5 June 1942. Tripoli, Libya.
allanpcameron
Donor
5 June 1942. Tripoli, Libya
Once the RAF’s Desert Air Force had cleared the North African coast of Italians and Germans, a degree of relaxation had been allowed to let the men rest and the aircraft be serviced. Some Squadrons and their support had left for the Far East, but there was still a strong force, especially of the South African Air Force, which had been strengthened over the last couple of years. Two South African Wings had now been created, No 4 Wing SAAF was made up of the fighter squadrons (2nd, 4th, 5th, and 15th) which were all now flying Curtiss Kittyhawks. The bomber squadrons (12th, 21st, 24th), along with the Reconnaissance squadrons (15th, 40th, 60th), formed No 3 Wing SAAF. Two of the Reconnaissance squadrons were flying Martin Marylands while 40th Squadron using single seat fighters including Hurricanes and Tomahawks for reconnaissance. All the SAAF bomber squadrons were equipped with Boston III bombers.
The two SAAF Wings had been moved to Tripoli, along with three RAF Squadrons (38, 162, 221) equipped with Wellingtons, two with Beaufighters (46th, 27th) and three fighter squadrons (73, 112 with Kittyhawks, and 145 with the first Spitfires in the theatre outside of Malta). To keep up their levels of training and combat experience the bombers and fighters regularly attacked the Italian islands of Pantelleria, Lampione, Lampedusa and Linosa. Thousands of tons of bombs had been dropped and strafing runs by fighters had been undertaken. Along with the Royal Navy as well as aircraft from Malta, a tight noose had been placed around these islands, which as far as Signals Intelligence could gather were all now short of water.
The success of the amphibious attack on Rhodes in April, along with the blockade of Pantelleria, gave General Wavell the confidence to order an attack on Linosa and Lampedusa, followed by Pantelleria. No 8 (Guards) and 11 (Scottish) Commando of the Special Service Brigade, carried in HMS Ulster Monarch, sailed from Malta, with a strong Royal Navy escort of cruisers and destroyers. Along with the Commandoes, two LCTs carried two troops of Tetrarch DD tanks, though there was great dubiety about whether the terrain would be ‘tank friendly’. Each troop had two gun tanks and two close support tanks.
The arrival off the coast of Lampedusa of the British fleet was met with an Italian radio signal requesting a delegation to be sent to receive the island’s surrender. Major David Stirling, second in command of No 8 Commando, with a shore-party, went ashore in an LCA and took the surrender of the Italian Governor who handed over his sword to the British officer. A small detachment was left on the island to detain the Italian garrison, who were transferred onto one of the Royal Navy Destroyers and returned to Malta. The Governor had informed Rome that the lack of water caused by the British blockade was the reason that the garrison could offer no resistance.
When the British ships arrived off Lampione, they were somewhat taken aback as the Italian garrison crowded into boats, many unseaworthy, and made their way to the British ships. Captain Geoffrey Oliver of HMS Hermione was all set to issue the order, ‘stand by to repel boarders’ when it became clear that the Italian garrison were surrendering en masse. This wasn’t quite the way the capture of Lampione had been planned for, and the commandoes were keen to go, so Vice-Admiral Maund, CO of the operations gave permission for the plan to go ahead. The Italian garrison Commandant (who had been incommunicado at the time of the arrival of the British) was subsequently found and the official surrender was finalised. When the Commandant (with his mistress) were transported out to HMS Hermione, he was told in no uncertain terms by the Italian POWs what they thought of him (and her). Captain Oliver ordered that he should be kept separate from the other POWs, and from his mistress, who became a guest of the wardroom, or officers' mess.
Pantelleria was by far a harder nut to crack. There was a defiant response to the request to surrender, and so the bombardment began, the fleet covered by the fighters from Malta. The Italian air force did attempt to intervene, but between the RAF on Malta and the predominately South African fighters at Tripoli, the Italian pilots were unable to make any serious attack on the British, and suffered heavily in the process. The bombardment covered the approach of the landing force, which, due to the lack of suitable landing places, was approaching one beach on the northern side of the island.
As there were so few landing places, much of the Italian beach defences were concentrated on this particular area. It was necessary for a destroyer to approach close to the beach to provide direct fire support as the first wave of commandoes were bogged down. The arrival of the naval gunfire support and the DD tanks broke the deadlock, and the second wave were able to break through the crust of the Italian defence and begin to move swiftly towards the airfield and the main town.
After the battle was finally won, the British interrogators of the surviving Italian commanders discovered that Mussolini had insisted that the garrison fight to the last man and last bullet. There was an implied threat that the families of the officers and men would suffer consequences if the men gave up too easily. This became something of a propaganda coup subsequently, with Mussolini’s orders being broadcast to the Italian population over the BBC World Service.
