A Glorious Union or America: the New Sparta
- Thread starter TheKnightIrish
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Chapter One Hundred and Twenty One Hooker’s Left Hook
Chapter One Hundred and Twenty One
Hooker’s Left Hook
Hooker’s Left Hook
The Rebel Charge at Chattahoochee
From “Civil War Medals and Honors” compiled by Rufus J. Howell
Great Bear Books 1993
[A limited extract of awards relating to the pontoon crossing at Cavalry Ford by 3rd Brigade, 3rd Division, XXI Corps, Army of the Cumberland comprising 35th Indiana, 8th and 21st Kentucky and 51st and 99th Ohio…]
CLARK, JOHN S. – Medal of Honor
Major, 8th Kentucky Infantry. At Cavalry Ford, Ga., 27 June 1864. Citation: Gallant conduct in resisting attack, where, after his colonel, and senior major, and one third the company officers had fallen, he gallantly assisted in rallying the remnant of the command to hold its position.
CORRELL, ISREAL – Kearny Cross
2nd Lieutenant, 51st Ohio Infantry. At Cavalry Ford, Ga., 27 June 1864. Citation: On his initiative led a platoon of volunteers into a copse of trees on the left flank, where a squad of the enemy’s sharpshooters were sheltered, and compelled their surrender.
CRAM, GEORGE H. – Medal of Honor
Brigadier General. At Cavalry Ford, Ga., 27 June 1864. Citation: Daring heroism and great tenacity in holding his position on the east bank of the Chattahoochee River against repeated assaults, and carrying the advance fortifications known as Leadbetter posts 6 and 7.
HELWIG, SIMON – Medal of Honor
Private, 51st Ohio Infantry. At Cavalry Ford, Ga., 27 June 1864. Citation: Rushed in advance of his brigade as a volunteer skirmisher, shot a rebel officer who was rallying his men to charge and then was wounded holding his advanced position resisting with the bayonet.
KEITH, WILLIS B. – Kearny Cross
Private, 35th Indiana (1st Irish) Infantry. At Cavalry Ford, Ga., 27 June 1864. Citation: In hand to hand fight at the pontoon crossing he recaptured the regimental colors despite being wounded.
REAM, ELI – Medal of Honor
Private, 99th Ohio Infantry. At Cavalry Ford, Ga., 27 June 1864. Citation: Capture of enemy flag in resisting charge.
RICHARDSON, ISRAEL B. – Kearny Cross (2nd Award)
Major General. Cavalry Ford, Ga., 27 June 1864. Citation: Personally leading a charge which broke a supporting enemy formation despite having been severely injured in the river crossing by the loss of an ear.
From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004
“The failure of Jackson’s gallant charge and the subsequent defeat of William Bate’s supporting brigade had a dramatic impact on the Confederate position. Israel Richardson secured the immediate Confederate works with elements of Buell’s division. However he promptly dispatched the next formation to cross the river, William P. Carlin’s II Division southwards to flank the Confederate works at Cavalry Ford itself. The right flank of the rebel defensive line had been turned…
General Richardson’s macabre sense of humor was on full display in the aftermath of the clash on the east bank. When a staff officer arrived at Richardson’s hastily formed headquarters with a request for a meeting from the captured rebel General William Bate, Richardson responded by producing his handkerchief, “Tell that rebel he can have my ear for a long as he likes but the rest of me is presently otherwise engaged”. The handkerchief contained the remains of Israel Richardson’s right ear…”
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
“It was an extremely happy and satisfied General Richardson who reported the successful crossing of the river, and he did so by another innovation introduced by General Hooker – front line telegraph. Major Samuel T. Cushing, Chief of Signals for the Army of the Cumberland, had received orders to be prepared to “rapidly extend the line to and beyond the river to follow the advance as practical”. Telegraph wires had already been erected to the western end of the pontoon bridge by Cushing’s “wire dogs” in time for General Richardson to report the successful engagement against John K. Jackson’s troops. Within 30 minutes of the securing of Leadbetter Post 6, in which Richardson established a forward headquarters, he was connected to the army’s headquarters and could receive direct and immediate instructions from the commanding general. Joseph Hooker had ensured the face of command on the battlefield had changed forever…”
Battlefield Telegraphy
