Fear Not the Revolution, Habibi: A Middle East Timeline
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Thanks! And yeah, I'm glad Dayan is gone too. He was my original candidate for HaNasi, but he was just too much of a mad dictator in waiting. He wouldn't lead Israel in the direction I want it to go
Morocco "turning out fine" is definitely up in the air right now. While al-Lajna has the country locked down for the moment, they have serious long-term problems staring them in the face. There are serious divides between conservative rural and more modern urban areas, the monarchy's corruption and the country's underdevelopment and resource poverty is giving it severe economic problems. The generals have managed to hold on to popular goodwill for now, but they may run out of rope relatively soon if the economy doesn't start to improve and/or if the democratic transition get stalled or rolled back by the generals.
al-Lajna also has the added impediment of lacking real institutionalization. Say what you will about the Moroccan monarchy, but they have been around for hundreds of years and have a reserve of legitimacy (if not popularity). The generals won't have that, and they have just proved that its possible to overthrow a government if you have the strength to do it...
I thought it was pretty clear. Allon has been in charge so far, and he'll be HaNasi through the Special Period (how long it lasts, or whether or not it's really so special, is up for debate
).
It's back, and with a successful Oufkir coup!
I'm guessing that Morocco is in for some very unstable times: as you say, the new ruling group doesn't have the monarchy's street cred, and it seems like they've got serious internal divisions.
I'm guessing that Morocco is in for some very unstable times: as you say, the new ruling group doesn't have the monarchy's street cred, and it seems like they've got serious internal divisions.
Ahh okay, makes sense.
Basically. Not all of the leadership of the committee is committed to a transition to democracy, for one.
Anyway, I have quite a bit of free time right now. What does everyone want to see next? I'm planning on covering at least two Middle Eastern states before returning to Israel and Palestine, discussing the first couple of years of Palestinian politics, the Ze'evi Plan and the structure of the Allon regime.
Iraq, Pakistan, Iran and Algeria
“The sudden overthrow of the last Hashemite monarchy and the foundation of a Palestinian state dominated by Syria shook the Iraqi regime, led by President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, to its core. While the Hashemites had long been the archenemy of Iraq’s military rulers, their replacement in Yasser Arafat’s left-nationalist Fatah movement was both ideologically friendlier and much more threatening to Iraq’s geopolitical position. Jordan, sandwiched by enemies on all sides, had no choice but to prioritize defence. Conversely, the Palestinian Arab Republic could act as a launching pad for Syrian aggression against the ‘traitors’ in the Iraqi Ba’athist establishment.
With the invasion of Jordan, a great debate began within the Iraqi cabinet. Hardliners tended towards a strongly anti-Syrian position. Led by Saddam Hussein, the vice-chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), this group advocated the occupation of Jordan’s eastern districts, a military buildup along the border including preparations for a possible intervention, and increased covert support for non-Fatah Palestinian groups. Iraqi intelligence had cultivated a pro-Iraqi Palestinian force, the Arab Liberation Front. Hussein called for the Iraqi army to empower the small proxy army so as to compete with Syria for control over the Palestinian national movement. Meanwhile, more moderate forces gathered under the leadership of the Minister of Defence, Hardan al-Tikriti. This group advocated support for the Palestinian cause through economic and military aid to the Palestinians in an effort to undermine Syrian hegemony. This view was strongly supported by Khairallah Talfah, the influential Governor of Baghdad, who noted that, “One attracts more flies with baqlawa than vinegar.”
As the Palestinians consolidated control over most of the East Bank and the Syrian war with Israel began in earnest, the moderate faction began to gain an upper hand. In desperation, the hardline faction attempted to create an incident with Syrian-Palestinian forces. Paramilitary forces under Hussein’s control were moved along the border, with several units crossing to occupy Jordanian territory. Ironically, local PLA commanders interpreted this as a show of support, cheering Iraqi units rather than preparing for an attack. Once discovered, the operation was shut down by al-Bakr, who publicly censured Hussein at a cabinet meeting the following day. With an increasingly dire humanitarian situation in Palestine including major shortages of food and water, Michel Aflaq, the founder of the Ba’ath, delivered an impassioned plea to aid the Palestinians. This was the final straw; al-Tikriti’s plan was implemented immediately. Truck convoys filled with food, water, medical supplies and some light military equipment for Palestinian forces began to stream into Palestine. Arafat, who had previously been openly hostile to the Iraqi regime, spoke amiably to media about his “Arab brother President al-Bakr.” Jadid, facing a dire military and humanitarian situation of his own, could do nothing but knash his teeth about warming Iraqi-Palestinian relations absent a Syrian connection.
