about a company of men to hold it, along with anti-tank guns and three Type 97 tanks. The route Alden and 14 Platoon took brought them out at the rear of the roadblock, where the gunner made short work of the tanks, and the infantry, with a couple of carriers in support put the Japanese troops to flight. One of the anti-tank guns managed to get a round off which left a groove in the armour on the side of the turret and a loud ringing noise in Alden’s turret. The co-axial MG made short work of the Japanese gun crew. With the roadblock neutralised, Alden brought his tank back into line with the rest of the troop and began to roll up the flank of the Japanese attacking force. ‘Like a hot knife through butter’ was the gunner’s opinion. While he was firing away, he and the loader got into an argument about just how many tin cans the gunner had killed so far.

As they were still doing the jobs, Alden didn’t intervene, but opened the hatch to focus on what was going on around him. The big Naik who’d led the tank was marching alongside, firing a VB from the hip. Alden motioned for him to come up onto the back of the tank, and fire over the turret. The smile he received in return was something to behold, and soon the big man on beside him, his number two alongside with reloads for the VB. Alden ducked down inside so he would be deafened by the fire and wondered if he’d done the right thing. Tanks were bullet magnets, and riding on the back would expose the big man. Alden couldn’t second guess himself, and the Naik seemed keen to take up the position, so Alden left him to it.

One of the problems of being a Troop Leader was that not only was he responsible for fighting his own tank, he also had to keep an eye out for the other two tanks in the troop. The large explosion close to the CS tank brought him back to his role. A Japanese field gun had been turned to fire on the tanks, and if there was one field gun, there was probably a battery of them. Sure enough, the three tanks found themselves facing four guns that looked a bit like Indian mountain artillery guns.

Once again the mantra of the first to see, first to fire, first to hit was the key to success. The range between the tanks and the guns was only about 5oo yards, and all three tanks opened up with their co-axial MGs, the CS tank putting an HE round into the ground just in front of the gun that had fired previously. The explosion knocked the gun and crew over, but that crew had been in the process of reloading. The other three guns were firing over open sights, and for direct fire artillery under pressure they came very close, one was just over the CS tank in the middle, the other gun tank was pelted with shrapnel and mud from a near miss just in front of the tank. Alden’s tank was rocked as the shell missed by about ten yards, and he feared for the two men on the back of the tank as the sound of shrapnel rang off the armour.

All four guns were put out of action before they could fire again. When Alden opened the hatch he found only blood stains where the Naik had been. He could see the two Indian lying on the ground, but he couldn’t tell if they were dead or just badly injured. The ground beyond the guns cleared somewhat and the carrier platoon extended the flanks of the counter-attack which broke the Japanese. It transpired that the tanks had overrun a Regimental HQ which had been using the four guns as a last resort. The fighting wasn’t over by a long chalk, but C Company were soon linked with A and D Companies of 4/10th Baluch Regiment, and then Alden’s troop met the troop of tanks supporting the 2nd Bn HLI who had been advancing from the other flank.

Alden wanted to get back to the Battalion HQ where a truck with petrol, oil and ammunition was waiting. Lt Col Dean noted that the counter-attack had been successful, the Japanese were fleeing into the jungle and that his Battalion was once more in control of the situation. Alden ordered the driver to lead the troop back to HQ but as he did so he found the 2nd Lieutenant commanding 14 Platoon and asked after the Naik who’d been blown off his tank. The good news was that the Naik was alive, though with some extra holes from the shrapnel, the bad news was that the number 2 was dead, he’d taken the worst of the explosion and saved the Naik’s life. Alden asked for his best wishes to be conveyed to the Naik and promised to send him the chocolate from his rations in gratitude for his work.

 

[allanpcameron]

23 December 1941. Kuching, Borneo.

Lt Col Henry Moorehead (CO Sarawak Force 3rd Bn 16th Punjab Regiment and 5th Bn 14th Punjab Regiment) had been in contact with the Dutch force at Singkawang II airfield. The Dutch had 750 men and a tank and armoured vehicle detachment protecting their airfield. It was just 70 miles from Kuching, but the road towards the Dutch East Indies border ended at Krokong, with a river ferry Batu Kitang before that that needed to be defended. Between Krokong and Singhawang II there was almost forty miles of virgin jungle.

The planning that A/Lt Col Lane had in place before the arrival of Moorehead’s force was to hold the airfield and then withdraw back towards Singhawang. Since Moorehead’s arrival he had working parties of his own troops and locals to try to widen a native trail into a path over the border, so that when the time came the men, and white civilians, would be able to make the journey a bit easier. The Dutch had agreed to allow the working parties to cross the border, and had some heavy machinery to push up from Siluas towards the border, adding to the British effort to make it possible. The result had been that two of the Dutch tanks, in fact Vickers Mark VIC Light Tanks armed with Besa 15mm and 7.92mm guns, had arrived to test the ability for tracked vehicles to get between the two airfields.

The Royal Dutch Indies Army, Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (KNIL), had ordered 73 Vickers-Carden-Loyd Light Tanks and had received 24 before the war had begun. In June 1940, the British War Office informed the Dutch exile government in England that the balance of the order of Light Tanks would be taken over by the British Government. At that time 16 vehicles were ready for delivery at Newcastle at the Vickers Armstrong factory. In the following months, the Dutch Foreign Office and the Colonial Office tried to recover all the missing 49 vehicles, and finally succeeded in early 1941. However, since all the tanks had been used for training purposes, and were therefore not brand new, the British had replaced half of them with new Vickers Mark VIC light tanks. These had been accepted by the Dutch government in exile and shipped to the East Indies, via the Panama Canal, in June 1941.

Since the KNIL had six Mark VICs at Singhawang II, the Dutch Brigadier Timmer (a brigade was a 15 man group in the KNIL) had been ordered to support the two Punjab battalions with his two tanks. Moorehead greeted Timmer with great enthusiasm. Moorehead had placed his 3rd Bn 16th Punjab Regiment to defend the waterways into Kuching. 5th Bn 14th Punjab Regiment were defending the airfield and some of the crucial points on the route to Singhawang II. His plan was to oppose a landing as far forward as possible, then to pull back to the airfield. The airfield itself was scheduled for demolitions, but it would a position for the 5/14 Punjab Regiment to hold, to allow the men of the 3/16 to withdraw through and prepare to hold the river crossing at Batu Kitang, to allow the other Battalion to fall back, and then leapfrog one another, bleeding the Japanese as much as possible all the way back. With two light tanks in addition to his understrength carrier platoons, he now had a mobile force with a bit of teeth to it. Timmer agreed to Moorehead’s plan and started working with the Punjabis to rehearse how such support would be best used.

There were three vessels at Kuching: Margaret, Rejang, and Gladys that the Punjabis had taken over as floating strong points. The sepoys had brought on board sandbags to protect the crucial features and added a variety of weapons including Vickers HMGs to provide the firepower. In addition to the Punjabis, the Sarawak Coastal Marine Service provided the crews for the three vessels. Each ‘gunboat’ had a platoon of troops including at least one anti-tank rifle on each boat.

When Lt Col Lane had been SarForce CO, he had received reinforcements of two 6-inch guns Hong Kong Singapore Royal Artillery and commanded by Captain H.N.P.R. Halstead. One of the guns had been lost trying to cross a river, but Halstead had positioned the remaining gun so that ships approaching along the Santubong River would be covered by it. The Punjabis’ had also been issued with three old 18-pounder guns and Halstead’s men had trained detachments of Punjabis to operate them. These were placed to cover the Sarawak River approach to Kuching. Between the ‘gunboats’ and the artillery Moorehead was confident that any Japanese landing parties wouldn’t have an easy time of it.

The intermittent radio communications from Lane’s 2nd Battalion 15th Punjab Regiment confirmed the Japanese landing, and the attempts they had been making to cause the Japanese as much trouble as they could. Lane had informed Moorehead that all four of his Companies were still actively engaged with the enemy but avoiding set-piece battles where the Japanese numerical superiority could be brought to bear. Lane had planned on resisting for a week, and then pulling his men back to reserve positions where they could rest and regroup. Once that happened, Lane suspected that the greater part of the Japanese force would likely head towards Kuching.

The Dutch Militaire Luchtvaart-KNIL (Military Aviation) and Marine Luchtvaartdienst-KNIL (Naval Air Force) had been attempting to bomb the Japanese ships at Miri with some success, the destroyer Shinonome had been sunk, and it was believed that at least one transport had been damaged. The Royal Dutch East Indies Navy (Nederlands-Indië Marine) had two submarines in the vicinity K-XIV (Lt.Cdr. C.A.J. van Well Groeneveld) and K-XVI (Lt.Cdr. L.J. Jarman) which were converging on Miri to attack the ships there. Lane reported that some of the ships were still off-loading what looked like engineering equipment. His best guess was that it was equipment to get the oil field running again. If those transports could be sunk, then it would give Moorehead longer to prepare to defend Kuching, and the Dutch to defend Singhawang II.

 

[allanpcameron]

24 December 1941. Singapore.

The first DM (Durban-Malaya) convoy had arrived with a heavy escort. The RAF Buffaloes and Fleet Air Arm Sea Hurricanes provided an umbrella over the troopships and Motor Transport freighters. The activity in the harbour was best described as frenetic. The first priority was to get the men of 18th Infantry Divisional Troops off the ships and into their holding areas. The Divisional HQ; Intelligence Corps; three field regiments, anti-tank regiment and light AA regiment of the Royal Artillery; three Royal Engineers Field Companies and Field Park Company; the Royal Signals; RASC; RAOC; RAMC; MPs; a machine gun battalion; The RAC’s 18th Reconnaissance Battalion. As well as the divisional troops, 53rd Infantry Brigade was on board: it was a lot of men to be sorted and moved.

The other two Infantry Brigades (54th and 55th) with their own support units were on the next part of the convoy. A full Infantry Division contained over 17000 men, but the convoy had also carried 7th Bn RTR (58 Matilda II) and an extra Royal Artillery Medium Regiment and Heavy AA Regiment, along with various RN, Army and RAF replacements, almost 20000 men altogether. All these men carried off the ships just their own duffel bag and personal weapons. All the weapons and equipment that made the men into the fighting force, including over 4000 vehicles, needed to be unloaded and that would take time.

The crated Tomahawks for the RAF were being prioritised. The RAF had learned from the arrival of the Buffaloes earlier in the year that it would take time to uncrate the aircraft, put them together, test fly them and train the pilots on them. All this would come to naught if they were destroyed on the ground by Japanese air raids. The crates would be taken to a number of different locations where the work could be carried out in some semblance of safety.

HMS Ark Royal was currently on a run between Ceylon and Port Sudan to pick up RAF Hurricanes to be flown off directly to Singapore. HMS Formidable sailing from the Mediterranean would join her, they expected to arrive with almost 100 Hurricanes between them at by the middle of January. HMS Formidable would return to the Mediterranean fleet after ferrying the Hurricanes. HMS Illustrious had started her journey from North America but was in a collision with HMS Indomitable while sailing together. They would both sail for the UK for repairs, with both carriers eventually joining the Eastern Fleet. HMS Indomitable was supposed to replace HMS Ark Royal in Gibraltar, but HMS Furious would do so after her refit in America.

Ships carrying crated Martlet IIs (G-36Bs with folding wings) sailed in August 1941, with 36 shipped to the UK and 54 shipped to the Far East. At Ceylon these aircraft were being prepared and Fleet Air Arm pilots training on them, to become the fighter squadrons on HMS Ark Royal and to defend Ceylon. HMS Illustrious and Indomitable would also have those Martlets shipped to the UK as their fighter squadrons when they sailed for Ceylon after repairs.

Admiral Phillips was waiting for more reinforcements including HMS Warspite coming from Alexandria to replace HMS Barham. Four R Class battleships, Ramillies, Resolution, Revenge and Royal Sovereign along with HMS Hermes, which was at Durban being refitted, were all expected in Ceylon around March, for all the good Admiral Phillips thought they would do. HMS Repulse was in the dry dock in Singapore having emergency repairs, she was expected to sail with the empty merchant ships when they left Singapore. The battlecruiser was likely to need a longer time for repairs, which would probably mean sailing to the United States.

Major-General Merton Beckwith-Smith (GOC 18th Infantry Division) was glad to get off the ship and onto dry land. With his senior staff they went for an immediate meeting with Lieutenant-Generals Percival and Mackay, who were to be his Commanding Officer and Corps Commander respectively. Mackay had been responsible for the planning for the men of 18th Division coming off the ships, the Australians had learned a lot from the arrival of their own 9th Division.

Since he’d sailed from Durban two weeks earlier, Beckwith-Smith hadn’t had much in the way of news of how things were going with the Japanese. The situation in Hong Kong was terrible, Percival thought that the end would come in a day or two at most. Percival’s senior intelligence officer gave a briefing of the current situation in Malaya and Borneo. Mackay laid out his plan for 8th and 9th Australian and 18th Division. The two Australian Divisions had been working hard on training and preparing defences to protect Johore. He wanted Beckwith-Smith’s men to have time to regain their fitness, and then have some jungle training and exercises so that they’d be in the best possible shape for the fight to come. To enable this 18th Division would stay on Singapore island in the first instance. There were some defensive preparations they would have to make. Should there be a failure to hold Johore having 18th Division prepared to defend the island, it would give the Australians, and whatever was left of the Indian Corps, somewhere to fall back to.

