WI: Hitler gives Rommel necessary supplies in 1942?

[MattII]

So you did not look up the Hendaye meeting, you know, the one between Hitler and Franco. This is disinterest - by you, for the real history. Good bye.

Depends if the Canaris meetings came first, because if they did, then they would have been important. Also, I believe Britain offered Franco a significant amount of money to stay neutral too.

 

[Michele]

Depends if the Canaris meetings came first, because if they did, then they would have been important. Also, I believe Britain offered Franco a significant amount of money to stay neutral too.

Look, the other poster stated:

"Hitler had such an aura of invincibility that if he went down to Spain and told Franco join me it would have happened."

The factual history tells us that Hitler did go down to Spain and told Franco join me, and it did not happen.

It's like stating "If, after the German invasion of Poland, France and Britain had issued an ultimatum to Germany, then Germany would have withdrawn from Poland".
It's real history that denies that.

British money and Canaris's behavior may have contributed to Franco's decision, but we're not discussing the reasons. The point isn't the why. The point is that Franco was faced, in real history, with a situation that the original poster wrongly supposes is hypothetical, and he took exactly the opposite stance that the original posters imagines he would take.

 

[jmc247]

Look, the other poster stated:

"Hitler had such an aura of invincibility that if he went down to Spain and told Franco join me it would have happened."

The factual history tells us that Hitler did go down to Spain and told Franco join me, and it did not happen.

After that aura was already busted by the Battle of Britain... like I said immediately after when the aura was still there.

The Battle of Britain cemented the British public behind the war, pushed the U.S. a great deal out of its neutrality and showed the world an incompetent the German Air Force leadership was and it didn't look good in regard to the Corporals military decision making either.

 

[RodentRevolution]

After that aura was already busted by the Battle of Britain... like I said immediately after when the aura was still there.

The Battle of Britain cemented the British public behind the war, pushed the U.S. a great deal out of its neutrality and showed the world an incompetent the German Air Force leadership was and it didn't look good in regard to the Corporals military decision making either.

But prior to the Battle of Britain Hitler's choice for top best buddy nation was Britain. You just have to study his Table Talk or Goebbels Diaries to see that his change in attitudes only occurred during in the Battle itself.

Even ignoring that why would Hitler at that point need Franco? Hitler only got involved in the Balkans and Africa to drag Mussolini's chestnuts out of the fire. Prior to that he thought he could win over or defeat Britain himself and then take down the USSR at leisure.

 

[MattII]

"Hitler had such an aura of invincibility that if he went down to Spain and told Franco join me it would have happened."

The factual history tells us that Hitler did go down to Spain and told Franco join me, and it did not happen.

Yes, but when did Canaris start meeting with Franco? See, that's a big deal because if Canaris met him first, then it's likely Canaris had some effect, and thus sans Canaris there's a small chance Franco does actually agree.

British money and Canaris's behavior may have contributed to Franco's decision, but we're not discussing the reasons. The point isn't the why. The point is that Franco was faced, in real history, with a situation that the original poster wrongly supposes is hypothetical, and he took exactly the opposite stance that the original posters imagines he would take.

Except we do actually need to know why to discuss the point properly.

 

[MalcontentRex]

The Nazis are screwed no matter what once the US is in the war.

 

[MattII]

The Nazis are screwed if they're not constantly expanding, because their economy is based on smash-and-grab.

 

[Michele]

Except we do actually need to know why to discuss the point properly.

Except I disagree. If we were discussing the merits of the issue, yes, we'd need to know the reasons, and yes, what had happened before, including with Canaris, would be relevant.

But what I am objecting to, and while I'm not surprised that the original poster doesn't see that, I'm surprised that it's difficult for you, too, is the very logic of this.

"If Britain and France had issued an ultimatum to Germany right after the invasion of Poland, Germany would have withdrawn the troops from Poland".