However, with the end of the war in Syria and the de-facto consolidation of Palestinian control, Iraqi-Syrian relations began to improve. First, Iraqi aid to Palestine and Syria both during and after the war, while primarily in the form of non-military supplies such as food, fuel and construction materials, did much to engender goodwill. Jadid, while suspicious of Iraqi intentions, could not deny their material support. In a gesture of reciprocal kindness, Jadid allowed Michel Aflaq and several other Syrian Ba’athist exiles back into Syria to visit their families, and quietly released dozens of political prisoners linked to the Iraqi Ba’ath.
Another factor was reorganization of the Iraqi cabinet. Al-Bakr, suspicious of Saddam Hussein’s attempts at political trickery, acted accordingly. Hardan al-Tikriti, who had lost significant power during the preceding months due to Hussein’s influence over al-Bakr, regained much of his authority. He retained the position of Minister of Defence and Vice-President, as well as becoming a vice-chairman of the RCC, responsible for international affairs. Hussein retained his position as vice-chairman for domestic affairs, but his power was diluted significantly. While formal reconciliation between the Ba’athist factions was still off the table, war at least was as well…
Nationalization of the oil industry, from drilling rigs to export facilities, was a radical idea. Strongly resisted by the West, it had played a role in the downfall of Mohammed Mossadegh’s nationalist government in Tehran, which had put a chill on new attempts for a generation. However, state control over the world’s most valuable resource was an idea that fit the ideological and political needs of many revolutionary regimes. Besides being a lucrative source of revenue, direct control over supply gave states the ability to easily subsidize consumption of petroleum products and use oil as leverage in international politics. With the sudden rise in oil prices beginning in 1970, it was a tempting strategy…
In 1971, the Ba’ath made their move. While modern scholarship generally views Saddam Hussein as the architect of the wildly popular nationalization plan, he received little credit. Instead, it was President al-Bakr who made the announcement on state radio. He, Vice-President al-Tikriti and the Ba’ath would gain much of the credit for the economic boom that followed…”
Alexander Langer. Ba’athist Iraq: Revolution From Above. New York: Columbia University Press (2009). Print.
“Balochistan is a land of wondrous sites and peoples. The Baloch share a long history. We have lived in our arid lands since time immemorial. Many empires, from the Persians of ancient days to the Mughal overlords of Hindustan to Englishmen from across the seas, have sought to subjugate us to their whims. Yet, the Baloch have never given their ground without a battle, never allowed the fire in our hearts to flicker and die…
The restoration of democracy to Pakistan, with Zulfakir Ali Bhutto claiming the prime minister’s seat, was celebrated throughout the land. Years of military rule had led to little but corruption, oppression and stagnation for the majority of Pakistan’s citizens of all ethnicities. However, the rule of the Pakistan Peoples’ Party has not proved itself to be anything but a . Rather, under Bhutto, democracy itself has been corrupted, oppression of Pakistan’s people has increased, and the economy stagnates under the heavy hand of a perverted elite. Bhutto, who but a year ago called for a nation ruled by the people and promised Roti, Kapra aur Makan to the people, believes in none of these things for the Baloch.
Thus, the people of Balochistan called for freedom, taking example from their Muslim brothers in Bangladesh. Outright rejected by the buffoon in the prime minister’s chair and his spidery masters in the military, the government of the false state of Pakistan responds with bloodshed, arrests, and the destruction of what little democracy remained in our hands. General Tikka Khan, the man responsible for the brutal murders of millions of our Bengali brothers and sisters, has been placed in charge of our lands with the intention of duplicating his genocide in our lands and against our people…
The extremists and murderers of Pakistan are matched in their perfidy only by the imperialists of the Persian Empire to the West. Persia has long attempted to crush our spirit and annihilate the Baloch, not only through death and destruction but also through making us into Persians by the point of a sword and the stroke of a pen. We will never follow their ways, yet they devastate us nonetheless. The Shah in Tehran believes he has defeated us, and his bureaucrats and taxmen and soldiers return to our lands, pompously declaring their right to rule over us. No more. We resist there, and will continue to resist until the Persian imperialists scurry home in defeat, covered in blood and dishonor…
I call on all Balochis to join in resistance. None are free until all of us are free. I call on the people of the world and our Arab and Muslim brothers to support us in our freedom. I call on false rulers in Islamabad and Tehran to accept their inevitable defeat and grant us a free land, that we may live in peace among the nations of the world…
Communique from Nawabzada Khair Baksh Marri, leader of the Baloch Liberation Army, 17 February 1973.