Mackay believed that if the Indians could continue to bleed the Japanese as they had been doing, by the time the Australians were on the front line, the Japanese would have shot their bolt. Then 18th Division would be Mackay’s choice to begin the counter-attack, pushing the Japanese back up the Malaya peninsula. Beckwith-Smith had some questions, but was generally happy with the plan. He had been training his men since July 1940, training and hard work was something they were well used to. Having a clear role to prepare for, both defensively and offensively, gave the Major General a chance to show how far his Second Line Territorial Army Division had come and just exactly what they would be able to do.

 

[allanpcameron]

25 December 1941. Broadcast from London.

I am glad to think that millions of my people in all parts of the world are listening to me now. From my own home, with the Queen and my children beside me, I send to all a Christmas greeting.

Christmas is the festival at home, and it is right that we should remembers those who this year must spend it away from home. I am thinking, as I speak, of the men who have come from afar, standing ready to defend the old homeland, of the men who in every part of the world are serving the Empire and its cause with such valour and devotion by sea, land and in the air.

I am thinking of all those, women and girls as well as men, who at the call of duty have left their homes to join the services, or to work in factory, hospital or field. To each one of you, wherever your duty may be, I send you my remembrance and my sincere good wishes for you and for yours.

I do not forget what others have done and are doing so bravely in civil defence. My heart is also with those who are suffering – the wounded, the bereaved, the anxious, the prisoners of war. I think you know how deeply the Queen and I feel for them. May God give them comfort, courage and hope.

All these separations are part of the hard sacrifice which this war demands. It may well be that it will call for even greater sacrifices. If this is to be, let us face them cheerfully together. I think of you, my peoples, as one great family, for it is how we are learning to live. We all belong to each other. We all need each other. It is in serving each other and in sacrificing for our common good that we are finding our true life.

In that spirit we shall win the war, and in that same spirit we shall win for the world after the war a true and lasting peace. The greatness of any nation is in the spirit of its people. So it has always been since history began; so it shall be with us.

The range of the tremendous conflict is ever widening. It now extends to the Pacific. Truly it is a stern and solemn time. But as the war widens, so surely our conviction depends at the greatness of our cause.

We who belong to the present generation must bear the brunt of the struggle, and I would say to the coming generation, the boys and girls of today, the men and women of tomorrow – train yourselves in body, mind, and spirit so as to be ready for whatever part you may be called to play, and for the tasks which will await you as citizens of the Empire when the war is over.

We must all, older and younger, resolve that having been entrusted with so great a cause, then, at whatever cost, God helping us, we will not falter or fail. Make yourselves ready – in your home and school to give and to offer your very best.

We are coming to the end of another hard fought year. During these months our people have been through many trials, and in that true humanity which goes hand in hand with valour, have learnt once again to look for strength to God alone.

So I bid you all be strong and of a good courage. Go forward into this coming year with a good heart. Lift up your hearts with thankfulness for deliverance from dangers in the past. Lift up your hearts in confident hope that strength will be give us to overcome whatever perils may lie ahead until the victory is won.

If the skies before us are still dark and threatening, there are stars to guide us on our way. Never did heroism shine more brightly than it does now, nor fortitude, nor sacrifice, nor sympathy, nor neighbourly kindness, and with them – brightest of all stars – is our faith in God. These stars will we follow with His help until the light shall shine and the darkness shall collapse.

God bless you, everyone.


Actual Christmas Message of King George VI from here

 

[allanpcameron]

26 December 1941. Carmen. Philippines.

The Provisional Tank Group (PTG) had arrived in the Philippines in September and November of 1941. Consisting of the 192nd and 194th Tank Battalions, each with fifty-four M3 Light Tanks. The two battalions were among the first to hear about the attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December, and as they were assigned to defend Clark Field against a parachute attack. They were witnesses, and victims of the Japanese air attacks that had brought war to the Philippines.

Brig. Gen. James R.N. Weaver (GOC PTG) had taken the National Guard units sent from America and tried to prepare them for war. After the initial few days of confusion, 192nd Tank Battalion was ordered to support Major-General Wainwright (GOC Northern Luzon Force), but weren’t put under his command. As Wainwright attempted to deal with the invasion at Lingayen on 22 December, he ordered his main mobile force, 26th Cavalry Regiment of the Philippine Scouts, to Rosario. The Scout Car platoon, ahead of the main force of horsemen, moved through Damortis on the coastal road where they encountered Japanese tanks and reconnaissance troops, so they fell back towards Damortis, where the rest of 26th Cavalry were establishing positions to resist the Japanese, but prepared to fight a delaying action.

Colonel Pierce called on General Wainwright for help as his force was already struggling to contain the Japanese attack. Wainwright was warned that more Japanese forces were on their way to Damortis, Wainwright requested a company of tanks from Brig. Gen. Weaver. Because of a shortage of gasoline, Weaver could furnish only a platoon of five tanks from Company B, 192d Tank Battalion.

Moving forward, they clashed with Japanese light tanks. The lead tank, 2nd Lt Ben Morin’s, as it manoeuvred off the road, received a direct hit from a Japanese Medium tank and burst into flames. The day had begun badly for the American officer. He had been bombed by Japanese aircraft, and when he ordered the gunner to test fire his 37mm gun, but the gun had locked in recoil and remained inoperative. The other four tanks, all hit by 47-mm. antitank fire, succeeded in returning to Rosario. Morin and his crew surrendered to the Japanese, in the first combat between and American and Japanese tanks of the war, the victory was Japanese.

On December 23 and 24, the rest of B Company was in the area of Urdaneta. They were ordered to withdraw to the south of the Agno River, but found the main bridge had already been destroyed. Have to fight their way through Japanese troops early in the evening of Christmas Eve, successfully crossed the river in the Bayambang Province. Here they found the rest of 192nd Tank Battalion had taken up positions just south of the Agno River from Carmen to Tayung. The tanks of the 194th Tank Battalion which had also come forward, were holding the line on the Carmen-Alcala-Bautista Road.

On 26 December the whole area was the subject to an airstrike, followed swiftly by an assault on the river Agno positions after sunset. The Japanese, with artillery support, crossed the river, the M3 Light Tanks of 194th Tank Battalion were only carrying AP shot, the Japanese infantry being engaged by the machine guns on the tanks, but were unable to hold up the advance. Lt Harold Costigan’ platoon of C Company 194th TB recognised that there was a real possibility of being cut off, and ordered his tanks to withdraw. As they approached the barrio they came under heavy fire, and had to smash through a roadblock, where two tanks were lost, though the crews were picked up by the other tanks and escaped, though under fire until they were out of range.

This set the tone of the rest of the campaign for the tanks. The tank battalions found themselves in the role of holding positions so new defensive lines could be formed. Brig. Gen Weaver’s written command to his men was that: “Tanks will execute maximum delay, staying in position and firing at visible enemy until further delay will jeopardize withdrawal. If a tank is immobilized, it will be fought until the close approach of the enemy, then destroyed; the crew previously taking positions outside and continuing to fight with the salvaged and personal weapons. Considerations of personal safety and expediency will not interfere with accomplishing the greatest possible delay.”

 

[allanpcameron]

27 December 1941. Butterworth. Malaya.

Sergeant John Runcie, the commander of the Matilda II ‘Allahkaffik’, was no longer attached to the Bahawalpur Battalion, much to their disgust. The tank had been an omen of victory and indeed had proven crucial to their defence of Alor Star. Now Runcie, along with two other Matilda IIs from A Company 11th Bn RTR, ‘Abdullah’ and ‘Ahmed’ (recently renamed from Ajax and Achilles), were at Kampar.

The 29th Indian Infantry Brigade had arrived as part of 5th Indian Division after their efforts in East Africa. Up until now they had been Lieutenant-General Heath’s III Indian Corps reserve. They had been working around Ipoh building up defensive positions, but now were Headquartered in RAF Butterworth, preparing positions behind the Muda River.

The surviving troops of 6th and 15th Brigades were being rested and reorganised at Ipoh after their efforts around Jitra. Moving by train down to Ipoh on 20 December put them far enough away so that they could truly rest. The reorganisation was to merge the two Brigades into one effective. The British Battalion (1st Battalion, Leicestershire Regiment and 2nd Bn, East Surrey Regiment); The Punjab Battalion (1/8th and 1/14th Punjab Regiment); The Jat/Punjab Battalion (2/9th Jat and 2/16th Punjab Regiment. Amongst these three Brigades were added men of the Bahawalpur Battalion which had been broken up as replacements.

The 6/15th Brigade was due to arrive back at Butterworth the next day to join 29th Brigade holding the positions at the Muda River. The position at Gurun was still holding, but the men of 10th Indian and 28th Gurkha Brigades were tiring, as Japanese pressure continued on them.

Sergeant Runcie’s troop of tanks in the meantime had been assigned to 6th Bn 13th Frontier Force Rifles. The good news for Runcie was that the names of the tanks had found favour with the men of 6th/13th FFR, made even better by the fact they had worked with Matilda IIs in East Africa. Where the Bahawalpur’s had been keen to the point of enthusiasm, the men of the Frontier Force were somewhat more sanguine. They knew what battles were like and that tanks weren’t some sort of magic wand or divine intervention. The tank was another tool to accomplish objectives, like the rifle, the mortar and the life blood of a man.

Runcie and his three tank commanders went through the various exercises they had employed previously to make sure that all the troops in the Infantry Battalion were clear on how best to work with tanks. Runcie had been informed that another battalion of Matilda IIs were arriving with the latest convoy. With any luck they might have brought some spare tanks as replacements for the losses of 11th Bn RTR. Maybe when they arrived Runcie thought that he and his crew might get a bit of R & R. They’d had a couple of days of relative quiet while the tank was being worked on, but then they’d been exercising with the infantry for hours every day, when not taking cover from air raids.

 

[allanpcameron]

28 December 1941. Bangkok. Thailand.

The meeting between Lieutenant General Iida Shōjirō and Lieutenant General Yamashita Tomoyuki (GOC 15th and 25th Armies) had been called by General Count Terauchi Hisaichi, C-in-C Southern Expeditionary Army Group who had come from Saigon to get a report on the current situation.

15th Army was only slightly engaged in Burma so far. 143rd Regiment of 55th Division, having landed on the Kra Peninsula had advanced into Burma and captured the airfield at Victoria Point. They had then detached a unit to Bokpyin which had also been captured. Otherwise, the rest of 55th Division and 33rd Division were occupying Thailand. Three infantry regiments were assigned to 33rd Division (213, 214, and 215 Regiments) and would arrive from China in due course. Once the efforts in Malaya were successful, and his skeleton force would be expanded as it had recently with the arrival of 56th Division (113 and 148 Regiments) then he would be ready to enter Burma.

The situation for Yamashita’s 25th Army couldn’t be more different. The elements of 23rd Infantry Brigade, 18th Division, that attempted to land at Kota Bahru failed in their attempt and had been wiped out. The 5th Infantry Division’s 42nd Regiment, which had landed at Patani had failed to cross the middle of the country to break into the British rear at Kroh. They had then moved to attack Kota Bahru from the north and had been held up by the British and Indian forces there.

The other element of 5th Division which had landed at Singora (41st Regiment and 3rd Tank Group) had made good progress through Thailand and had pushed the British out of Jitra and Alor Star. In doing so they had been weakened beyond the ability to carry on. Since reinforced by 11th Regiment, which had arrived on 16 December, they were preparing to get back into the fight. The Imperial Guards Division was now engaged at Gurun, but were finding that the British resistance was strong.

Yamashita believed that the intelligence about the strength of the British and Indian troops in Malaya had underestimated them. The 3rd Tank Group had not been expecting the British heavy infantry tanks and had suffered as a result. While it was known that some of these tanks had arrived, their use by the British had been more effective that believed possible. Intelligence before the campaign also suggested that the Indian troops would give up easily rather than fighting for their Imperial masters. This hadn’t happened, they Indian troops hadn’t shown any sign of wanting to throw off their English oppressors and were fighting very hard. While all this was disappointing, it wasn’t completely unexpected in the wargames.

General Yamashita was conscious that the extra efforts of his men was leading to shortages of ammunition (especially for the artillery) and other supplies. The Thais were being leaned on to support the efforts of the Japanese Army with food, fuel and some other essentials. Yamashita was confident that once the crust of resistance in the north of Malaya was broken, the movement towards Singapore would be an easier task. However, his staff had been repeatedly warning him that the plan had featured capturing British supplies, which hadn’t been happening. Responsibility for such things weren’t the concern of the Count, who suggested Yamashita’s staff spoke to someone on the Count’s staff about such matters.

Yamashita, aware of talking down the situation, felt he also had to express his concern from aerial reconnaissance that more troops and supplies were arriving in Singapore, which the navy didn’t seem capable of doing anything about. The Air Regiments had their hands full with trying to eliminate the British air strength and supporting the ground troops. It would take greater efforts to close Singapore’s port to prevent more reinforcements to arrive.

As well as 11th Regiment, Yamashita requested the early arrival 21st Regiment, the other element of 5th Division. Between the Guards Division and the fresh 11th and 21st Regiments, 25th Army would be ready to continue their advance down the west coast. With the loss of the part of 18th Division, Yamashita wondered if the rest of that Division, 55th and 114th Regiments, might also be assigned earlier than planned to Malaya.

Count Terauchi had listened to the two generals’ reports in silence. After a few moments' thought, he agreed that while Yamashita was correct in saying that some of the wargames had shown up a slower attack in Malaya, there was a timetable to be considered in the whole of the centrifugal offensive. Perhaps the two generals didn’t know that the other part of 18th Division, 124th Regiment, were encountering similar difficulties in Borneo. It was entirely possible that 114th Regiment would be needed there. General Imamura Hitosi’s 16th Army, responsible for conquering the Dutch East Indies had 2nd Division in Japan waiting for the Philippines and Malaya to fall. Then 16th Army would be reinforced by elements of Homma’s 14th and Yamashita’s 25th Armies. If the fighting in Malaya wasn’t concluded swiftly, then the whole timetable would be jeopardised.