Don't you see what's wrong with that? We could discuss why Germany did not, in actual history, do that at all, sure. But we cannot discuss what would have happened if France and Britain had issued such an ultimatum as if this were a counterfactual hypothesis because it is not, it's what really happened. And much less can we hypothesize the outcome of such an ultimatum as being a German withdrawal, because real history tells us no.
The reasons why Germany did not withdraw, evidently, are neither here nor there, when it comes to being able to recognize the obvious fact that the above is not a counterfactual hypothesis, a what-if - it's what actually happened, and on top of that, exactly because it happened, we know perfectly well what would happen.

As to the secondary issue of having the Hendaye meeting in June, that would indeed be a legitimat what-if. But exactly because Britain had not even, at the time, being directly attacked, the chances that Franco would behave differently are non-extant. Franco would be even more aware than in October (a time when we know the Battle of Britain was over, BTW, but it was not so evident back then) that the British presence on the seas was as strong as always, able to choke and starve Spain in six months tops. So, no.

 

[MattII]

Except I disagree. If we were discussing the merits of the issue, yes, we'd need to know the reasons, and yes, what had happened before, including with Canaris, would be relevant.

But what I am objecting to, and while I'm not surprised that the original poster doesn't see that, I'm surprised that it's difficult for you, too, is the very logic of this.

"If Britain and France had issued an ultimatum to Germany right after the invasion of Poland, Germany would have withdrawn the troops from Poland".

Except we're discussing what if Hitler can convince Franco, which is quite different. Yes Franco said 'no' to Hitler IOTL, but without knowing why he said no (was it just natural caution, or had other players made their marks?), it's kind of difficult to figure out whether his refusal is immutable, as you suppose, or could be different in an alternate history.

Don't you see what's wrong with that? We could discuss why Germany did not, in actual history, do that at all, sure. But we cannot discuss what would have happened if France and Britain had issued such an ultimatum as if this were a counterfactual hypothesis because it is not, it's what really happened. And much less can we hypothesize the outcome of such an ultimatum as being a German withdrawal, because real history tells us no.

So you're suddenly unwilling to accept that certain issues could have gone another way?

The reasons why Germany did not withdraw, evidently, are neither here nor there, when it comes to being able to recognize the obvious fact that the above is not a counterfactual hypothesis, a what-if - it's what actually happened, and on top of that, exactly because it happened, we know perfectly well what would happen.

The reasons why Germany didn't withdraw are pretty evident, Hitler was a vengeful madman, and since he and his cronies were in charge, they weren't pulling out.

As to the secondary issue of having the Hendaye meeting in June, that would indeed be a legitimat what-if. But exactly because Britain had not even, at the time, being directly attacked, the chances that Franco would behave differently are non-extant. Franco would be even more aware than in October (a time when we know the Battle of Britain was over, BTW, but it was not so evident back then) that the British presence on the seas was as strong as always, able to choke and starve Spain in six months tops. So, no.

Except that in June Germany would have been coming off the back of not one, but two major victories, Norway and France, the former at least partly a naval action. In June too, it wasn't proven that Britain would be able to resist the Germans in the air. Also, again, we have to know why he said 'no' in October (besides, obviously, the BoB going to the British) to figure out whether or not he could be convinced in June.

 

[RodentRevolution]

Except we're discussing what if Hitler can convince Franco, which is quite different. Yes Franco said 'no' to Hitler IOTL, but without knowing why he said no (was it just natural caution, or had other players made their marks?), it's kind of difficult to figure out whether his refusal is immutable, as you suppose, or could be different in an alternate history.

The reason Michele is arguing that it is unlikely that Franco would behave differently is based on the publicly available information at the time and the record of Franco's decision making. We can examine the whys in detail in fact Michele has already mentioned a big part of the why. While we shall never know it is possible to assign a probability to a particular outcome.

So you're suddenly unwilling to accept that certain issues could have gone another way?

Until you demonstrate evidence for your position why should anybody? Especially when they can point to evidence that indeed no Franco's decision most likely would have remained the same.

The reasons why Germany didn't withdraw are pretty evident, Hitler was a vengeful madman, and since he and his cronies were in charge, they weren't pulling out.

Well the thing about being in charge is that it is always a careful balancing act. You are only in charge so long as sufficient people decide to take your orders. There were other factors as to why Germany did not withdraw. Hitler may have been a vengeful madman but Poland was not high on his hit list in that regard.