“Following the withdrawal of the French military and the 1962 declaration of independence, Algeria was in shambles. The departure of the pieds-noir removed most of the administrative class and economic elite from Algeria overnight; suddenly, Algeria was missing hundreds of thousands of skilled tradesmen, doctors, lawyers, police, soldiers, bureaucrats, teachers and businessmen. Additionally, the country’s infrastructure had been devastated by conflict, with distribution networks broken and the population and government bankrupt. The response was obvious, with Algerian civilians and the state rushing to claim control of abandoned land, houses, possessions and economically productive resources such as farms and factories. A process of ‘autogestion,’ whereby Algerian laborers took over now-derelict businesses and began to produce goods and services again, occurred en-masse, inspired by the socialist rhetoric of the National Liberation Front (FLN). Meanwhile, the state began to marshal the country’s resources in a policy of ‘Algerian socialism’ as outlined in the Tripoli Program, nationalizing huge parts of the economy and placing them under the control of semi-autonomous coordinating committees…
Politically, Algeria was unstable. While the FLN led the resistance to France and had an undeniable right to lead the country post-war, the movement was factionalized and outsiders such as regionalists, clan leaders, ethnic minorities and Communists all circled, aiming to seize power of their own. Initially, a triumvirate of Prime Minister Ahmed Ben Bella, Defence Minister Colonel Houari Boumédiènne, and party leader of the FLN Mohamed Khider ruled the country, representing the three major factions within the Algerian state respectively. However, due to Ben Bella’s authoritarian and centralizing tendencies, this system began to fall apart almost immediately. Khider was expelled from the FLN and forced into exile in 1963, where he began to plot with disaffected FLN members and the leftist opposition to overthrow the government. By 1965, with ongoing revolts in the Kabylie and Sahara regions by the socialist opposition National Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (CNDR), Ben Bella looked to negotiate a compromise. This require purging Boumédiènne, who had supported Ben Bella’s centralizing measures. When Ben Bella attempted to remove Boumédiènne loyalists from power, a swift and bloodless coup overthrew the government, placing Ben Bella under arrest and putting the military arm of the FLN firmly in charge.
Boumédiènne, as Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, combined Ben Bella’s centralist political instincts with equally state-centric economic policies. Retreating from Ben Bella’s focus on developing rural areas and experiments in worker-controlled enterprises, Boumédiènne implemented more traditional central planning of the economy. State-led industrialization was a key plank of this plan, intended to wrest independence from foreign producers and make Algeria the center of industrial production in the Maghreb. With a sharp rise in oil prices, foreign-owned petroleum production was nationalized in 1971, giving the Algerian state significant new reserves of capital. While the country became increasingly prosperous, political pluralism was absent. Boumédiènne maintained a tight hold on political power with the support of the military and secret police. Political opponents were frequently harassed, exiled, or disappeared. Alternate centers of power from the security state, such as the FLN and trade unions, were rapidly subordinated and hollowed out, concentrating power in the hands of the Chairman and his clique
Under Boumédiènne, Algeria continued to embrace an anti-colonial foreign policy, seeking leadership in Africa and the Arab world. Algeria pursued civil relations with both the capitalist and socialist blocs and aggressively supported the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as financed and supported anti-colonial resistance movements throughout Africa and the Middle East, such as the PLO, ANC and SWAPO. Algeria’s revolutionary foreign policy frightened its neighbours. This prompted Tunisia, a tiny state, to closely align with its more powerful neighbour. Meanwhile, Morocco mobilized against Algeria, mixing conservative fears of Algeria’s socialist tendencies with longstanding border disputes. With the fall of the Moroccan monarchy to a military coup, the ambitious Boumédiènne saw an opportunity to establish Algerian hegemony in the Maghreb, in one way or another…”
Nicholas Méthot. ‘An Involuntary Response’: The Consequences of French Imperialism from the Old Regime to Neocolonialism. Boston: Harvard University Press (2001). Print.
