Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

[allanpcameron]

20 October 1941. Sirte. Libya.

The arrival of 50th (Northumberland) Infantry Division to join 7th Armoured Division and 6th Infantry Division in XIII Corps had allowed the Corps to begin rehearsing for the forthcoming attack towards Misrata and ultimately Tripoli.

The Royal Navy and RAF had reported many successes stopping shipping coming from Italy to reinforce the Italian and German forces. There was a lack of intelligence about just what axis forces were still in theatre, so Lieutenant-General O’Connor had to plan for the worst-case scenario.

The Royal Navy had been hard at work escorting a veritable fleet of coasters which were carrying the stores needed for the build up to the attack. The fact that they had been able to bring the vast majority of the Valiant I tanks for 7th Armoured Division by sea to Benghazi had saved the tanks from the long overland route.

There was a growing hope that the next convoy would be able to make it to Sirte itself. There was little in the way of port facilities, but there was more than enough expertise in off-loading stores over the beach. The reason for this hope was that the RAF, reinforced by the SAAF and RAAF, seemed to be making inroads towards air superiority.

The numbers of fighters available at the front had risen to eight squadrons of Hurricanes and four squadrons of Tomahawks. The Wellington bomber force, based between Malta and Benghazi had reached five squadrons, with another seven squadrons between Beaufighters, Blenheims and Marylands. The problems facing Air Marshall Tedder in achieving this had been extraordinary. The need for a fighter Squadron’s ground element to be mobile enough to move forward with the aircraft from one landing ground to another was only possible with the help of the RAOC and RASC. Knowing that control of the air was a vital component of any success, General Wavell had agreed to Tedder’s requests for help.

The lessened activity over the summer months had allowed Tedder to build up a small reserve of pilots. During the summer months a number of ‘club runs’ to Malta had delivered many more Hurricanes to Malta, a percentage of which carried on to the area around Benghazi. The logjam at Tokradi was clearing, though the expected arrival of the first Kittyhawks from America would probably put things back again.

Once again, the combined work of Navy, Army and Air Force was paying off. With more fighter cover around Benghazi, the Navy were able to ship more supplies, including petrol, bombs and spares for the RAF squadrons close to their landing grounds. The increased Naval and Air power of Malta, focused on interdicting the Italian convoys to Tripoli, meant that the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica were lacking fuel supplies. This meant their ability to fly enough sorties was hampered. The first Bf 109F fighters were beginning to arrive in Libya, and the Macchi C202 were appearing over Malta. These outclassed the Hurricanes and Tomahawks on an individual level, but numbers mattered. As more and more British, Australian and South African pilots became proficient, some of the older tactics, which were obsolete, gave way to a similar style as the Luftwaffe used. The advantage given to the fighters defending Benghazi and Malta by Radar was also a force multiplier.

The majority of sorties flown by the RAF light bombers focused on their opposite numbers. Airfields, fuel dumps and transport hubs were the primary target. Tedder had begun the campaign to soften up the ground for the army, giving his bombers a month to cause the enemy aircraft as much trouble as possible. The Wellingtons concentrated on making the use of Tripoli’s port very difficult for the Italians and Germans.

The integration of 50th Infantry Division with 7th Armoured Division involved learning the skills of ground-air cooperation. Two Hurricane and two Tomahawk squadrons were designated as ‘Army Cooperation’ squadrons for XII Corps. The aircraft’s weaponry wasn’t entirely satisfactory for the role of ‘flying artillery’. The machine guns and 40lb bombs carried by the Hurricanes had to have an element of luck in hitting and damaging their targets. The Tomahawks weren’t much better, but could carry a larger bomb.

Each Brigade HQ had an RAF liaison attached. This officer was in radio contact with the RAF liaison at Divisional HQ, who in turn was in contact with the liaison at Corps HQ. As each request for air support was passed up the chain to RAF Western Desert HQ. Air-Vice Marshall Coningham, as Air Officer Commanding, had his team organised to be able to sift the requests, and knowing what and where his aircraft were, his team would assign the missions with the overall picture in mind.

There were two particular lessons that the latest serious of exercises had shown up. The first was recognition of friendly forces. Up until now British tanks had a white circle painted around the top of their turret. The dust and sand blowing up from tanks and other vehicles on the move meant that the circles weren’t always visible. The 50th Division’s experience in France and Flanders had noted that the German vehicles often had their swastika flag on the roof. The flag’s red background with a white circle, in which the black symbol was contained, was probably colourful enough to be seen from the air. The idea of having a Union Flag on every vehicle was considered, but discounted. After a search through Quartermasters stores and the souks of the Delta, enough orange-coloured cloth was sourced to add a panel on every British vehicle. Strict instructions had been issued to each and every unit to make sure that the panels were checked regularly to make sure they were clearly visible.

The other result of the debriefings was that some of the light bomber squadrons complained that they were held in readiness for a support mission, and then might only fly one sortie per day. On average the length of time it took from request to carrying out a mission was two and a half hours. The centralised way of collating requests was one reason, another was the distance of strike forces from the battlefield.

Once a mission was issued, the crews would need to be briefed, the aircraft then would have to take off, form up in the air, wait to rendezvous with the escorting fighters. They would then have to find a target, a landscape that didn’t lend itself to easy identification of landmarks. Visually identifying the correct target, was difficult enough, and when all was finally achieved, the weapons available were less than ideal.

No 21 Squadron, a Maryland equipped and South African manned squadron, had been particularly scathing in their debrief. Instead of waiting at readiness on their airstrip, they suggested that each light bomber squadron, with an accompanying fighter squadron should be circling in the vicinity of the battle. That way, if a mission came through, they would be on station much quicker. If no missions were allocated to them, then they would be free to engage targets of opportunity before returning to base. If each paired squadron in turn did this, then the total sortie rate would be much higher. One of the South Africans mentioned that it should be like a taxi-rank. The taxis are lined up and ready to go as soon as a call came in or a passenger hired them.

AVM Coningham agreed to try this in the next set of exercises. The need for clear map coordinates and some kind of smoke marking the target would also have to be practiced. The senior Royal Artillery commander present, noted that efforts to have an Observer in the air, giving corrections to batteries by R/T had proven useful previously. He said this hoping that the RAF would offer to provide aircraft again for his observers. This way they might also help coordinate air attacks with artillery bombardments. Coningham had a lot on his plate and wasn’t entirely sure he could help with that.

The Fleet Air Arm liaison mentioned that there were trained officers on the Fleet’s Battleships that were familiar with correcting gunnery from the air. He would happily ask Admiral Cunningham if someone could be spared from HMS Barham or Queen Elizabeth for the next exercise. Normally the job would be done flying on of the Battleship’s amphibians, though perhaps a Fulmar would be the better choice to use in a possibly hostile airspace. If a Royal Artillery Observer wanted to ride along and see what was involved, the Fleet Air Arm would happily help. The fact that most RAF raids needed to be guided by Albacores to find their target was something that the FAA didn’t want to rub in too much, and at least Conington acknowledged that the role of the FAA was important.

With 7th Armoured Division's 4th and 7th Armoured Brigades at full strength, efforts were being made to sort out the way which the Support Group was formed and used. Major-General Michael Creagh had been reassigned to General Auchinleck’s staff to become the Adviser Armoured Fighting Vehicles in India. Acting Major-General William ‘Strafer’ Gott was now GOC 7th Armoured Division. Having commanded the Support Group, and seen various ideas come and go, he had asked Lieutenant Generals O’Connor and Godwin-Austen for permission to adapt the Support Group to something more useful.

Acting Brigadier Jock Campbell, having been appointed as the CO of 7th Support group, had seen how the Indian 3rd Motorised Brigade had done with 22nd Armoured Brigade. Therefore, he had started calling the Support Group, “7th Motor Brigade”. This name quickly became popular. With three motorised Infantry Battalions, (2nd and 9th Kings Royal Rifle Corps and 2nd Rifle Brigade), it was now a more rounded organisation. Some people had argued that, like the Support Group, that it should be arranged as a Brigade Group. This would mean having some integrated artillery (including anti-tank and anti-aircraft) and engineers. Major-General Gott however wanted, as with the Royal Engineers, all Royal Artillery units under Divisional control, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft units.

The problem Gott had seen previously was by parcelling out the artillery to various units, it meant that neither the Division, nor the Support Group, had enough combined strength. The problem of being defeated in detail was part of the learning taken from the fighting in France and Flanders. The Division had to be key organisation in battle. In Gott’s mind, putting Brigade Groups out separately was a recipe for disaster. Campbell, as an artillery man, could see the logic of Gott’s desire for consolidation of fighting power, though still thought there was a place for adaptation.

With the two Armoured Brigades and one Motor Brigade making up the Division, it was still very tank heavy, six armoured Regiments and only three infantry battalions. As all the tanks were Valiant I Infantry tanks, Gott had been working with Major-General John Evetts (GOC 6th Infantry Division) to attempt to use 4th Armoured Brigade, as a Tank Brigade. In this case, each Armoured Regiment would work with either one of the three infantry Brigades, or with the three battalions of one Brigade for a solid punch. This would let Gott keep 7th Armoured Brigade and 7th Motor Brigade as the ‘breakthrough’ force. This ‘Mixed Division’, tried by the short lived 22nd Armoured Division, was much easier to handle and while the speed of the Valiant I wasn’t terribly fast, it wasn’t too different from the German panzers.

For Acting Lieutenant-General Reade Godwin-Austen, the forthcoming operation was quite different to his experience in East Africa. Richard O’Connor had taken him under his wing and had tried to bring him up to speed on what the battles in North Africa had taught the British Army.

The force Godwin-Austen now commanded, an Armoured and two Infantry Divisions, with all the Corps troops, was a powerful force. He’d studied everything that had happened up till then in North Africa and with Gott and John Evetts’ experience, he was relying heavily on them. Major-General William Ramsden (GOC 50th Division) was a late arrival, but had led 25th Brigade with distinction in the fighting in Flanders. Ramsden had taken over command of 50th Division when Giffard Martel had been promoted to GOC Royal Armoured Corps.

50th Division was made up of 69th, 150th and 151st Brigades, all of which were well seasoned. The Durham Light Infantry of 151st Brigade had taken part in the Battle of Arras which had put a dent in General Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division. It was believed by British Intelligence that Rommel was in Berlin looking to redeem himself after his failure in North Africa. Godwin-Austen felt he had three crack Divisions under his command. While it was possible that Vyvyan Pope’s XXX Corps might have to take over from him, Godwin-Austen believed that he had a force strong enough to march into Tripoli, as he had into Addis Ababa, if all the planets aligned correctly.

 

[allanpcameron]

25 October 1941. Singapore.

Lieutenant-General Percival finally had a chance to sit down and talk about the first couple of months of having tanks under his command with Lt-Col Michael Hedderwick (CO 11th Bn RTR). Hedderwick was happy to report that his men and machines were coping with the climate, and had begun exercising with both Australian and Indian troops.

During September, Hedderwick and his Squadron Commanders had gone on a lengthy tour of the area looking at the terrain. With Percival’s pre-war work on defending Malaya, the RTR officers concentrated on the most likely routes that a Japanese force might take to attack Singapore from the north. With some help from the Royal Engineers Survey Depot, the Battalion now had a fairly good set of maps of the whole area. These maps would allow the tanks to avoid bridges that would collapse under the weight of the Matilda II tanks, something the Royal Engineers were quite keen on. They also were fairly realistic about the kind of terrain that the tanks could use off-road. The expectation of the RTR officers was that Malaya would consist mostly of impassable jungle. The reality they’d found was quite different. Large areas of the countryside were set aside as rubber plantations. While a tank might knock down a few trees here and there, the plantations weren’t completely unsuitable ground for tanks.

Hedderwick noted that the conditions of the roads were always going to be a factor in the mobility of the tanks. He expressed his disappointment at how few tank transporters he had to move his tanks around. The tracks on a Matilda would always have a negative impact on road surfaces, but usually there was a verge on the side of the road that the tanks could use.

Having looked over the ground, Hedderwick had re-evaluated his request to keep the whole Battalion together in the event of an attack. Having a central depot where the tanks could be serviced was clearly important, and the RASC were happy to offer to expand one of their workshops for the RTR. The suggestion that Hedderwick now wanted to make was to offer to keep his HQ Squadron at Singapore itself. A, B and C squadrons could be parcelled out, one to each of the three Infantry Divisions (9th & 11th Indian, 8th Australian). Having 18 Infantry Tanks at the disposal of the Divisional General would allow sufficient flexibility.

Percival wanted to know Hedderwick’s evaluation of the plans for Operation Matador. Major Tom McBride, CO B Squadron, had been able to drive up to Bangkok and back in a civilian car with his driver ‘on leave’. They’d taken lots of photographs to let the intelligence officers get an idea of what might be possible.