From “The Irish Corporal – The Life and Battles of Patrick Ronayne Cleburne” by James Fitzgerald Maguire
Trinity Press
“It was as though a damn had burst and a blue tide flooded across the Chattahoochee, first overwhelming Jackson’s and Bate’s brigades, and then washing away Manigault’s and Chalmers’ brigades. Preston Smith and his two remaining brigades were now completely cut off from the army on the extreme right with most of a Union army corps intervening…
Cleburne realized quickly that there was no prospect of driving Hooker’s bridgehead back across the river and ordered his remaining forces on the right to withdraw. Orders were dispatched by a circuitous route to Preston Smith for him to, somehow, return to Atlanta…
Cleburne urgently sought out Hardee and Churchill to decide what they might do next and whether by any action they could yet save Atlanta…”
From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953
“The first indication that General Hooker had launched he assault was the sound of cannon fire that could clearly be heard from Grant’s Headquarters at Smyrna. Yet Grant received no response to his requested for an urgent report until midday when a staff officer arrived from General Hooker to report that a bridgehead had been established. It is telling that General Hooker managed to maintain regular contact with General Richardson on the frontline by means of the telegraph and yet could not do likewise with General Grant’s Headquarters…
General Grant attitude spoke volumes about the man. He had no intention of “looking the proverbial gift horse in the mouth” (James Wilson) and quickly alerted his commanders to prepare for immediate orders to move. The followed a period where Grant sought to locate Hooker for a direct meeting to assess the bridgehead and decide how best the other army formations might support Hooker’s attack. Many on Grant’s staff assumed General Hooker was deliberately avoiding Grant to ensure the crossing was fully secured without input from the commanding general so Hooker could be sure of all the credit. In any event the delay in locating Hooker was crucial in that valuable time was wasted before the Armies of the Mississippi and Ohio were put in motion both because of the lack of warning of the likelihood of urgent orders to march and in deciding where they could apply the most pressure on the rebels…”
From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004
“The confusion arising from Hooker’s sudden decamping onto the eastern bank seemed to disorder the Union forces more than the Confederates. Having rapidly concluded the river line was lost General Hardee was able to quickly withdraw his troops from the more exposed positions and retreat towards Atlanta. It was some time before elements of the Armies of the Mississippi and Ohio began to cross the river and secure their own bridgeheads on the eastern bank. In fact it would be over 32 hours before significant elements of any unit outside the Army of the Cumberland would be present on the eastern bank…”
Davis could not conceive how the Confederacy could survive the loss of Atlanta having lost Richmond
From “The Unyielding Office – the Presidency of Jefferson Davis” by James L. Caney
Buffalo
“Though a veneer of calm seemed to permeate the city Panic lurked just below the surface. For some citizens of the de facto capital this was not their first time in a city as a Union army approached threateningly. This time the President had no intention of allowing events to be dictated to him by soldiers and cabinet officials. He made his appeal directly to the people of Atlanta, Georgia and the Confederacy in speech after speech ever day for a week. If the city was abandoned without contest “the world will judge us unworthy of the title nation”; if the city was lost through misguided state jealousies or concerns “we will forever stain the legacy of the great father’s of American Independence”; it was only through “blood and tears; the supreme sacrifice that we can confirm to the world the established fact of our independence”…
Whether through President Davis’ efforts or not the cabinet and General Johnson were, for once, united. General Hardee would be pressed to aggressively defend the city and whatever resources were left to the rump Confederacy would be pressed into service…”
The Final Round?
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come back KnightIrish
I'm back. Currently writing up battle no.4 of 9 for the next post. Should appear toady or tomorrow morning at latest.
