Morocco, Elections and Dayan, oh my!
“With the coronation of King Hassan II of Morocco in 1961, a new era began. Hassan’s father, Mohammed V, was beloved by the people as the leader who, returning from exile in Madagascar, had led Morocco to independence. The French-Moroccan Agreement of 1956 transformed Morocco from a colonial protectorate into a sovereign state. The agreement established Morocco as a constitutional monarchy with both a central role for the king, widely respected in a conservative society, and responsible government. Under Mohammed V, the king and the major nationalist party, Istiqlal, cautiously balanced each other’s authority, preventing either from establishing authoritarian rule while largely shutting out more radical political movements. While not entirely democratic, Morocco was secure in a region full of mounting repression and instability.
Hassan II was not nearly as restrained as his father. While in 1963 Hassan introduced a constitution that firmly established multi-party government, the first state in the Maghreb region to do so, it also centralized authority with the palace. While in theory Parliament reigned, the king, his appointed cabinet and a collection of shadowy advisors ran the country. In the face of protests from Istiqlal and the UNFP, the country’s two major political parties, Hassan responded with repression. In 1965, Hassan dissolved Parliament and declared direct rule under a “state of exception.” Violence against political opponents soon mounted, both within Morocco and in the diaspora, paired with restrictions on civil liberties and the media. On October 29, 1965, Mehdi Ben Barka, leader of the republican UNFP, disappeared while in exile in Paris after being arrested by French police. He was never seen again, although most experts believe that he was murdered by the Moroccan regime with the aid of allies in the French security establishment. These restrictions continued to tighten. A 1967 report by the State Department observed: "Hassan appears obsessed with the preservation of his power rather than with its application toward the resolution of Morocco's multiplying domestic problems.” Morocco through this period struggled to grow its economy sufficiently to absorb a swelling labour force and improve the standard of living for its population.
Still, by the end of the 1960s, Hassan felt comfortable enough in his rule that he began to loosen his grip. Restrictions on freedom of speech and association were relaxed and some political prisoners were released. There is evidence that the palace even had plans to move forward with a new constitution and a restoration of parliamentary rule, albeit restricted in its scope…
The 1969 coup attempt in Libya spooked Hassan, who responded by strengthening the Royal Guard and paramilitary forces at the expense of the army and Air Force. Military expenditures soared, especially after the conquest of Jordan by the PLO and Ba’athists in Syria; Hassan dreaded a similar move by Algeria, which he feared would cooperate with leftist and other insurrectionary forces within Morocco to overthrow the Alaouite dynasty. Interior Minister General Mohamed Oufkir, a feared ally of the king, gaining control of the Defence ministry. As defence spending soared, the country ran up a huge budget deficit and forced to make cuts to social spending. This, along with soaring inflation caused by the rising price of oil and Morocco’s tepid response to the Israeli invasion of Syria, led to rising discontent among the poor and middle classes. All that was needed was a spark.
On July 19, 1971, a young activist named Abdullah Bouazizi was tortured to death in Interior Ministry custody for organizing an anti-corruption rally in Marrakesh. This produced demonstrations in the city, which threatened to grow and possibly spread throughout the country if left unchecked. When local security forces were unable to suppress the mounting protests, King Hassan ordered the army to put down what he viewed as an attempt at revolution. He placed a trusted confidant, General Mohamed Medbouh, in charge of the operation. Medbouh though, while loyal to the king, a man he admired, was increasingly disenchanted with the corruption and tyranny of the Moroccan regime. He privately refused to crack down on Moroccan civilians, counseling Hassan to restore the constitution and implement liberalizing reforms. Hassan was furious, and ordered the immediate arrest of Medbouh. However, the army, tired of the distrust and venality of the king, no longer answered to His Majesty. Rather, they answered to his closest ally, General Mohamed Oufkir.
