WI: Japanese discover oil in Manchuria

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Coal fields have large veins of coal. Coal bearing regions have it sparsely within the stone.

Think of the Cola Bearing as a creek where someone is panning for gold dust or nuggets. There is not allot there for a huge amount of work. Coal Fields are like huge gold veins, you find more in a smaller area for less work.

I do wonder if FDR would have allowed US Oil companies to help the Japanese develop these new Oil Fields if it was felt it would reduce most of the tensions in the Far East.

I don't think FDR had any real control over who the Us Oil Comapanies did business with. I think the better question is would the Imperial Japanese government want the USA to even have their hands in this pot.

While Japan having their own oil supply may ease the tension between the two nations (What good is an embargo, if the other guy has the embargoed item, now?) I can't see the Japanese asking for help. Even at this time the Japanese had very good engineers. These were guys, at least in regards to the military, who designed quaility machines rather than going for quantity. I think they would do rather well at starting up oil production in their mainland holdings.
 
A poster on Warships1 found this

Japanese oil hunting in Manchuria

Accession number;05A0526807 Title;Japanese oil hunting in Manchuria Author;KOMATSU NAOMOTO Journal Title;Journal of the Japanese Association for Petroleum Technology
Journal Code:G0188A
ISSN:0370-9868
VOL.70;NO.3;PAGE.250-258(2005) Figure&Table&Reference;FIG.6, TBL.1, REF.10 Pub. Country;Japan Language;Japanese Abstract;Japan hunted oil in Manchuria before World War II. In 1927 Japanese geologist found scattered asphalt in vugs of basalt and quaternary gravel deposits on the north western shore of Hulun Nur (lake), NW Manchuria. Geological Survey of China made a check survey of the area, and found the same asphalt in 1931. After establishment of Manchukuo, geological survey, tortion balance and refraction seismograph survey, and drilling were conducted during 1932-1941. One deep well (1,114m TD) and 21 core holes were drilled on the northern shore of the lake, but no potential oil were found. That the core hole drilled in Fuxin coal mine hit oil shows in 1938, led to extensive oil exploration program. Geological field party mapped a broad anticline located on east of Fuxin, and the core hole drilled on the anticline recovered some 30m thick sandstones (100-200m in depth) impregnating with oil. To explore this oil called on massive drilling campaign, and 47 or more wells were drilled on this anticline, but the reservoir quality was not good enough to establish commercial production. It is noteworthy to point out that the geologists engaged in Fuxin oil exploration thought that the oil came from Jurassic shales deposited in fresh water lake. In 1940 oil shows were found in the water wells near Chengde, and a one-month field check survey was conducted, and mapped a small anticline in Jurassic shales, but no further exploration was conducted. (author abst.)
 
There is evidence that in late '35'`early '36, the Senior Japanese Officers where trying to Rein in the more Militarist of the Junior officers.
[Whe have enuff problems, don't go opening another cans of worms to deal with]

If this was found in late '34 or early '35, it may help the Senior Officers.
If the military is pulled back from the borders to oversee this Oil discovery, there would be less chance of a accidental incident.

?What would a No Sino-Nipponese War in '36 China be like today?
 
Push the PoD back a few years. If Japan does have oil before she signs the Tripartite Pact, can the U.S. persuade her not to sign?
 
Finding Oil in Manchuria would not alter Imperial Japans strategic outlook.


True it may stop or delay a war with the Americans and Europeans, but it will not prevent the Japanese from Occupying French Indochina or engineering the Marco Polo bridge or Shanghai incident.

The 'advance south policy' came out of the fact that interdisciplinary rivalry between the navy and army came to ahead around 1936, the navy was incredibly frightened of the out of control military commanders in Manchuria getting Japan embroiled in a war between the Chinese and Russians.

Hence to steer the IJA away from the Russians they unilaterally began naval actions after the Marco Polo bridge incident to take Hannan island and Shanghai. These naval operations (and the supply to troops stationed here) is what brought about heavily oil usage, but at the time it wasn't 'critical'.

The trouble came when the IJN Occupied French Indochina, which sparked off a lot of anti-Japanese sentiment in Europe and America and what led to oil and Steel embargoes placed on Japan. This is when suddenly the American oil had been cut off, and so Japan had to go to war with America to return the oil supply for its navy to function and not leave loads of troops trapped in coastal regions of China.

At no point would gaining an oil supply in Manchuria have changed these outlooks.

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How well would have Imperial Japan faired against the Russians?

Firstly its not going to happen unless you butterfly away the IJN to a second rate department compared to the army.

For a scenario that Khalin Gol or similar escalates into full conflict, then the Japanese are fairly screwed since the majority of the army would have already been fighting the Chinese and the Russians would have been able to push deep into Manchuria (if they wanted to) before the Japanese regain the initiative.

If however there is no Chinese Marco Polo Bridge (or similar) then the question is a lot harder to answer.


In a war with only the Soviets the Japanese would have faired far better, they had comparative bombers, but while they lacked artillery batteries and tanks, this wasn't as huge an issue circa 1937. Japanese light infantry doctrine meant that although their units weren't well supported they could move fast and use the terrain more effectively.

This helps the Japanese on the defence because the Russian advance at this time will be slowed by having to bring up support equipment in very poor terrain.

Since this scenario precludes the IJA having preference we would likely quickly get an influx of light guns, and light bombers into the Japanese warmachine. The Japanese were fairly good at making artillery...god because the gun barrels were only just inside tolerances making them light for their calibres, they also had in general adopted the split and sprung carriages which allowed their guns to work as good as the day, particularly where roads did exsit.

The JAAF was also comparative to the European powers of the time, and also probally the most experienced airforce of the day.

Without the navy hogging material, the Japanese Airforce is going to see massive expansion since an aircraft can carry the firepower of the artillery without half the logistical issues.

This may prompt a form of 'heavy bomber development' in the medium to long term since obviously the Soviet east relies on the tarns-siberian railraod. Once the Japanese take that out of commission, the Soviets are fairly trapped. We may see instances like 'Stalingrad' but this time at Vladivostok, as the Japanese are able to isolate the city.

In the short term, the Soviets are favoured, but Japanese doctrine will favour them on the defence and in the long term aircraft development would allow the Japanese to strangle the eastern soviet armies. Thus it is on balance more likely to be a Japanese end victory...but fought across Manchuria without the Japanese being able to strongly push into the Stannovoys or Siberia. Thus the end result might be a return to the near status quo.


Of course the Chinese would likely backstab the Japanese and join with the Russians in the early war...in such a case Japan is lucky to hold onto Korea...but also that means that China goes communist (again).
 

SinghKing

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Bumping this (yes, this is a necro, but I felt it was better to do so than to start my own thread on the topic when a more established one already existed). How might this have altered Japan's strategic goals, along with those of the other major powers in the run-up to WW2?
 
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