Chapter One Hundred and Twenty Two The Atlanta Waltz
Chapter One Hundred and Twenty Two
The Atlanta Waltz
The Atlanta Waltz
From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004
“From June 29, the very day Grant’s Headquarters crossed the river, there would be an engagement every day for the next 40 days ranging from furious brigade sized skirmishes to army sized clashes…”
Decatur (July 4, 1864)
From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953
“After crossing the Chattahoochee, Grant intended to re-establish complete control over the movement of his three armies. He intended initially to split his army into three columns for the assault on Atlanta with Thomas' Army of the Ohio, on the left, moving from the north largely as a feint. Hooker and Ord would draw away to the east with the intention of circling the city and cutting it off from the south…”
From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965
“General Hardee read General Grant’s strategy and prepared an appropriate response. Screening Thomas with some troop from the Atlanta garrison under Loring, and then largely ignoring him, Hardee allowed the larger Union wing to march some distance to the east. General Cleburne pressed for an attack at Peachtree Creek but Hardee wished for more distance to develop between the two Union wings so that Thomas would not be able to support Hooker and Ord. Hardee prepared his attack to occur just north of Decatur…”
Lieutenant General Patrick Cleburne at Decatur
From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004
“In fact Ord’s leading troops were divided out of the necessity of crossing several creeks and streams in the area. Hooker’s troops were still all north of Peachtree Creek when the rebels struck. Cleburne’s troops struck the head of Ord’s force (Dodge’s XVI Corps) from the south while Churchill attacked from the south west. The determined assault threatened to overrun the exposed head of the Union advance, and Ord became increasingly concerned. Dodge was pleading for help but the few good roads and the rarer good crossings were becoming clogged with Union troops. In concert with Hooker, Ord decided to withdraw Dodge’s XVI Corps and the leading elements of Warren’s XV Corps from, what he considered their exposed position. The advance of the larger Union wing was temporarily halted…”
Peachtree Creek (July 7, 1864)
From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965
“The critical task now for General Hardee was to maintain the initiative and keep the Union forces off balance. General Cleburne pressed for an attack on Thomas’ weaker Army of the Ohio on the left. However the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff both agreed with General Hardee’s assessment that the larger column north of the city remained the greater threat for the moment…
Hardee choose to attack the seam between Hooker’s army and Ord’s at Peachtree Creek. The attack was made by General Churchill’s II Corps with artillery support from Cleburne’s ordnance. The rear of Ord’s Army was manned by the division of Alvin P. Hovey of Eugene Carr’s XIII who eventually repelled the assault by General William Preston’s Division. However the lead of Hooker’s column comprised Steedman’s division of Granger’s XXIII Corps. Hit by both Bushrod Johnson’s division and that of Liddell’s, Steedman’s division crumpled and fell back on Cox’s division. The determined assault threatened to overrun Granger’s Corps at various locations, but eventually the Union held, stiffened by the arrival of General Hooker, and the Confederates fell back…
The question remains what would have been the outcome had Hardee, instead of mauling the larger Union force he could not realistically expect to defeat, attacked Thomas’ isolated Army of the Ohio…?”
Utoy Courthouse (July 14, 1864)
From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004
“Grant’s forces had previously approached Atlanta from the east and north and had not been able to break through, so Grant decided to shift emphasis and attack from the west. He ordered Hooker's Army of the Cumberland to move from the left wing to the right to support Thomas. Their combined objective would be to cut Hardee’s last railroad supply line between East Point and Atlanta…
The movement of troops to the west was not lost on Hardee who sent Cleburne’s Corps to intercept the Union force. Attached to Cleburne’s force was the newly constituted IV Corps of the army which had formerly been the garrison of Atlanta under William Wing Loring. The garrison troops, militia, home guard units and convalescents from Atlanta’s hospitals had been formed into two divisions under Loring. However neither Generals Hardee nor Cleburne put much faith in their performance…
General Thomas had anticipated such a thrust, and had cleverly side stepped the first Confederate attack at Ezra Church. Instead he had swung his force wide to the west, covered by a thick screen of skirmishers, and entrenched further south at Utoy Courthouse. Having been misled as to the location of Thomas’ force, the attack fell to the left hand wing of Cleburne’s force – Loring’s troops. The leading division under Franklin Gardner (one of the last prisoners released under the cartel before General Kearny suspended it) led the assault but was repulsed by men of Black Jack Logan’s XVII Corps inflicting numerous casualties. However General Cleburne reported that “the performance of Gardner’s division, their gallantry in advance and steadfastness in retreat, were in accordance with the highest standards of this army”. Such heroism and enthusiasm among Loring's troops would not last…
However the Union troops failed to cut the railroad. While Thomas sparred with Cleburne and Loring at Utoy, an attempt by a column of Union cavalry to cut the railroads south of Atlanta ended in failure, with one division under Brigadier General Eugene Crittenden completely smashed at the Battle of Connally’s Farm…”
Hopewell Church (July 22, 1864)