Getting to it in a timely manner however was always going to be the problem. The speed of the Matilda II would be an issue for the infantry commander to have to take into account. The journey to Songkla, at about 140 miles, would put the tanks under a lot of strain. Pattani, which was half the distance, would be a more realistic prospect, if the tanks were to get there, fight and get back. The RTR officer was also concerned with Japanese forces outflanking that kind of move northwards in Thailand. His own assessment, which chimed with McBride’s, was that the RAF base in Kota Bharu would be a prime target for the Japanese. Any British force sent into Thailand could well find itself having to fight its way back.

Percival was pleased with Hedderwick’s assessment. It confirmed what he thought was the weakness of Operation Matador. He would be relying on two Brigades of 11th Indian Division to both hold Jitra in the west and move into Thailand in the east. Until the next wave of reinforcements arrived, and had time to acclimatise and train, Percival was concerned that his forces would be open to defeat in detail if they were spread out too much. The question about whether the Thai army and police would cooperate or resist an incursion was a matter of debate.

There were two routes leading from South Thailand into North Malaya—the main road from Singora via Haad’yai Junction into Kedah and a secondary road from Patani via Yala to Kroh in North Perak where it branched, the better road going west into Province Wellesley and the other, which reported to be fit only for light transport, turning south to join the main north-south road west of the Perak River.

McBride had noted that on his travels he had regularly bumped into Japanese men, obviously army, who seemed to be doing exactly the same kind of reconnaissance as he was. He particularly noted that on one of his stops a group of Japanese had stayed in the same rest house. The two parties then proceeded to meet again on the road to Kroh. There was a feature on the road, known as the Ledge, where the road was cut into the hillside, with a steep descent to a river below. If that road was destroyed, movement south would be severely hampered. If it were open, it would allow a force to move into the rear areas of the Indian Division around Jitra.

Percival took careful note of this. Reports of Japanese ‘tourists’ were rampant, and they were obviously planning something. To counter whatever the Japanese had in mind, a fleet was being assembled for Singapore. The Battlecruiser HMS Repulse was currently working out of Mombasa. It would set sail for Trincomalee in November. The aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable, after she had worked up in the West Indies, was going to Gibraltar to replace HMS Ark Royal. HMS Ark Royal, with HMS Nelson, would sail to Singapore, via Alexandria, after they’d escorted a convoy to Malta. Admiral Cunningham, C-in-C Mediterranean, was being asked to send another battleship (most likely HMS Barham), with a Cruiser Squadron and two Destroyer flotillas. HMS Prince of Wales was currently escorting a convoy towards South Africa, and then onwards to Trincomalee to rendezvous with HMS Repulse, HMS Nelson, HMS Barham and HMS Ark Royal. With her experience of flying off Hurricanes, HMS Ark Royal would receive two Naval Air Squadrons, each with 12 Hurricane Ibs, in addition to one of her Fulmar squadrons, leaving half of her Swordfish squadrons on Malta, along with the other Fulmar squadron.

The Royal Australian Navy’s Cruisers and destroyers were the obvious choices to send as the basis for the Cruiser Squadron and Destroyer flotillas. The Australian destroyers HMAS Vampire, Vendetta, Voyager, Waterhen, Napier, Nestor, Nizam, would be much missed by Cunningham, but sending them home was a reasonable request from Australia. HMAS Stuart had already been detached and was being converted to an Escort Destroyer at Williamstown, Victoria. The sloop HMAS Parramatta would also return to strengthen her sister ships. The new destroyer, HMAS Norman, would follow from Home Fleet.

As for Cruisers, HMAS Perth was already being refitted in Sydney. HMAS Hobart was undergoing a refit in Colombo and now wouldn’t be returning to the Red Sea. HMAS Australia and HMAS Canberra’s work in the Indian Ocean would likely end and two RN Cruisers (HMS Gloucester and Dido) would be deployed to replace them. Admiral Cunningham was also going to release HMS Carlisle, the AA Cruiser, and HMS Fiji to add to the Australian Cruisers. HMS Greyhound, Ilex, Imperial and Juno would be the British Destroyers to join their Royal Australian Navy comrades.

The new Australian Prime Minister, John Curtin, had finally persuaded Winston Churchill to allow the Australian I Corps (6th and 9th Divisions AIF) to be shipped home from the Middle East. Since both Divisions had suffered in the fighting in Greece and North Africa, Curtin was keen on giving the men some home leave. Once they were up to full strength, he planned sending them to Malaya. This would mean that I (Australian) Corps (6th, 8th and 9th Divisions) would be available to Percival. There were questions about whether the 23rd Brigade, spread over Rabaul, Timor and Ambon, would be better off if a Brigade Group as in each of those locations, this might mean splitting up some of the Brigades returning from the Middle East.

The Australian First Armoured Division were still at a relatively early phase of their development. The good news was that they were beginning to receive the first of 365 Stuart M3 Light Tanks. These Lend-Lease tanks, originally for the British Army, had been transferred over to the Australians. They expected that the full order that would be complete by the end of December. The expectation was for them to be available in the spring of 1942. Lieutenant-General John Lavarack, GOC I Corps, had already flown to Canberra to be consult with Curtin. Lavarack, despite Blamey’s objections, would take command of 2nd Australian Imperial Forces in the Far East. Already some of his staff were making their way to Singapore to begin the process of setting up a Corps HQ.

Percival had been informed by the War Office that 18th Infantry Division were about to embark directly for Singapore, with the hope that they would arrive in time for Christmas. A large Canadian contingent would be shipped on American vessels to Liverpool, to allow the direct transport to the Far East of the 18th Division. Along with this British Division, the RAF had shipped 96 crated Tomahawk IIbs, with ground-crew and some pilots to reinforce the squadrons defending Malaya. This had been done despite a protest from the Prime Minister who wanted to send as much as possible to the Soviet Union. He was informed that this was in fact a planned reinforcement of Middle East Command, which Generals Wavell and Auchinleck had agreed ship onwards to Singapore personally. Ninety-six Hurricanes had gone to the Soviet Union instead. The first shipment of P40s directly from the United States to the Soviet Union had been shipped in September.

The Brewster Buffaloes that the RAF, RAAF and RNZAF were being equipped with were, to quote one Australian pilot, ‘pathetic’. What the British Purchasing Commission had ordered, and what Brewster had delivered wasn’t exactly the same. The engine, often a second-hand refurbished Cyclone was underpowered, while the British requirements meant it was much heavier, reducing its underwhelming performance even more. The Tomahawks, when they arrived, and were rebuilt, and the pilots trained on them would be big improvement. But Air-Vice Marshall Pulford still worried that it could well be January before the Tomahawks were ready for action.

General Auchinleck, as C-in-C India, had looked again at the Indian troops who had gone to Iraq and Iran. He was aware that General Slim’s men should have gone to Malaya, and that their deployment had left Percival short. General Wavell, with some reluctance, agreed to Auchinleck’s request for 5th Indian Division to be returned firstly to India to take on new drafts to replace casualties. Auchinleck was in two minds about sending the 5th Indian Division to Malaya, to augment III (India) Corps, or to beef up the defences in Burma. Percival argued, convincingly, that Burma’s best defence was holding Malaya and Singapore. Lieutenant-General Heath (GOC III Corps) was delighted that his old Division was coming under his control. If Operation Matador was still being considered, 5th Indian Division would be an invaluable asset to move into southern Thailand.

 

[allanpcameron]

31 October 1941. Libya.

The RAF’s efforts over the last few weeks had been intensified, so, it was clear to the Italians and Germans that the British were coming. With almost the whole of the Wehrmacht committed to Operation Barbarossa, almost no German reinforcements had arrived. With the position of the Royal Navy and RAF strengthened on Malta, very few ships had arrived to resupply or reinforce the Italians either. Those that had, didn’t carry enough of what was needed. The morale in Tripoli was very low. In Rome, despite the bombast of Mussolini, the loss of both the East African and North African colonies imminently was causing a degree of unrest in the civilian population.

Hitler’s attempts to support his Italian ally had been successful in Greece, but had failed on Crete, and in North Africa. He wasn’t prepared to keep sending troops and tanks to support, to his mind, a lost cause. Once the Soviets were defeated, a thrust down to the Persian Gulf to take the oil off the British would be enough to knock them out of the war.

During the summer months, knowing that the British were strengthening their forces, and stockpiling supplies for their next thrust, the Italian leadership in Tripoli tried to think of ways they could spoil the attack, or at least defend against it effectively. The losses of men and equipment since the ill-fated invasion of Egypt the previous year were irreplaceable. The constant failure to better the British in any fight had left the Italian troops angry and afraid. What remained on the German expeditionary force had retired to the vicinity of Tripoli to attempt to rebuild with what they had left.

The Italian navy’s ‘Decima Flottiglia MAS’, after their successful attack on Suda Bay in March, had attempted to derail the British build-up with an attack on Malta in June which had been a disaster, and Tobruk harbour in September. This mission had been partly successful, two merchant ships had been sunk, but the loss of the adapted submarine Sciré in the aftermath of that attack had made more attacks problematic. The losses to the main fleet at Taranto and Cape Matapan had thrown up the weaknesses of the Italian fleet at night-fighting and cooperation between the Air Force and the Navy.

The idea of running a big convoy to Tripoli, with a strong escort had been tried and failed. Ubiquitous British aerial reconnaissance made the gathering of such a force impossible to hide, and the British Mediterranean Fleet was still considered too dangerous to take on in a fleet engagement. The loss of all the merchant ships, especially two tankers and an ammunition ship, in the most recent convoy on the night of 25/26 October had been a great blow. The Italian navy claimed to have sunk a British cruiser in the battle, but HMS Aurora, although damaged, had managed to return to Malta under her own steam.

The French were being pressed by the Germans to allow greater access to their territory, including ports and airfields in Tunisia. With a large British force sitting on the borders of Syria, and increasing propaganda from the Free French forces there, the Vichy government were caught between a rock and a hard place. If they acquiesced to the German demands, it was possible that the British would see that as an act of war, and the French possessions in the Middle East and North Africa would go the same way as the Italians. If they refused, there was real possibility that the Germans would occupy all of France. Marshall Petain was dithering; Admiral Darlan was pressing for the German demand to be met. The Americans were pressing Vichy to resist the German demands and were backing De Gaulle’s Free French movement.

In the meantime, the Italians had been doing their best to fix their defences for the expected attack. As well as covering the main coast road, the usual British attack included an inland hook. The Italians had been trying to make sure the obvious routes would also be defended. The problem with this was that the Italian forces were now more thinly spread than they would prefer. The German force had agreed to act as the mobile reserve with the surviving units from the Ariete Division.

 

[allanpcameron]

2 November 1941. El Gheddahia, Libya. Operation Crusader, Day 1.

The Valiant I Tanks of 6th Bn RTR (4th Armoured Brigade) accompanied the men of 22nd (Guards) Brigade (2nd Bn Scots Guards [2SG], 3 Bn Coldstream Guards [3CG], 1st Bn Durham Light Infantry [1 DLI]) before first light from their starting positions. The entire artillery assets of XIII Corps had begun their bombardment at 04:00hrs. Two hours of constant firing had covered the movement of men and machines up to the point where the Royal Engineers had been working silently to probe for mines. Streamers of white tape marked the cleared lanes for the men to move forward.

Aggressive patrolling by the men of 23rd Brigade (2nd Bn York and Lancaster Regiment [2YLR]; 2nd Kings Own Royal Regiment [2KRR] and 1st Battalion the Buffs [1 Buffs]) in the preceding weeks, along with aerial reconnaissance had shown up the first line of Italian defences. These were merely trip wire positions. Only about 600 men were strung out in a series of self-supporting boxes, with layers of mines providing them further protection from incursions. Each of these boxes had received a great weight of artillery fire. The rolling barrage preceded the Scots Guards and B Squadron of Valiant tanks, as they closed with these enemy positions, all of which were neutralised just after dawn. The few machine gun positions that had opened fire on the Scots as they approached had been dealt with by the Valiant tanks providing cover for the advancing infantry.

As suspected, the Italian artillery had tried to keep itself masked as much as possible, but they had zeroed in on these same defensive boxes to catch out the British infantry as they consolidated their gains. The first main objective for the Guard’s Brigade attack was an abandoned air strip some ten miles from the start point. The route they were following was primarily westwards, which put the rising sun in the eyes of the Italians. The Scots Guards had moved through the Italian positions as quickly as their officers could manage. The Italian barrage fell behind the majority of the Guardsmen, though those caught by it had plenty of Italian bunkers and trenches to shelter in.