“The sudden overthrow of the last Hashemite monarchy and the foundation of a Palestinian state dominated by Syria shook the Iraqi regime, led by President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, to its core. While the Hashemites had long been the archenemy of Iraq’s military rulers, their replacement in Yasser Arafat’s left-nationalist Fatah movement was both ideologically friendlier and much more threatening to Iraq’s geopolitical position. Jordan, sandwiched by enemies on all sides, had no choice but to prioritize defence. Conversely, the Palestinian Arab Republic could act as a launching pad for Syrian aggression against the ‘traitors’ in the Iraqi Ba’athist establishment.
With the invasion of Jordan, a great debate began within the Iraqi cabinet. Hardliners tended towards a strongly anti-Syrian position. Led by Saddam Hussein, the vice-chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), this group advocated the occupation of Jordan’s eastern districts, a military buildup along the border including preparations for a possible intervention, and increased covert support for non-Fatah Palestinian groups. Iraqi intelligence had cultivated a pro-Iraqi Palestinian force, the Arab Liberation Front. Hussein called for the Iraqi army to empower the small proxy army so as to compete with Syria for control over the Palestinian national movement. Meanwhile, more moderate forces gathered under the leadership of the Minister of Defence, Hardan al-Tikriti. This group advocated support for the Palestinian cause through economic and military aid to the Palestinians in an effort to undermine Syrian hegemony. This view was strongly supported by Khairallah Talfah, the influential Governor of Baghdad, who noted that, “One attracts more flies with baqlawa than vinegar.”
As the Palestinians consolidated control over most of the East Bank and the Syrian war with Israel began in earnest, the moderate faction began to gain an upper hand. In desperation, the hardline faction attempted to create an incident with Syrian-Palestinian forces. Paramilitary forces under Hussein’s control were moved along the border, with several units crossing to occupy Jordanian territory. Ironically, local PLA commanders interpreted this as a show of support, cheering Iraqi units rather than preparing for an attack. Once discovered, the operation was shut down by al-Bakr, who publicly censured Hussein at a cabinet meeting the following day. With an increasingly dire humanitarian situation in Palestine including major shortages of food and water, Michel Aflaq, the founder of the Ba’ath, delivered an impassioned plea to aid the Palestinians. This was the final straw; al-Tikriti’s plan was implemented immediately. Truck convoys filled with food, water, medical supplies and some light military equipment for Palestinian forces began to stream into Palestine. Arafat, who had previously been openly hostile to the Iraqi regime, spoke amiably to media about his “Arab brother President al-Bakr.” Jadid, facing a dire military and humanitarian situation of his own, could do nothing but knash his teeth about warming Iraqi-Palestinian relations absent a Syrian connection.
However, with the end of the war in Syria and the de-facto consolidation of Palestinian control, Iraqi-Syrian relations began to improve. First, Iraqi aid to Palestine and Syria both during and after the war, while primarily in the form of non-military supplies such as food, fuel and construction materials, did much to engender goodwill. Jadid, while suspicious of Iraqi intentions, could not deny their material support. In a gesture of reciprocal kindness, Jadid allowed Michel Aflaq and several other Syrian Ba’athist exiles back into Syria to visit their families, and quietly released dozens of political prisoners linked to the Iraqi Ba’ath.
Another factor was reorganization of the Iraqi cabinet. Al-Bakr, suspicious of Saddam Hussein’s attempts at political trickery, acted accordingly. Hardan al-Tikriti, who had lost significant power during the preceding months due to Hussein’s influence over al-Bakr, regained much of his authority. He retained the position of Minister of Defence and Vice-President, as well as becoming a vice-chairman of the RCC, responsible for international affairs. Hussein retained his position as vice-chairman for domestic affairs, but his power was diluted significantly. While formal reconciliation between the Ba’athist factions was still off the table, war at least was as well…
Nationalization of the oil industry, from drilling rigs to export facilities, was a radical idea. Strongly resisted by the West, it had played a role in the downfall of Mohammed Mossadegh’s nationalist government in Tehran, which had put a chill on new attempts for a generation. However, state control over the world’s most valuable resource was an idea that fit the ideological and political needs of many revolutionary regimes. Besides being a lucrative source of revenue, direct control over supply gave states the ability to easily subsidize consumption of petroleum products and use oil as leverage in international politics. With the sudden rise in oil prices beginning in 1970, it was a tempting strategy…
In 1971, the Ba’ath made their move. While modern scholarship generally views Saddam Hussein as the architect of the wildly popular nationalization plan, he received little credit. Instead, it was President al-Bakr who made the announcement on state radio. He, Vice-President al-Tikriti and the Ba’ath would gain much of the credit for the economic boom that followed…”
Alexander Langer. Ba’athist Iraq: Revolution From Above. New York: Columbia University Press (2009). Print.