From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004
“Thomas waited for a few days to see if the rebels would be foolish enough to attack again. He deliberately left a gap between his own position and that of Hooker in order to further encourage Confederate aggressiveness. The rebel commanders would not oblige him…
General Thomas reorganized his troops for a further advance on the railroad. They crossed Utoy Creek on July 20, but by July 21 they had discovered a substantial series of defenses with lines of abatis near Hopewell Church which slowed the Union attack when it restarted on the morning of July 22. Thomas sent in Schofield’s corps but his troops were repulsed with heavy losses and failed in the second attempt to break the railroad…”
Rough & Ready (July 28, 1864)
From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004
“General Thomas next suggested another cavalry raid on the railroad, larger and better organized than the last. General Grant consented and General George Crook was instructed to lead the bulk of his cavalry corps on the raid. The objective would be to strike somewhere between East Point and Morrow Station…
Union cavalry tear up railroad tracks
Leaving on July 25, Crook hit the Atlanta & West Point Railroad later that evening, tearing up a small area of tracks. Next, he headed for the station with the incongruous name of Rough & Ready on the Macon & Western Railroad. In transit, on July 27, Kilpatrick's men hit the Morrow Station supply depot on the Macon & Western Railroad, burning great amounts of supplies. On July 28, they reached Rough & Ready Station and began their destruction. Confederate cavalry under Abraham Buford quickly appeared, having been alerted by the raid on Morrow Station. Buford’s two divisions, under Joseph Wheeler and John A. Wharton, fought into the evening with George Crook’s two divisions under Robert Minty and Edward M. McCook. It was a fierce fight with neither cavalry wishing to give way. Eventually Crook’s raiders were forced, having fought into the night, to finally withdraw in order to avoid encirclement as Confederate infantry appeared to come up from the south…
Although Crook had destroyed supplies and track at Rough & Ready, the railroad line was back in operation in three days. Most important was the sole infantry prisoner Crook’s cavalry had taken from the Confederate troops coming up from the south. After interrogating the prisoner himself Crook reported to Thomas who in turn sent a message to Grant – John Bankhead Magruder’s III Corps had arrived…
McClernand’s Army of the Alabama had become fixed by the discovery and liberation of the giant prison camp at Andersonville. Many of the prisoners were too ill to move and further there was some question as to the safety of ferrying prisoners back down his tenuous supply line to Mobile. Having scored a propaganda victory through having reporters and photographers record the horrors of Andersonville, McClernand now seemed rooted to the spot as he tried to work out what to do next. Any further advance would seem to imperil the freed prisoners upon whose recent liberation he had puffed his reputation…”
Second Utoy (July 31, 1864)
From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965
“McClernand’s paralysis was an opportunity for Hardee and Magruder. Leaving nothing more than a cavalry brigade to watch McClernand, and relying on the Union troops to remain fixed, Magruder marched north towards Atlanta will all haste. The Army of Tennessee would finally be united in the defense of Atlanta. As one Yankee reporter was to put it “The rebel Hardee now has four corps with which to try to stop three mighty armies – Patrick Cleburne’s I Corps, Hardee’s sword arm, Thomas James Churchill’s II Corps, Hardee’s shield, John Bankhead Magruder’s III Corps, past masters of deception and battlefield misdirection, and William Wing Loring’s IV Corps, the dregs of a rebellion and an army who have shown in this campaign that they can fight like the Duke of Wellington’s own scum”…”
From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953
“With confirmation of the imminent arrival of some or all of Magruder’s Corps, Grant expected that the desperate rebels would go on the offensive. Reports from North Carolina spoke of catastrophic reverses for the rebels there. Grant knew Hardee would be under intense political pressure to secure a victory. The question would be whether Hardee would attack Ord on the left, Hooker in the centre, or Thomas on the right. In any event Grant drew in forces in one both flanks, with Ord falling behind Peachtree Creek and Thomas behind Utoy Creek…”
From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004
“On the night of July 30, General William Sooy Smith, commanding Ord’s front line reported substantial noise and movement before his lines at Peachtree Creek. It seemed clear to Ord and Grant that the blow would fall there come the morning. In was in fact General William Wing Loring staging a demonstration, though his own division commanders expected an order to attack in the morning. Hardee judged correctly that Loring’s mixed bag of troops could not but make the Union commanders aware of their presence as they moved into position at Decatur. In fact the force of Hardee’s attack would fall on George Thomas, west of Atlanta, at Utoy Courthouse…
Thomas Churchill’s troops held the wooded ridge south of Utoy Creek which effectively ran south west from Atlanta almost all the way to East Point. His task was to attack Thomas’ lines north of the creek to fix him in place. Cleburne’s corps was massed within the city itself. His task was to strike the Union left to sever Thomas from any support from Hooker. Finally Magruder’s corps loitered near Connally’s Farm. His objective was to swing around Thomas’ right, flanking it and getting behind him. His objective was Utoy Courthouse. Hardee’s plan called for no less than the encirclement of Thomas’ Army of 2 corps/5 divisions by 3 Confederate corps comprising 9 divisions (the Confederate government had demanded two divisions remained in the city’s works to defend it lest Hooker fall on it from the north while the Confederate army was engaged on both flanks. Preston Smith’s battered division from Cleburne’s corps and Ben Helm’s under strength division from Churchill’s corps would remain in the city’s defenses)…
