I am going to look at Kentucky when I look at the Election. William "Bull" Nelson has been military governor of most of Kentucky for some time now. Though a disastrous field commander, he did quite a lot early in the war to nurture pro-Union sentiment in Kentucky.
A Glorious Union or America: the New Sparta
- Thread starter TheKnightIrish
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I am going to look at Kentucky when I look at the Election. William "Bull" Nelson has been military governor of most of Kentucky for some time now. Though a disastrous field commander, he did quite a lot early in the war to nurture pro-Union sentiment in Kentucky.
Sorry for the delay. I have been doing some research on Reconstruction and on Kearny (I have found three of his staff in Hunt's Brevet Brigadier Generals in Blue and must admit I have been calling Joseph C. Bristoe, James in error - he will be an important figure later. George W. Mindel and Chauncey McKeever are both in there as well).
In short I promise an update tomorrow and possibly one on Sunday.
In short I promise an update tomorrow and possibly one on Sunday.
As cold as it sounds it's sad to see the Civil War is ending. Your battle narrative is simply superb. Hopefully you will manage to squeeze in a battle or two from the Western Front?
I understand that you will keep the currect format, that being the excerpts and quotes from various ATL history books, even though the war is over?
I understand that you will keep the currect format, that being the excerpts and quotes from various ATL history books, even though the war is over?
This will be interesting to see. In OTL, the Union occupation/interactions in Kentucky led to the dominance of the "Bourbon Democrats" of the political scene for the rest of the 19th century and most of the 20th century. This acted to retard Kentucky's Economic/Political/Social progress in a way that Kentucky still had not completely recovered from. If the Bourbons are blocked from coming to power, that could lead to interesting developments down the road.
I will keep this format. Including conflicting perspectives from time to time.
Don't worry about having to wait 60 years for more battles. The problem with letting your generals be politicians is that war really does become the continuation of politics by other means...
Just Hardee to finish off in detail (Kirby Smith and Beauregard will be swept up as well).
Will the USA have a more aggressive pursuit of manifest destiny with regards to its northern and southern neighbours and foreign possessions in the West Indies and Caribbean?
So the next part should be interesting to see how is the peace going to be handled.
Chapter One Hundred and Nineteen Details and Details
Chapter One Hundred and Nineteen
Details and Details
Details and Details
From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern
“This was the beginning of what Kearny often referred to as “the War on Paper”. The surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia presented major practical issues for the Commander in Chief to overcome…
General Kearny was keen to ensure there was no confusion between the officers who had surrendered under the Chantilly Terms and those taken unconditionally in the field. General John Buford’s capture first of Jubal Early and later of Robert Barnwell Rhett (alleged to have been captured disguised as a Confederate chaplain on the road to Wilmington) had created a national sensation which immediately quieted the voices in the North raised but a few days earlier against the Chantilly Terms. Early and Rhett, along with existing senior captives, like Bragg and Pemberton, would be subject to the “whim of the President, Congress and the Mob” (Thomas Seymour). However Kearny had staked his honor on upholding the Chantilly Terms…
The general officers from Longstreet’s army were to be transported to and imprisoned at Fort Delaware, away from the eye of the press and the reach of the mob. Early and Rhett would join the other unconditional prisoners in the more forbidding atmosphere of Fort Warren in Boston Harbor…the Colonels, Lieutenant-Colonels, Majors and Captains would be housed in separate camps at Point Lookout in Maryland within sight of Virginia. Oliver O. Howard had suggested each rank have its own camp “if they have an ounce of the old army spirit they will be too busy arguing about seniority to created any difficulties”…”
Fort Warren today
From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006
“The capture of an army dramatically hindered the operations of the Army of the Potomac. Identifying and processing the officers proved challenging, with scores casting off their uniforms and hidden among loyal elements of the rank and file. The supply and transport of Confederate enlisted parolees also had to be arranged to “pacified districts”. For the moment those seeking to return to South Carolina, Georgia, Florida and Texas had to be held in North Carolina. That in itself proved difficult…
However General Kearny was not happy to let the army sit idle. General Peck was dispatched to finally seize the port of Wilmington to confirm the occupation of all of North Carolina…
Fort Delaware - The prison for General Officers surrendered on Chantilly Terms
Having read General Rodman’s reports on the chaos believed to exist beyond Tidewater South Carolina (over which Rodman had largely established control) General Kearny sought to exacerbate Confederate difficulties by launching three major cavalry raids into the state.