***
“Balochistan is a land of wondrous sites and peoples. The Baloch share a long history. We have lived in our arid lands since time immemorial. Many empires, from the Persians of ancient days to the Mughal overlords of Hindustan to Englishmen from across the seas, have sought to subjugate us to their whims. Yet, the Baloch have never given their ground without a battle, never allowed the fire in our hearts to flicker and die…
The restoration of democracy to Pakistan, with Zulfakir Ali Bhutto claiming the prime minister’s seat, was celebrated throughout the land. Years of military rule had led to little but corruption, oppression and stagnation for the majority of Pakistan’s citizens of all ethnicities. However, the rule of the Pakistan Peoples’ Party has not proved itself to be anything but a . Rather, under Bhutto, democracy itself has been corrupted, oppression of Pakistan’s people has increased, and the economy stagnates under the heavy hand of a perverted elite. Bhutto, who but a year ago called for a nation ruled by the people and promised Roti, Kapra aur Makan to the people, believes in none of these things for the Baloch.
Thus, the people of Balochistan called for freedom, taking example from their Muslim brothers in Bangladesh. Outright rejected by the buffoon in the prime minister’s chair and his spidery masters in the military, the government of the false state of Pakistan responds with bloodshed, arrests, and the destruction of what little democracy remained in our hands. General Tikka Khan, the man responsible for the brutal murders of millions of our Bengali brothers and sisters, has been placed in charge of our lands with the intention of duplicating his genocide in our lands and against our people…
The extremists and murderers of Pakistan are matched in their perfidy only by the imperialists of the Persian Empire to the West. Persia has long attempted to crush our spirit and annihilate the Baloch, not only through death and destruction but also through making us into Persians by the point of a sword and the stroke of a pen. We will never follow their ways, yet they devastate us nonetheless. The Shah in Tehran believes he has defeated us, and his bureaucrats and taxmen and soldiers return to our lands, pompously declaring their right to rule over us. No more. We resist there, and will continue to resist until the Persian imperialists scurry home in defeat, covered in blood and dishonor…
I call on all Balochis to join in resistance. None are free until all of us are free. I call on the people of the world and our Arab and Muslim brothers to support us in our freedom. I call on false rulers in Islamabad and Tehran to accept their inevitable defeat and grant us a free land, that we may live in peace among the nations of the world…
Communique from Nawabzada Khair Baksh Marri, leader of the Baloch Liberation Army, 17 February 1973.
***
“Following the withdrawal of the French military and the 1962 declaration of independence, Algeria was in shambles. The departure of the pieds-noir removed most of the administrative class and economic elite from Algeria overnight; suddenly, Algeria was missing hundreds of thousands of skilled tradesmen, doctors, lawyers, police, soldiers, bureaucrats, teachers and businessmen. Additionally, the country’s infrastructure had been devastated by conflict, with distribution networks broken and the population and government bankrupt. The response was obvious, with Algerian civilians and the state rushing to claim control of abandoned land, houses, possessions and economically productive resources such as farms and factories. A process of ‘autogestion,’ whereby Algerian laborers took over now-derelict businesses and began to produce goods and services again, occurred en-masse, inspired by the socialist rhetoric of the National Liberation Front (FLN). Meanwhile, the state began to marshal the country’s resources in a policy of ‘Algerian socialism’ as outlined in the Tripoli Program, nationalizing huge parts of the economy and placing them under the control of semi-autonomous coordinating committees…
Politically, Algeria was unstable. While the FLN led the resistance to France and had an undeniable right to lead the country post-war, the movement was factionalized and outsiders such as regionalists, clan leaders, ethnic minorities and Communists all circled, aiming to seize power of their own. Initially, a triumvirate of Prime Minister Ahmed Ben Bella, Defence Minister Colonel Houari Boumédiènne, and party leader of the FLN Mohamed Khider ruled the country, representing the three major factions within the Algerian state respectively. However, due to Ben Bella’s authoritarian and centralizing tendencies, this system began to fall apart almost immediately. Khider was expelled from the FLN and forced into exile in 1963, where he began to plot with disaffected FLN members and the leftist opposition to overthrow the government. By 1965, with ongoing revolts in the Kabylie and Sahara regions by the socialist opposition National Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (CNDR), Ben Bella looked to negotiate a compromise. This require purging Boumédiènne, who had supported Ben Bella’s centralizing measures. When Ben Bella attempted to remove Boumédiènne loyalists from power, a swift and bloodless coup overthrew the government, placing Ben Bella under arrest and putting the military arm of the FLN firmly in charge.