Once the attack had got underway towards the airfield, the majority of XIII Corps medium artillery attempted to counter the Italian artillery. As promised, a Walrus amphibian from HMS Queen Elizabeth, carried an artillery spotter who gave the RA commander clear guidance about where to strike and corrections to fire. The Field Regiments switched their fire to support 6th Division’s other thrust straight up the road to Misrata. 7th Hussars provided the Valiant Infantry Tanks, while 16th Brigade (1st Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders [1 A&SH], 2nd Bn Leicestershire Regiment [2 LR], 2nd Bn Queens Royal Regiment [2QRR]) provided the infantry. With 2 QRR taking the lead, this thrust also had an abandoned air landing ground as its objective. General Evetts was aware that this would likely be the more difficult route for the men of his 6th Division. His other Brigade (23rd Bde, & 41 RTR) would be ready to move to support 16th Brigade if they got bogged down.

The speed of the British advance was limited primarily by having to deal with landmines. The mine clearance vehicles that had arrived for evaluation in Egypt with mine ploughs and the rotating drum driving chains to detonate mines were still back in the Delta. The plough idea had been taken up by some of the 6th Bn RTR Light Aid Detachments (LAD). Four Valiant Is had been equipped with locally produced versions. The stony ground of the desert wasn’t ideal for this method, but it was either that or men pushing bayonets into the ground inch by inch. In exercises beforehand three of the tanks had taken up a V formation so that mines would be moved aside by the first, and then the next two, creating a wider lane.

Putting their training into practice, the three tanks attempted to move forward at a steady pace. The infantry followed, walking only where the tracks of the tanks had passed. After moving a few hundred yards a mine detonated under the plough on the left-hand tank, bending the plough out of shape. This tank reversed and the spare tank moved up to take its place. The LAD had made a few extra ploughs, expecting this result. The three tanks carried on while the damaged plough was dismounted and replaced.

It became clear quite quickly that the Italians didn’t have an unlimited supply of land mines. While areas were marked as minefields, as the ploughs moved forward, they weren’t actually shifting any mines after the first couple of hundred yards. There were still mines around, but the minefields were found to be sparsely sown. The quickened pace allowed the Scots Guards and tanks to cover the ground much more quickly. The ground towards the air strip was generally open, so the Italians hadn’t made any great efforts to defend the indefensible. A company of 1 DLI with the Regiment’s carrier platoon was protecting the southern flank, south of the wadi along which the route being followed by the main force.

It was late afternoon when the tanks and men arrived at the deserted airstrip. There were signs of former use, and many craters from previous visits by the RAF. The plan was to stop for the night, to allow the rest of the Battalion to catch up, and for the tanks to refuel and re-arm. C Squadron would take over the push the next day with the men of 3CG. By the end of operations on the first day, only three men had been killed in action, another ten wounded, mostly to landmines.

Unlike 6th BN RTR, the 7th Hussars hadn’t experimented with plough attachments. Progress up the main coastal road was therefore slower. The area between the road and the coast also had to be cleared, which 1 A&SH were responsible for. As the first day of Operation Crusader concluded the progress was just over five miles from the start lines. One tank had been disabled by a mine, losing its track. Six men had been killed and another twenty wounded. The majority of the casualties had resulted from a well-planned ambush which had caught a platoon of 1 A&SH out in the open.

 

[allanpcameron]

3 November 1941. Libya. Operation Crusader, Day 2.

The progress made the day before, continued with little interference from Italian forces. The LRDG had noted that there was a defensive line based on Wadi Sofeggin. This was expected to be the main line of resistance on the road to Misrata.

6th Division continued towards their two objectives. 22nd (Guards) Brigade and 6th Bn RTR pushed forward from the abandoned airstrip heading towards Sedada, where another airstrip had been identified. 3 Bn Coldstream Guards led the way, with 1 DLI protecting their flank to the south. The Scots Guards followed on, less one Company, which was securing the area covered the previous day.

On the main coast road, 23rd Brigade, supported by 41 RTR, had taken over the push northwards. 1st Battalion the Buffs [1 Buffs] were working on the right flank between the coast road and the coast itself. 2nd Kings Own Royal Regiment [2KRR] took the lead up the main road with B Squadron of 41 RTR. Their day’s objective was marked on the maps as the landing ground at B. el-Churgia and the hamlet of el-Hescia. Because of the growing gap between 22nd (Guards) Brigade and 23rd Brigade, Major General Evetts had ordered 16th Brigade to hold their positions in the morning, and then to follow the track that ran to the left of the road to prevent any gap between the Brigades being exploited by the enemy.

On the coast itself, the infantry of 7th Support Group were pushing northwards to keep pace with 16th and 23rd Brigade, securing the right flank of the advance. This unit had the support of elements of the Royal Navy’s Inshore Squadron. This had been kept to a minimum to try to help the RAF concentrate on protecting the army’s main thrust.

The rest of XIII Corps, 7th Armoured Brigade with 50th (Northumberland) Division, were moving up to the starting positions of 6th Infantry Division and 4th Armoured Brigade. GOC XIII Corps, Lieutenant-General Reade Godwin-Austen, from his experience in East Africa, wanted the advance to be slow and steady. Once 6th Division had secured the area south of the expected line of resistance, then the fresh Infantry Division and Armoured Brigade would smash through it. It would still be another week before XXX Corp, currently at Sirte, would be fully ready to proceed with their part in the operation. General O'Connor, GOC 8th Army, wanted to keep the Italians and Germans eyes fixed on what was happening in front of them, for as long as possible.

 

[allanpcameron]

4 November 1941. Libya. Operation Crusader, Day 3.

Lieutenant Peter Smith watched the sun rise with the same feeling of awe as the first time he’d watched it in the desert. The ethereal beauty of the cold clarity of the starlight as it was warmed and suffused by the palest peach, the delicate rose, the richer gold of the rising sun never failed to move him. Smith’s father was a Vicar in a country church in Suffolk, and as many times as he’d tried in letters to describe the experience to his father, he could never yet fully express the experience.

Smith’s contemplation was interrupted by Private Wilson passing him a cup of tea. Wilson was the loader in Adsum, which along with Aggressive, and Arethusa made up the three Valiant I tanks in Ajax Troop, A Squadron, 1st Bn RTR. The troop had been involved in pretty much every fight so far in the war in North Africa. 7th Armoured Brigade had come a long way, and as another day dawned, it was time to add some more miles.

Corporal John Twist, Adsum’s gunner, had finished his tea, and was rolling up the blankets that had kept them warm during the night, before removing the camouflage netting over the tank with Wilson’s help. Private Bill Jones, Adsum’s driver, finished off checking the fuel and oil levels. Lieutenant Smith drank down the hot, sweet liquid, and headed off to meet Major John Wilkins, the Squadron CO and the other troop leaders. Although fully briefed on the day’s activities the night before, there was always an update in the morning to cover anything that had changed. Wilkins ran through the main headlines and confirmed that there were no changes to the plan.

When Smith returned to his Troop, he went over everything with the two Sergeants commanding Aggressive and Arethusa. After shaking hands, the three men returned to their tanks and prepared to start engines and move off. Somewhere out ahead, the 4th Armoured Brigade and 6th Infantry Division would be engaging the enemy. 7th Armoured Brigade and 50th Infantry Division were following close on their heels.

The big diesel engine that powered Adsum fired up, drowning out almost every other sound. The sun was above the horizon now, its wintery light casting long shadows. Smith gave Jones the brief order to move off. The two other tanks in the troop followed on, as Smith stood in the commander’s hatch. As far as he could see the desert seemed to seethe with movement. Tanks, tractors pulling guns and lorries, lots and lots of lorries, moved like a wave towards the enemy. Wilson started to whistle, and soon the rest of the crew were singing ‘It’s a long way to Tipperary’. They’d tried to fit the name of Tripoli in place of Tipperary, but it never quite worked. As Smith scanned the sky and land around him, all the men in all the vehicles knew exactly what their objective was.

 

[allanpcameron]

5 November 1941. Sedada, Libya. Operation Crusader, Day 4.

Wadi el Zerzer was little more than a dip in the desert at this point. As it moved towards the sea and joined Wadi Sofeggin it became much more of a tank trap. For C Squadron 6th Bn RTR it wasn’t the Wadi that they were worried about. It was the gunfire coming from the direction of Wadi Nfed that had forced the Royal Engineers around them to take cover.

Once more the minefields were slowing things down, and if the Italians were covering this one with artillery fire, it was obviously important. From somewhere behind them the British guns began to answer their Italian counterparts. Major John Dixon, OC C Squadron had taken a nasty piece of shrapnel in his shoulder the previous day, so Captain Mark Lawson was now in temporary command. There was only one CS Valiant I tank with the Squadron, and Lawson had ordered it forward, so that along with the smoke bombs from their mortars, the squadron could put up a half decent smoke screen fairly quickly. The wind was picking up, so keeping the screen in place would be problematical. Unless the engineers could clear a path, the tanks and infantry were going to remain stuck where they were.

There had been an air raid the previous evening as the tanks went into laager. Some Stukas had managed to get through the British fighter cover, and they’d scored a couple of lucky hits on both a petrol bowser and an ammunition lorry. The exploding ammo had kept much of the squadron and accompanying Durham Light Infantry awake and deep in their shell scrapes. The ground was very difficult to dig into, making for an uncomfortable night.

At first light the tanks and infantry had moved off, but were soon stopped when one of the tanks lost a track to a mine. That seemed to be the signal for the Italians to open up, hence the need for a smoke screen. As the smoke thickened, the Engineers moved up and took up their role once again. A Machine Gun Company were adding their indirect heavy fire to the artillery barrage to shut the Italians up and let the Engineers get on with their job.

The length of white tape marking the cleared line was extending, and a company of the DLI moved forward to try to make a bit more progress. Laws0n had ordered 2nd Troop, with the CS tank, to support the attack. The 3-inch gun in the CS tank changed from smoke to HE. Lawson wished the other three tanks could do the same, but at least their machine guns provided direct fire support to the men from around Durham.

Somewhere over to his left, another company of the DLI were trying to find a way to flank the Italian position. The radio crackled and the message was passed that this flanking movement was making progress, but needed tank support. Switching over to the Squadron’s frequency, Lawson ordered 3rd Troop to back up to the start line, then swing round to support the flanking manoeuvre.

Whether it was the artillery or the flanking move, the Italian guns had gone silent. The wind quickly blew away the remains of the smoke screen allowing the DLI and C Squadron to see the way ahead. A large crater was evident where the track had been. Lawson couldn’t figure out when it must have been made, surely an explosion that big would have been heard, even above all the other noise.

With no incoming fire, Lawson climbed down from the tank turret and hurried over to the Captain commanding the Royal Engineers. The track would need to be repaired to let the wheeled traffic pass, but Lawson wanted to see if his tanks could by-pass the crater. To be able to do that the Engineers would need to check for mines. Captain Timothy Lethbridge was bleeding from a couple of places. It wasn’t just the shrapnel from the Italian guns that was dangerous, the force of the explosions carried sand and stone at high enough speed to injure.

Lethbridge detailed a squad to take the tank officer forward and check whether the tanks would be able to move around the crater. “Careful where you step, Sir!” seemed to Lawson an unnecessary warning, but he carefully stepped in the boot print of engineers ahead of him. Two of the men proceeded with probes, while the Corporal in charge asked Lawson about the thresher tanks that had been around at the beginning of the attack. Lawson explained that the engine which spun the drum with the chains on, was a car engine. It seemed that the vibrations when a mine exploded had been too much for the engine. The Light Aid Detachment were working on replacing it, but, Lawson agreed, this would be the ideal situation for a mine clearance tank to proceed the rest of the squadron through terrain like this.

With the less than confident “We think it might be clear, Sir”, Lawson returned, still stepping in the boot prints. The Officers of the Royal Tank Regiment carried ash sticks, going back to the days of the Great War when tank commander would walk ahead of the Mark I tank checking the depth of mud. Mines were a different problem, but thinking of the probes used by the Engineers, things hadn’t changed too much. Arriving back at 2nd Troop’s position, he gave a quick briefing to the tank commanders and spoke with the senior DLI officer. Waving them forward, Lawson, once more trying to walk from boot print to boot print, guided the leading tank along the path checked by the engineers.

Behind the leading tank there was a squad of infantry, walking along where the track marks were. The Sergeant commanding the tank halted at Lawson’s command, and the OC clambered up behind the turret, saying to him “At this point, you’re as well putting your foot down and just going for it.” Using the radio, Lawson spoke to the Troop and told them that once they were around the crater to spread out and support the infantry up the rise to where the Italian positions had been. If someone lost a track, they would just have to deal with it. The day was getting on, and the objectives still hadn’t been achieved.

After Lawson had jumped down off the tank, 2nd Troop, with the CS tank, moved forward over the rough ground, the infantry following as closely as they could. As the four tanks spread out, and the Durham Light Infantry company moved forward, it became clear that the minefield wasn’t as deep as feared, and that it looked as if the Italian troops had withdrawn. Once more they seemed to be following this pattern. The mines to slow the British, with artillery and machine gun fire to cover the minefield. Once the British artillery could cover the engineers, then the Italians pulled back to the next position and did it all over again.