On the evening of August 2, army units ambushed a Royal Guard convoy carrying King Hassan from his coastal palace in Skhirat back to Rabat. Loyalist forces surrendered after a brief battle with few casualties; there is evidence that officers loyal to Medbouh, a former Royal Guard commander, were involved in the coup. The king was arrested and place in the custody of the Armed Forces Committee for National Restoration, commonly known
al-Lajna, or ‘the Committee.’ The throne was declared vacant, with Medbouh appointed as Regent. The king’s family, including eight-year old Crown Prince Mohammed, was allowed to leave for exile in France, although many older Alaouite family members were arrested. The coup surprised many actors, including protestors, who returned home as army units began to patrol the streets under the ‘state of national emergency’ proclaimed by
al-Lajna. Moroccan allies were deeply suspicious of the new regime, although they were heartened to see that the new government promised to maintain all of Morocco’s international commitments and, in the words of the new Prime Minister Mohamed Oufkir, “battle for a free, democratic, prosperous Morocco” rather than embrace revolutionary rhetoric.
The new regime immediately moved to restore order. Opposition parties remained banned for the time being, although they were increasingly tolerated. Istiqlal and the UNFP, among other parties, began to organize for expected future elections. Cuts to military spending (including the elimination of the Royal Guard), confiscations of property from beneficiaries of royal corruption, fuel rationing and a 90-day wage and price freeze gave
al-Lajna room to stabilize the country’s economy. The generals were wildly popular among the urban elite and middle class. They had also begun to build relationships with rural landowners and clan leaders, many of who remained openly monarchist. On November 18, Morocco’s Independence Day, Regent Mohamed Medbouh declared an end to the monarchy and the creation of the Republic of Morocco, with himself as Acting President. All political parties were legalized, and elections for a constituent assembly were scheduled for January 1972. For many, the future of Morocco looked bright. Others though could see the clouds looming on the horizon…”
Mohamed Ben Jelloun. The History of Modern Morocco. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001
“The general election of 1972, was, considering expectations, surprisingly tranquil. While there were noisy protests and a boycott by a large segment of the right, street violence was minimal and polling went smoothly. This was due to the overwhelming presence of police in public spaces as well as, more problematically, the surveillance, harassment and censorship of the opposition, including detention of opposition political activists throughout the campaign...
Two factions competed to lead the next government, while religious parties and the fragmented liberal center and far left hoped to make gains at the expense of their rivals. On the left, Tekumah, swallowing other small leftist parties, combined celebration of the NSC’s seizure of power and the suppression of the ‘Irgunist radicals’ with a platform of economic populism and a realist but defensively geared foreign policy. On the economy, Allon vowed to further subsidize industrial growth in ‘development towns,’ drastically expand Israel’s military production capacity, develop the ‘frontier’ and improve the education system through more rigorous testing, a focus on science and technology and the reintroduction of the Labour Zionist stream in schools. Significant new infrastructure spending was planned, with a focus on reducing Israel’s need for imported energy. On foreign policy, Allon ran on the Ze’evi Plan, his government’s proposed solution to the issue of the occupied territories, as well as promising to uphold the Sarajevo Agreement and rebuild the IDF’s strength to allow it to better defend the nation’s frontiers.
On the right, the National Unity Party, Ma’al, toed a narrow line. The party, led by the aging Yosef Sapir, attempted to appeal to the furious energy of the Revisionist right while maintaining an acceptably moderate platform. Unfortunately for the party, Sapir, a man in the classical liberal Zionist mould, was unable to bridge this divide. The party narrowly escaped dissolution by the Central Elections Committee and the Supreme Court after a number of its candidates and activists were charged with speech “threatening public safety” during the campaign. With the mainstream and state media firmly in the left’s camp, public opinion rapidly turned against Ma’al. At the same time, a boycott of the polls by more extreme members of the Revisionist movement depressed the right’s turnout to record-low levels, and working-class Sephardic voters, enticed by Tekumah’s promises of stability and economic development for their communities, defected in significant numbers.