The first (Gregg’s and Devin’s Divisions) under Buford himself would head south west through Spartanburg and Greenville towards the Savannah River. Buford was to judge whether, by demonstrating to the east of Atlanta he could be of any assistance to General Grant’s forces.
The second under George Armstrong Custer (three brigades, his own division plus Hugh J. Kilpatrick’s brigade) would strike out south towards Columbia. It was believed General Beauregard had headquartered there and was seeking to rally state forces. Custer was to ensure he was “an extreme inconvenience” (Fitzgerald) to General Beauregard.
The third, the cavalry of the Army of the James under Elliott, was to led Peck to Wilmington and then swept south down the hinterland of the coast as far as Charleston to break up any resistance to Rodman’s occupation of South Carolina’s ports. Rodman had been prevented from penetrating too far inland by want of cavalry and General Elliott’s force would remedy this…”
There was a limit to what Rodman could do beyond the South Carolina coast without cavalry
From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern
“General Kearny was concerned that matters be resolved in Georgia as soon as possible. He was already planning to release some part of the Army of the Potomac to follow Buford’s spearhead south westwards towards Hardee’s rear. The war was not over yet and Kearny angrily refused requests from senior officers for leave. “Our work is not yet complete…Hardee is still abroad in Georgia…until subdued the place of all loyal men is with the army”. Kearny was not the only man yearning for news from Atlanta…”
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Chapter One Hundred and Twenty A Bridge Too Far?
Chapter One Hundred and Twenty
A Bridge Too Far?
A Bridge Too Far?
From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004
Grant used Thomas’ arrival to reorganize the armies in the Western Theatre and to assume clear overall command, much to Hooker’s chagrin. Hooker’s Army of the Cumberland remained unchanged – three full corps (Rousseau’s XIV, Richardson’s XXI and Granger’s XXIII) and a weak fourth corps (Davis’ XX). George Thomas was given command of an expanded Army of the Ohio including the XXV Corps under Schofield just arrived from East Tennessee plus Logan’s XVII Corps. E.O.C. Ord was promoted to command of the Army of the Mississippi now containing three corps (Carr’s XIII, Warren’s XV and Grenville M. Dodge’s XVI)…
The Battle of Pace's Ferry was an engagement fought on June 17, 1864. Troops of Major General Gouvenor K. Warren’s XV Corps sought to create two pontoon bridges over the Chattahoochee River, which would enable Union troops to continue their offensive to capture Atlanta….
Gouvenor K. Warren launches the first attempt to cross the Chattahoochee
Warren sought, with Grant’s approval, to use a road which led east toward Atlanta, crossing the Chattahoochee River at Pace's Ferry, where the Confederates themselves had constructed a pontoon bridge but which Thomas Churchill’s troops had destroyed following their retreat. Warren’s engineers sought to erect two pontoon bridges at the same point…
Frederick Steele’s skirmishers [I Division XV Corps] sought to drive off the Confederate defenders, initially only the brigade of States Right Gist, with the support of several batteries of artillery. However as the pontoon bridges extended into the river, the engineers and workers became increasingly exposed to accurate fire from the Confederate bank. The advance of the pontoons stalled…
Warren sought to recommence works during the night but Churchill, anticipating the move, had ensured Gist (now supported by Roger W. Hanson’s brigade) had an ample supply of flares. The pontoon parties suffered severe casualties and were driven back despite great courage…
Furthermore the Confederates had used the cover of night to further expand their defenses at Pace’s Ferry, using large numbers of impressed slaves who toiled at the defenses while under sporadic fire from the Union batteries…
Not seeing a suitable opportunity to attack the strong Confederate positions across the Chattahoochee, Warren abandoned the pontoon construction and ordered his corps into camp on high ground facing the river. He informed Grant that any attempt to cross the river at Pace’s Ferry would be prohibitively expensive in lives…”
The erection of a traditional pontoon bridge exposed the engineers and troops to constant rebel fire
From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965
“General Hardee had realized the tenuous state of his defensive line on the Chattahoochee and he used the weeks, wasted by Grant while waiting for Thomas, to reinforce those defenses. Brigadier General Danville Leadbetter, having served in both the US army engineers and artillery, had been appointed as Chief of Engineers in Hardee’s army. Even before the army had retreated across the river, Leadbetter had begun to design a series of small but sturdy earthworks to reinforce the river’s natural defenses. General Johnson in Atlanta had given Leadbetter carte blanche to use whatever labor was available to be pressed into service…
They would create the Leadbetter Line – 53 independent earthworks which, at critical likely crossing points in the river, created a lethal zone of crossfire. The Leadbetter Line initially extended from Lick Skillet to Cavalry Ford…”