Once the RAF’s Desert Air Force had cleared the North African coast of Italians and Germans, a degree of relaxation had been allowed to let the men rest and the aircraft be serviced. Some Squadrons and their support had left for the Far East, but there was still a strong force, especially of the South African Air Force, which had been strengthened over the last couple of years. Two South African Wings had now been created, No 4 Wing SAAF was made up of the fighter squadrons (2nd, 4th, 5th, and 15th) which were all now flying Curtiss Kittyhawks. The bomber squadrons (12th, 21st, 24th), along with the Reconnaissance squadrons (15th, 40th, 60th), formed No 3 Wing SAAF. Two of the Reconnaissance squadrons were flying Martin Marylands while 40th Squadron using single seat fighters including Hurricanes and Tomahawks for reconnaissance. All the SAAF bomber squadrons were equipped with Boston III bombers.
The two SAAF Wings had been moved to Tripoli, along with three RAF Squadrons (38, 162, 221) equipped with Wellingtons, two with Beaufighters (46th, 27th) and three fighter squadrons (73, 112 with Kittyhawks, and 145 with the first Spitfires in the theatre outside of Malta). To keep up their levels of training and combat experience the bombers and fighters regularly attacked the Italian islands of Pantelleria, Lampione, Lampedusa and Linosa. Thousands of tons of bombs had been dropped and strafing runs by fighters had been undertaken. Along with the Royal Navy as well as aircraft from Malta, a tight noose had been placed around these islands, which as far as Signals Intelligence could gather were all now short of water.
The success of the amphibious attack on Rhodes in April, along with the blockade of Pantelleria, gave General Wavell the confidence to order an attack on Linosa and Lampedusa, followed by Pantelleria. No 8 (Guards) and 11 (Scottish) Commando of the Special Service Brigade, carried in HMS Ulster Monarch, sailed from Malta, with a strong Royal Navy escort of cruisers and destroyers. Along with the Commandoes, two LCTs carried two troops of Tetrarch DD tanks, though there was great dubiety about whether the terrain would be ‘tank friendly’. Each troop had two gun tanks and two close support tanks.
The arrival off the coast of Lampedusa of the British fleet was met with an Italian radio signal requesting a delegation to be sent to receive the island’s surrender. Major David Stirling, second in command of No 8 Commando, with a shore-party, went ashore in an LCA and took the surrender of the Italian Governor who handed over his sword to the British officer. A small detachment was left on the island to detain the Italian garrison, who were transferred onto one of the Royal Navy Destroyers and returned to Malta. The Governor had informed Rome that the lack of water caused by the British blockade was the reason that the garrison could offer no resistance.
When the British ships arrived off Lampione, they were somewhat taken aback as the Italian garrison crowded into boats, many unseaworthy, and made their way to the British ships. Captain Geoffrey Oliver of HMS Hermione was all set to issue the order, ‘stand by to repel boarders’ when it became clear that the Italian garrison were surrendering en masse. This wasn’t quite the way the capture of Lampione had been planned for, and the commandoes were keen to go, so Vice-Admiral Maund, CO of the operations gave permission for the plan to go ahead. The Italian garrison Commandant (who had been incommunicado at the time of the arrival of the British) was subsequently found and the official surrender was finalised. When the Commandant (with his mistress) were transported out to HMS Hermione, he was told in no uncertain terms by the Italian POWs what they thought of him (and her). Captain Oliver ordered that he should be kept separate from the other POWs, and from his mistress, who became a guest of the wardroom, or officers' mess.
Pantelleria was by far a harder nut to crack. There was a defiant response to the request to surrender, and so the bombardment began, the fleet covered by the fighters from Malta. The Italian air force did attempt to intervene, but between the RAF on Malta and the predominately South African fighters at Tripoli, the Italian pilots were unable to make any serious attack on the British, and suffered heavily in the process. The bombardment covered the approach of the landing force, which, due to the lack of suitable landing places, was approaching one beach on the northern side of the island.
As there were so few landing places, much of the Italian beach defences were concentrated on this particular area. It was necessary for a destroyer to approach close to the beach to provide direct fire support as the first wave of commandoes were bogged down. The arrival of the naval gunfire support and the DD tanks broke the deadlock, and the second wave were able to break through the crust of the Italian defence and begin to move swiftly towards the airfield and the main town.
After the battle was finally won, the British interrogators of the surviving Italian commanders discovered that Mussolini had insisted that the garrison fight to the last man and last bullet. There was an implied threat that the families of the officers and men would suffer consequences if the men gave up too easily. This became something of a propaganda coup subsequently, with Mussolini’s orders being broadcast to the Italian population over the BBC World Service.
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