 

[allanpcameron]

6-11 November 1941. Libya. Operation Crusader, Day 5-10.

As expected, the main Italian position was anchored by the Wadis Sofeggin and Zerzer. Lieutenant-General Reade Godwin-Austen, had insisted that the battle should be fought primarily with steel and fire rather than flesh and blood. A day been taken up bringing forward XIII Corps’ artillery (with the exception of that supporting the attack at Sedada). Once the artillery and ammunition were in place, a full and lengthy barrage was brought down on the Italian positions. The Fleet Air Arm’s Walrus aircraft carrying artillery spotters were used to make the best use of the barrage. The RAF Wellington bombers had been hitting Misurata, while the light bombers had focused on the road between Misurata and the front line. Under the cover of this bombardment, the Royal Engineers attempted to clear some of the mines that the Italians had sown in front of their positions.

Once Sedada had been cleared, 22nd (Guards) Brigade and 6th Bn RTR were to advance on the western side of Wadi Sofeggin, rolling up the Italian defenders from the south. On the right flank, beside the sea, the 7th Support Group continued to make progress along the coastal path, threatening the Italian flank from that direction.

On 9 November, before dawn, 16th Brigade, with support from 7th Hussars, began their assault. The main attack was to the right of the main road, following a track through the marshy sand sea. The attack on quite a narrow front bogged down, sometimes literally for the Valiant I tanks of 7th Hussars. Progress quickly began to peter out, with losses mounting among the 2nd Bn Queens Royal Regiment steadily increasing. Again and again, the CS tanks, with their 3-inch dual purpose guns, were called forward. The high velocity 2-pdr on most tanks were almost useless against the Italian bunker and trench systems. The machine gun ammunition for the co-axial BESA machine gun was used up, but the gunners occasionally attempted to use the main gun almost like a sniper rifle, not something that it excelled at.

A number of well concealed and protected Italian guns, either meant for anti-aircraft or general artillery roles, were used in the anti-tank role. The frontal armour on the Valiant tank withstood most hits, but as the range decreased, the toll on 7th Hussars mounted alongside that of the infantry. Brigadier Cyril Lomax was prepared to send in the Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, but Major-General Evetts felt that wouldn’t change the situation entirely. Instead, he ordered Lomax to keep the Italians occupied by expanding the width of the attack, hopefully drawing their reserves to this axis of attack. The 22nd (Guards) Brigade were beginning to make progress on the left flank, which, if continued would unseat the Italians much more quickly, with hopefully, fewer casualties.

For the rest of that day, and for the next, continued British pressure made some progress, while the Italian defenders put up continued effective resistance. The break, when it came, came suddenly and completely.

Brigadier Hugh Russell’s 7th Armoured Brigade (1st Bn RTR, 8th Hussars, 45th Bn RTR) were due to support 50th (Northumbrian) Division in the second phase of the operation. They would exploit any breakthrough once it was achieved by 4th Armoured Brigade and 6th Infantry Division. Lt-General Godwin-Austen was used to this type of fighting in East Africa, his Army Commander, Lt-General O’Connor wasn’t. After a heated discussion, Godwin-Austin accepted O’Connor’s order to let 7th Armoured Brigade loose, with 50th Division hot on their heels.

When Russell got the order to move, he had a brief meeting with his counterpart in 4th Armoured Brigade, and decided that rather than use his tank force in ‘penny packets’, he would force the issue with the Italians in an all-out attack. Originally the idea was Russell would follow the path taken by 22nd (Guards) Brigade and 6th RTR, which was now little more than at half strength. Russell however, with O’Connor, had other ideas.

As dawn was breaking on the morning of 11 November, Armistice Day, 180 Valiant I tanks rolled forward under the cover of a sustained barrage by all the artillery of XIII Corps, 6th and 50th Divisions within range. Immediately behind the tanks was the lorried infantry of 151st Brigade. Moving from Sedada they followed the track towards the airfield at Bir El Gebira. There were two lines of Italian defences based on ridges at the edge of Wadi Soffegan and then Wadi Merdum. Up until now these had mostly been by-passed as the Guards had worked northwards to the east of these lines. With the constant danger in the centre of the Italian lines, more and more of the units designated to defend these lines had been pulled away to fill gaps.

Therefore as 7th Armoured Brigade emerged out of the edge of the barrage, before the Italians had time to fully man their positions, the tanks rolled over the first line, with 45th Bn RTR turning west and running along the Italian position from behind, aiming for another landing field at El Merdum. 1st Bn RTR and 8th Hussars continued forward, the barrage having once more been timed to allow the tanks to close with the Italian forces at Wadi Merdum as quickly as possible. The barrage wasn’t quite as effective, much of the artillery was now out of range, and the two tank battalions split to move to the left and right of the ridge. This allowed the Italian gunners to get an opportunity to hit the tanks on the sides, causing losses among the tanks and their crews.

The effect of the British tanks appearing on both flanks of the Italian positions very quickly put the defenders in an untenable position. While the men of 151st Brigade came forward to police up the Italian prisoners, the support vehicles arrived to replenish the tanks. While 7th Armoured Brigade paused, news of the breach reached the Italian Command HQ. The preceding days had pulled almost all reserves into the line to defend against the British attack. The only mobile reserve was what was left of the Ariete Division, based around Bir Durfan.

Their role was to attempt to counter such a left hook, or cover the retreat of the main forces towards Misurata if the main line was breached. They couldn’t do both. The news of the British breakthrough on their right flank caused dismay among many of the units which had been in the thick of the fighting over the previous few days. The idea that they would soon be cut off from Misurata had some commanders, especially at Brigade and Regimental level, ordering their own units to pull out before it was too late. The confusion in the Italian lines couldn’t have come at a better time for 4th Armoured Brigade and 6th Infantry Division.

After the initial barrage to support 7th Armoured Brigade, much of the artillery returned to their own targets. 2nd Bn Scots Guards were probing forward when the Italian unit in front of them suddenly broke. The chain reaction of a breakthrough on the main position, coupled with the upset of the arrival of British tanks on the flank, completely destroyed Italian resolve. For some men and units, they simply surrendered in place. Others, especially towards the rear and the coast turned tail and tried to make their way up the main road before it was cut off. Some units continued to fight until it was clear that doing so was a pointless waste of their lives.

Lt-General Godwin-Austin ordered 6th Infantry Division/4th Armoured Brigade to advance at best speed up the road, with the exception of 23rd Brigade which would deal with Italian prisoners and hold-outs.

Brigadier John Caunter (OC 4th Armoured Brigade) knew that the efforts of his three Battalions had taken a heavy toll. He ordered the two RTR battalions to amalgamate their surviving tanks and add the remaining squadron to strengthen 7th Hussars. Since the Hussars were in the best position to move forward, they took the lead, along with 16th Brigade through the Italian positions and up the road. Progress was slowed by the sheer number of Italian units that they had to pass through on the main road. Very little efforts were made by the Italians to resist the British advance, most of those captured early were on foot, often without their weapons.

The Ariete Division, on receipt of their orders to counter attack the British at Bir El Gibera, had begun to move. No sooner had they done so when counter orders were received to move to cover the withdrawal of the main Italian force along the main road. There followed a three way ‘discussion’ between the senior Italian commander in Tripoli, the Commander of the Italian defence line and the commander of the Ariete Division. For three hours the Division was forced to wait while the decision about which was the greater threat was hammered out.

By the time they did start to move, the 7th Armoured Brigade had been pushing north from Bir El Gibera. Making good time over the desert the South African Armoured Cars Company, acting as the scouting force for 7th Armoured Brigade began to run into elements of the Ariete Division that were moving east towards the road. Brigadier Russell ordered 1st Bn RTR and 8th Hussars to change their direction to punch into the side of the Italian force. At 16:00hrs 1st Bn RTR made contact with the 132nd Tank Regiment, swiftly followed by 8th Hussars. The Valiant I Infantry tanks outmatched the M13/40s of the Italians in almost everything but speed.

The battle between the two tank units was brief and one sided. Without time to coordinate with the 8th Bersaglieri Regiment, which should have provided infantry, artillery and anti-tank support, two Battalions of 132nd Tank Regiment were destroyed, some 75 tanks had been knocked out. Sixteen Valiant tanks were disabled in the engagement, though only a few were actually destroyed, and fifteen had various mechanical malfunctions. What remained of the Ariete Division joined the stream of Italian units towards Misurata.

The two Battalions of 7th Armoured Brigade pulled back towards Bir El Gibera to replenish and leaguer for the night. 45th Bn RTR had captured El Merdum airfield and with the rest of 50th Division arriving during the night, Major-General William Ramsden (GOC 50th Division) met with an exhausted Brigadier Russell to go over the plan for the next day. They agreed that 45th Bn RTR, with 151st Brigade would attempt to capture Beni Ulid. The rest of 7th Armoured Brigade and 50th Division would continue firstly to Bir Durfan, then, all being well, the following day attempt to reach the coast at Zliten, cutting off the town of Misurata from Tripoli, and hopefully bagging the majority of the Italian army in the process.

 

[allanpcameron]

12 November 1941. Libya. Operation Crusader, Day 11.

Lieutenant Peter Smith had to be shaken awake so that his gunner, John Twist could pass him his hot sweet tea. The previous day had been the most exciting, terrifying day of their lives. That explained Twist’s question, “Hope its another day like yesterday?” Smith felt himself shiver as he emerged from under his blanket, it had been a cold night. The shivering he’d been doing the night before was trying to work the adrenaline out of his system.

Private Wilson, the loader in Adsum, had outdone himself the day before, and was smiling still. Smith remembered the way in which the whole crew had worked together in such harmony. Bill Jones had kept the tank moving, with short halts to let Twist fire accurately. Smith had called out the targets, Twist laid on and Wilson loaded. They’d fired off every single shell they carried, ninety-five casings had been thrown out of the hull after the battle.

There was some debate around the troop the night before about how many Italian tanks each tank crew had brewed up. Smith wasn’t entirely sure, the whole day was just a kaleidoscope of memories. He’d sat with the Squadron intelligence officer and tried to make sense of it all. Twist and Wilson were in such a fine display of teamwork, that when Twist responded to his designation of a target, he shouted “On!” Jones would halt, and almost immediately Twist followed with “Away!” When Wilson said “Up!”, Twist would fire again “Away!”, “Up!” “Away!” “Up!”. Three shots into the target, then Jones would move. If Smith was happy that the target was destroyed, he would call out another, and the whole process would start again.

Coming on to the Italian tank regiment had started off like a training exercise back in Blighty. Having caught them in the flank, the first few targets were simple shots crossing in front of the tank. Once the Italians were aware of the danger, they turned towards the British tanks and tried to close the distance, so that their guns would be able to penetrate the Valiant’s armour. By the end of the battle, it felt like they were in engaged in a knife-fight. Adsum had taken four hits, all of which had bounced off, but the last had caused some fragments of spalling which had given Jones a terrible fright and a few lacerations to his face and hands.

The other two tanks in the troop, Aggressive and Arethusa, had also been hit multiple times. Arethusa had come off worse, its left track had been broken and one of the bogies needed to be replaced. Otherwise, A Squadron thought they’d accounted for at least fifty tanks for four of their own disabled, and one crew and tank destroyed. The intelligence officer had smiled as each tank crew claimed multiple kills. Between 1 RTR and 8th Hussars, 75 Italian tanks had actually been destroyed. The chances were that when the wrecks were examined, there would be some that would look like Swiss cheese.

Smith joined Major John Wilkins, the Squadron CO, and the other troop leaders for the morning briefing. Aware that everybody in the Squadron would be tired after the previous day’s action, Wilkins noted that today was likely to be less exciting. The Squadron was to move north, past yesterday’s battle site, occupy Bir Durfan, if there were any Italians left there. A halt there would allow for the diesel carriers to come up and refill the tanks. After that, it was a simple matter of carrying on northwards towards the sea, about thirty-five miles as the crow flies. Most of the infantry from 69th Brigade would be accompanying the 1st RTR and 8th Hussars. The force would also include 74th Field Regiment RA; 61st Anti-tank Regiment, and a couple of batteries of 34th LAA Regiment. The objective was to cut the road between Misurata and Homs at Zliten. After time for questions and sorting out last minute details of practical concerns, Major Wilson wished the Squadron “Good hunting!” and Smith returned back to Adsum. Since the troop now consisted just of Adsum and Aggressive, he briefed the two crews together and happy that everyone was in a good mood, he gave orders to move off.