Driving matters was his general desire for war. He was however able to sell the plan to his generals and senior officials because he could point to the necessity of Poland's resources in maintaining Germany's rearmament program without which Germany would appear to be vulnerable to soon to be better armed foes. He also ahd a track record of avoiding war with the great powers so many in the regime believed any war could be kept limited to Poland. Once war actually started the need was to secure at least one front the better to be able to focus on the West.

There are normally a lot of reasons why a national leader does something, the greater the risk involved normally the more reasons there have to be to justify it.

Except that in June Germany would have been coming off the back of not one, but two major victories, Norway and France, the former at least partly a naval action. In June too, it wasn't proven that Britain would be able to resist the Germans in the air. Also, again, we have to know why he said 'no' in October (besides, obviously, the BoB going to the British) to figure out whether or not he could be convinced in June.

Germany had narrowly avoided being starved of supplies of iron ore and had beaten a corrupt French regime on land, something which had happened before without Britain going down. You might recall Napoleonic history, the French made a habit of beating Britain's continental allies and it did not do any good. Nappy had then invaded Spain which Franco would know very well from his history did not turn out too well and then when that still did not beat Britain invaded Russia.

Franco knows his history, he knows what happened last time a would be conqueror came to Spain and said, "Let's make war on England!" You need to have something more to persuade him to gamble. So he would have asked for concessions from Germany. Depending on how likely he thought Germany's chance of winning without him the stiffer these would be, Hitler would essentially have been coming to Franco as a supplicant.

Being anyone's supplicant was not an experience Hitler enjoyed. See above in this thread for Alan Bullock's assessment of Hitler's feeling of the Hendaye meeting for example.

 

[MattII]

Until you demonstrate evidence for your position why should anybody? Especially when they can point to evidence that indeed no Franco's decision most likely would have remained the same.

Except we don't know what Franco's decision was based on. Had Canaris visited him already and placed doubt in his mind? Had the money from the British gone through?

Well the thing about being in charge is that it is always a careful balancing act. You are only in charge so long as sufficient people decide to take your orders. There were other factors as to why Germany did not withdraw. Hitler may have been a vengeful madman but Poland was not high on his hit list in that regard.

Russia was though, and Poland was in the way. Plus there was the whole corridor thing, which was also high on the list.

Germany had narrowly avoided being starved of supplies of iron ore and had beaten a corrupt French regime on land, something which had happened before without Britain going down.

Yes, and? Hitler had won in France with a force much smaller than that of his opponents, and had left Britain with precious little equipment for its now mostly disarmed troops.

You might recall Napoleonic history, the French made a habit of beating Britain's continental allies and it did not do any good. Nappy had then invaded Spain which Franco would know very well from his history did not turn out too well and then when that still did not beat Britain invaded Russia.

Napoleon didn't have trucks trains or aircraft though.

Franco knows his history, he knows what happened last time a would be conqueror came to Spain and said, "Let's make war on England!" You need to have something more to persuade him to gamble. So he would have asked for concessions from Germany.

How about Gambia, Sierra Leone and Southern Cameroons?

Of course, the question then comes, exactly what Hitler gets out of the whole thing? Sure there's Wolfram (albeit mostly from Portugal), and maybe a few U-Boat bases. Other than that though, Spain is in a pretty poor state. Oh, and when does Spain declare war, right now, or do they wait until the 11th hour as Mussolini did in France?

 

[RodentRevolution]

Except we don't know what Franco's decision was based on. Had canaris visited him already and placed doubt in his mind? Had the money from the British gone through?

Actually my point is that we do know a lot of the factors that influence Franco's decision. Not all of them I grant you but enough to know that Canaris's arguments probably reinforced rather than replaced his own conception of the world in 1940.

Russia was though, and Poland was in the way. Plus there was the whole corridor thing, which was also high on the list.

Exactly when judging the way decisions will fall look for lots of reasons to do something not just one and then balance those against any imperatives against not doing that.

Yes, and? Hitler had won in France with a force much smaller than that of his opponents, and had left Britain with precious little equipment for its now mostly disarmed troops.