The earlier than planned release of 21st Regiment was a reasonable request, though getting from Shanghai to Malaya would need the help of the navy to escort the transports. More transports had been lost, even in the last few days at Miri, that it might not be a simple exercise to move a Regiment out of sequence. It made much more sense for 143rd Regiment from 55th Division to move down from Burma to reinforce 5th Division. Burma had to wait until Singapore had fallen anyway, so the minor achievements it had had could easily be left aside until later. Between 5th, Guards, 18th and 56th Divisions, Terauchi reasoned, would be more than enough to take Malaya, and then focus on Burma as planned.

Lieutenant-General Iida was disappointed that he would be losing his only effective fighting force. However, it was always planned to conquer Singapore before Burma. His fear was that General Auchinleck would be using the time to gain reinforcements and strengthen his position in Burma. That would make the fight a bit harder, but Iida had every faith in his men. Lieutenant Yamashita was somewhat relieved that he hadn’t lost face with Count Terauchi. Yamashita’s forces had done well against a much better organised force than expected, and perhaps the British victories over the Italians had given them greater morale. The Infantry Tanks were a real fly in the ointment, Brigadier Naganuma (CO 3rd Tank Group) was sure that if the British tanks hadn’t been there, then the battle at Jitra would have gone very differently.

Count Terauchi gave his two subordinates a brief update on the rest of the Southern Expeditionary Army Group’s activities. The invasion of the Philippines was going as planned, the Americans were withdrawing onto the Bataan Peninsula, and Lieutenant General Homma was confident that his 14th Army would soon be in control of all of the Philippine islands. The fall of Hong Kong to the 38th Division was also a great victory, and soon the 38th Division would be available for the invasion of the Dutch East Indies. The bigger question was whether to attempt another landing in southern Malaya to get behind the British defensive lines. That would involve the cooperation of the Navy, who were unhappy at the losses of their cruiser force covering the initial landing. Count Terauchi would have to give that some consideration before approaching the Navy for another movement in the South China Sea. However, if locally sourced boats could be found to move the men, then he had no objection to the use of such tactics.

On the whole the Count expressed some satisfaction with how things were going. It was unfortunate that the Indian troops didn’t see the possibility of their liberation from the British and therefore stop fighting. On the other hand, the losses incurred at Kota Bahru and at Jitra were greater than feared, but within the casualty projections overall. As long as Yamashita kept up the pressure, and continued to try to upset the British plans, Count Terauchi was confident of victory.

 

[allanpcameron]

29 December 1941. Kaluga. CCCP

146th Independent Tank Brigade (ITB), in the region of Kalugo to the immediate west of the Soviet capital, was the first to be equipped with the Valiant Mark II which had been fitted with the L11 76.2mm tank gun. These had arrived with the internal fixtures for the British 6-pdr, and then adapted by the Soviets for their own gun. This gave the British made tank a very similar armour to the KV-1 tank and used the same gun. The KV-1 had the advantage of being designed with the Russian Winter in mind, whereas the Valiant had the much milder British winter in mind.

The British had delivered 466 tanks since the first PQ Convoy, most recently with another 80 Valiant IIs in the sixth convoy which had arrived on 20 December. The majority of tanks carried in first couple convoys had been Matilda IIs. These had been concentrated in 136th Independent Tank Brigade, and for the most part had either been destroyed by enemy action (80) or withdrawn because of their problems with the cold. The preference for the Valiant shown by the Soviets meant that nearly all the tanks that arrived in the last few convoys were Valiant Is. PQ 4 (arrived 28 November) had carried the first few Valiant IIs without guns so that the Soviet gun could be fitted. The L-11 would soon be replaced with the slightly more effective F32, though there were those who really wanted the F34, but Marshall Kulik (Artillery Directorate Chief until June 1941) had blocked this for some unknown reason.

The 131st ITB and 146th ITB were both part of Moscow Military District and involved in the fighting to first halt, and then throw back the German advance. The 131st ITB was currently around Tula, south of Moscow, while 146th were involved in the fighting to recapture Kaluga. Only five of the Valiant Tanks had been armed with the Russian gun, the rest were Valiant Is with the standard British 2-pdr. Unlike most Independent Tank Brigades the full quota of 5 Heavy, 10 Mediums and 20 Light Tanks were actually present in preparation for the attack. The five L11 equipped Valiant IIs made up the Heavy Squadron, and ten Valiant Is made up the two Medium Squadrons. There were also two companies of Light tanks (twenty T-60 Scout tanks) which provided reconnaissance and flank protection for the Brigade.

On 19 December the British Foreign Minister had inspected the Russian formation during his visit to Moscow. He had visited Klin, which had been liberated on 15 December, and the 146th ITB was about to be moved to south of Moscow. During his visit, Eden was accompanied by the Soviet Ambassador to the UK, Ivan Maisky, who had visited one of the factories building Valiant tanks for the Soviets. Now he was seeing them in the hands of Russian troops. The opinion of the Soviet tank men was hampered by the presence of their political officers, so the tanks were compared unfavourably with the KV-1 and T-34 that they should have been equipped with. However grudgingly, the tanks’ good points were brought out, and the conversion of the Valiant II to take the Russian L-11 gun had given them a good HE capability, lacking in the 2-pdr. Complaints that tanks were being sent without guns was based on the misunderstanding about what Vickers had agreed with the Soviets. Eden was happy to see the results of Lend-Lease in place and wished the Soviet troops victory in the coming battle.

Eden’s wish for the Soviet crews of the Valiant tanks seemed to being fulfilled. The Independent Tank Brigade was part of the 49th Army’s attack on the German 4th Army, the latter frozen in place. The snowdrifts were preventing movement by the Germans who were ill-equipped for the weather. The Soviets on the other hand were much more familiar with the conditions and how to ameliorate them. The British tanks took a bit more work than the T34 and KV-1, but there were work arounds that had been tried and tested to keep them running in the mind-numbing daytime temperatures of -15°F (-26°C), at night it fell to -25°F (-31°C). The 31st Cavalry Division were doing much of the work, using the tanks where resistance was strongest. The German anti-tank weapons were still struggling to cope with the stronger armour of the Russian and British tanks. The intervention of the Valiant II with the L-11 gun’s potent HE shell had the desired effect of silencing those places of resistance.

The Russian attackers didn’t know that General Von Kluge, formally GOC 4th Army, now C-in-C Army Group Centre, had been trying for days to persuade Hitler to allow General Kuebler (recently arrived GOC 4th Army) to pull his army back between 10 and 15 miles to shorten the line and free up three divisions to support their flanks. If 4th Army didn’t abandon Kaluga, Kluge argued that he could not save two other crucial line of communications centres which the Soviets were threatening. Eventually after many questions about how much supplies would have to be abandoned, Hitler gave Kluge permission to withdraw 4th Army, but would allow no other retreats. When Kuebler got this order Kaluga was already all but lost, leaving some units to die or surrender in place, allowing their comrades to save themselves.

 

[allanpcameron]

30 December 1941. Rangoon, Burma.

The men of 20th Indian Brigade marched out of the port and onto a train to take them to Pegu where 10th Indian Division was being concentrated. The men had been brought to Burma onboard RMS Queen Mary, along with the Division’s artillerymen, engineers and the rest of the men that made up a Division’s fighting ability. The men of 21st and 25th Brigades had sailed on RMS Queen Elizabeth. The two troopships normally ploughed the sea between Australia and the Gulf of Aden. The need to bring the 10th Indian Division to Burma as speedily as possible had meant a detour to Basra. Standing off Rangoon because of the threat of air attack, the men had been transhipped onto other smaller vessels to carry on into the port. General Auchinleck had to fight tooth and nail for the 10th Division to be sent to Burma. With the fighting in Malaya, Percival had been hoping for this Indian Division on top of the recently arrived Australian 9 Division and British 18th Division. General Alexander, newly appointed as GOC Burma Army, had won the argument with the War Office that this Division was crucial to his plan to hold Burma. This, along with Auchinleck’s interventions, had been accepted.

Some of the ships normally used in the Mediterranean between Alexandria and Tobruk and in the Red Sea between Port Sudan and the Suez Canal had been sent to pick up 10th Division’s equipment. These ships, with various escorts, were already in the Bay of Bengal and expected to arrive within the week. Among the equipment was 252nd Indian Armoured Brigade’s mix of light tanks, some well-travelled Vickers A9s and A10s, armoured cars, and 14th/20th King's Hussars’ had M3 Stuart tanks.

Major-General Bill Slim and some of his staff had been in Rangoon for a week trying to sort out all the practicalities of moving and training a Division from one theatre to another. Major-General Arthur Wakely’s 7th Indian Division already had two of its Brigades in Burma. The 13th Brigade had been under the command of the Burma Division. The 16th Brigade was finally complete with all three Battalions concentrated at Mandalay. With the arrival of 14th Brigade, and the Divisional Troops, Wakely, like Slim was trying to get his Division sorted out. The arrival of General Harold Alexander was expected within a day or two. He was currently in Calcutta with General Auchinleck being briefed on the situation, especially about the need to work with the Chinese to keep the Burma Road open.

The other problem that Slim had to deal with was the likelihood that he would be promoted to Lieutenant-General and be put in charge of a newly formed Burma Corps. Slim had requested that General Auchinleck appoint Brigadier Douglas Gracey from 17th Indian Brigade in Iraq to take over as GOC 10th Indian Division. Slim was also aware that a Corps would need a lot more staff that were currently on hand. Auchinleck had negotiated with Wavell to give Alexander help with staff, on top of what he could spare himself from India. Slim had been promised that he would have a proportion of those staff officers when they arrived.

In the meantime, Slim and Wakely had visited Major-General Charles Fowkes (GOC 11th African Division) whose HQ was near Moulmein. They also met with Major-General James Scott (GOC 1st Burma Division). Losing 13th Indian Brigade, Scott was now facing the question about how his two remaining Burmese Brigades would be used. Without Harold Alexander’s input, Slim wasn’t able to say for definite. He admitted that frankly he would like Scott’s men to spend some more time training, both themselves and especially training new arrivals in getting to know, and not fear, the Burmese jungle. Slim was also aware that both Wakely and his men would need translators and local guides. Having some of the Burma Rifles or police on hand would prove very useful.

In discussions among the generals, it became clear to Slim that native Burmans made up a very small percentage of the Burmese forces. Scott noted that his forces (army, police, frontier, auxiliaries, territorials) had over 27000 men, but of that less than 4000 were Burmans. The largest contingent were Indians (over 10000), with substantial numbers of Karens, Chins and Kachins (just under 10000). Scott confirmed what Slim had already been advised by Lieutenant-General Donald McLeod, outgoing GOC (Burma Army), that the political temperature between the various nationalities within Burma was rising. There was a strong independence movement amongst the Burmans, influenced by Gandhi’s Congress Party in India. McLeod’s police had evidence that this was being supported and promoted by the Japanese. There was a real fear that this movement would work at undermining the defence of the country, especially in providing the Japanese with translators and guides. It was even possible that there would be a threat from fifth column activities. All of this made Slim and Wakely keen to enlist Scott’s help to procure reliable locals to support the two Indian formations.

Slim and Wakely were then informed of the existence of the Bush Warfare School at Maymyo officially known as Mission 204 or ‘Tulip Force’. This had been founded to train Australian and British troops in guerrilla warfare for the British Military Mission to China. The secrecy surrounding it came from the time when support for the Chinese was kept as hidden as possible so that there would be no justification for a Japanese attack on the British Empire. Major Michael Calvert was forming his trainees into three Special Service Detachments, or Commandoes. These were all small forces, but available to Slim and Alexander. Calvert was keen on using these commandoes as the Long Range Desert Group had been used in North Africa. The use of irregular troops in the East African campaign had played an interesting role, especially Gideon Force, not one that Slim was terribly keen on, but open to.

Slim was also introduced to the existence of the Oriental Mission, which had been founded in Singapore in May 1941 as the regional headquarters of the Ministry of Economic Warfare. Force 136, as it was known, was designed to conduct espionage, sabotage and reconnaissance in British territories that might be occupied by an enemy. Slim was informed that they were supporting Lt Col Noel Stevenson who had begun to organise levies from amongst the Karen tribesmen in the Shan States. Stevenson had served with the Burma Frontier Service and had extensive experience of working with the Karens. There was little time, few resources and next to no equipment, but many Karens were being organised to keep watch on Japanese movements and to identify Burmese collaborators. These two pieces of information made Slim realise why General Alexander had asked for Brigadier Orde Wingate to be attached to Burma Command.

Slim noted that having some kind of intelligence gathering system would be crucial and made a note to speak to Alexander about setting up some kind of organisation to provide his Corps with timely and accurate information about Japanese activities and intentions.

As he was new to the area, Slim had paid particular attention to the fact that there was a very limited road network and the railway ran north to south rather than east to west. Slim knew the 11th African Division from East Africa and noted their lower-than-normal establishment of motor vehicles. This was a double-edged issue. On one side, they weren’t tied to the roads so much. On the other side, their movement would be generally slower than a Division with the full allocation of Motor Transport. Slim was interested in how both the Burma Brigades, and the Africans were using more in the way of mules for resupply. Looking at the country, he could see the logic of having ‘all-terrain’ means of getting ammunition, water and rations to units.