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
“The problem with Grant, according to Dan Butterfield, was that he was only 3/5ths of a great general. He had “the strategy right...the men well cared for...and determination…” but he was a “poor tactician and lacked any style or imagination”... So it was that the Lick Skillet attack was conceived…”
From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953
“Grant prepared more thoroughly for a second crossing, managing the details himself. It would be spearheaded by General Ord’s Army of the Mississippi further south west near the township of Lick Skillet. General Thomas, having taken over the area near Pace Ferry, was to demonstrate in support of the attack…”
From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004
“Union engineers began to assemble six pontoon bridges before dawn on June 23, two just north of the township, a third opposite Mason’s Church, two farther south near Bethlehem Church, and the sixth well south of the Leadbetter Line near Sandtown…
Once again the engineers constructing the bridge directly across from the hamlet came under punishing fire from Confederate sharpshooters, primarily from the corps of Thomas Churchill, in command of the southern sector of the river defenses. Union artillery attempted to dislodge the sharpshooters, but the positions in the Leadbetter fortifications, which included fortified farm houses, rendered the fire from 40 guns mostly ineffective. Eventually Ord decided to send infantry landing parties over in the pontoon boats to secure bridgeheads and drive off the sharpshooters. Colonel Isaac C. Pugh of Illinois volunteered his brigade for this assignment at Lick Skillet. Colonel Milton Montgomery of Wisconsin led the crossing at Bethlehem Church…
General Jacob G. Lauman, commander IV Division XVI Corps and Pugh’s superior, was reluctant, lamenting to Pugh in front of his men that "the effort means death to most of those who should undertake the crossing." When his men responded to Pugh's request with three cheers, Lauman conceded and ordered the attack. At 3pm, the Union artillery began a preparatory bombardment and 239 infantrymen from the 15th and 32nd Illinois crowded into the small boats, and the 53rd followed soon after. The 15th were notable in that most of the men had responded several months previously to General Kearny’s personal plea to re-enlist for the duration of the war. Only a handful had accepted mustering out which had occurred but two weeks earlier…
The 32nd Illinois crossing in pontoon boats
Confederate firing increased to a towering crescendo of noise as many blue troops died in the river. “Had they more than a handful of artillery none of us would have survived” (Colonel George C. Rodgers 15th Illinois). The Lick Skillet crossing faced fire from Leadbetter posts 15, 16 and 17 manned by troops from the brigades of Brigadiers Colton Greene and Edmund Pettus. Their divisional commander, Ben Helm, had already ordered up his third brigade, Colonel Burbridge’s, as soon as the Union engineers had appeared on the riverbank…
The crossing at Lick Skillet was bloody failure. Many of the Illinois boys never made it to the rebel east bank, those that did found themselves subject to terrific small arms crossfire. Although many of the Union troops surrendered, fighting went on in isolated pockets for several hours. It was a soaking wet and bloodied Colonel Pugh who reported to General Lauman. Quietly confirming General Lauman was right Pugh expressed his regrets at not being “dead on the right side of the river with my men”…
Though less bloody Colonel Montgomery’s attack into the very teeth of half of Bushrod Johnson’s division was no less a failure. General Kimball of III Division had personally taken a hand in ensuring as many of Wisconsin’s sons a possible returned to the Union bank…
Grant’s grand crossing of the Chattahoochee was another failure. Twice the Union army had loudly announced its intention to cross and had failed in the face of robust Confederate responses…”
From “The Irish Corporal – The Life and Battles of Patrick Ronayne Cleburne” by James Fitzgerald Maguire
Trinity Press
“Grant had shifted his weight southwards and attacked twice, seeking to secure a crossing. Thomas Churchill had borne the brunt of the fighting so far. Opposing Cleburne in the northern sector was Joe Hooker’s Army of the Cumberland. Hooker’s army had been surprising lethargic during these engagements. The Yankee newspapers which still crossed the river comfortably where Grant could not, trumpeted another row between the ambitious Hooker and his superior Grant…
Paddy Cleburne could never be described as complacent but he neither mastered nor understood the intricacies of army politics. In many ways he was naïve about the effect of disagreement and professional rivalries, both as they concerned him, and as he observed them from outside. This led to the greatest error of his career. Assuming Hooker, “Huffer-in-Chief” according to pro-Grant Illinois newspapers, would sit out Grant’s next move, Cleburne agreed to send some of his troops to support Churchill in the southern sector. Once again Grant seemed to be shifting his weight further south, towards the southern end of the Leadbetter line…