It took an hour to reach the site of the battle, and the wrecks of the Italian tanks did indeed appear to be full of holes, many of them burned down to twisted wrecks. The crew of Arethusa had stayed the night, along with the men of the Light Aid Detachment, trying to get the tanks fixed up that could be. A Battalion of Green Howards from 69th Brigade were protecting the site and sorting out the prisoners and wounded Italians. There was no time to dawdle, and Smith had to have a quiet word with Twist and Wilson as the hung out the turret making comments about the shattered Italian force. They were quiet when passing a burned out Valiant and M13/40, the Italian tank had obviously managed to get very close to the Valiant’s side and it looked like the British tank had been penetrated with a few shells. The Italian tank looked as if it hadn’t survived very long after knocking out the British tank.

Rolling into Bir Durfan was, literally a walk over. A company of 5th Bn East Yorks went ahead of the tanks, with engineers to check for mines, but nothing was found. The whole place had been abandoned. There was time for a brew, while waiting for the trucks carrying the diesel in Jerry Cans to arrive. There was also some time for a bit of souvenir hunting. The Ariete Division, having left in a hurry had abandoned a great deal of supplies which were raided to have a change from standard British rations. Dried pasta wasn’t to the taste of many of the British troops, but there was enough ‘interesting’ stuff to keep the troops occupied. Major Wilkins threatened bloody murder if anyone was caught drinking, but many tanks had some bottles of wine stashed away as they moved off in the early afternoon.

The next twenty miles took Smith’s troop just under three hours to negotiate. The road itself was quite good, as was the desert on each side. Obviously, someone on the Italian side hadn’t lost all sense of military discipline. A few demolitions had been carried out, and every now and again a mine would catch a tank or lorry unawares. The effect was to slow the advance, although two squadrons of the 8th Hussars, with a company of South African armoured cars pushed ahead at their best possible speed to scout the area and check if there was any serious opposition ahead.

Listening into the Squadron net, Smith noted that another Valiant had thrown a track, and he felt sorry for the crew. It was a hard job sorting that out, eventually the LAD would get to them. In the meantime, Smith could imagine the jeers from all the other vehicles that passed them, such was life in the army. Major Wilkins came on the net to ask Ajax Troop to move out further on the right flank. Smith had got used to being on the very edge of the Battalion, but wondered what had been seen to widen the route of march. Having passed the message over to Aggressive, the two tanks widened the gap between themselves and the main force. Twist, who had his head out of the turret, spotted a dust cloud in the direction they were moving towards. Using hand signals to the Sergeant commanding Aggressive, Smith ordered Twist to get himself set, Wilson was ready with a 2-pdr shell as soon as Twist opened the breech.

Trying to focus through his binoculars the jolting of the tank was making it almost impossible to tell what he was looking at, but it was certainly getting closer. Seeing a small rise ahead, he ordered Jones to pull the tank into a hull down position, he noted that Aggressive followed his lead. Smith clambered up onto the roof of the turret to give him the height to see what was approaching. Finally, the binoculars brought into focus a gaggle of vehicles that were actually on a course that would take them into the side of the main force if everyone continued on the same bearings. All the vehicles Smith could see were wheeled, there was no immediate sign of any tanks, though he was sure he could see a couple of armoured cars.

The vehicles looked Italian and a quick check of the map gave Smith the idea that this was part of the retreating Italian army heading directly back towards Homs and Tripoli. Signalling back to Wilkins on the Squadron net, he gave a situation report, and noted that other than a couple of armoured cars, most of the vehicles were soft skinned, with permission to engage, Bill Jones nosed the tank forward, so that Twist had a clear view of the targets. While Twist would go for the leading Armoured Car, Smith ran over to Aggressive and quickly outlined his plan.

As the range closed, Smith gave permission to fire and Twist was delighted to note that his first shot was a hit, the second missed, but the third brought the Armoured Car to a halt with thick smoke belching from it. Jones, on the third shot, immediately gunned the tank forward over the rise, and Twist used the co-axial machine gun to bring the cars and lorries under fire. Aggressive had taken out the Armoured Car at the back of the column and had joined Adsum in brassing up the Italian vehicles.

Twist was ready to fire the main gun again, but Smith ordered him to keep up the good work with the Besa, it seemed to be doing a good enough job. The distance was now closing fast, but from a car in the centre of the column, Smith could see something white being waved. He ordered Twist to cease fire, and gave the same order to Aggressive. Two lorries were on fire, and Italian infantry were pulling out wounded comrades, but no one was pointing any weapons at Smith, which he thought was quite sporting of them.

While there was an attachment to take a Bren gun on the turret of the Valiant I tank, it was very rarely carried. Instead, Smith had an Italian machine pistol, liberated from Tobruk, which he took with him. As the dust was settling, he could see that the white thing that had been waved was a man’s shirt. Knowing that the two tanks’ co-axial machine guns were covering him, Smith walked, calmly as if on a stroll, and found himself facing a somewhat irate Italian in a very splendid uniform. Smith only had a few words of Italian, but another irate Italian, is a less splendid, but still impressive uniform, had enough English to announce the surrender of General Carlo Vecchiarelli, General Officer Commanding Tripolitania Command and General Officer Commanding XX Corps. The English-speaking officer introduced himself as General Fedele de Giorgis, until recently GOC 55th Infantry Division ‘Savona’. Smith suddenly had a horrible feeling that the battle the day before was nowhere near as bad as this day was about to turn out.

 

[allanpcameron]

13 November 1941. Libya. Operation Crusader, Day 12.

Captain Mark Lawson OC C Squadron 6th/41st Bn RTR, had the unusual feeling that things were looking up. After butting their heads against the Italian defences for days on end, and seeing all too many of his comrades killed and injured, he was now on an open road, the tank travelling at a steady fifteen miles per hour. The rest of the Squadron was following, and behind C Squadron the rest of the amalgamated Royal Tank Regiment was also motoring northwards.

Lawson was superstitious enough to quickly spit over his shoulder and touch something wooden, so that he wouldn’t have just jinxed the day. The sound of aircraft engines broke through all the other noises, and as he looked back over his shoulder, he saw a flight of four Beaufighters, flying at, what looked to him like less than fifty feet, passing directly overhead. He had no idea what the flyboys were up to, but at least they weren’t Stukas. That made him realise that he hadn’t seen much in the way of enemy aircraft for a while.

Moving in the opposite direction was a steady stream of Italian prisoners. A few Bren Carriers were shepherding the columns of defeated men. Looking at them, Lawson thought that they didn’t look too upset. For them at least, the war was over. His thoughts were interrupted by a message from the Battalion CO. 7th Hussars were leaguered at Gioda, having been involved in a running battle with an Italian rear-guard, including tanks. They’d found themselves low in ammunition, and were waiting for their replenishment vehicles to arrive. That meant that the Royal Tank Regiment would take over the chase.

From previous briefings, High Command believed that there was a further line of Italian resistance protecting Misurata. If so, it would probably be around Crispi, though there were no obvious geographical features to anchor it. It occurred to Lawson as he looked at his map, that that was probably where the Beaufighters were heading. The Battalion was to push on past Gioda, then fan out in preparation for blasting through whatever line the Italians had. Lawson had, from bitter experience, a higher opinion of the Italian defensive works than the plan seemed to indicate.

Nonetheless, Lawson passed on the information to his Troop leaders over the Squadron net: C Squadron would be on the left-hand side of the Battalion, and looking for a flank to turn. The South African Armoured Car Company would be scouting out the situation, and hopefully would provide some real intelligence before Lawson and his squadron blundered into a line of anti-tank traps and guns.

The banter between the donkey-whallopers of 7th Hussars and the RTR men as they passed contained the usual invective of the men of two regiments of the British army. The worst off were the RTR men that had been used to strengthen the Hussars, their days with the Lilywhites, or saucy seventh, would long be remembered by their comrades.

Carrying on northwards, the sides of the road were littered with abandoned equipment and groups of foot-weary Italian prisoners. A fast-moving vehicle coming towards him, brought Lawson back to full alertness. It quickly came into focus as a Marmon-Herrington armoured car. The South African, Sergeant Charles Margot, commander of the armoured car halted beside Lawson’s tank. The armoured car’s radio had been damaged in an ambush, which had destroyed the rest of Margot’s troop. He had been wounded, but was able to show Lawson on the map where it had happened.

He reported that there were at least a couple of anti-tank guns, and although he hadn’t seen one personally, his driver was sure there were a couple of tanks involved. Margot estimated that the Italian force was at least a Company in strength, probably more. Lawson thanked him, and sent him off back to an aid station get his wounded arm fixed up. Lawson passed on the information over the radio to his superiors and while waiting for orders, sorted out his own Squadron to prepare them to go forward, ready for immediate action. The ambush had taken place about five miles ahead, and the leading elements of 16th Brigade wouldn’t be too far behind the South African scouting force. Margot had mentioned that’s he’d given a report to a Captain in 2nd Bn Leicestershire Regiment, who were the furthest advanced unit.

Issued with orders to catch up with the Leicestershires and support them against whatever Italian forces were resisting, Lawson waved his Squadron to move forward, at their best possible speed. Fifteen minutes later Lawson and Captain Lawrence Morris were coordinating their plan. The Battalion’s Carrier Platoon were up ahead at the site of the ambush, and were reporting that the Italians were still there. Morris had waited for Lawson’s tanks before ordering his Company forward. The rest of the Battalion was preparing to follow up the attack by A Company and C Squadron.

Lawson had three of his Troops in an arrowhead formation, with his HQ Troop and the other two troops in a line behind them. The infantry followed in lorries, and would stay with the tanks until they reached the Carrier Platoon when they would dismount. Lawson had two of the Battalion’s CS Valiant I tanks with the HQ Troop. The South African sergeant hadn’t mentioned anything about mines, but if there was one thing the British tankers had learned in their war against the Italians, there would likely be at least a few.

The three Troop leaders in the arrowhead had orders to stop for nothing. These nine tanks would blast through the ambush zone, and the rest of the squadron would support the infantry clearing up whatever was left. If needs be, Lawson would order the first three troops to circle around and hit the Italian positions from the rear. Lawson’s HQ troop, with the CS tanks, would cover the nine tanks, and then cover the infantry as they moved up. Requests for air support and artillery support were made, though the time frame was difficult to predict.

The three troops went at top speed through the ambush area, two of the tanks were disabled, one by a mine and the other by an anti-tank gun strike to the engine compartment. The rest of the tanks kept going as ordered, while the rest of Lawson’s squadron provided covering fire, along with the infantry. Lawson saw a chance, and ordered his remaining tanks to advance, having given Captain Morris warning with a coloured flare.

As planned with the seven tanks that had gone through the ambush site and turned to come round behind the Italians, whatever fight was left in the Italians disappeared. White flags began to appear, and Lawson called on the Squadron net for all tanks to cease fire. Jumping down off the tank, Lawson went looking for Captain Morris. When he found the Leicestershire’s Company HQ, Lawson noted that Morris had sustained a wound that was being treated by a medic. Assured that it was only a minor flesh wound, Morris conferred with Lawson, Morris’ batman providing them both with a brew of hot sweet tea.

When the Battalion Commander arrived, the majority of the Italian prisoners were being processed and a couple of English-speaking officers were being interrogated. A map was found which seemed to suggest that the main Italian position was another five miles ahead, around Crispi. From what could be gathered, most Italian units, at least those that had transport, were by-passing Misurata and heading straight towards Tripoli. According to the captured officers, the troops holding the positions around Crispi were low in number, quality and morale.

It took an hour to coordinate with the Brigade and Divisional Commanders, and another hour for the 2nd Bn Leicestershire Regiment to get itself sorted. The lead company of 1st Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders [1 A&SH] arrived to take over the Italian prisoners, while the Leicesters and Lawson’s Squadron moved off towards Crispi. The good news was that the Brigade’s Field Regiment RA had also moved up in support and a Forward Observation Officer in a universal carrier had joined the tanks and lorries.

Lawson had kept five Troops in a loose arrowhead, this covered quite a broad front. His HQ Squadron followed with the Infantry’s Carrier Platoon in close attendance. The infantry’s lorries followed primarily using the road. The final two troops, both reduced to just two tanks were out ahead acting as reconnaissance. Each of these two troops would cover the other as it moved forward, then the other would take over, moving forward from cover to cover. The loss of the South African armoured cars necessitated this clumsy reconnaissance effort.

When contact with the Italian positions around Crispi was made, Lawson made his own way forward with the Royal Artillery FOO and Captain Morris. They agreed on a plan to try to force the issue. The Field Artillery would open with a bombardment, after a few minutes they would switch to smoke and the tanks and men would advance under the cover of the smoke. The tanks would act as Infantry Tanks in this situation, providing immediate support and cover to the infantry assault.