Major General Thomas James Churchill on the morning of Second Utoy
What followed was one of the most costly battles for the Confederacy and a classic defensive battle for the Union. General Thomas was little troubled by Churchill’s attack to his front. Churchill’s position on the southern bank of the Utoy Creek was an excellent defensive position but it was poor ground from which to launch an attack against dug in veterans over an exposed creek…
As the attacks developed on both flanks General Thomas remained campaign. On his left where Cleburne’s assault came from the city, he had General Logan refuse his flank, drawing the divisions of John E. Smith and John McArthur back so that the Union left resembled the letter C, with the division of Isaac Quinby holding the upper part facing Churchill across the creek (Francis J. Herron’s division had been detached to guard supply lines). “Two forces of nature clashed near the Brune House as Black Jack Logan showed Paddy Cleburne Illinois’ mettle” (Chicago Tribune)…
On the Union right Schofield’s XXV Corps only had two divisions. John F. Miller’s largely Ohio force and August Louis Chetlain’s Colored Division. They would be hammered head on by Mansfield Lovell’s division of Marguder’s corps. While Lovell attacked, the divisions of W.H.T. Walker and Dabney H. Maury deftly swung around the flank. Again the ever present Thomas sensed the danger and refused his flank, pulling Chetlain’s division around at right angles of Miller’s line. Fierce fighting erupted between Chetlain’s men and Walker’s…
General Hardee had anticipated that an attack on Thomas would heavily involve colored troops in Union service. His orders had been explicit. All Union troops, regardless of race, were to be treated as lawful combatants and afforded the full courtesies as soldiers and prisoners of war. There were nonetheless still a few recorded instances of the killing of wounded men and surrendering soldiers on this part of the battlefield…
General Dabney H. Maury had swung clear of both Lovell’s and Walker’s fights. He achieved his objective by swinging behind Thomas army as far as Utoy Courthouse. Thomas’ retreat was effectively cut off and Thomas had no reserves to deploy. Maury’s triumph was brief. Within 15 minutes of securing the courthouse he was attacked from the north by the division of Anson George McCook. General Hooker had answered Thomas’ request for help promptly by dispatching Rousseau’s XIV Corps to his aid. McCook’s troops were often said to be the best armed division in the Union army with almost every man carrying a repeating rifle. Though Maury’s three brigades (Lloyd Tilghman’s, Alpheus Baker’s and John A. Orr’s) outnumbered McCook’s, McCook did not need the assistance of a single man of John Turchin’s following division to help route Maury. Now Maury was in the difficult position of having McCook before him, and Thomas’ lines behind him. He found himself having to give the invidious order to retreat around Thomas’ flank in the face of an overwhelming fire…
Major General Dabney H. Maury
Second Utoy was the battle that was supposed to smash George Thomas’ Army of the Ohio. Instead the smallest army in Grant’s force had given a stellar performance in battle with both John Logan and John Schofield performing admirably. Instead Magruder’s III Corps had taken heavy casualties the Army of Tennessee could ill afford; the normally victorious Cleburne’s attack had petered out, his troops exhausted from weeks of fighting; and Thomas remained in position exactly where he had at the battles commencement…
The outcome of the battle seemed to have a dramatic effect on Confederate morale and, combined with rumors from North Carolina, increasing numbers of troops (particularly in Loring’s formation) began to either drift away or to simply ignore orders…”
Panthersville (August 7, 1864)
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
“General Hooker had been appalled that General Grant had surrendered the initiative to the rebels. Though the rebels had been defeated, Hooker was not alone in thinking that Atlanta was no closer to capture. General Hooker strongly and repeatedly demanded that the Union armies return to the offensive…”
From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953
“Grant’s forces had successfully cut Hardee's supply lines in the past by sending out cavalry detachments, but the Confederates quickly repaired the damage. In August, Grant determined it was time to return to the offensive after the rebels had worn themselves out in futile attacks. Grant believed that if he could cut Hardee's railroad supply lines, the Confederates would have to evacuate Atlanta. He therefore decided to move the majority of his corps against the supply lines. The army began pulling out of its positions on August 2 to hit the Macon & Western Railroad between Rough and Ready and Jonesborough. To counter the move, Hardee sent Cleburne with two corps (his own and Loring’s) to halt and possibly rout the Union troops, not realizing Grant's army was shifting to the east in force. On August 7, Cleburne attacked two Union corps west of Panthersville. This time General Ord had been ready for the attack and Eugene Carr’s XIII easily repulsed Loring’s half-hearted assault…
After the hard fought battles of the campaign, this easy Union victory shook Confederate confidence and morale to its core. The poor performance of Loring's troops led to a breakdown in trust between different formations in Hardee's army. The end for Atlanta was coming quickly and much faster than anyone on either side had foreseen...”