In Cleburne’s defense Churchill had requested the transfer and Hardee had endorsed it. Off went Polignac’s small division along with 3 brigades of A.P. Stewart’s division. Cleburne kept one brigade, Otho Strahl’s as a reserve to support Withers’ and Smith’s divisions in the northern sector…”
From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999
“General Hooker had seen an opportunity in Grant’s defeats. Remaining closeted with his chief of staff Dan Butterfield and his chief of artillery William Barry they prepared their own plan for a crossing of the river by the Army of the Cumberland. General Hooker had one secret weapon – Brevet Major General George P. Buell. Known in the Army of the Cumberland as “The Great Pontoonier” Buell had perhaps accumulated more experience of river crossings, contested or otherwise, than any man in the Union army…
Buell had scouted an ideal spot for a pontoon bridge north of Cavalry Ford where the river had worn away a stretch of flat riverbank on the eastern shore before rising quickly, and steeply, to merge with the main line of the eastern bank. It was ideal for two reasons: Confederate positions were too far back to fire into the dead ground on the eastern bank, or for that matter observe it much; and it was close enough to Cavalry Ford such that a flanking force, breaking out could take the Leadbetter posts defending it in the rear. Buell had also perfected a pre-fabricated pontoon bridge in two parts which, he believed, could be put in position and secured in minutes…
General Hooker decided to commit his whole force to the attack. For reasons of security he failed to inform General Grant…”
From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004
“On the morning of June 27th, without a hint of a preparatory bombardment, engineers of the Army of the Cumberland raced out into the Chattahoochee under the personal supervision of George Buell to erect the pontoon bridge. At the same time Lovell Rousseau ordered John Turchin’s division to assault Cleburne’s main position head on at Cavalry Ford…
Patrick Cleburne’s attention was initially focused on Rousseau’s attack at Cavalry Ford against Manigault’s and Chalmers’ brigades. General Barry had managed to concentrate a reasonable proportion of the Army of the Cumberland's artillery without drawing too much attention. That was now being unleashed on the Leadbetter fortifications at Cavalry Ford as Turchin’s men raced forward…
Brigadier George H. Cram, son of Pennsylvania, officer of Kentucky
Brigadier General George H. Cram looked about with some surprise. The other brigade commanders who had set foot on the rebel bank at Pace’s Ferry and Lick Skillet had fallen in seconds. He led the first of Buell’s brigades to cross the river. Only with his whole brigade across did his skirmishers report rebels advancing on the bank. The race was on – Cram would need to get his brigade up the steep bank and hold it before the rebels arrived or they would be shot down from above like fish in a barrel and to make matters worse Cram could see General Richardson, commander of the XXI Corps, on the west bank preparing to cross at the head of Buell's second brigade…
Brigadier John K. Jackson, commanding a brigade in Preston Smith’s Division, was a veteran of many battles. He had distinguished himself at Pulaski and particularly in fighting all over the field at Elk River. Though he had sent an urgent runner to Cleburne he knew if he did not drive back the Union bridgehead the whole defensive line was lost. William Bate and his brigade was coming up slowly. He had to vacate the Leadbetter posts he manned, which gave no angle to fire on the Union bridgehead. It would take time for him to form up and join the attack. He knew not where Preston Smith was with Colonel Carter’s and Kelly’s brigades…
Brigadier John K. Jackson of Georgia
Jackson’s Georgia brigade would make the decisive attack, for good or ill, defending their own state. They were not completely alone. Lieutenant Colonel Peter Snyder, formerly of the Prussian Rhineland and Arkansas, commanded one of Cleburne’s special sharpshooter battalions which had been attached to Jackson’s command. Racing forward in a cloud to drive off the Union skirmishers who had already crested the steep bank, they covered Jackson’s attack…
Sword aloft Jackson roared to his troops “Our state will rise or fall on the outcome of this attack. Now Sons of Georgia: With me! Who will come with me?!” (Lieutenant Colonels Joseph S. Cone, 47th Georgia). With their trademark rebel yell eight Georgia regiments, banners unfurled, charged forward…”
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Great chapter TKI. Looks like the Confederates are in trouble.
I wonder if some historians will write that Grant's attacks were planned diversions for Hooker.....certainly Grant would have expected resistance at the crossing points he attacked.
I wonder if some historians will write that Grant's attacks were planned diversions for Hooker.....certainly Grant would have expected resistance at the crossing points he attacked.
For reasons of security. Right.
Mr Herbert Walter is quite the Hooker apologist. Eventually there will be a hell of a lot to apologize for!Although there is also a lot to legitimately praise. Joe Hooker is going to generate quite a bit of debate among historians...