Boumédiènne, as Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, combined Ben Bella’s centralist political instincts with equally state-centric economic policies. Retreating from Ben Bella’s focus on developing rural areas and experiments in worker-controlled enterprises, Boumédiènne implemented more traditional central planning of the economy. State-led industrialization was a key plank of this plan, intended to wrest independence from foreign producers and make Algeria the center of industrial production in the Maghreb. With a sharp rise in oil prices, foreign-owned petroleum production was nationalized in 1971, giving the Algerian state significant new reserves of capital. While the country became increasingly prosperous, political pluralism was absent. Boumédiènne maintained a tight hold on political power with the support of the military and secret police. Political opponents were frequently harassed, exiled, or disappeared. Alternate centers of power from the security state, such as the FLN and trade unions, were rapidly subordinated and hollowed out, concentrating power in the hands of the Chairman and his clique
Under Boumédiènne, Algeria continued to embrace an anti-colonial foreign policy, seeking leadership in Africa and the Arab world. Algeria pursued civil relations with both the capitalist and socialist blocs and aggressively supported the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as financed and supported anti-colonial resistance movements throughout Africa and the Middle East, such as the PLO, ANC and SWAPO. Algeria’s revolutionary foreign policy frightened its neighbours. This prompted Tunisia, a tiny state, to closely align with its more powerful neighbour. Meanwhile, Morocco mobilized against Algeria, mixing conservative fears of Algeria’s socialist tendencies with longstanding border disputes. With the fall of the Moroccan monarchy to a military coup, the ambitious Boumédiènne saw an opportunity to establish Algerian hegemony in the Maghreb, in one way or another…”
Nicholas Méthot. ‘An Involuntary Response’: The Consequences of French Imperialism from the Old Regime to Neocolonialism. Boston: Harvard University Press (2001). Print.
OTL Algeria wasn't radically different in its intentions and relations towards Morocco. In Baluchistan there have been separatist tendencies like since forever.
Sidelined Saddam is a good thing. Hope its permanent.
Interesting with Iraq. With no Saddam, we may not see an Iraq-Iran war any time soon
This is gonna' be a really interesting TL. We're not even five years into the decade, and things in the Near East are already starting to look radically different from OTL. I am looking forward to reading more about Ba'athist Iraq sans Saddam and Republican Morocco. Will Oufkir maintain Morocco's ties with the United States, or will he start drifting towards the Soviet Union like Gaddafi?
I knew that, but it didn't click when I was making the post. Probably because it was 2 AM
This TL continues to be excellent and interesting, though the latest update seemed very similar to OTL besides Iraq.
I knew that, but it didn't click when I was making the post. Probably because it was 2 AM
This TL continues to be excellent and interesting, though the latest update seemed very similar to OTL besides Iraq.
As we say in this country, "in the little". I only mentioned it because it really stuck out to me.
Well yeah, if I saw anyone say the the it would really stick out to me too. I might get around to learning Hebrew myself, but Arabic comes first (and that would make it easier, too.)
Thanks! One correction: the first listed "Independent Liberals" should be "Moledet HaYehudit," led by Zevulun Hammer.
Saddam is down, but don't count him out. He made a major error with trying to sneak a confrontation with the Syrians, but al-Tikriti doesn't have the same political killer instinct as Saddam.
As for Oufkir, everything I can tell from him was that he had close links to France and was not particularly ideological. He'll do what's best for him. Also, Oufkir is not the only one with power here. He's got the army in his corner (for the most part), but Medbouh and his brothers and cousins (who seem to be everywhere in the Moroccan establishment) are important as well. Medbouh is enormously popular with the street and has much less of the old-regime taint on him.
I knew that, but it didn't click when I was making the post. Probably because it was 2 AM
This TL continues to be excellent and interesting, though the latest update seemed very similar to OTL besides Iraq.
Thanks! It's pretty much OTL other than Iraq, although the changes that are going on will definitely affect the response of regional actors to the various situations.
Also, update either very late tonight or sometime tomorrow.
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