Morrow’s Station (August 12, 1864)
From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004
“Panic was building within Atlanta. The news that Cleburne’s attack had been brushed aside and that Ord and Hooker advanced on the railroad was poorly received. Thomas’ troops now appeared north of the city and wild stories began to circulate in the city that Chetlain’s colored troops would be released to sack the city like some “marauding horde from the Dark Ages”…
On August 11 Hardee gave the order to move all his forces to the east. The next day, a Union corps (Carr’s XIII) broke through Cleburne's hastily erected line between Elam Church and Morrow Station, and some of his troops retreated south towards Jonesborough. Hardee had realized on the night of August 11 his exhausted troops were reaching the end of their endurance. Furthermore replenishing ammunition was becoming a serious issue for the army and it was suggested that some of Loring’s troops had gone into battle with nothing more than empty rifles and substandard bayonets…
It took longer for the government to realize Atlanta’s time was up. Only on the morning of August 13 did the Chief of Staff issue the order for the evacuation of Atlanta. For many it was too late. Leading elements of Ord’s army were already in possession of parts of the railroad at Morrow Station. Sensing that Second Utoy and Panthersville had broken the spirit of the defenders Grant had also released his cavalry to raid indiscriminately in the rebel rear around Jonesborough and Lovejoy Station…”
Lovejoy Station (August 15, 1864)
From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004
“Hardee’s troops’ morale collapsed quickly following the defeats at Utoy, Panthersville and Morrow Station. It was now widely rumored that Longstreet had surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia in North Carolina, and Kirby Smith’s attempt to break out of Texas had been defeated by James Blunt at Sabine River (which had occurred on July 12th)…
The troops had retreated largely at their own discretion as far as Fayetteville and beyond Lovejoy Station. This precipitous retreat had caught both the General Grant and the population of Atlanta by surprise. Many members of the Confederate government were now effectively cut off in the city while many others sought to sneak out through the still porous lines…
General Hardee sought to make on last ditch effort to reopen the railroad to the city and attacked the leading elements of Ord’s Army of the Mississippi at Lovejoy Station. General Eugene Carr again led the Union forces, commanding both his own XIII Corps and the cavalry of John Wynn Davidson. The cavalry brigades of James H. Wilson and Eli H. Murray fanned out on both flanks and opened up an unrelenting fire on the attacking rebels…
To press the attack Hardee had rounded up Stewart’s and Polignac’s Divisions of Cleburne’s Corps, Bushrod Johnson’s Division of Churchill’s Corps and Mansfield Lovell’s Division of Magruder’s Corps (Loring’s Corps had quickly dissolved from its route at Panthersville to barely a man with the colors)…
With no artillery to support the attack it was a forlorn hope. Carr was sufficiently comfortable in his ability to repel the attack offered by Hardee that he refused General Warren’s offer to dispatch General Ewing’s division as reinforcement from its position near Hebron Church…
The railroad to Atlanta was now permanently severed. Hardee’s fast diminishing army was falling back southwards away from Lovejoy Station and half the Confederate Government was still in and around Atlanta as Grant’s forces moved in…”
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Excellent update KI.
A hard fought battle, but the inevitable Union victory. I imagine Grant isn't going to burn Atlanta like Sherman did IOTL. Different circumstances and different leader.
A hard fought battle, but the inevitable Union victory. I imagine Grant isn't going to burn Atlanta like Sherman did IOTL. Different circumstances and different leader.
This gem of an update was worth the long wait. The Confederacy is undeniably in its last days.