There weren’t many hours of daylight left, and Lawson was keen to attack with enough time to come back to the current position to rearm and refuel. At the appointed hour, the artillery barrage began, the FOO sending corrections over the radio. Two Companies of infantry were going forward, each platoon accompanied by one of Lawson’s tanks. The rest of the tanks, and the carrier platoon, would be ready to reinforce or exploit as needed.

Under the cover of the smoke, the attack went in. A few Italian machine guns fired through the smoke, but as the tanks and infantry appeared and opened fire, the white flags, which must have been near at hand, were raised. When informed of this, Lawson ordered his HQ Troop and the carrier platoon forward. They worked their way through the Italian positions and, with as much haste as possible aimed at the town of Misurata, the other Company of infantry following on their lorries.

Rolling over an abandoned aerodrome, Lawson cut the road from Misurata to Zliten. The carrier platoon and infantry Company moved through the town itself, much of which was abandoned except by footsore Italian soldiers who had been unable to outpace the British advance. Misurata was no longer part of the Italian Empire.

 

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14 November 1941. Singapore.

The men of 16th Brigade formed up on the docks of Singapore, the shouts of NCOs urging the men to get fell in. About half of the men had stood on similar docks in Egypt and Greece, unloaded from troopships wondering what on earth lay in store for them. The rest of the men were replacements, bringing the three Battalions back up to full strength. Some of the replacements were for the dead and wounded in North Africa and Greece. Other replacements for the men shipped off to training depots to pass on their experience to other recruits for the other Australian Infantry Battalions. The men all had had two weeks home leave, and then after a week in camp integrating the replacements, they’d sailed from Sydney Harbour.

The 16th Brigade had proved itself against the Italians at Tobruk, and the Germans in Greece as part of 6th Australian Division. Now they were part of 8th Division, bringing that Division up to full strength. 6th Division’s other two Brigades (17th and 18th) were being joined by 23rd Brigade (formerly of 8th Division) and each Brigade would act independently in Rabaul (17th), Timor (18th) and Ambon (23rd). General Ivan Mackay, having led 6th Division so successfully, had been considered for a more senior command in Australia. With his Division having been turned into three Independent Brigade Groups, Mackay had requested another command. General Auchinleck at the same time had been requesting that General Gordon Bennett, GOC 8th Division, might be recalled to Australia. There were problems between Bennet and Percival that were making cooperation difficult. Wavell and Blamey both gave Mackay the warmest of recommendations, and so it was decided to swap Mackay for Bennett as GOC 8th Division.

With the imminent arrival of 9th Australian Division and 1st Australian Armoured Division in Malaya, this would allow Mackay to become Corps Commander in due course. The men of the 16th Brigade were relieved that their ‘Mr Chips’ would continue to lead them. They were also happy to see that along with their Brigade, the 6th Calvary Regiment had been renamed as the 8th Division Cavalry Regiment. These had left behind their old Italian tanks and now boasted two squadrons of the new American M3 Light Tanks, as well as another of Humber Armoured Cars. The 2/1st Machine Gun Battalion had also been attached to 8th Division, something that Mackay had insisted on, along with 2/1st Field Regiment Royal Artillery.

With practised ease, the men of 16th Brigade followed the orders of their Officers and marched off the docks, heading for trains to take them to Kuala Lumpur. Joining the other two Brigades of 8th Australian Division, they would undergo a series of exercises designed by Mackay and his staff to take on board the lessons learned in North Africa and Greece, as well as learning how to fight in the new country they had been sent to defend.

 

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15 November 1941. Sirti, Libya.

Lieutenant General Vyvyan Pope, GOC XXX Corps, took the salute of 2nd Armoured Division as elements of it passed the reviewing stand. This was a fancy description for the Canadian Pattern Truck he was standing on, but it played its role. Three days ahead of schedule, Pope was pleased to inform General’s O’Connor (GOC 8th Army) and Wavell (C-in-C Middle East), standing alongside him on the truck, that XXX Corps was fully trained and ready for action.

XIII Corps had done extremely well having captured Misurata ahead of schedule, but, as expected they were now having to hold in place, as their stocks of supplies had been depleted and were in need of resupply. The Royal Navy had been running convoys directly from Benghazi to Beurat and over the beach at Misurata until its limited facilities could be improved.

Now it would be the turn of XXX Corps to take up the momentum that would lead the British and Empire forces to Tripoli. The 4th Indian Division were already at El Gheddahia, with the 2nd New Zealand Division at Tamet. Now that the 2nd Armoured Division had completed its final rehearsals satisfactorily, they would set off in the morning along the coast road via Tamet to El Gheddahia. A journey of over 80 miles just to the start line would take its toll on the Valiant I* tanks, but that would just be the beginning of days of seriously difficult driving.

 

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16 November 1941. Kazan Tank School, CCCP.

The arrival of the second convoy from Britain at the end of October had included more tanks for the Soviets. As Sir John Carden had expected, the preferred choice from all the different types that had been sent on the first convoy was the Valiant I. The second convoy had carried sixty of these, as well as another twenty Matilda II, their second choice. The next convoy was due to arrive in a few more days, carrying another sixty Valiant I, but would also include five Valiant II. The primary difference being that it was capable of taking the Russian 76mm gun rather than the 6-pdr which weren’t yet in wide enough production. A further twenty Matilda II tanks were also being delivered. To ease the problems of supply the Matilda II were the Mark III version with a diesel engine.

The Soviets had asked for modifications to be made before the British Mark II and III (as they called the Matilda and Valiant) were shipped. While British tanks were designed to operate in freezing conditions, a Russian winter was a very different experience of ‘freezing.’ Both British tanks had armoured side skirts which in snow and muddy conditions would affect the mobility of the tank. It was difficult to clear any clogged ice or mud, affecting the drivetrain and suspension. Twelve inches of snow was enough stop the tanks from moving, and the narrow tracks had limited grip on icy terrain.

The 2-pdr guns, with the lack of an HE shell was another complaint, so a percentage of the tanks being sent were Close Support variants, equipped with the 3-inch howitzer. The idea of receiving the Valiant II without a British gun and equipping it with the same gun as the T34 was very attractive. A request for the gun used in the T34 and KV1 to be sent to Vickers to ensure the correct fit had been ignored. Likewise, the request for the drawings of the guns was also ignored. The British civilian and military personnel who had come with the tanks to instruct the Soviets found that they were treated with suspicion by those in authority. The personal relationships with the Soviet tank crews were friendly, but the Soviets had obviously been warned against too much fraternisation. The British too had been warned off Soviet women becoming too friendly, there was the suspicion of what were described as ‘honey traps’.

In the meantime, the 164th Tank Brigade and 136th Separate Tank Battalion were familiarising and equipping themselves with the Valiant I and Matilda II tanks respectively. Part of the 16th Army, they would soon be thrown into the defence of Moscow.

(I relied heavily on this article in writing this: WW2 Soviet Medium Tanks Archives - Tank Encyclopedia (tanks-encyclopedia.com)

 

[allanpcameron]

18 November 1941. Misurata, Libya. Operation Crusader, Day 17.

The few days of resting and resupplying should have been a pleasant interlude for the men of XIII Corps, except a terrible storm raged, soaking everything and everyone. Despite this some pushing in the direction of Homs had been done, and the small town of Zliten had been captured a few days earlier.

The reconnaissance efforts had shown that the next main line of resistance ran from Homs on the coast to Tarhuna inland. This seemed to be yet another extensive position and from captured men and documents it consisted of three Italian Infantry Divisions, with the remaining German forces around Tarhuna to protect the inland flank.

Lieutenant-General Godwin-Austin and General O’Connor had planned XIII Corps’ attack on Homs to coincide with the arrival at Tarhuna of XXX Corps. The 4th Indian Division, with an extra large contingent of Royal Engineers, had the difficult task of preparing the route so that the New Zealanders and 2nd Armoured Division would be able to move at a reasonable pace up to Tarhuna. The New Zealanders had arrived at Beni Ulid, with 2nd Armoured close behind them at El Merdum. The planned combined attack was due on 20 November. It wasn’t clear yet how the rainfall would affect progress towards Tarhuna, many wadis were impassable due to the water runoff. There was some flexibility in the plan, allowing for an extra day or two, which would allow XIII Corps to continue to build up their stocks of supplies.

The RAF were doing their best to keep up with the advance, though many landing grounds were waterlogged, but they still hoping to have enough aircraft within range for the attack. The Royal Navy were doing wonders at getting supplies forward and still blockading Tripoli. Another Italian convoy had been intercepted and destroyed the previous week. Tripoli’s harbour had taken a beating from the escorting ships of a British convoy heading for Malta. HMS Ark Royal’s aircraft had scored some good hits of targets inland. HMS Nelson, along with three cruisers had bombarded the docks for a good ten minutes before withdrawing out of range.

In one of their other operations, a submarine had taken as small party of Free French delegates and dropped them off in the vicinity of Tunis. These men were tasked with feeling out the situation regarding what the Vichy Regime might make of Italian and German troops coming over the border from Libya. It was suspected that some resupply ships for the Italians and Germans had been offloading in Tunisian ports and being convoyed across the border. While it was unlikely that Tunisia would side with De Gaulle, just like Syria, but they too would be worried about the consequences of providing the British with a reason to declare war.

 

[allanpcameron]

19 November 1941. London, England.

The trials of the M2 75mm gun in the American Medium M3, despite being in a side sponson, had been found to be quite positive. Its length at 31 Calibres gave it a muzzle velocity of 1,929 ft/s. A longer M3 75mm gun was soon to enter production, which would grow to 40 Calibres giving an improved 2,031 ft/s. There were two types of shell, the M48 HE 75x350 shells, which was judged excellent, and the M72 armour piercing round which was judged good. A new AP round was in development, the M61, which looked like it would be a great improvement. This gun and its ammunition had the capacity to both defeat German panzer armour at a good range, and answer the call from the front for an excellent HE shell. The next American tank, the M4 would be equipped with the M3 75mm, and the word from America was that it was looking like a good tank.

A report on the American Tank Destroyer Battalions that were being developed, noted the primary use of the 37mm towed anti-tank gun, which was already obsolescent. There were also reports of a 75mm gun being shoehorned into a G3 half-track. A request to examine this had been made, with the possibility of it being acquired under lend-lease.

Major-General Campbell Clarke, as Director of Artillery, continued to complain about accepting American weapons that relied on imported ammunition. The M3 Light Tank’s 37mm gun was a case in point, and now with this 75mm gun arriving in the M3 Medium, with another 37mm gun, to say nothing of the Browning machine guns that used .3-inch rounds, it would just make a quartermaster’s job so much harder.

Clarke continued to sponsor the 17-pdr gun that was being designed to eventually replace the 6-pdr in the towed anti-tank role. While Vickers 75mm HV had been approved for production for the Victor tank, Clarke was still unhappy with having two different types of gun, one in tanks and another for the anti-tank regiments. He considered the 6-pdr in the Valiant II, with the new HE shell, as being quite adequate for the next two years at least. This had the advantage of being the same gun and ammunition as used in the towed anti-tank regiments. While the up-armoured Panzer III and IVs encountered in North Africa were still vulnerable to the 2-pdr, though only just, the German armour, especially now it was known to be face-hardened, would be no match for the 6-pdr.

There was little of no information about German tank development, but the chances were that a ‘Panzer V’ would arrive at some point. It could be expected to have armour something like the French B1-Bis or the Matilda II and Valiant. The Germans Panzer III and IV also seemed to follow the British notion of an infantry and cruiser tank. If that continued then a Panzer VI could also be expected, likely to heavily armoured and armed. The 17-pdr was being designed for just such a development.

Clarke had to admit that the Vickers 75mm HV was further advanced, and that the prototypes had performed adequately. It might not be quite as effective as the 17-pdr, but he had to admit that the cries from North Africa for a proper dual purpose gun had become deafening. Even sending more Close Support versions of tanks, with the 3-inch howitzer, wasn’t satisfying the armoured regiments.

As Director of Artillery, Clarke approved of sending Valiant II, equipped for, but not with, the Soviet 76mm gun. It was hard to fathom why the Soviets hadn’t sent the guns or plans to enable that to happen, but, the way of the Russians had always been something of a mystery. At least it would mean that more of the 6-pdrs would be available to equip British forces sooner. He was also hoping that the Americans would react positively to the 6-pdr as a replacement for their own towed 37mm anti-tank gun. Having a standard 57mm anti-tank gun, if and when the Americans joined the war, would be beneficial.

Therein lay his problem. Arguing for standardisation on towed anti-tank guns, led, inevitably, to standardisation of tank guns. The Americans were committed to the 75mm tank gun for obvious reasons. While their artillery regiments were due to replace the 75mm gun for a 105mm howitzer, their production facilities for 75mm were second to none (now that France was out of the picture). Once again, his nemesis, Sir John Carden, had proposed looking at adapting the 6-pdr to take the American 75x350 shells. It appeared from early analysis that this wouldn’t be a terribly difficult problem to resolve. At this point however, with America still neutral and with an army that was in many ways behind the British, it seemed to Clarke that there was a danger of the tail wagging the dog.