The logistics of supporting a force in the east of Burma were going to be difficult. The vast rivers that flowed north to south were useful barriers against an invasion, but the limited bridges and ferries hampered supplying the defenders. There was an obvious danger of traffic jams along the limited roads waiting to cross rivers. This would be an invitation to the Japanese bombers to do great damage with little effort. Slim and Wakely would have to sit down with their staffs and work out how best to make sure the men had adequate supplies at all times.

When the problems had begun in Iraq earlier in the year, the initial forces had been flown into Basra by RAF transports. Slim knew very well the importance of air support, not only in defending troops against the enemy’s bombers, and in attacking the enemy’s troops, but also in re-supplying forces in emergencies. The RAF’s weakness in Burma was a real concern, one that needed more bombers, fighters and transport aircraft. This was out of Slim’s hands, but again something to discuss with Alexander when he arrived.

Something else that would need to be discussed was the threat of malaria and other diseases that would hamper the fighting power of the Indian troops. Slim had been informed by Brigadier Eric Lang, (Director of Medical Services) about the struggles to increase the levels of medical support for the growing army in Burma. Slim knew very well that the health of the troops, keeping the men fit and healthy, would have massive benefits, as would keeping up their morale. While getting more men and equipment was always going to be important, looking after the men and equipment already present was just as important. Until such time as all the reinforcements arrived, Slim had to take as much care for the men under his command as possible.

Finally, Slim and Wakely were shown the picture of what Lt-General McLeod’s staff had identified the two most likely routes that the Japanese would take if they did indeed invade. The Southern Shan States were crucial to the protection of the Burma Road to China. The fear was a thrust north eastwards into the Southern Shan States from the Chiengrai-Chiangmai area of Thailand. There were relatively good land communications inside Thailand towards the Burma frontier. Although the routes across the frontier itself were limited to tracks, once inside Burma the Japanese could head straight for the roads on the Tachilek - Keng-Tung –Thazi and the Mongpan-Thazi routes. The 1st Burma Infantry Brigade and the 13th Indian Infantry Brigade were in the Southern Shan States, along with the Burma Frontier Force columns, F.F.3 and F.F.4 protecting that route, with the other two Brigades of 7th Indian Division concentrating at Mandalay from where they could act in defence of the Burma Road.

The other possibility was an attack across the Dawna Hills into Tenasserim, followed by a drive aimed at Rangoon. The 2nd Burma Infantry Brigade, with F.F.2, defended Tenasserim, with significant garrisons at Moulmein, Tavoy and Mergui. This was where the 11th African Division had been sent to man the main line of defence at the Salween River, which was to be held at all costs. Slim’s 10th Indian Division, concentrating at Pegu would back up the 11th African Division. McLeod believed that the difficult border terrain and lack of adequate roads would preclude any serious attack in that direction.

Slim also was informed that the Chinese had offered to send two armies to help defend Burma, the Fifth and Sixth, each about the equivalent on size of a British division but with far less equipment. Auchinleck had accepted this offer but at first wanted these troops to remain inside China but close to the border with Burma where they would provide a reserve until Japanese intentions were revealed. Liaison was established with the Chinese, and it was agreed that one regiment of Chinese troops would move up to the Burma border early in December 1941. This unit was to be available to move into Burma to support the British in the event of a Japanese attack into the Southern Shan States. Auchinleck had agreed for the Chinese 227th Regiment of the Chinese 93rd Division to take over the defence of the Mekong River east of the Kengtung-Mongpyak road, relieving some pressure on Scott’s 1st Burma Brigade.

When General Alexander arrived, there was a great deal to be resolved and finalised. Slim could see some of the potential pitfalls and was reassured by some of his assets. The longer the Japanese delayed invading Burma, the longer the British Empire Forces would have time to prepare. Slim was keen to get to work on making the most of the time he had.

Map from here

 

[allanpcameron]

31 December 1941. Dhond. India.

Trooper Jack Marrisan was a long way from Sheffield. As the year was ending, he couldn’t help think back to all he’d been through since the war started. As a drop stamper on the drop hammer in a foundry, Marrison was in a reserved occupation, something that prevented him joining up. He had gone to Rotherham and lied about his job which meant that he joined the 10th Battalion The York and Lancaster Regiment (10 Y&LR). After initial training had taken him to defend the beaches near Clacton.

Looking at a picture of his wife and two children, he went back to that night in December 1940 when his family had to be dug out of a cellar after nine hours of being trapped following an air raid. He could still picture the look on the MP’s face who tried to tell him to board the train while saying goodbye to his wife on the platform of Sheffield Station. Jack had left him in no doubt what would happen to them should he and his sidekick disturb him again. He completed his goodbyes and boarded the train. The fact it had been a year since he’d seen his wife and children, he couldn’t help wonder when he would see them again. The last letter he’d received had come before the news that Sheffield had been bombed again, and he was constantly looking to see when the next delivery of mail was come.

Training continued all through the first six months of 1941, until the infantry battalions of 207th Infantry Brigade (9th Bn Duke of Wellington Regiment (9 DWR), 7th Bn Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (7 KOYLI), 10 Y&LR) were chosen to be transformed into Royal Armoured Corps regiments (146th, 149th and 150th RAC). They had boarded convoy WS11 in August and had arrived in Bombay in October where they were to be formed into the Indian Army’s 50th Tank Brigade.

Trooper Jack Marrisan had been undergoing training as a tank driver, his pal from Sheffield, Corporal Harry Donohue, was the gunner. Trooper Charlie Hopkins was the loader and the tank commander was Lieutenant Robert Wait. The convoy had brought the three newly created RAC regiments and their Valiant I tanks. Marrison didn’t realise that he and his mates had originally been scheduled to go to Persia after training in India. But with the Japanese in Malaya it looked like they’d be sent to Malaya or there were rumours of being needed in Burma.

The delivery of the Grant tanks from America, that the Indian Armoured formations were to be equipped with, were still months away. The Australians were getting the first lot, then the Indians would get theirs. The 50th Tank Brigade was currently the only infantry tank force in India. General Auchinleck wanted them fully trained and ready for action by April at the latest. They were expecting the arrival in January of the Officers and Other Ranks who’d been sent on courses when the decision to turn the Brigade into a Royal Armoured Corps formation had been taken. Once these men were back, it was expected that the training intensity would be much greater.

Marrison had been talking to some of the Royal Tank Regiment men who’d transferred to 150th RAC to help with the transformation. It was their considered opinion that it would take about eight months to be fully trained. Not only had the men to learn their jobs and how to maintain the tanks. Then they’d have to learn how to fight a tank as part of a troop, of a squadron, of a Regiment, of a Brigade. Then they’d have to train on how to cooperate with infantry, artillery and even the RAF. They’d probably need jungle warfare training, so it wasn’t something that could be done quickly. If they were going to be of any use to anybody, there would be no point throwing them untrained into battle, it would just be throwing them away. Auchinleck’s hope to have them ready in eight months was starting from mid-summer in England. It didn’t account for all the time spent at sea or anything else. Realistically, it would be July at the earliest they could be declared operational.

For OTL Jack Marrison on whom this is based is found here. I hadn't realised that these three RAC regiments had shipped out to India on WS 11, the difference here is that they came fully equipped with tanks, while OTL they only had some Valentines to train on.

 

[allanpcameron]

1 January 1942. Fort Canning, Singapore.

Lieutenant-General Percival opened the meeting with wishing everyone a happy new year. The fact that the meeting was taking place in a heavily defended and protected Operations Room while a Japanese air raid was going on didn’t help promote a feeling of joy around the table.

Lieutenant-General Percival’s Chief of Staff gave the initial round-up of the situation.

The situation in the Soviet Union continued to be difficult to summarise. The Soviet’s efforts to push the Germans back from the gates of Moscow continued, but there was a lot of fighting in Crimea which looked difficult for the Russians. The situation in North Africa remained unchanged. The Eighth Army were resting on the borders of Tunisia, while which way the French North African holdings would go, was awaited with great interest.

The Japanese invasion of the Philippines continued apace, with Manila likely to be occupied soon. The Americans and Philippine troops continued to resist, but were preparing for a siege on the Bataan peninsula. Reinforcements on the way to the Philippines were being redirected to Australia, where the Americans were beginning to build up a base of operations.

The American Asiatic Fleet had withdrawn from the Philippines to the Dutch East Indies. Discussions were on-going about the Americans, British, Dutch, and ANZACs working together. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill hoped to create an overall command, but details were still being worked out about just where exactly the boundaries of this command would be. General Auchinleck had been approached to be overall commander, but hadn’t agreed until he had complete clarity about what and who was involved.

There were a number of sticking points. Auchinleck argued that India-Burma-China were all interlinked because of the Burma Road, which meant that these three theatres should have one overall commander, but that would lead to difficulties in appointment, India couldn’t come under the overall command of a Chinese or American, no matter how senior. Likewise, excluding Australia and New Zealand from the ‘ABDA’ area would complicate matters for such a generalissimo, as these two countries would be essential parts of the logistical network for working in the southeast pacific. The disadvantage currently for the Americans was that most of their fighting force in the region was miniscule and hard pressed.

Auchinleck had expressed private doubts to both Prime Ministers Churchill and Curtin about having General MacArthur in charge of any British or Empire forces. Cooperation before the war had been ‘difficult’ to say the least. The Prime Minister at the Arcadia Conference in Washington had been keen to show the Americans his desire for united commands, something that Auchinleck understood as being necessary. However, he was arguing for a separate South East Asia and Pacific command. South East Asia would include British, Dutch, French and Australian/New Zealand holdings. Pacific Command would be the American zone of influence, including the Philippines. Auchinleck, and other senior officers were worried that the Americans were attempting to undermine the role of the European empires.

At this point of the meeting there was a discussion about the Americans, British, Dutch, and ANZACs working together. This began to get a bit heated, but Percival felt that enough time had been spent on the matter that was not in their control anyway.

The Chief of Staff then gave an update on the situation in Borneo. He reported that the Indian troops were being pressed hard by the Japanese, but giving a good account of themselves. Their orders were to fall back to Dutch territory and keep up the fight from there as long as possible. The Royal Navy had been carrying supplies to Pontianak for the Dutch to take forward to the Indian troops. There was no way to know just how much trouble the Indian troops were causing the Japanese, but it seemed to be tying down at least a Regiment of Japanese troops. The Dutch reported that their submarines had managed to sink at least three of the Japanese freighters which wouldn’t be able help their efforts in the future.

After another few comments about various matters, Lieutenant-General Percival asked his senior commanders to give an update on the situation, beginning with Lieutenant-General Mackay (GOC II Australian Corps). Now that the Australian 9 Division were fully deployed, their GOC Major-General Leslie Morshead had been working with 8 Division’s new (acting) Major-General Cecil Callaghan to come to full readiness. Mackay’s estimation that it would be the end of the month before 9 Division would be fully prepared hadn’t taken into consideration Morshead’s men’s previous experience. They had been involved in battles in North Africa and Mackay could see the difference between the two Brigades of 8 Division and the four Brigades that had joined II Australian Corps from the Middle East. Mackay felt that another couple of weeks, after Corps level exercises, would be all it would take to declare his two Australian Divisions fully operational.

The most recent addition to his Corps, 18th Infantry Division were hard at work on Singapore Island, acclimatising, training and preparing defensive positions. Mackay rated Major-General Merton Beckwith-Smith highly. The Guardsman had taken over command of 1st Infantry Division during the retreat to Dunkirk and put up a very good show. He had trained 18th Division very well before the left Britain, and was continuing to do so with great effect since arriving in Singapore. Mackay believed that the Division’s readiness for operations would be achieved by later in the month. Until they were, Mackay was happy for them to remain on Singapore Island, while the two Australian Divisions continued to defend J0hor and Malacca. Mackay also mentioned that he had begun training for moving from defensive to offensive operations. The arrival of 7th Bn RTR and their infantry tanks would go a long way to giving 18th Division a real punch, just as the two Divisional Cavalry Regiment’s tanks and armoured vehicles would help the Australian Divisions.

Having previously discussed it with Mackay, Percival announced while the defence of Johor would continue to be the role of the Australians, the presence of 18th Division on Singapore Island would allow him to redeploy three Infantry Battalions from the two Malaya Brigades to reinforce III Indian Corps. In addition to the 2nd Bn Loyal Regiment, 2nd Bn Gordon Highlanders, and 2nd Bn 17 Dogra Regiment; the 1st Bn Manchester Regiment, a Machine Gun Battalion, was also being released to Lieutenant General Heath. The three Infantry Battalions, designated as 2nd Malaya Brigade under the command of Brigadier Francis Fraser, had been ordered to be ready to move on 3 January.

Lieutenant General Lewis Heath then gave the meeting his update on the work of III Indian Corps. First of all, Heath had asked Brigadier Fraser to move his Brigade by rail to the Kuala Krai to replace one of 9th Indian Division’s Brigades. Major-General Barstow’s Division had been in pretty constant contact with the Japanese for three weeks. Casualties had been heavy, as had expenditure of ammunition, especially for the artillery. Barstow was doing his best to rotate his battalions in and out of the line, but having three fresh Battalions would be a great help to him. Currently, the initial Japanese forces had obviously exhausted themselves and had been content to hold their gains. Barstow’s Divisional HQ was at the railhead at Kuala Krai.

Heath reported that he had been informed by Lt.Col. James Mackellar (CO 4th Battalion, Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces) that there were reports that a Japanese force had been working its way down the east coast. With 9th Indian Division pushed back off the coast, the idea that a Japanese force was making its way south along the coast was entirely believable. As far as Heath knew at least one Company of 1st Battalion Mysore Infantry had retreated from the Gong Kedak area down the east coast. They hadn’t been in contact and Heath didn’t know whether or not they were still effective. RAF reconnaissance hadn’t noted anything obvious, but that whole coastal area was undeveloped and could easily hide even a large force from aerial reconnaissance.