Sounds like Grant outlasted the rebels more than anything. Though, it does help that they got overconfidence with the reinforcements and decided to attack.
Though, I wonder if McCook's division, being armed mostly with repeating arms will be something noted and learned from. From what I heard, armies were somewhat slow to adopt repeating firearms(not to be confused with breechloaders).
But then warfare against the Indians on the plains tends to call for range.
Though, I wonder if McCook's division, being armed mostly with repeating arms will be something noted and learned from. From what I heard, armies were somewhat slow to adopt repeating firearms(not to be confused with breechloaders).
But then warfare against the Indians on the plains tends to call for range.
Excellent updates. It looks like we're beginning to move into the postwar settlement and Reconstruction, which should be interesting. I'm looking forward to it.
Grant has the challenging task of an Atlanta full of civilians and a great many members of the Confederate Government. Occupying Atlanta may prove to be a challenge...
Hooker no doubt feels a little thwarted that Grant commands and not him. Hooker and Grant have troubles yet to come...
Phil Kearny loves war but is not a dyed in the wool traditionalist. He has several ideas for the evolution of the army. Some good. Some bad. Some nuts.
Yes now comes the hard part. The majority of the north want the leading rebels (numbering in the hundreds and perhaps thousands) tried for treason. And probably hung. Lincoln will struggle to swallow that pill and indeed many will baulk at the final fence at the very idea of a thousand hangings...
How did he deal with hanging of the Dakota at Mankato MN? I think you said that the Dakota war went much the same ITTL? As i recall OTL, there were hundreds on the list to be hung, all but 33 were spared by Lincoln. It was still the largest mass hanging in US history
Repeaters are all nice and well, especially for cavalry, but prior to invention of gun cotton and smokeless powder their most problematic feature is clouds of smoke they produce when firing continuously.
Early breechloaders such as Dreyse Needle-Gun and Chassepot suffered from issues with leakage which caused them at times to backfire on the shooter, but the general idea was a step in right direction.
Blimey, I completely forgot about Dakota Uprising in Minnesota. Things got pretty ugly there with most of the able-bodied males conscripted to fight in ACW.
I remember reading a Polish adventure trilogy about it. It actually was sort-of history of Dakota tribe with mainly fictional characters, but historical figures such as Sitting Bull and Red Cloud appeared as well. That was one of the reasons I was intersted in American Indians in my youth.
It was written by Alfred Szklarski and boy, this guy had it hard for the foot-notes about plants and animals - some of them took half the page.
Those are breechloaders, not repeaters.
And the Chassepot came almost a decade later than the Needle-Gun and didn't have the issues of leakage.
I'm referring to repeating arms like the Sharps or the Henry. The problem with those weapons is that they suffer from weak power and range. Not something you want on the open plains of the Mid-West.
Also, guncotton has already been invented.
Charles Smith Hamilton was appointed to the Dept. command (Post 737) in the fall of 1862. It was a sop to Hamilton who had been displaced from his divisional command to give Phil Kearny an appropriate command.
The Battle of Wood Lake still occurs though it is called Lone Tree Lake. By December there are about 350 prisoners on trial. Hamilton has them tried by military tribunal and 331 are sentenced to be put to death by hanging.
General Hamilton and Senator Wilkinson of Minnesota recommend the sentences be carried out. However Lincoln is disgust by the reports of Hamilton's cruelty and the prisoners conditions as well as by the sentences. All but the 44 directly (and conclusively compared with some of the verdicts) convicted of involvement in murders are pardoned by the President. This act of clemency has two consequences:
1. When Little Crow and his son are captured by one of Hamilton's patrols in the summer of 63 they are shot out of hand for "resisting arrest". This act made Hamilton a hero in Minnesota and angered the President. However the President was distracted by other considerations and took no further action.
2. Following the execution of General David Hunter and the hardening of attitudes to the rebels many radicals would hold up Lincoln's leniency to the Sioux as an example of how he would fail to punish the rebels for treason and murder. The President's comment to Senator Wilkinson that "he could not afford to hang men for votes" troubled many republicans and was used by the radicals - everyone knew that a large portion of the nation would enthusiastically vote for "a national hangman" (Ben Butler). At least one radical in the west ran on a platform in 1864 of "No leniency for Red Men or Secesh Traitors". Senator Wilkinson was one of the casualties of Lincoln's mercy and would not be re-appointed to the Senate...