Chapter Forty-Three
Hard Times for Hardee
Part I
The Heartlands Campaign Discussion Group at the 38th Annual Civil War Conference at Louisiana State University hosted by Professor Douglas Lee Bannerman...
"Today we are examining the often overlooked Heartland Campaign and the performance of the generals on both sides. The period of January through June 1863 in Tennessee is often overshadowed by the campaigns in Virginia and on the Mississippi, but in recent years the spotlight has more and more frequently been shone on Hardee and Rosecrans.
We will be looking at a campaign that included 5 major battles – Spring Hill, Williamsport, Mount Pleasant, Pulaski and Elk River. Joining me today in examining the campaign are:
Jones N. Keegan, historian, park guide and author of “The Battle of Shelbyville” and “First Light – The Battle of Spring Hill”;
C.M. Townsend, lecturer in 19th century history at MacArthur University, and author of “The Battle of Duck River” and “The Southern Trinity – Hardee, Cleburne and Churchill”;
James Fitzgerald Maguire, retired attorney, historian, and author of “The Irish Corporal – The Life of Patrick Ronayne Cleburne”, “The Irish in the Western Armies” and “The San Patricios Reborn”; and finally
Col. J.T. Starke (ret), author of “Army of the Heartland” and 7 regimental histories of units in both the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of Tennessee.
Hardee would go into this campaign with a substantially altered command structure following the Battle of Shelbyville/Duck River (I know Jones and Charles disagree to this day about the proper name for the battle). The death of Polk caused Hardee to split his army into three wings or corps: Cheatham’s Left (divisions of A.P.Stewart and Jones M.Withers), Cleburne’s Centre (divisions of Bushrod Johnson and Preston Smith) and Breckinridge’s Right (divisions of John P.McCown and Thomas James Churchill). Hardee’s promotion to full general had also been authorised by Congress after his recent successes.
Rosecrans had not altered his command structure after the Duck River Campaign but he had been joined by two divisions of the newly constituted XXIII Corps under William “Bull” Nelson as they rested at Spring Hill. A third division would soon join them.
Although the period in Tennessee had been good for the Army of Tennessee in terms of supplies (and particularly in horseflesh) there had been no widespread volunteerism, and although conscription had been enforced to an increasing degree in the Confederate controlled areas in Tennessee, the Confederate Army was still substantially outnumbered by the Army of the Cumberland.
Spring Hill
Gentlemen let’s start with the Battle of Spring Hill. Forrest’s cavalry sweeps across the Duck River pushing the Union cavalry back. What looks like just another Confederate cavalry raid in a long succession, is in fact cover for the Army of the Tennessee crossing the River in a lightening march on Rosecrans encamped army at Spring Hill. The Confederates surprise the Union army at dawn on the morning of 20 March 1863.
Crittenden’s XXI Corps is quickly scattered and put to flight in the course of less than an hour by Cleburne’s wing. Breckinridge manages to stampede Johnson’s Division of McCook’s XX Corps, and McCook is knocked unconscious in the rout. However Davis and Sheridan steady their commands and halt Breckinridge’s momentum. Finally Cheatham’s wing attacks the division of Lovell Rousseau, later than planned, and Rousseau, warned by the sounds of battle elsewhere, manages to form his brigades into a line of battle and fights a lone struggle until Thomas can get the other elements of XIV Corps into the fight. What in the early morning looks like a disaster for the Union, is a stalemate by midday, and with the arrival of elements of Nelson’s XXIII Corps turns into a Union victory in the afternoon.
Keegan – It's a classic case of over confidence among the rebel command. While I acknowledge Hardee’s tactical expertise, he was no strategist. The Battle of Spring Hill was not one the south could win. All the elements of Rosecrans’ army were in supporting distance of one another, which to date had not been the case on other battlefields. Hardee exposed his army to disaster with an over ambitious plan, all be it well executed, that left him with his back to the river.
Townsend – Firstly I don’t think you can either credit or blame Hardee for the notion of an aggressive move. His departmental commander, Bragg, had ordered an attack on Rosecrans to try to uncover Nashville following Hardee’s victories on the Duck River. Bragg was probably one of the most aggressive commanders the south had so I see him as the impetus for the move and his wirtten orders back up that conclusion.
I fundamentally disagree with Jones about the prospects for the move. Rosecrans had taken no serious precautions and had not entrenched. Both Cleburne’s and Breckenridge’s attacks put large elements of the Federals to flight. The failure generally can be attributed to the execution of Cheatham’s part of the plan. His delay on moving against Thomas corps, arguably the best led corps in Rosecrans’ army, allowed Rousseau to prevent any panic. Cheatham’s delay and Rousseau’s resolve changed the outcome of the battle. Spring Hill in my mind is a major lost opportunity for the rebels.
Starke – I have to agree with Jones that Spring Hill strategically was a step too far for the Confederates. The chances of their scoring a sufficiently decisive victory to permit the recapture of Nashville were minimal. Bear in mind that Rosecrans effectively had a full corps unengaged in reserve, Nelson's encamped well north of Spring Hill, as well as the garrison of the city.
On the other hand tactically Hardee performed very well indeed. The movement from Duck River to Spring Hill was fast and with little straggling among the troops. Forrest’s sweep of Union patrols and pickets meant that Rosecrans hadn’t an inkling of the approaching threat. The tactical plan for the assault itself was excellent. Cleburne achieved a success in the centre beyond all expectations. Breckinridge quickly achieved his initial objectives as well. On the day Rosecrans was saved, not by his three on-hand corps commanders, but by three divisional commanders – Lovell Rousseau, Phil Sheridan and “Union” Jeff Davis. Once the Union troops had halted Hardee’s momentum it became a game of numbers and the Army of the Cumberland was always going to win a numbers game.
Maguire - Yeah I thinks its important to focus on Rousseau here. This is where Rousseau makes his first big splash. Prior to Spring Hill he was really at bit of a footnote at Mount Vernon and at the Duck River. But in the words of some of his later political opponents Lovell Rousseau wrote his name large at Spring Hill "in the blood of his division". This battle and indeed the subsequent campaign were a significant launch pad for his return to Congress and his subsequent political career.
Starke - Going back to Rosecrans my big problems are with his initial failure to entrench his camps in the first place and his failure to immediately pursue Hardee when he began to withdraw. Certainly there was disorganisation in XXI Corps but Thomas’ and Nelson’s corps were fit to pursue the retreating rebels immediately. That 24 hour delay is unforgivable. At that point the battle might have been accounted a draw had not Rosecrans eventually let Nelson off the leash.
Yes let’s look at what happened next. As Hardee withdrew across the Duck River, Nelson was pleading with Rosecrans for a prompt pursuit of the rebels. Rosecrans gave the order: Nelson would lead with his two divisions, then Thomas, the largely recovered McCook would follow Thomas and finally Absalom Baird’s Division marching to join Nelson’s corps, which was expected hourly, was to bring up the rear. Crittenden claimed it would take at least two days to reorganise his formations.
Thomas however suggested he should follow Hardee closely but that Nelson and the others should swing wide and cross the Duck River at Williamsport. Rosecrans approved the plan. The next action would occur on 23 March 1863 as Nelson clashed with Forrest at Williamsport…"
. The other authors don't stick out as much.