Well you might want to look at the Spanish Embassy in London's assessment of Britain's state of disarmament. The fact is we know that Britain was not disarmed. In fact the forces in Britain were far stronger than the BEF. There were some thirty nine divisions all motorised in Britain by September. There were line after line of fortifications. There were some seven hundred fighters alone plus bombers which would get about 10% of the landing barges before they moved back to Germany and the Baltic as was.

Then of course there was the Royal Navy, which vastly outnumbered the German Kriegsmarine and would continue to have the edge in deployable ships even if the Italian and French navies came on board, both of which are bigger than Spain meaning that they could get to ask for more than Spain for the same risk.

Napoleon didn't have trucks trains or aircraft though.

Which in some ways made his job easier and Spain had a bigger navy to bring to the table, in fact Spain had a big Navy which it does not in the C20th and it got even smaller as a result of losses in the Civil War. Spain's Navy cannot protect its coasts and trade from the British and Germany's Navy cannot protect its coasts and trade from the British and Italy's Navy has a tough enough time protecting its own coasts and communications links with Libya.

How about Gambia, Sierra Leone and Southern Cameroons?

Well is there any evidence that he wanted those? I will need to go back and read but my recollection is the territories that Franco asked for came out of the French Empire but that may have been him playing the ass while seeming to entertain Hitler's ideas.

Remember that Spain is taking an awfully big gamble here. The British can hurt Spanish trade which is not going to make Franco popular with his power base. Worse they and the Americans could decide to bring Portugal into the war. That means the land war will take place in Spain...again.

Also take into account that most observers knew which way the Americans were leaning and also knew that American economic power made them dangerous even when they were not in the fight. So while I understand you may be throwing out the above colonies as hypotheticals you need try and asses how they balance up against the risks in Franco's mind and in the minds of his subordinates because he ruled by being the lynch pin of competing factions in Spain so has to avoid alienating too many of them.

 

[RodentRevolution]

Of course, the question then comes, exactly what Hitler gets out of the whole thing? Sure there's Wolfram (albeit mostly from Portugal), and maybe a few U-Boat bases. Other than that though, Spain is in a pretty poor state. Oh, and when does Spain declare war, right now, or do they wait until the 11th hour as Mussolini did in France?

Ah my post crossed over this bit. Indeed you are now looking at the why would Germany go looking to Spain before the Battle of Britain? Indeed the amount Spain can bring to the table is rather minimal. Indeed there is an argument that Spain served Germany better by staying neutral as a counter-weight to Portugal thereby keeping them out of the Allied camp, with gains to Germany as you pointed out above.

 

[Magnum]

There were some thirty nine divisions all motorised in Britain by September.

I find this very hard to believe. Do you have a source for this?

On a different note, it's funny how a discussion about the Panzerarmee Afrika in 1942 turned into one about Hendaye in 1940.


Lastly, regarding Spain's troubles had it joined the axis, I will just say a couple of thoughts:

- the British were in no position to invade the Canaries or Spanish Morocco faster than the axis could reinforce them
- Italian assets will no longer have to cover the western approaches to Italy thanks to Gibraltar being shut down, putting increased pressure on the British in the eastern Med
- a naval blockade of Spain would by no means be watertight in the early months of its participation, especially with the RN having as its 3 main priorities (1) deterring Sealion; (2)defending Atlantic convoys and (3)defending Egypt
- the gradual shutting down of Spanish overseas trade can be compensated (for about a year) by increased trade with the USSR, as Stalin was giving everything (short of actual territory) the Germans wanted at really bargain prices
- Portugal is not suicidal and is not going to declare war against anyone
- Once their built-up stockpile is consumed, sometime in early 1942, Spain will experience critical shortages of food and petrol, though I doubt it's going to be so severe as to bring down state structures
- With the axis having super-safe supply lines in the eastern Med, TTL's Op. Torch equivalent will probably take place somewhere safer, such as Dakar and/or Spanish Sahara, delaying the Allied timetable massively
- OTL, once Sicilly was taken, Allied shipping no longer had to go around Africa. TTL, they will continue to have this problem well in '44 at the earliest, meaning some operations (probably in the Pacific) will suffer as a result