 

[allanpcameron]

20 November 1941. Montreal, Canada.

Production of the Valiant IA* continued apace, with the Canadian 5th Armoured Division having received its full quota of 340 tanks, plus replacements. During the early part of 1941, once full production was underway, thoughts had turned towards a follow-on tank.

There had been a close look at the American Medium M3 to see if the hull could be adapted to take a fully traversable turret. Progress on the American Medium M4 had been advanced with the presence of the British Valiant I, which had helped the designers to master the turret mechanisms. With American production ramping up, it was clear that access to the materials to build an M3 variant in Canada wasn’t likely to be that easy.

While the Valiant II, with the new turret to take the larger 6-pdr gun was looked at, it was felt that it would be easy enough to convert the production of the Valiant IA* to take the new turret, and larger gun, which Canadian factories were preparing to build. The Canadian Government had been approached to enquire if production of the Valiant IIA* could be continued to supply the Soviet Union with Lend-Lease tanks. The formation of a second Canadian Armoured Division (4th Armoured Division) was underway, and while the Valiant IIA* was originally chosen to equip this, another tank had been developed as far as the prototype stage as an alternative.

At the same time, the connection with Australia had been deepening, with experts travelling in both directions to help set up Australian production of tanks. It was clear that both the Canadian and Australian army were looking for the same kind of tank. The proposal from Vickers to start production of the Victor was welcomed, but access to the Merlin based engine would be problematic. The Victor had many of the qualities that both Dominions were keen on, but it was felt that it was perhaps a step too far for two nations new to tank building.

The New South Wales Government Railway Company had opened Sydney's Chullora Tank Assembly Shops, with help from Canadian Pacific Railway Company. Like the Canadians, the Australians were using cast hulls and turrets, rather than welding. The difference being that the Australians were casting the entire hull in one piece, likewise the turret. Taking the Valiant as a starting point, they had been looking at continuing to use the Cummings diesel engine, but with slightly less armour to keep the tank’s weight down, and speed up. The new Merritt-Brown transmission in the Victor and Churchill was a step too far for either country’s capacity in the short term. On the other hand, the French Hotchkiss style Horizontal Volute bogies, and the Valiant’s final drive and gearbox, were all within Australian capacity, as well as Canadian.

Australia’s capacity for rolling steel was already fully taken up in the munitions industry. The use of castings was looked at, and the best kind of steel for strength, were all investigated, so that the Australian prototype had a single cast hull, a considerable achievement for the steel industry in Australia.

Taking all these things together, a joint design team of Canadians and Australians, had worked on a Canadian/Australian Cruiser (CAC1). Once the hull requirements had been worked out, the usual problem of a suitable gun was discussed. Options included the 2-pdr, 6-pdr, the American M2 or M3 75mm, but the feedback from the fighting in North Africa gave an emphasis to the primary role of the gun delivering a potent High Explosive shell.

Since both Canada and Australia were building 25-pdrs, the design team looked at the howitzer as a possibility. This gun had proven itself in direct fire against German tanks in North Africa, as well as its celebrated artillery role. The Australians had taken the lead on adapting the 25-pdr for use in a tank, making it shorter, lighter and moving to an overhead recoil system. This had been done successfully, but with the loss of about 13% of the standard howitzer’s range, considered less important in the tank role.

Looking at the hull it became obvious that a turret big enough to take the 25-pdr would need a turret ring of at least 64-inches. Choosing such a large gun, with the need for adequate ammunition stowage, plans to have a hull mounted machine gun and gunner had to be deleted to make room. The crew of four (commander, driver, gunner, loader) would be protected with 3-inchs armour on the front of the tank hull and turret, less than 2-inches on the sides to keep the weight down.

Without the ‘hidebound’ views of the British military establishment, it was felt in Ottawa and Canberra that such an armament was more than adequate for the role of a tank that needed to deal with enemy anti-tank guns and fortifications more than simply a tank to fight other tanks. The Americans and French had both opted for a 75mm gun, adapted from a field piece. Choosing the excellent 25-pdr would ease supply of ammunition if the same was being used by the Artillery and tank forces. When the War Office in London was informed of this new tank development stream, it was described as a ‘very courageous’ decision.

When Sir John Carden looked over the “CAC1” (Canadian/Australian Cruiser) he was impressed. The designers had taken an already effective engine, drive and gearbox, adapted the suspension, and with a very large turret ring, had managed to resolve the gun question with a proven and available howitzer. If he had one criticism, it was that the maximum elevation of the gun prevented it being used efficiently as an indirect artillery piece, such as the Birch gun.

There had been a great deal of debate between the Canadians and Australians about a name for the tank. The Canadians wanted to call it the Ram, the Australians went along with them, but preferred Jumbuck, the Australian nickname for a ram.

 

[allanpcameron]

24 November 1941. Libya. Operation Crusader Day 23

The Italian Army had planned to send an Expeditionary Corps to support Operation Barbarossa, the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. The losses in East and North Africa had left Mussolini’s military advisors arguing that Libya needed to be reinforced rather than sending ill-equipped troops to Russia. With a great deal of reluctance, Mussolini agreed, and despite the losses in shipping across the Mediterranean, most of the men two Divisions (50th Regina, 52nd Torino Infantry Divisions) arrived to reinforce the remaining Italian troops. Not all their heavy equipment had arrived, and very little fuel had made it through the British blockade.

When the new troops arrived, they had been immediately placed in the defensive line stretching from Homs on the coast to Tarhuna inland. The remains of the German Afrika Corps, based around Tarhuna, provided the only mobile force on that flank. The 25th Bologna Division was dug in around Homs, while the two newly arrived Divisions were spread out over the very long front. The Border Guard units that had previously faced west against the French in Tunisia had been stripped and sent east to bolster the line that had to protect Tripoli. The Blackshirts’ 1st and 2nd Libyan Legions were also part of the defensive line, and the Italian army units on either side of them looked on their flanks with dismay.

The men who had arrived in Libya immediately picked up the sense of defeatism that had infected Libyan High Command. General Ettore Bastico, Commander-in-Chief North Africa was still trying to exude confidence, but without any real hope. Desertions were mounting, especially among the Libyan troops, and large numbers of Italian families that had come to Libya to colonise it were desperate for any places on ships bound for Italy, despite the danger of the crossing.

The remaining German forces had been informed that they could expect no more reinforcements, even if it were possible to send them over the Mediterranean. It was clear to Berlin that there would be no point throwing good money after bad. Plans to send an infantry Division to join the remainder of 5th Light and 15th Panzer Divisions had been cancelled. The needs of Operation Barbarossa now took precedence over everything else. To confirm just how serious this was, the Luftwaffe contingent in North Africa had been ordered to fly their remaining aircraft to Sicily. The ground contingent were to move to Tripoli and use whatever ships they could commandeer to follow the aircraft back to Europe.

The possibility of withdrawing all German units from North Africa had been debated in Berlin. Some specialists were flown out in a series of secret flights, people whose skills would be difficult to replace. The wounded were also airlifted out. The senior German General, Johann von Ravenstein, commanded the newly formed 21st Panzer Division, a name that was somewhat ironic. The survivors of 5th Light Division and 15th Panzer Division together weren’t even as strong as a Light Division. 21st Panzer Division was made up of just over one Battalion of Panzers, with only a handful of Panzer IVs and twenty Panzer IIIs, the rest made up of Panzer IIs. The Infantry Regiment, while officially still with three battalions, was under strength, and many replacements had been scoured from ancillary units. The one strength was the Reconnaissance Battalion, which had two armoured car companies, instead of one, and the motorcycle Reconnaissance Company had an extra platoon.

Von Ravenstein and his senior officers had met to look at what to do in the event of an Italian collapse, or rather, when there was an Italian collapse. The extra motorcycle Reconnaissance platoon had been detached to scout a route that any surviving German forces would take towards the Tunisian border.

General Weygrand, the French Governor of Algeria, and Commander in Chief of French North Africa, had increased the French colonial army in North Africa from 30,000 to 180,000 men, not all, but many were fully equipped with tanks, machine guns, trucks, and artillery. He had plans to increase the army further by raising a large number of Senegalese troops. When informed of this through channels, Hitler had been pressurising Petain to stop the plan, preferably by demoting Weygrand and bringing him back to Metropolitan France. In the light of what was happening to the Italians in Libya, the Vichy officials had been slow to follow Berlin’s demand. Notification had reached Weygrand of his impending change of circumstances, but as yet the order to return had not yet been issued.

Von Ravenstein expected that should the German troops arrive at the Tunisian border, pressure from Berlin on Vichy would be enough to make sure that they were treated with honour and sent home. No one in the German command structure was quite sure what to expect, but having a plan to extricate themselves from the Italian incompetence and failure was a relief. This was particularly the case due to increasing pressure coming from the direction of Beni Ulid.

Initially it was believed that this was just a British flank guard, but the reconnaissance battalion had managed to capture a few prisoners, who turned out to be from 4th Indian Division. This indicated that another British force was aiming for Tarhuna. The storm of the past few days had diminished, leaving many wadis still flowing with water, and some ground waterlogged. The fact that the Indians were still approaching in these conditions gave Von Ravenstein grave concerns.

Having spoken to General Bastico, Von Ravenstein who had one of the Blackshirt Legions immediately on his flank, ordered his Division to stand ready. He had requested permission from Bastico to make a spoiling attack on the Indians, which had been refused. His Reconnaissance Battalion was making every effort to impede the Indian advance, but the German troops were finding that the Indians were moving slowly and steadily, and were obviously well trained and experienced. Almost no aerial reconnaissance had been flown, so one element of the Reconnaissance Battalion had taken a long detour to get around the side of the Indians to see what, if anything, was following on behind them. Their last radio signal before they went off the air, was that there was a British panzer Division moving up the road towards Tarhuna.

 

[allanpcameron]

25 November 1941. Libya. Operation Crusader Day 24

Lieutenant-General Vyvyan Pope congratulated Major-General Frank Messervy (GOC 4th Indian Division) on an outstanding job. Pushing against German troops the Indians had managed not only to push the Germans back, but also, with the Divisional and Corps engineers, improve the road for 2nd Armoured Division and 2nd New Zealand, who would now attack towards Tarhuna.

Major-Generals Freyberg and Harold Charrington (GOCs 2nd New Zealand and 2nd Armoured Divisions) reported that they were ready. Charrington and Freyberg had worked together in Greece and had a good relationship, as did the 1st Armoured Brigade’s men with the New Zealanders. This would be quite a different type of battle from that in Greece. Here they would once again face the Germans, but they were better equipped and would be on the attack.

Originally it had been hoped to begin the attack on 20 November, but the RAF had had problems establishing functional landing grounds due to the storm, and the Royal Engineers had had to redo some of their work which had been washed away by the rain and subsequent floods. A German patrol had been intercepted by 3rd Indian Motor Brigade on the flank of 2nd Armoured Division, and so the hope of surprising the defenders of Tarhuna was presumed lost. The Corps’ artillery, along with the three Division’s Field Regiments had got themselves into position, so when both Pope and Godwin-Austin informed 8th Army that the two Corps were ready, General O’Connor gave the order to go.

The Royal Artillery had had plenty of practice over the last year in the Middle East, and between the two Corps, there were plenty of guns ready to hammer the Italian position and lines. In XXX Corps, 6th New Zealand Brigade led the way, with 1st Armoured Brigade (3rd, 4th Hussars, Kings Dragoon Guards), in close attendance. Advancing under the cover of the barrage, the Valiant I* tanks closed with the German positions at a steady fifteen miles per hour.

A number of German armoured cars were engaged by the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry acting in the reconnaissance role, ahead of the tanks. Major Sutherland, OC A Squadron, was at the forefront, his Squadron made up of Mark VI Light Tanks, universal carriers and some Marmon-Harrington Armoured Cars. Generally, the New Zealanders came off worse in these encounters, the German armoured cars tended to be better armed. Despite these losses, A Squadron did their job of finding the enemy. 24th Battalion of 6th Brigade were hot on the heels of the Cavalry, with A Squadron of Valiant I* tanks from 1st King’s Dragoon Guards supporting. Before long, German anti-tank guns were taking a toll on the advancing tanks, and machine guns and mortars on the infantry.

The men of 24th Battalion, working together with tanks, managed to force the covering force of the Germans back. A lot had been learned about cooperation between infantry and tanks, hard lessons that had cost many lives, but those lessons were paying off. On this occasion the SAAF also played a role, a Tomahawk squadron arrived overhead and plastered the German artillery line, allowing the 24th Battalion to retake the initiative, until they hit the main line of German resistance.