Meanwhile, Mapai lacked an easy way to distinguish themselves from Tekumah, sharing most of their platform but none of their energy. Yisrael Galili, a wooden campaigner, had offered to resign the party leadership but was asked to remain on by Mapai’s Knesset caucus. Mapai ran a campaign promising a return to “normality,” hoping to resume power as Israel’s natural governing party. While they were buoyed by defections to Mapai by several of Rafi’s remaining members, they struggled to gain traction. The death knell for Mapai’s campaign came when the leader of the Histadrut, Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, publicly endorsed both Mapai and Tekumah, calling for a unification of the non-Communist left. Mapai, with its core voting bloc now up for grabs, resigned itself to minor party status for the first time…
The election’s results were surprising to many, although perhaps they should not have been. With low turnout, the Independent Liberals and Free Center picking up many moderate voters, and some hardliners defecting to the religious Zionist HaMolodet HaYehudit, Ma’al led the Revisionist movement to its worst electoral showing since the founding of the state of Israel. Meanwhile, the left, heavily mobilized, seized control of the Knesset, with Tekumah winning a huge plurality of seats and a clear mandate. Even the far left made gains, with Rakah and Maki reunified into the Popular Front in the face of growing repression. As the leading parties of the “Third Camp,” which denounced both the Begin government and the NSC, they gained protest votes and won the largest number of mandate in their history.
As the dust settled from the election and Yigal Allon returned to the Prime Minister’s office, the stage was set for the era defined by its central political figure, a man known best as HaNasi, ‘the prince’…
Daniel Ayalon. Israel: A Modern History. Tel Aviv: Qumram Books, 2012
“…but the third and final act of Moshe Dayan’s political career reads like Shakespeare. A man of action, rising to a crescendo of power, threw it all away in a fit of hubristic madness. Yet, the madness was there all along. When Moshe Dayan’s power vanished, devoured by his ambition, his stubborn pride and the bloody streets of Damascus, he was left a pitiful creature.
With Yigal Allon in the Prime Minister’s chair, Dayan had few options left. He had, over the years, thoroughly alienated Allon through repeated humiliations, from seizing his military command of the South in 1949 to pushing him out of the cabinet during the Purim War. The war had exploded in Dayan’s face and Allon was now the master of the Left. Dayan, desperate to remain on top, had locked arms with the Right and preached national unity while Begin busily tore the country apart. In the last, bitter days of the national constitutional crisis, Dayan secretly attempted to negotiate a compromise with Yisrael Galili: Begin would retreat on many of his more controversial political reforms, and all parties would form a national unity government with Begin as Prime Minister. Begin, furious, nearly fired one of his few remaining allies. Meanwhile Galili countered his offer with a poison pill, demanding that Begin resign and fresh elections be called…
On the morning that the Special Period began, Moshe Dayan lay in bed. Generally an early riser, he felt unusually ill and exhausted, perhaps a premonition of what was to come. Finally climbing out of bed at a knock on the door, with the sun dissolving the morning dew, he was greeted by a pair of policemen, who politely informed him that his telephone had been disconnected and that he should remain in his home during the transition ‘for his own safety.’ Dayan was never arrested. Yet, all but his closest loyalists in the Knesset defected to Mapai and his name became synonymous with ‘traitor’ in leftist circles.
After the election, in which Dayan and his bloc were excised from national politics, the tax authority and courts began to examine his assets and behavior with a fine-tooth comb. He was made to appear before a Knesset investigation of the handling of the Syrian War. Fiercely defending his record in the beginning, Dayan was eventually browbeaten into silence. His head drooping from exhaustion after days of testimony, Dayan finally admitted that the war’s failure was his responsibility. While the committee, empowered by new laws, chose not to pursue criminal charges of negligence, Dayan was left disgraced. His animalistic confidence gone, there was nothing left but an empty, broken shell.
Dayan, retiring from politics, returned to his childhood home of Nahalal. He remained there, seldom speaking to anyone beyond his bodyguards and his surviving family, until his end.”
Tommy Lapid. “Moshe Dayan (1915-1979)” in The Signal Fires. Trans. by Michael Goldman. Keter Press. 1985