Although it was still over a hundred miles north of Kuantan, Mackellar reported that there was almost nothing to stop the Japanese north of his force, which was just one Battalion spread thin over the eastern coast of Pahang State. The possibility of another Japanese amphibious attack on the east coast couldn’t be ruled out either. Heath had ordered Barstow to use 2nd Malaya Brigade to replace one of his tired Brigades, probably 8th Indian Brigade, and for them to move back to the Kuantan area. Here they could rest and refit. Having a Brigade, tired and depleted as it was, holding the airfield and resources of Kuantan would be most valuable. The previous commitment of Australian 8 Division to provide a counter-attacking force in the event of another Japanese landing was still on the table.

Heath then moved onto the situation on the west coast where 11th Indian Division were committed. After the initial attacks by the Japanese Guards Division had been repulsed, the intensity of the fighting had died down a little. There were growing indications that more Japanese troops were heading in the direction northern Malaya to reinforce the attack there.

28th (Gurkha) and 10th Indian Brigades had held the line around Gurun very successfully, but it had been a costly battle, and now had been moved into reserve at Ipoh to rest and refit. The 29th Indian Brigade and merged 6/15th Brigade were now holding a line anchored on the Muda River. Heath recorded that Major-General Murray-Lyon had been doing an excellent job of leap frogging his Brigades from one prepared defensive line to the next. The 6/15th Brigade had had just over a week’s rest at Ipoh before returning to the Muda River line. Heath and Murray-Lyon had both met with the officers and men of that Brigade and had found them to in good heart. The first probes of a Japanese attack on those positions had been recorded and Murray-Lyon was expecting that it would be another fresh Japanese unit that would be attacking.

Heath revealed that 1st Independent Company (OC Major Sheppard Fearon) and the Australian Rose Force (OC Captain Dan Lloyd) were working behind the Japanese lines. They were working in platoon sized forces, being supported by the Royal Navy who were using the river system for infiltration and extraction. The two forces were supported by volunteers from the Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces, local European men who were acting as guides and translators. Most of the efforts of these special forces were in guerrilla tactics, making the rear area of the Japanese thrust unpredictable and tying down and ambushing Japanese troops defending their lines of communications. They also had small teams on overwatch of the roads and railway. These sent occasional radio messages when circumstances permitted. The information they were giving was worth its weight in gold, as there few other sources of reconnaissance information. Murray-Lyon’s preparations for a new Japanese attack was based largely on the information they were getting from 1st Independent Company.

Once Heath had finished and answered some questions, Rear Admiral Ernest Spooner, attending the meeting as the Royal Navy representative, gave an update on the current situation regarding the RN. HMS Prince of Wales and Nelson were currently at Ceylon awaiting the return of HMS Ark Royal, accompanied by HMS Formidable, with Hurricanes to reinforce the RAF. HMS Warspite was also on its way from Alexandria to join the other two battleships as part of Force Z. The damage to HMS Repulse had been temporarily fixed in Singapore and the battlecruiser was now sailing for the United States for complete repairs and refit, accompanied by HMS Mauritius which had been undergoing a refit in Singapore before the invasion. Spooner’s understanding was that Force Z would sail together with the two aircraft carriers in mid-January to protect them. Whether Phillips would do more depended on the situation on the Malay Barrier. The cruisers HMS Carlisle, Cornwall, Dorsetshire, Exeter, Emerald and Enterprise were all now attached to Far East Command, mostly working as escorts for convoys in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal.

The three elderly British cruisers, HMS Danae, Dragon and Durban, had joined forces with the Dutch cruisers De Ruyter, Tromp and Java working under the command of Vice Admiral Helfrich. This force also had a number of destroyers from the two navies. The British and Dutch submarines were continuing to work along the east coast of Malaya and in the South China Sea to interdict the Japanese navy and transports, noting a number of successes. Light forces were also at work on both the east and west coast of Malaya fulfilling very important roles. There had been casualties due to enemy air attack, and a couple of submarines had been lost to unknown causes, probably mines.

An ANZAC force had been established to work in the Northeastern part of the Australia station. The Australian cruisers HMAS Australia, Canberra, Hobart, Perth, with HMNZS Achilles and Leander, with a number of destroyers and sloops were busy protecting the approaches to Australia through the Coral, Solomon and Bismarck seas.

Spooner then noted that the American Asiatic Fleet had withdrawn from the Philippines to the Dutch East Indies. Before the Japanese attacks, Admiral Phillips (C-in-C Far East) had spoken to Admiral Hart (USN) about the Americans working out of Singapore. In the event, Hart had chosen to work out of Surabaya on Java. The move to the Dutch territories included TF.5 located at Timor in Koepang Bay. This consisted of the heavy cruiser USS Houston, the light cruisers USS Boise and Marblehead, with the destroyers of Destroyer Division 59: USS Parrott, Pope, John D. Ford, and Paul Jones. How this Task Force and the Dutch/British force could cooperate was a matter of urgent talks.

Air Vice Marshall Pulford was aware of the criticism so often given to the RAF since the beginning of the war about the lack of air cover for both Navy and Army. His limited forces had had to be safeguarded from extinction, which is what the Japanese Army and Navy Air Forces had been trying to achieve. The casualties that his crews had suffered pointed to the fact that the RAF, RAAF and RNZAF were doing their part, but it was proving difficult.

Pulford was focusing on getting the Tomahawks which arrived on Christmas Eve ready as quickly as possible as the strain on the Buffalo fighter squadrons was becoming intolerable. No 3 Squadron RAAF had flown their fourteen Tomahawks to Singapore in stages from the Middle East. These aircraft were now undergoing maintenance, but the job of the Australian pilots was to help get the 96 Tomahawks ready for the fray. The 151st Maintenance unit assembled the first four within two days and were currently managing between six and eight per day. 24 were ready for operational service, having been test flown by 3 Squadron pilots. Other pilots were working with the pilots of 21 Sqn RAAF to be the first of the four fighter squadrons to convert from the Buffalo onto the Tomahawk. Unfortunately, two of these aircraft had been lost already, one in a training accident and another caught on the ground during an air raid. Realistically it would be towards the middle of the month before a full squadron would be combat ready.

Pulford mentioned that 4 Sqn RAAF had spent a few days in Rangoon talking with the American Volunteer Group’s pilots to learn their tactics which seemed to be more effective than those being used by the RAF. The tactics the Australians had used in North Africa against the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica perhaps didn’t translate to fighting the Japanese. The AVG’s successes over Rangoon showed that there was something the RAAF pilots could learn from the AVG pilots at Rangoon. When the Tomahawk aircraft were operational in RAF service in Singapore it would be helpful if they could be as effective as the Americans were making of them.

The arrival of four squadrons of Hurricanes (30, 135, 136, 258 Sqdns) in mid-January due to be flown off the two Aircraft Carriers would be none too soon. Discussions with the Dutch about using their airfields in Sumatra as alternative locations for the delivery and maintenance of RAF aircraft had been approved. The problems of trying to work on the airfields on Singapore Island under Japanese attack was all too often slowing work. The loss of Port Victoria had meant that aircraft being flown to Singapore from Burma already had to use Medan as a stopover. The airfield at Palembang on Sumatra was believed to have the advantage of being out of reach of Japanese bombers.

The Air Officer Commanding went on to note that the losses to the Buffaloes since 8 December was forty-two; twenty-three Blenheim I & IV had been lost; sixteen Hudson IIs; nine Vildebeestes and two Catalinas. Losses among the aircrew were also very high, while some pilots and crew had managed to bail out over friendly lines, all too many were missing believed killed.

The RAF’s on-hand reserves of eighty-eight aircraft had almost all been issued to squadrons to make up for these losses. The current air strength was: 453 RAAF and 243, 488 RNZAF squadrons were each reduced to ten operational Buffaloes. 1 and 8 RAAF squadrons had been amalgamated and had eight Hudson IIs on hand. The Blenheim bomber squadrons (32, 34 and 60 RAF) had twenty bombers between them. The Vildebeeste Squadrons (36 and 100 RAF), thanks to reserves, were able to put up 16 aircraft between them. Likewise, 205 Squadron’s Catalinas had used replacements to maintain three on active service.

The other reinforcements Pulford had received, 12 Fleet Air Arm SeaHurricanes and 6 Swordfish from HMS Ark Royal were also reduced now to six and four. Since Christmas Day, twelve Buffaloes flown by Dutch pilots from 2-VLG-V (2e Afdeling, Vliegtuiggroep V (2nd Squadron, Airgroup 5)) were operating out of Kallang airfield in defence of Singapore, a much-appreciated help. The question which kept Pulford up at night was whether his men could keep going until the Tomahawks and Hurricanes were able to bring his fighter force up to strength.

The question was asked if Pulford had any idea about how many losses the Japanese were taking. He had to concede that fighter pilots tended to overestimate their ‘kills’ as did bombing raids of enemy held airfields. If they were to be believed then the Japanese would have lost over 200 machines (more than double his own losses of 92). Pulford believed that the losses of Japanese aircraft was probably between 120 and 140, a ratio of about 1:1.3 or 1:1.5. There was no real organisation to count downed Japanese aircraft, so there was no real evidence for his claims, but he felt the lower estimate were about right.

Pulford finished his briefing looking at bombers, which were still going to be a problem. 36 Hudons IVs had been delivered to Australia during December, some of which would be sent as replacements, or given to RAAF squadrons in Australia and the older aircraft sent to Malaya. Blenheims and Wellingtons were on their way from the Middle East, and currently in eastern India. Getting the aircraft into the area was only one part of the story, their bombs, spares and ground crew were all following by sea, so that even when the planes arrived it would be some time before they would be operational.

After the Quarter Master General had reported on the availability of various stores, Lieutenant General Percival brought the meeting to a conclusion. In his opinion, the work being done by III Indian Corps was buying time for the Australian Corps to be fully ready to either take up the defence of southern Malaya, or hopefully, to go on the offensive to regain lost territory. If that offensive was in conjunction with Bill Slim’s Corps from Burma, then it was possible that Thailand could be liberated. Until such a happy day, Percival asked his senior officers to pass on his gratitude to all the units who were doing great work under trying circumstances.

 

[allanpcameron]

2 January 1942. Singapore.

Sergeant Tommy Docherty’s shoulder wound had been properly treated and he was now on light duties. He had been brought back to Singapore Island to work with recently arrived 7th Bn RTR. Many of the men who’d fought at Arras were now leavening RAC units throughout the Corps, but there was still a number of veterans of the attack on 7th Panzer Division that had been so crucial to the delay to the German advance to the English Channel coast.

Their Commander was the recently promoted Lt-Col Jock Holden, who’d been Adjutant Captain during the Arras battle, and RSM Fowler still had his role. Lt Col Hedderwick had already visited his old comrades and welcomed them to Singapore. Tommy Docherty had been a trooper 7th Bn RTR in 1940, a driver of an A11. He’d been promoted and transferred to 11 Bn RTR when it had been raised in January 1941.

Docherty had spent a couple days catching up with old friends, and a couple of nights in Singapore drinking heavily with old and new friends. Suffering somewhat from a sore head, Docherty was spending the morning with the tank commanders of A Squadron, sharing his experience of fighting the Japanese in the Malayan terrain. He was able to share with them some of the lessons that had been learned, and it kept coming back to the problem of the 2-pdr gun. Most of the fights 11th Bn RTR had been in, the tanks were just mobile pillboxes, with one machine gun. Docherty couldn’t help but compare that to Arras and the effectiveness of the pompom gun that could deal with soft as well as some hard targets.

The good news was that 7th Bn RTR had arrived with a larger number of 3-inch armed Close Support tanks than a tank battalion would normally have (18 instead of 6). They also had spares, some of which would be sent to 11th Bn RTR to help supplement the number in the remaining tanks in that Battalion. Each troop of three tanks would have one CS tank and two 2-pdr tanks, something that Docherty approved of. The other thing Docherty had learned, and spoke in favour of, was taking the Bren gun mount that could be attached to each tank. Originally this was designed as an anti-aircraft mount, but Docherty argued that the tank commander having one could use it while the main Besa MG was reloading or having the barrel replaced. He told his story of how he came to be wounded, he explained that while having the Sten gun in the tank was useful, a Bren had better range and power. Even better was having a Gunga Din who’d man that Bren gun while the tank commander was inside the hatch. The fact that being on the back of a tank was a particularly dangerous place wasn’t lost on the men of A Squadron, but Docherty’s description of how his mate, Sergeant Bill Morris, died was horrendous.

Because 7th Bn RTR would be working with 18th Infantry Division, part of the planning for exercises to prepare for combat, the men of 53rd, 54th and 55th Brigades were all scheduled to have time working with the tanks. Docherty, and a few others from 11th Bn RTR passed on the information about what signals to look for. As part of their training Western Command before sailing, the 18th Division had had some time training with tanks, so it wouldn’t be an entirely new situation for them. The primary difference at this stage was that in Division sized exercises in the UK an Army Tank Battalion would support one infantry Battalion. Each squadron of five troops would provide each of the three attacking platoons with a troop of three tanks, the other two troops being available either for a flanking move, or to thicken the firing line. Currently there was one tank Battalion spread out among III Indian Corps, and now one with II Australian Corps. It was clear that a new system would need to be worked out. For this the experience of men like Docherty was essential.