C Squadron of Valiant I* tanks of 1st KDG, with the infantry of 25th Battalion, had swung out to the left, where the Cavalry Regiment had noted what looked like the German flank. C Squadron supported the men of the 25th Battalion who put in an attack on the right flank of the German positions holding up the Brigade’s advance. With 24th and 25th Battalion and two Squadrons of tanks, the German line started to roll up.

The expectation had always been that a counter-attack, possibly with panzers, would be the German’s next move. HQ and B Squadrons of 1st KDG, along with 26th Battalion, with 31st and 32nd batteries of 7th Anti-tank Regiment were ready for just such an eventuality. The Cavalry Regiment’s Major Sutherland’s last act was to radio a waring of panzers moving towards the battle.

The men of 7th Anti-tank Regiment had all their 2-pdrs replaced that had been lost in Greece. Having had that experience there were two main differences to the way they operated now. Firstly, all the 2-pdrs were on portées, which they had exercised with for firing in both in the mounted and dismounted positions. Secondly, each Battery, in addition to the three troops of four 2-pdrs, also had an extra troop of 18-pdrs. These guns, adapted for use in an anti-tank role, were fitted with telescope and open sights. They were rather cumbersome, but because they could fire a HE shell as well as AP shot, provided a useful and versatile addition to the anti-tank resources.

This was the force that the German Panzer Battalion ran into. 24 2-pdr anti-tank guns, and eight 18-pdrs took an immediate toll on the German formation. The men of 26th Battalion’s C, D and HQ Companies, with attached Vickers HMG teams from 27th MG Battalion, protected the gunners who had elected to fire dismounted from the portées. It was the arrival of the 1st KDG’s Valiant I* that turned the battle. The Panzer IIs, which made up the majority of the German force, had no answer to the Valiant I* armour. Realising that he was in danger of losing his entire force, the German commander ordered his panzers to withdraw, which they did. The inclination of the 1st KDG to chase them had been trained out of them. The chances were that the tables would be turned on them as the panzers withdrew behind their own anti-tank screen. Later, thirty disabled panzers were found in the area, the rest having withdrawn in a westerly direction. Losses to the 1st KDG Valiant I* tanks in total were twenty-one, with another six needing simple repairs to get them running again. About half of the twenty-one tanks were complete write-offs, the others, if returned to a properly equipped depot, could be repaired.

The New Zealand 5th Brigade, along with 3rd Hussars would take over the push the next morning, while the men of 6th Brigade and 1st KDG spent the night prepared for another counter-attack which never came.

 

[allanpcameron]

26 November 1941. Libya. Operation Crusader Day 25

While XXX Corps had been making progress the previous day against German opposition, XIII Corps were fighting a more set-piece battle against the Italians. The previous day had consisted largely of artillery barrages and probing attacks to find weaknesses in the Italian positions.

It was 11th Hussars who found the weakness. As XIII Corps’ dedicated reconnaissance regiment, A Squadron were working about fifteen miles from the coast, they had followed a motor track towards the town of Cussabat. With the Hussars keeping watch, the infantry of 2nd Rifle Brigade, part of 7th Motor Brigade (as the old 7th Support Group had been renamed), moved up during the night. Behind them were 8th Hussars in their Valiant I tanks, along with attached artillery and anti-tank batteries. This force would be the spearpoint for the rest of 7th Armoured Division. For the majority of Operation Crusader, the 4th and 7th Armoured Brigades, with the 7th Motor Brigade had been working with the 6th and 50th Infantry Divisions. Major-General William ‘Strafer’ Gott had argued for the next phase, that his Division should fight as a whole, breaking through the enemy and exploiting the breach. General O’Connor agreed and much of the probing for the last week or so was to find somewhere which could be attacked, broken, and then have the armoured forces run loose in the enemy’s rear.

The town of Cussabat had a wadi that ran out of the hills on the north of the town, and this wadi was what the Italians had used in front of their line from Cussabat to Homs. The wadi was the intersection between two Italian forces. The 2nd Libyan Legion held the town, and the line going towards Tarhuna, while the newly arrived 52nd Torino Infantry Division held the higher ground and part of the line going towards Homs and the sea.

The RAF had been requested to bomb the town in the early morning, and two squadrons of Marylands, with a squadron of Hurricanes escorting them, had indeed turned up at the right time and the right place. The reputation of the RAF among the British soldiers was beginning to improve after the disappointments of the evacuation of Dunkirk and the Greek campaign. As soon as the bombers withdrew, 3rd Royal Horse Artillery Regiment, equipped with the Birch Self-propelled guns, began a barrage, under the cover of which 2nd Rifle Brigade and a squadron (14 Valiant I* and 2 Valiant I*CS) of 8th Hussars tanks moved forward.

Between the bombing and shelling the approach of the British tanks infantry went unnoticed until almost the last moment. The tanks of 8th Hussars roared out of a smoke screen and advanced using the Besa co-axial machine guns to keep the defenders’ heads down. The men of the Rifle Brigade approached alongside the tanks, each of the assaulting platoons working with two tanks, the new phone on the rear of the tank into the turret being particularly useful.

The Blackshirts of 2nd Libyan Legion were basically Militia troops made up of Italian colonists. The approach of tanks that were immune from their anti-tank guns, having had the attentions of the RAF and 24 25-pdrs, was just too much for them. A few fought bravely, but the rest ran, throwing away their weapons to try to move more quickly. The rout of the fascist troops gave C Squadron of 8th Hussars, which was following the first wave of the assault, to swing right behind the hills on which elements of the 52nd Torino Infantry Division were dug in. The 81st Infantry Regiment, holding that part of the line had expected to find that their flank would be vulnerable with the Blackshirts there. General Manzi, (GOC 52nd ID) had deployed extra mortars and artillery support to the Battalion of Fusiliers holding the area.

Major Tim Fitzgeorge Parker (OC C Squadron 8th Hussars) had no infantry support as he passed through the town and headed towards where the Italian artillery lines were expected to be. The speed of the Valiant I* became the vital factor in this, the ground allowing the tanks to spread out and close quickly with the Italians. There were some 47mm anti-tank guns deployed to protect the mortars and artillery positions from just such an eventuality. One managed a hit on a tank’s tracks that stopped it. The other fifteen tanks in the squadron charged on, making liberal use of their co-axial machine guns as they smashed through the Italian defences.

Lt-Col Kilkelly (CO 8th Hussars), when informed by Fitzgeorge Parker that he was making progress, ordered his last squadron to follow up, and arranged that 9th Kings Royal Rifle Corps followed the tanks, carried in lorries. The tanks would make a good job of unseating the Italian defenders, but the infantry would be needed to take and hold the ground.

The men of the Rifle Brigade continued to chase the Libyan Legion men, all the while widening the breach in the Italian line. When news of this reached Major-General Gott, he ordered the rest of 7th Armoured Brigade and 7th Motor Brigade to move as quickly as possible. 4th Armoured Brigade would follow through, moving north towards the sea, cutting off the rest of Italian forces and opening up the coast road to Tripoli.

 

[allanpcameron]

27 November 1941. Rome, Italy.

The last message from General Nasi was passed on to Benito Mussolini. The commander of the last Italian garrison in Africa Orientale Italiana (AOI Italian East Africa) reported that his last reserves had been unable to stop the enemy, and that armoured vehicles had entered the town. Coupled with the latest messages from Tripoli of British breakthroughs in the last defensive positions protecting the capital of Africa Settentrionale Italiana (ASI Italian North Africa) brought the reality of the loss of the Italian empire home to the Italian dictator.

While he would claim some credit for the defeat of Greece, in reality, without German help, he could have ended up losing Albania. His outrage at the inability to defeat the British by land, sea or air had left him at odds with his military command. The reminder that they had been planning for war beginning in 1942, not early 1940, was an affront to his judgement. He was terribly aware that there were plenty of people whose husbands and sons, brothers and uncles now were sitting in camps around the British empire. At least they knew they were safe, there were far too many grieving parents, widows and children. Resentment against the war, with only defeat after defeat, was also, to Mussolini’s mind, resentment towards himself. The support of the Blackshirts was assured, but the armed forces were a different kettle of fish. He would need to look after his own position now: he’d lost an empire, it wouldn’t take too much for him to lose power altogether.

Mussolini’s relationship with Adolf Hitler had also cooled dramatically. Despite sending an Infantry and Panzer Division to stiffen Italian resolve, the Italian army had failed completely, costing Germany those two Divisions. The fact that most of the defeats inflicted on the Italian forces of AOI had come from Indians and Africans, not Europeans, just confirmed Hitler’s disdain for his ally’s ability.

Berlin was now having to look at contingencies for the possibilities of various actions by the British. If they take on the remaining French possessions in Africa, especially on the Mediterranean coast, that would have consequences for the Petain regime in Vichy. Worse, would be if Weygand went over to the ‘Free French’. There were plans in place to occupy the rest of France, but that would involve using forces that might overwise finish off the Soviets. The OKW now had to consider the potential of an invasion of Greece or even Italy itself. Intelligence told them that a new British army was being formed in Iran, and once the British 8th Army had finished with the Italians, these might be available to counter moves towards the Soviet oil supplies.

The onset of the terrible winter weather in Russia had stalled the German advance at the gates of Moscow. What was even more galling was that these ‘impenetrable’ British tanks were appearing there too. The German organization in charge of tank development (Wa. Prüf. 6) was commanded by Oberst Sebastian Fichtner. General Guderian had invited Fichtner to examine the Russian and British tanks captured by his panzer army. Having returned from the Eastern Front with his Special Armour Investigation Committee, he had reported his findings, and General Guderian’s requests.

They identified three advantages the T-34 had over the Panzer III. The first was the sloped armour, which afforded greater protection than flat armour of the same thickness. The second was the suspension; the T-34 used a Christie type suspension which along with its wide tracks gave excellent mobility, even over mud and snow. The third thing was that unlike German tank design which avoided the gun overhanging the front of the tank, the T-34’s longer barrel resulted in better muzzle velocity and thus better armour penetration.

The evaluation of a captured Valiant tank in Russia was relatively dismissive. It was certainly well armoured, but the 40mm gun was obsolescent, the suspension was an old style, without much room for improvement. The diesel engine was considered quite good, but otherwise the tank wasn’t any better than the Panzer III or IV. It was certainly a more impressive tank than the British Matilda Infantry tanks left behind in France, and the ‘cruiser’ style tanks. The new 50mm anti-tank gun was proving effective against the British armour, but only at a closer range than was comfortable for the gunners. The 7.5cm anti-tank gun, expected to begin production in February 1942 would be more than capable, as should the turret mounted version.

As well as these observations, Fichtner included General Guderian’s requests in his report. Firstly, all current tanks should have the minimum of the 5cm gun. New tanks must be made with wider tracks and lower ground pressure to deal with the mud and snow. He emphasised the need for all his panzer to be able to drive cross-country in all weathers. Thinking about the next generation of tanks, he wanted it to have a heavier armament, at least 7.5cm, the armour protection needed improved, the 7.6cm gun on the Soviet tank had to be countered. Finally, the importance of tactical mobility had to be learned. The new tank needed a high power-to-weight ratio, and so a more powerful engine would be essential.

The debate that Fichtner’s report began was between his own preference, to continue with the development of the VK20 project, the design of which was nearly complete. This project had been devised to replace the Panzer III and IV, and adapting it to Guderian’s recommendations would be easier, and faster, than starting from scratch.

On the other hand, the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition, Fritz Todt, wanted to go-ahead and start work on designing a completely new tank. The shock of the T34/KV1, on top of the British Matilda/Valiant success over the panzer arm, asked too many questions of the current thinking. The VK20 project was still limited to 20 to 25 tonnes, what was needed was something that would start at 30 tonnes. The powerplant and suspension of the VK20 project, was in Todt’s opinion, not strong enough to really take the changes that would be needed.

Ultimately the political decision was made to begin work with a design competition between Daimler-Benz and M.A.N. They were requested to develop a tank between 30-35 tonnes, with sloped armour, designed to take Rheinmetall’s 7.5cm cannon, and with an engine providing between 650-700 horsepower, providing a top speed of 55kph. The design was to be ready by the spring of 1942, with prototypes and production models to follow as soon as possible. In the meantime, work on the Panzer III and IV to have additional armour added and the improved cannon fitted would keep these tanks capable of dealing with the enemy.

Progress on the heavier Panzer VI prototypes were being rushed to be ready for the Fuhrer’s birthday in April 1942. This at least would have the armour protection needed to deal with current and projected enemy anti-tank guns, and with the 88mm cannon, it would deal easily with just about anything thrown against it. It was hoped that it would be ready for production in the summer of 1942. Fichtner’s experience of tank development left him worried that such a rush would lead to problems with reliability when it entered service, which the new designation for the 30 tonne tank would likely suffer from too.