 

[thaddeus]

as to Spain (and Franco) there was a point at which he seemed ready to enter the war but (logically) was trying to extract maximum benefit. but follow the timeline and the attacks on Vichy France at Algeria and Dakar occurred and, especially at Dakar, the Vichy forces resisted.

by the time of Hitler-Franco meeting the Vichy regime looked like a more important (?) not ally, maybe CONSIDERATION is correct term, and one important request from Franco was for Morocco.

with that consideration of Vichy regime, maybe the agreement to sign would be Paris Protocols, part of which would allow Axis to use port of Tunis (doesn't solve all supply problems but would have helped.)

 

[Imladrik]

Franco never wanted to enter the war. By 1940 the country still wasn't pacified, he was reliant on foreign important and actually wanted to keep his power. Franco always purposedly required a price so high for his participation in the war that it would be a net loss to Hitler. A Spanish entry in the war would cost Germany French Morocco, and probably French West Africa and a part of Algeria which was a big no no for Hitler (he knew that the French generals of French North Africa were actually ready to continue the war, and at this point, there is no equivalent forces in North Africa to the French ones).

 

[RodentRevolution]

I find this very hard to believe. Do you have a source for this?

I realise I am going to have dig, I need to make sure myself I am not counting yet to be activated divisions however my figure is far from impossible as of June 18 1940

2. The number of men in the Army at Home today, including
Dominion troops is about 1,313,000, made up as follows:-
Field Army Troops ex B.E.F.- 275,000
" " " in U.K. 320,000
Air Defence 151,000
Coast Defence 13,000
Home Defence Battalions 42,6000
Holding Battalions (under disposal instructions to make up Field Force Units) 49,000
Training Units (half to make up Field Force Units) 365,000
Misc. Establishments 59,400
Canadians 22,000
Australians and New Zeaianders 16,000
Grand Total 1,313,000*
The average monthly intake is just under 50,000 under the
National Service Act, and about 27,000 volunteers.

* '
Note. From the point of view of immediate use it must be
realised that apart from the 90,000 about to be called
up, Air Defence of Great Britain and coast defence
amount to 164,000 while some 150,000 of the grand
total have less than two months service. The total
figure includes 45,000 R.A.M.C. , 45,000 RAOC*,
and 130,000 R.A.S.C , who are not trained to fight.

From CAB 66/8/40

Which is viewable from the National Archives here

There is sufficient manpower for my claim but I will be the first to admit that manpower does not equate automatically to organisation and equipment. I will keep digging.

On a different note, it's funny how a discussion about the Panzerarmee Afrika in 1942 turned into one about Hendaye in 1940.

Not really a surprise the Axis were painfully weak in the Med, they were just lucky that the Allies were not sufficiently stronger enough to go on the offensive for so long.

Lastly, regarding Spain's troubles had it joined the axis, I will just say a couple of thoughts:

- the British were in no position to invade the Canaries or Spanish Morocco faster than the axis could reinforce them [1]
- Italian assets will no longer have to cover the western approaches to Italy thanks to Gibraltar being shut down, putting increased pressure on the British in the eastern Med [2]
- a naval blockade of Spain would by no means be watertight in the early months of its participation, especially with the RN having as its 3 main priorities (1) deterring Sealion; (2)defending Atlantic convoys and (3)defending Egypt [3]
- the gradual shutting down of Spanish overseas trade can be compensated (for about a year) by increased trade with the USSR, as Stalin was giving everything (short of actual territory) the Germans wanted at really bargain prices [4]
- Portugal is not suicidal and is not going to declare war against anyone [5]
- Once their built-up stockpile is consumed, sometime in early 1942, Spain will experience critical shortages of food and petrol, though I doubt it's going to be so severe as to bring down state structures [6]
- With the axis having super-safe supply lines in the eastern Med, TTL's Op. Torch equivalent will probably take place somewhere safer, such as Dakar and/or Spanish Sahara, delaying the Allied timetable massively [7]
- OTL, once Sicilly was taken, Allied shipping no longer had to go around Africa. TTL, they will continue to have this problem well in '44 at the earliest, meaning some operations (probably in the Pacific) will suffer as a result[8]

My bolded numbder in parenthesis

[1] Is highly disputable, it is not that the British would or could invade fast but their blockade would go into effect straight away.