The advantage of the Matilda IIs that had arrived with 7th Bn RTR was they were equipped with a powered phone from the rear of the tank to inside the turret, allowing the infantry and tank commanders to converse without putting themselves in harms way. Docherty, when he saw this, couldn’t help but remember Gunga Din’s face every time he opened the hatch smiling down at him. Docherty had lost touch with where 3rd Bn 5th Mahratta Light Infantry were now, and hoped that the wee Indian was doing alright.

The tanks themselves were undergoing a bit of maintenance after their long sea voyage, and some ‘tropicalisation’ was being done to prepare them for work in Malaya. Another advantage that Docherty noticed was that with the tank battalion, they had brought a larger than normal ‘B echelon’. The plan, it seemed, in the War Office was that 11th and 7th Bn RTR would be the basis for a full Army Tank Brigade, 4th Bn RTR with 58 Matilda Mark II infantry tanks were sailing Wilson Special 14 convoy, along with battle replacements for 7th and 11th Bn RTR. Having sailed on 9 December 1941, the ships bound for Singapore were expected at the end of January.

The RAOC was responsible for the supply and repair for weapons, armoured vehicles and other military equipment and ammunition. Since a full tank Brigade was now being established in Singapore having the AFV element of the RAOC centred on the primary RAC Base Depot, co-existing at an RASC depot, made sense. By including a Base Supply Depot, an advanced Ordnance workshop, an extra Light Aid Detachment and RAOC Brigade level workshops along with 7th Bn RTR’s men and tanks, better care could be taken of the tanks. Lt-Col Hedderwick had already requested that some of his ‘Beyond Local Repair’ tanks might be brought back for some of the bigger jobs that his own B echelon couldn’t handle. The fact that a few tank transporters were included with the Advance Ordnance workshop meant that this could happen much more easily.

For the next few weeks, as Docherty recovered from his wound, his presence among the men of 7th Bn RTR, especially with those who hadn’t been in action before was helpful. Docherty couldn’t help wonder when the Medical Officer would class him as fully fit for duty and return to 11th Bn RTR, if there was much left of it by the end of the month.

 

[allanpcameron]

4 January 1942. Rabaul.

Brigadier Stanley Savage was furious at the damage done by the Japanese bombers. Sixteen Navy G3M Type 96 bombers had scored three hits on the runway of Lakunai airfield, while the other 17 bombs landed on the Rapindik Native Hospital and the labour compound, killing 15 civilians and horrifically wounding 15 others with shrapnel.

17 Brigade had been on the island since the end of November and Savage had been trying to improve the defences that ‘Lark Force’, based on 2/22 Infantry Battalion (CO Lt Col Howard Carr), had being doing before the other two Battalions arrived. Since their arrival in April 1941, Lt Col John Scanlan’s force (HQ New Guinea Area) had been constructing defences and training for operations in the tropical environment. His force over time had been reinforced by a coastal defence battery with two 6-inch guns, two out-dated 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, and the 17th Anti-Tank Battery (12 x 2-pdrs). With the arrival of Savage and his 2/5 and 2/7 Battalions, Scanlan had been happy to hand over command of Rabaul to him, remaining Savage’s Chief of Staff.

The planned evacuation of women and children, and other Europeans of a population of about one thousand, who wanted to leave had been carried out when war had been declared. Also interred and shipped to Australia were all the Japanese on the island. The Chinese population (almost a thousand people) had been unable to persuade the Australian Administrator (Brigadier-General Sir Walter McNicoll) to also evacuate Asian women and children, causing some resentment.

Originally Lark Force had been sent to “maintain a forward air observation line as long as possible and to make the enemy fight for this line rather than abandon it at the first threat”. Now there was a full brigade of troops, reinforced with artillery, including anti-aircraft and anti-tank forces. These units had been taken from what had been 6 Division’s resources: 2/1 Field Regiment RAA (24 x 25-pdrs), B Company 2/1 MG Regiment, a battery of 2/1 Anti-tank Regiment (12 x 2-pdrs), 3rd Battery 2/1 LAA Regiment (12 x 40mm Bofors AA)), a troop of carriers and three armoured cars from the Divisional Carrier Regiment. The extra engineers and pioneers, signallers and medical personnel were all assigned roles to expand the ability to defend the island effectively. The other elements of 6 Division had been sent to Ambon and Timor.

When Savage had arrived, he had spent some time with the RAN escorting destroyer’s Captain and Navigation Officer to look over the area from the point of view of where landings might take place. With the experience of Greece in mind, he also looked at how an evacuation could take place if required. Scanlan had already tried to imagine how the Japanese would attack, and therefore, how the island and its airfields would be defended. With 1400 men Scanlan had always known that the chances were he would only be able to offer token resistance. His forces had been disposed covering the harbour area, with an improvised company at Praed Point (where the two 6-inch guns were sited), an infantry company in beach positions at Talili Bay, westward across the narrow neck of the peninsula; another Company at Lakunai; and others along the ridge around the bay, at Four Ways and defending Vunakanau airfield. He hadn’t however, given much thought to the evacuation of his force if everything went wrong.

Savage met with the senior RAAF officer, Wing Commander Lerew, whose four Hudson bombers and ten Wirraway trainers turned fighters, were a large part of the reason for the Australian force to be present. Lerew was in no doubt that his feeble force was little more than a bump in the road for a Japanese steamroller. His bomber crews were primarily doing reconnaissance, after a couple of inconclusive attacks on Japanese shipping. Savage was concerned that his men were placed in harm’s way for a very weak ‘forward air observation line’. Lerew wasn’t sure whether reinforcements were going to arrive. There were feelers out to the Americans whose reinforcements for the Philippines were being rerouted to Australia. There were P40Es arriving directly from the United States and being assembled at Amberley near Brisbane.

The two Wirraways that had attempted to intercept the Japanese bombers failed to do so. While there was a direction finding station at the airfields, it was used primarily to guide aircraft in. It wasn’t the kind of RDF that an early warning system relied on. Coastwatchers were in various places, and early warning of an incoming air raid depended on these men giving timely intelligence, and that had been sadly lacking that morning. The two 3-inch AA guns had engaged the Japanese planes which were estimated to have bombed from 18000 feet, but their shells failed to reach the height of the bombers. The light AA battery didn’t engage, as per standing orders. Not only would the Japanese aircraft be completely out of their range, but they would also lose the element of surprise that Savage hoped to achieve when the time came.

The Australian Chiefs of Staff wanted their forward air observation line spread in an arc from east of Australia's Cape York to the Admiralty Islands, north of New Guinea, a distance of about 1,600 miles. Sections of 1st Independent Company were disposed for the protection of forward Air Operational Bases (AOB) at Kavieng (New Ireland), Vila (New Hebrides), Tulagi (Guadalcanal), Buka Passage (Bougainville), and Lorengau (Manus Island). Major Wilson (OC 1st Independent Company) had sent one unit of one officer and 18 ORs with a Wireless Transmitter to Lorengau, and Buka. The flying boat base at Vila had received 2 officers and 28 OR, the RAAF had wireless communications there already. Likewise, the RAAF flying boat base at Tulagi had only needed 1 officer and 8 OR, as the role there was to train the native police force for the role of assisting the RAAF in protecting the AOB. Both Tulagi and Vila had similar Direction Finding systems to the one in Rabaul. Savage wanted to know if the Independent Company could report sighting of enemy aircrafts’ direction, height and speed to the RAAF at Lakunai. This would perhaps give the pilots on immediate standby some warning to get in the air and where to expect the enemy to be coming from.

Scanlan agreed to look into it and Lerew also noted that each of the AOBs had a detachment of RAAF personnel manning the landing grounds. As an idea it was fairly simple to put into practice, but might take some exercises to fine tune it.

Examining the damage done by the air raid, three bombs had hit the runway of Lukunai, damage that was being repaired quickly. The questions of dispersal of aircraft, having protected revetments for them, fuel and ammunition dumps being camouflaged and protected were all discussed. In fairness to the RAAF, all these matters had been attended to, but in response to the first attack, more work would be done to improve matters further.

Savage then had a meeting with the Army Service Corps’ Quartermaster. The Brigade had two years’ worth of food on hand. Savage wanted the stores to be dispersed and hidden in the mountains. Should the Japanese invade, it could well be necessary to fight an extended guerrilla campaign, and having such stores squirrelled away would enable that to happen. One of the problems they faced was that there were almost no roads on New Britain and a mountain ridge covered in jungle between the Gazelle Peninsula (the area around Rabaul) and the main part of the island.

Savage had considered various ideas for withdrawing his force if vastly outnumbered by the enemy. Unlike Greece, there wasn’t anything like the Mediterranean Fleet ready and able to pick up men from the beaches of New Britain. Having spoken to the District Commissioner and a few plantation owners, Savage had ordered work to begin on what he called a ‘backdoor path’. Above the Kokopo Ridge the country was flat and covered in thick jungle, but around Vunakanau airfield was a large undulating area of high kunai grass. Narrow native pads or tracks on the Gazelle Peninsula linked village to village, but there were also a few tracks towards plantations that would provide his men with reasonable going. He wanted to get across the Warangoi River and back onto the coast at Wide Bay.

The fear of the men of 2/22 Infantry Battalion, who’d been on the island for more than six months was that they would be simply sacrificial lambs to the slaughter. The arrival of the rest of the Brigade had raised their hopes, but against a determined and strong enemy, the ability to hold out was always going to be limited. When Savage’s idea of an escape route became known, the men realised that they had a Commanding Officer who wasn’t prepared to simply throw away their lives in a hopeless gesture. Although it had been hard work to expand the track past Ralabang Plantation to the river, and put together a ferry crossing, the men working on it knew it was for their own benefit and so only grumbled a lot about the jungle and terrain. Once they were across the river the problems wouldn’t be over, but at least they have a few advantages.

One of these advantages was a detachment of the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles, comprising some eighty men, raised by Lieut-Colonel Walstab, the Police Superintendent and his native police. New Britain’s Melanesian population were an easy-going people who preferred to lead their own lives. The Australians had proved tolerant overlords on the whole, furnishing agreeable employment for a few on plantations and in the native constabulary, and leaving the others pretty much alone. The presents given and payments made to Lululais and Tul Tuls (village chiefs) for a little work to improve the tracks between villages were well received. While the Australian soldiers were pretty dismissive of these efforts, a definite route began to take shape. By placing some supplies along the route, the Australian troops and natives together had prepared for a ‘just in case’ scenario.

The bombing had brought home to the Australian forces that this was a place that the Japanese would want. Its natural harbour would of great benefit, as would the airfields. Savage and his men knew that time was running out, and this was confirmed that evening when another Japanese air raid, this time on Vunakanau airfield, was carried out. About eleven flying-boats made two runs over the airfield; one pattern of bombs straddled the end of the strip, but the others fell wide of it, killing one native. Once more the anti-aircraft fire was ineffective and no Wirraways were able to intercept the Japanese flying-boats.

 

[allanpcameron]

6 January 1942. Muda River. Malaya.

The 29th Indian Brigade and merged 6/15th Brigade were holding the line anchored on the Muda River. Increasing pressure was being felt all along the front, with the Japanese obviously probing for weak spots.

Just before dawn a lengthy Japanese artillery barrage had been focussed on the positions of the 6th Bn 13th Frontier Force Rifles around Kuala Ketil. This was followed almost immediately by a strong force of Japanese aircraft which bombed and strafed anything that looked like a defensive position. These two events made the Indian troops aware that something bad was about to happen, and so it unfolded.

The way the river snaked around had made it difficult to organise interconnected defensive positions. The presence of the Japanese aircraft made the mobile element of the defence more difficult. Likewise, the gunners of the Field Batteries supporting the Frontier Force men were mostly having to take cover and not give away their positions. The anti-aircraft firepower of the Indian Brigade was limited to light machine guns, and therefore largely ineffective.

As the morning developed, more and more infiltrations were being noted in various points. Sometimes these were counterattacked, but sometimes the Japanese just disappeared into the jungle. Brigadier Dennis Reid (CO 29th Indian Brigade) had been requesting RAF support to no avail. The 1st Bn Worcestershire Regiment and 6/13 FFR were both under heavy assault, all along their front, as were the 6/15th Brigade nearer the coast. Reid and Brigadier Oswald Lay (CO 6/15th Brigade) had conferred with Major-General Murray-Lyon about the way in which the Japanese attack was progressing. Each Brigade had one Battalion in reserve, but, with the skies filled with Japanese aircraft, moving the reserves would be problematical.

Murray-Lyon also requested fighter cover for his force, but AVM Pulford noted that his own airfields were themselves under attack and he didn’t have any spare fighters to assist. The two Brigades had some depth to their defensive positions, that once the river line had to be given up, there were prepared positions to fall back to. The Frontier Force were the first to move back to their secondary positions, and it looked as if the Japanese were building a bridge over the river in the vicinity of the one demolished previously. As the Frontier Force men withdrew, the 1st Worcs had to realign their position to keep in touch. The Japanese commander saw his opportunity and exploited this gap with a surge of a couple of Infantry Companies.

The lessons of the previous month had taught the British officers to do the modern equivalent of forming a square, going into a box formation. As Platoons and Companies were by-passed the troops had learned to stay in place. In a manoeuvre battle, the Japanese often gained the upper hand. Whereas blocking the main routes would slow the Japanese as their supplies and reinforcements weren’t as capable of going through the jungle. The presence of Matilda II tanks was the key to be able to make sure that the boxes were relieved in a timely fashion.

The Japanese were becoming more adept at finding ways to disable the Infantry Tanks, since their anti-tank guns were completely ineffective. Their preferred method was to try to break the tracks of the tank, leaving it immobile. Once that was achieved, they might be able to kill the crew with petrol bombs or firing at point-blank range through vision slits. This had led to a greater emphasis on having at least a platoon of Indian or British troops to protect each tank, basically one Infantry Company per troop of three tanks. This had evolved over the previous month from lessons learnt, but any Company with that job was almost guaranteed to take heavy casualties.