[2] Not only is it not a given that Gibraltar a powerful fortress reinforced by sea would fall but this would still leave British bases in Malta and Cyprus and Egypt, if the British could not always stop Axis submarines slipping through the Straits there is no reason to assume the Axis will do any better with less resources to cover the wider gaps in the Med.

[3] This is both true and irrelevant...the attrition rate against Spanish shipping would likely put pressure on ship owners to keep their vessels at home long before the British swept them all up or sank them. Remember it is not simply as they approach the Iberian coast they will be vulnerable but as they exit neutral waters anywhere and indeed inside the neutral water of states dependent on the British or American economies which basically means all of South America.

[4] Difficult. Sea trade will need to be replaced by rail transport across Germany who already have their own rail system under pressure to support their own war effort. Worth a look to see how much could be achieved but there are great physical difficulties even before you get to the economic ones

[5] Portugal would not be committing suicide. The terrain of Portugal is conductive to its defence, that is why there is still a Portugal today. Keeping in with the US and UK is very important to its long term future. Germany would need to allocate considerable force to any operation. Even then it is not a certainty they would prove triumphant. There are given the road and rail resources in Spain a limit to the numbers Germany can commit. A lot of course would depend on when Portugal came in cf your point [7]

[6] This true Spain would not simply go down to blockade however there would be internal politcal consequences for Franco short of state collapse.

[7] Until you can find a source proving to me that Cyprus does not exist I will question the existence of these hypothetical 'super-safe' supply lines. Further if Spain had entered the war there would now be a safer target than French North Africa, Iberia. If Portugal is to come in to the war...which it would ultimately in OTL that would be a very effective time for it to do so. Worse this scenario could in fact very well bring forwards the Torch landings.

There are a lot of factors that would decide when best to force Portugal in with the Good Guys™ but any time after the commencement of Barborossa is good and it may well have been possible before then (I do have to be careful how gungho I am on Portugal and Britain resisting pre-barb not so much post barb and not at all once the US is active).

[8] The Pacific can be delayed it was never the primary front but you cannot be sure that it would be. With Germany potentially facing a war on the continent earlier Italy could well swing alliances sooner. Further there would be less need to divide sea lift between D-Day and the Med than in OTL.

There is of course a lot of speculation as to exact outcomes but in general a non-neutral Spain adds to Germany's defensive woes in the west.

 

[MattII]

Actually my point is that we do know a lot of the factors that influence Franco's decision. Not all of them I grant you but enough to know that Canaris's arguments probably reinforced rather than replaced his own conception of the world in 1940.

But in June the Luftwaffe weren't beaten the way they were in October.

Well you might want to look at the Spanish Embassy in London's assessment of Britain's state of disarmament. The fact is we know that Britain was not disarmed. In fact the forces in Britain were far stronger than the BEF. There were some thirty nine divisions all motorised in Britain by September. There were line after line of fortifications. There were some seven hundred fighters alone plus bombers which would get about 10% of the landing barges before they moved back to Germany and the Baltic as was.

Then of course there was the Royal Navy, which vastly outnumbered the German Kriegsmarine and would continue to have the edge in deployable ships even if the Italian and French navies came on board, both of which are bigger than Spain meaning that they could get to ask for more than Spain for the same risk.

True, which I suppose means Franco would be cautious, but might promise an eleventh-hour declaration, say, to support Germany once they've secured the land zones or something.

Well is there any evidence that he wanted those? I will need to go back and read but my recollection is the territories that Franco asked for came out of the French Empire but that may have been him playing the ass while seeming to entertain Hitler's ideas.

Spain's territories at the time were a norther strip of Morroco, Western Sahara and Equatorial Guinea, so those territories would make their chain down western Africa more complete.

I don't think it would ever come to much mind, perhaps an agreement for an eleventh-hour DoW, once Germany's already got a secure foothold in Britain, and some troops for the occupation (to relieve German forces to go into Russia), but since that's not going to happen...