11th Bn RTR’s C Squadron had started off working with 8 Division AIF, until the arrival of the Australian’s own Stuart Light Tanks, then the whole Squadron had been reassigned to III Indian Corps. Major Rupert Booth (OC C Squadron) had assigned 3rd and 4th Troop (OC Lieutenant Martin Thwaites) to 29th Brigade, with 1st and 2nd Troops with 6/15th Brigade. Booth himself, with Squadron HQ, remained with Major-General Murray-Lyon’s 11th Indian Division’s HQ.

The three tanks in Lt Thwaites’ 4th troop were all named for birds. His own was Corncrake, Sergeant Mike Harris’ tank was Condor and Corporal Bill Clutson’s tank was Cormorant. There hadn’t been a lot of time to get used to 29th Indian Brigade, but at least Thwaites was working with the Worcestershire Regiment, which helped with communications. His friend Lieutenant Paul Gregson OC 3rd Troop was attached to 6th Bn 13th Frontier Force Rifles. Gregson had joked about the problems trying to understand the Australians, but the Indians were a whole different kettle of fish.

The general principle was for the troop of tanks to be stationed with the Battalion HQ, and therefore able to quickly respond to any particular danger to any of the Infantry Companies. The Battalion reserve Company, with the carrier platoon were usually the group that the three tanks would work with. For Lt Thwaites that meant he was linked with Major Donald Nott of D Company and Captain Anthony James (OC Carrier Platoon).

The first sign that the tanks would soon be called into action was when the Battalion HQ itself was attacked by a small force of Japanese infantry. They suddenly appeared out of the jungle and it was only the bravery of one of the AA Platoon Corporal’s who managed to bring the twin Bren gun to bear, that stopped what seemed like a suicidal attack. The fact that the Japanese had infiltrated as far as the Battalion HQ brought home the serious situation that the Battalion faced.

Most of the telephone wires between the HQ and Company HQs were cut, and the Subaltern commanding the Signal Platoon was organising parties to find the breaks and fix them. Knowing full well that such an effort would be hazardous to say the least, the Battalion Commander, Lt-Col Jock Knight wanted a larger force to go with the Signallers.

Major Nott was given the task, and looking at the situation he expressed his opinion that his Company and the troop of tanks would be needed to both support the signallers and re-establish the separated links of the Battalion. Lt Col Knight wasn’t keen on committing his reserves so early in the battle, but after consulting with Brigadier Reid, he agreed. The Brigade’s reserve, 3rd Bn 2nd Punjab Regiment, were ready to support the other two battalions.

In the time it had taken for the decision to have been made, things were getting decidedly hairy for the forward platoons of both the Worcestershire Regiment and 6/13th FFR. The Japanese attack was developing some momentum. With the British supporting artillery and mobile forces constrained by the Japanese bombers and fighters, and increasing numbers of Japanese troops and tanks across the river, the British and Indian troops were hard pressed. Two platoons of A Company (Worcs Regt) were completely cut off, and C Company was pinned down and unable to move. When D Company and the three tanks started off, they were immediately pounced upon by Japanese aircraft. As many Bren guns as possible were brought to bear on the aircraft, but with very limited success. Three of D Company’s trucks were destroyed and five men killed and another fifteen injured. A bomb had missed Cormorant by just a few yards, which had concussed the crew and knocked out the radio.

Once they got on the move again, they reached B Company’s HQ. The signallers got to work mending the broken wires and Major Nott was given an update on the problems of A and C Companies. Japanese infiltrations had been noted all through Battalions positions. Lt Thwaites, whose tanks were all armed with the 2-pdr gun, knew that his troop would be useful against the Japanese tanks, and wanted to move up immediately to C Company’s position to relieve them. Nott was inclined to agree but moving up the road just invited more attention from the Japanese aircraft.

Thwaites knew that his colleagues had had come success taking their tanks through the jungle, if the infantry were able to support them. It would take longer, but add the element of surprise when they arrived at C Company’s positions. Notes from an earlier attempt to do this had been circulated around the RTR Battalion, so Thwaites talked Major Nott through the procedure to follow. Leaving the damaged Cormorant with B Company, Thwaites and Sergeant Harris set off with the men of D Company following the tanks, except for the men of 12 Platoon which took the lead trying to guide the tanks away from impassable routes.

The slow walking pace meant that when the tanks and D Company arrived at C Company’s position, things were at a critical level. The wounded outnumbered those still fighting, and at least one platoon had been completely wiped out. Ammunition was almost gone, and there was no way to get supplies forward. Likewise, water was very short, and the wounded especially were suffering. The arrival of the two Infantry tanks, with three platoons of infantry turned the situation around. The Japanese withdrew rapidly into the jungle, leaving the battlefield suddenly quiet. Both C Company’s OC (Captain Brian Jacomb) and 2IC (Lt Richard Boulter) were dead, Lt Charles Cross, (OC 10 Platoon) had taken command. Once communications had been restored with the Battalion HQ, Lt Col Knight ordered all of C Company to withdraw. He also ordered Major Nott to move up to find A Company and enable them to withdraw in the same way. B and D Companies then would also pull back establish a new line of resistance, giving the map reference.

Lt Cross pointed out where A Company had been, but noted that not only had communications between the Companies been cut, but there had been diminishing sounds of battle from that direction. Cross got his remaining men together, and organised them to help the wounded back through the jungle the way the tanks had come. Warned of the possibility of small Japanese units still operating between the Company positions, Cross had to make sure that each party of wounded would have men protecting them from possible ambushes.

As Thwaites tanks set off in the direction of A Company’s positions, once again the men of 12 Platoon led the way. The quietness noted by Lt Cross wasn’t the complete absence of sound. The crump of a grenade and the sound of rifle fire could still be heard, even over the noise of the tanks. Working their way through the jungle towards where A Company’s HQ had been, an occasional burst of fire from 12 Platoon’s Bren gunners noted that the British troops were not the only ones using the cover of the jungle. Twice Sergeant Harris’ tank had to open fire with its co-axial machine gun, then disaster struck. A Japanese unit, manhandling a 75mm field gun managed to get two close range shots into Harris’ tank before the men of D Company could react. Harris himself escaped with burns, as did the driver, but both the gunner and loader were killed outright.

With the loss of Condor, Lt Thwaites was on his own, and he was worried about getting bogged down or otherwise disabled. After a brief conversation with Major Nott, the needs of the men of A Company had to take priority, and 13 Platoon were ordered to expand the cordon around Corncrake, to prevent another ambush.

Arriving at A Company’s HQ they found the site of a massacre. It seemed that the Company’s wounded had been gathered at an impromptu aid station, but the Japanese had obviously overran the position and put all the wounded to death. The corpse of the Battalion’s Chaplain, Rev Richard Welchman, was found tied to a tree with a multitude of deep wounds as if he had been used for bayonet practice. Nott used Thwaites’ radio to Battalion HQ to report the situation. The sound of firing coming from a couple of hundred yards away was investigated by 13 Platoon, who discovered the remains of 4 Platoon fighting almost to the last bullet. Clearing the Japanese off and evacuating the survivors took a matter of minutes, the blood of the men of D Company was up seeing what had happened to their comrades.

The senior NCO of 4 Platoon thought that some of 5 Platoon were still holding out in the next position, and Lt Thwaites’ tank led the men of D Company in that direction. As they did so they came upon a large force of Japanese troops with three light tanks. The men didn’t need orders from Major Nott to pour fire into the Japanese troops, caught moving along the road. Thwaites’ gunner took on the Japanese tanks, knocking out two of them in short order. The last withdrew at high speed down the road it had been advancing up. D Company’s officers worked hard to get their men to maintain discipline, and to withdraw leaving the Japanese survivors before they could react and get round the back of the British Company. As D Company retraced its route, a couple of men from 5 Platoon, who had been hiding in the jungle rejoined them. 5 Platoon had fought until their ammunition was almost exhausted, and then the Platoon Sergeant had ordered the men who were still able, to make a run for it. He, and the other wounded stayed in the position to given the others the best chance to get away. It had to be considered that they had paid for that with their lives.

When D Company linked up with B Company and the Battalion HQ the loss of two almost two complete Companies left Lt Col Knight devastated. The whole Muda River position was in danger, as the Japanese infiltration tactics disrupted the British and Indian troops’ dispositions. As had happened with the Worcestershire Regiment, so too 6/13th Frontier Force Rifles had been badly handled and were being forced to pull back, once again meaning the Knight had to relocate his much-reduced force to not lose contact with the Indian troops. Brigadier Dennis Reid had already committed elements of 3rd Bn 2nd Punjab Regiment, his reserve, to maintain the link with 6/15th Brigade. Making contact with Major-General Murray-Lyon, Reid informed him of his Brigade’s troubles, a conversation very similar with the one he’d already had with Brigadier Oswald Lay. This was where the plan to keep lines of resistance with two Brigades was weak. A full Division defence would have a third Brigade to shore up problems or commit to a counter attack. Murray-Lyon informed his Corps Commander, Lt-General Heath, that the Muda River line couldn’t be held any longer and requested permission to withdraw the two Brigades before they were overwhelmed.

Heath and Percival agreed that withdrawing from Kedah and Penang was the wise thing to do, but were concerned that it could be done in an orderly fashion. Most of the assets on Penang Island had already been withdrawn or destroyed, the RAF’s Butterworth airfield had also been put beyond use. The fresh 12th Indian Brigade, with the survivors of 10th and 28th Brigades (reformed as 10/28th Brigade) had been digging in at Kuala Kingsar.

Murray-Lyon had prepared a plan for the withdrawal of his two Brigades in stages. With Heath and Percival’s permission, he communicated to Lay and Reid to begin the planned withdrawal at sunset. Getting that information to the Battalions, Companies and Platoons was haphazard due to the Japanese troops in the rear areas. There was a real danger that the withdrawal would become a rout.

Major Rupert Booth (OC C Squadron 11th Bn RTR) was up to date with the situation of his twelve tanks in the forward areas. Six had been knocked out, though some could be fixed up if recovered. The other six were in various places doing their best to support the Battalions they were supporting. Booth had three tanks under his direct command and he knew that these might be crucial to supporting the withdrawal. The other mobile force available to Major-General Murray-Lyon were the armoured cars and carriers of 3rd Cavalry and some light tanks of the 100th Light Tank Squadron. Booth had been working with Major Jack Alford of the tank squadron to work out some way to have the light and Infantry Tanks cooperate together. Booth and Alford offered to put together three troops (each made up of one I tank and 2 Light tanks) to reinforce the battalions holding the line, if the 3rd Calvary could keep the main road open for the Battalions to fall back along. Lt-Col De Winton agreed that his men would do their best to achieve this, and Murray-Lyon ordered Booth to take command and get his men out.

The last few hours of daylight were a nightmare for the officers and NCOs of the British and Indian Battalions attempting organise a fighting withdrawal while in close contact with the enemy. This was particularly difficult with the Japanese units that seemed to be ranging far and wide behind the front line. At least the Japanese aircraft had mostly disappeared, allowing the British artillery to properly support the infantry.

Major Booth had managed to contact all of his remain tanks and make sure that they were where they needed to be to help with the pull out. Whether or not it was through intelligence gained from prisoners, or just plain cunning, the commander of the Japanese force had prepared for the eventuality that the troops in front of him would begin to pull out under the cover of darkness. The last Japanese reserves were thrown into the battle, with a force of carefully husbanded tanks, to upset the British plan. In this they largely succeeded.

Two Battalion HQs were attacked as they were packing up, this ended in the death of both Lt-Col Ronald Bates the CO of the Punjab Battalion in 6/15th Brigade and Lt-Col Ian Bain (CO 6/13th Frontier Force Rifles). Bates would be awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for leading the HQ troops in a desperate action to protect the ambulances carrying away the wounded from the Aid Post. With the loss of leadership at the critical moment, both Battalions struggled to disengage and get away. The other two Battalions in the line, the British Battalion and the Worcestershires managed to get away in better order, with the reserve Battalions, 3rd Bn 2nd Punjab Regiment and the Jat/Punjab Regiment playing a crucial role in allowing this to happen.

The Japanese usually only carried one day’s supply on hand, relying on being resupplied each night. This saved the situation to some extent. The Japanese losses in men and material had gutted the two Regiments which had attacked. Their supplies were delayed by the activities of 1st Independent Company working behind their lines. As the last of the two Indian Brigades loaded onto lorries to head south, Booth had only five working I tanks to cover them and four light tanks. Lt Thwaites’ Corncrake was the only survivor of his troop, and he was devastated to discover that his friend, Lt Paul Gregson had been killed along with his crew. Gregson would be one of the many whose bravery awards would be given posthumously. The survivors of 6/13th FFR spoke of a tank, already covered with burning petrol, breaking through a roadblock and allowing whatever transport they had managed to salvage, to escape. The last to see it as they retreated said that it was no longer firing its guns, but seemed to be attempting to crush any groups of Japanese infantry who were firing on the lorries and carriers with the sepoys clinging to them.

 

[allanpcameron]

7 January 1942. Singapore.

General Auchinleck had arrived from India to look over the positions of his command fighting in Malaya. He’d had breakfast with Lt-Generals Percival, Heath and Mackay, along with Admiral Phillips who’d accompanied the General on his travels.

The fighting along the River Muda had been terrible, but Major-General Murray-Lyon had managed to get a good deal of his two Brigades evacuated. Intelligence suggested that the Japanese attack had been about two Regiments (the equivalent of a British Brigade), and that they would have suffered much worse than the British and Indian troops had. The fact that the Japanese weren’t following up seemed to confirm that. Losing Penang was a blow, but it was believed to be another pyrrhic victory for the Japanese.

Heath had noted that Murray-Lyon was feeling the strain of command, and that the losses his men were taking was hitting him hard. Auchinleck asked if he needed to be replaced, but Heath felt that he probably just needed a bit of respite and more support to continue to do the job of holding up the Japanese.

In one of his previous visits Auchinleck had ordered Percival to make more efforts to fortify the island of Singapore, just in case. Later that day the two men would make a tour of the progress that 18th Infantry Division had been working on. Mackay noted that the two Australian Divisions were approaching full capability, there was a Corps level exercise later in the week to put that to the test. The senior British officers of 18th Division would take part in that, but Mackay was keen on the 18th Division moving off the Island and into the Johore area to work more closely with the two Australian Divisions.

Admiral Phillips was able to give an update on the situation with Force Z, and his plans to firstly escort the two carriers with the Hurricanes for the RAF, and secondly to make another sortie into the South China Sea. The plan for a counterattack by Mackay’s Corps would be helped greatly if there was a strong naval presence on the western side of Malaya. The question of timing was discussed briefly and the various Staffs were ordered to get the plan sorted.

Auchinleck had updated the others on the situation in Burma, where Bill Slims’ Corps was starting to come together. It had been noted that Japanese activity in Thailand seemed to have lessened, which was perhaps another sign that they were having to use more of their forces against Malaya. Once the 9th Highland Division arrived from the Middle East to be added to the African and Indian Divisions, then Slim would have a force capable of pushing into Thailand to give the Japanese two fronts to worry about.

Looking over the situation map, Auchinleck asked about the east coast situation. Lt-Gen Heath noted that 9th Indian Division had been holding quite well. Major-General Barstow was grateful for the reinforcements he had received, and one of his weakened Brigades had taken up positions around Kuantan. There was still a real worry that the Japanese would attempt another amphibious assault on that coast. Phillips noted that British and Dutch submarines were screening the coast and some of the light forces were still available if needed.

Air-Vice Marshall Pulford noted that his aircraft were still keeping up reconnaissance flights over the South China Sea to try to give some kind of warning if another Japanese invasion fleet was spotted. The failure of the RAF to support the ground troops at the River Muda had been a matter of some considerable animosity between Murray-Lyon, Heath and Pulford. The arrival of the Hurricanes from the Middle East couldn’t come soon enough. Pulford was able to say that the Tomahawk fighters were progressing towards availability, but these would basically only replace the aircraft already lost, only the Hurricanes would really increase his capability.

To Auchinleck this was an old argument, and he was keen to try to mend fences between the Army and RAF. Some of the Desert Air Force people were on their way, and he hoped that the lessons learned by them in Army Cooperation would soon improve matters here. He also noted that the American fighters around Rangoon were doing particularly well, and that perhaps when the Tomahawks were ready, the tide would turn in the RAF’s favour.

Auchinleck was asked about closer ties with the Americans, Australians and Dutch. He noted that the political motivation from the Arcadia Conference in Washington DC was clearly something that both Roosevelt and Churchill were keen on. The practicalities of coordination were extremely difficult. The Dutch and Australians already had good cooperation between themselves and the British forces. It was just a pity that there hadn’t been more collaboration with the Americans before the Japanese attacks. After he left Singapore, Auchinleck was travelling on to Batavia for discussions with the Dutch, then to Darwin to see the situation in Northern Australia. There he was due to meet some of the Americans who were starting to arrive in Australia having been unable to get to the Philippines.

Admiral Phillips noted that the Americans were requesting help to evacuate non-essential personnel and bring in medicines and ammunition to Bataan. Some American submarines had been making that trip, and it was possible that some of the submarines coming from the Mediterranean might be used in this way. There had been some experience of doing this type of work back and forth to Malta. The two minelaying submarines, HMS Porpoise and Rorqual were on their way and would be particularly suitable with their large minelaying capacity. Phillips expressed the preference that laying minefields to protect the east coast of Malaya was the more pressing need, but none the less, supporting the Americans was going to be an important role moving forward.

Once the working breakfast was finished the various commanders went about their business. Auchinleck took the opportunity of having Percival alone a few times while touring the 18th Division to get a handle on how his subordinate was getting on. Auchinleck had every confidence in Heath and Mackay as Corps Commanders. Percival seemed to be doing well because he was primarily doing a Staff officers job of managing the army. If he had to take a more active role in the fighting, Auchinleck didn’t think he would have the experience necessary. He constantly found Percival to be very defensive minded, which up until now was fine, but a counterattack would need a different mindset. The arrival of Lt Gen Alexander in Rangoon, with Bill Slim as his Corps Commander was a good team. Auchinleck couldn’t help but feel that he should recommend that London send out a replacement for Percival sooner rather than later. Lieutenant General O’Connor had a proven track record, though whether his experience in the desert of north Africa would be transferable to the jungles of Asia would be an issue.

 

[allanpcameron]

8 January 1942. Redlynch, England.

Redlynch House had become the home of the Headquarters of the Guards Armoured Division, though some HQ elements were at Wincanton. The whole Division was being assembled around Salisbury Plain. The 5th Guards Armoured Brigade (GAB) were grouped around Warminster and Shaftsbury, 6th GAB was at Codford, the Support Group was at Castle Cary, Frome and Midsomer Norton. The Divisional Reconnaissance Regiment, 2nd Household Cavalry Regiment were based at Bulford.

Since the formation of the Division the previous summer a large number of Guards Officers had passed through training courses at Bovington and Lulworth, where the Royal Armoured Corps had instructed them on the practical mechanical, gunnery and wireless knowledge that they’d need.

The decision had been made that every Guardsman of the rank of full corporal and above was to be trained in gunnery, driving, maintenance and wireless. The guardsmen below the rank of Corporal would be trained in just one of those skills. The flow of NCOs returning from the courses had been increasing as the weather had been worsening. The threat of imminent invasion was ever more remote, but the training regime for all in the Division was unrelenting.

The delivery of tanks had hampered this process. There were a great many calls on new tanks, not least to the Russians and the 8th Armoured Division, which was about to sail from Capetown on its journey to foreign parts. Major-General Oliver Leese had got his way and the tanks that had started appearing were Vickers Valiant II* cruiser tanks. The tank had a petrol engine and were equipped with the 6-pdr main tank gun. There were weekly deliveries fresh from the factories, and as each Battalion received more tanks, more exercises were being programmed.

Leese, with his Brigade Commanders (Allan Adair [6th GAB], William For-Pitt [5th GAB] and Lionel Manners-Smith [Support Group]), along with other senior staff officers had gathered to consider the lessons learned from the Armoured Divisions in North Africa. General O’Connor (GOC 8th Army) had overseen the writing up of lessons learned, both positive and negative about the handling of tank formations. This was a very complete document that had contributions from all the main actors, from O’Connor himself, to the Corps, Division, Brigade, Regiment commanding officers. In addition, there were reports from quartermasters, engineers, the Light Aid Detachments, all those elements which made a Division tick. O’Connor had also made sure that the learning was from the ground up. There were detailed reports from members of tank crews, Troop and Squadron Leaders, all of which tried to communicate what they had experienced, what had worked and what had failed.

It was expected that General O’Connor himself would be coming back to Britain for some leave and to present his report to the senior commanders of the Army. Leese was looking forward to hearing it all ‘from the horse’s mouth’, but reading the lengthy written report had taken up quite a bit of the Christmas and New Year leave.

Leese had always had in mind that the creation of the Guards Armoured Division was not just to be like the rest of the Royal Armoured Corps Divisions. As a Guards Division it would have the look and feel of the elite soldiers the Guards embodied. He had spent some considerable time working at the insignia of the Division. During the Great War, the Guards Division had used an ‘Eye’ as its insignia, and Leese had asked the officers and men of the Division to make suggestions of how have something that kept the glorious traditions of their forebears. Eventually the artist Rex Whistler, a Lieutenant in the Welsh Guards, had been commissioned to paint a variety of the ‘Eye’ on various vehicles. These had been presented to Leese and a chosen group of officers to choose which best kept the tradition of the past, but showed also the fighting characteristics of a modern armoured formation. Once chosen, it wasn’t long before every vehicle in the Division was painted with the ‘Eye’.

There were quite a few things that the staff of the Armoured Division disagreed upon, sometimes quite strenuously. Manners-Smith, whose Support Group was an odd assortment of one Infantry Battalion (1st Bn Welsh Guards), and one regiment each of artillery, anti-tank and light AA, felt that a more balanced force, one Armoured Brigade and one Motorised Infantry Brigade, with the artillery and engineers under Divisional control made more sense. That was the way the short lived 22nd Armoured Division had operated, and it certainly seemed a better model than the current one. Manners-Smith, as an artillery man, was particularly worried about how light the artillery support was for an Armoured Division.

The two Armoured Brigade commanders also were unsure of having one motorised battalion attached to their Brigades. Having four Battalions (three armoured and one infantry) in a Brigade wasn’t the normal British Army way of doing things. There were some lessons that Lt General Pope had noted from his experience in XXX Corps. Having an Armoured and Infantry Brigade working together, almost as three ‘battlegroups’ seemed to be fairly balanced. The other armoured Brigade tended to be used more in the Tank Brigade model of supporting an Infantry Division. Whether that was because the Valiant tanks that 2nd Armoured Division was equipped with lent themselves to that model, or it made more tactical sense was the cause of some debate.

Leese tended towards Manners-Smith position and wondered about asking the War Office to allow either 32nd or 33rd Brigade (Guards) to work with his Division to experiment on the model of 22nd Armoured Division. Fox-Pitt wondered if that model was to work, whether it would be better for 5th and 6th GAB to break into two Divisions, otherwise, one of the two Brigades might have to become a Tank Brigade. Adair thought that having two Guards Armoured Divisions would be problematic to get enough artillery and engineering units, as well as all the other necessary units to support a Division.

The next item that was discussed at length was the report’s estimation of both the Italian and German armoured Divisions, written by a senior Intelligence Corps officer. The Italian Divisions were dismissed primarily because of their poor quality tanks. The information on the Afrika Korps was fascinating. With the capture of some many of its men and equipment a much stronger picture was emerging of the way in which the Germans had adapted to the experience in France and Flanders.

The Panzer Division in North Africa had consisted of only two battalions of tanks and three Battalions of an Infantry Regiment. Each battalion of tanks had one ‘heavy’ and two ‘light’ Companies. The Panzer IV was much the same as that captured before Dunkirk. The Panzer III’s improved 50mm main gun, like the 75mm gun in the Panzer IV was short barrelled. If they produced a long barrelled version, it was likely to be as good as the new 6-pdr. The Germans had also improved their tanks’ armour, by adding extra armour plates. The expectation was that new build tanks would have thicker armour as standard.

In addition to the panzers there was another battalion which was known as the Panzerjāger (tank hunter) which consisted of what might be thought of as mobile armoured anti-tank guns. Based on Panzer I hulls, with the Czech 47mm anti-tank gun, the assessment wasn’t very complimentary, but noted that the crews were better protected (and mobile) that the British 2-pdr crews, including those which had been put on the back of lorries as portées. The reports from the fighting in Greece suggested there was a better version developed, and it was noted in the report that it would be helpful to get some intelligence from the Soviets about what they were encountering.

The report noted that as well as the two infantry Battalions, the Panzer Division had a very effective Reconnaissance Battalion, considered by many to be better armed and trained than the British reconnaissance battalions. The CO of 2nd Household Cavalry Regiment begged to disagree, but the armoured cars that his men were getting used to, compared with the various German vehicles were certainly outmatched, though his colleagues did agree about his men being highly trained. The fact that they were only recently moving from horses to armoured cars did leave the question open about what exactly they were highly trained for.

The Panzer Division’s three 3 artillery regiments, with Pioneers, Signals and other Divisional support units rounded out the Division. The report noted that there seemed to be some adaptation of the Panzer Division to North Africa, which may mean that it was a smaller formation than facing the Soviets. Currently the Guards Armoured Division only had one field artillery regiment (the other two were anti-tank and anti-aircraft). Using the model of one Armoured Brigade and one Motorised Brigade, instead of the Support Group, would mean that there would be three Field Regiments, preferably of Royal Horse Artillery, especially if equipped with the self-propelled Birch Gun.

Knowing the enemy was a crucial part of any chance of defeating them. The growing emphasis on signals within the Division was a direct result of the encounters with the German army so far in the war. Their command and control seemed to be excellent, an excellence that the Guards Armoured Division would need to emulate.

As well as receiving the Valiant II* tanks, the Guards Armoured Division were also being issued with the latest marks of anti-aircraft tanks (Vanguard), self-propelled guns (Birch), and the Viking personnel carrier. Their engineers would also have some of the ‘funnies’ being developed, for bridge laying and armoured recovery. All of these vehicles would take time to get used to and work out how best to use them.

Brigadier Adair noted that fighting in the deserts of North Africa would be different from fighting an invader of England, or even if the fighting was in France. He wondered if some of the lessons of desert warfare might not be applicable to the probable type of fighting that the Guards Armoured Division might be involved in.

Major-General Leese noted that it was time for lunch in the Officers’ Mess, so be brought the first part of the formal meeting to an end, but a visit to the War Office to talk over with the new CIGs (General Alan Brooke) was becoming a necessity. Given time, and equipment Leese knew that there would be a lot of experimentation to get things right in exercises, and then apply that experience to combat when the time was right.