British Republic
Banned
I mean to compensate nearly all of BNA, they might want to compensate the loss by focusing more on RDP, including the establishment of a colony, I mean the loyalists need to go somewhere.
Why did Britain stay out of the American Civil War?
- Thread starter Emperor Palpatine
- Start date
I mean to compensate nearly all of BNA, they might want to compensate the loss by focusing more on RDP, including the establishment of a colony, I mean the loyalists need to go somewhere.
British Republic
Banned
How do you think I got a "Wanked" USA
Anyway what I did was that with Quebec Act that is basically extending the Irish Penal Laws they openly back the Patriots, butterfies mean that NS also join.
As for Ruperts Land and Columbia Territory well they were lost later on.
Agreed, the Brits knew full well MOST US states were Free States while ALL CSA states were slave states.
TFSmith121
Banned
Yep, there is that...
Yep, there is that...
One point on the "the Union wasn't fighting slavery until after the Emancipation Proclamation and so the British could have intervened" meme:
Any thoughtful observer would have picked up on the realities of the First Confiscation Act (August 8, 1861) and the Second (July 17, 1862); the entrance of Kansas as a free state in January, 1861, after the internal conflict of Bleeding Kansas should have made it clear what the realities were going to be... any reading that slavery was not going to be diminished, if not prohibited, as a result of the war was an intentionally "mistaken" interpretation on the part of individuals with intentions that had nothing to do with slavery; far from it.
Best,
But, but, but, in Victoria I can scoop up colonies and raise armies to conquer Europe
Yep, there is that...
One point on the "the Union wasn't fighting slavery until after the Emancipation Proclamation and so the British could have intervened" meme:
Any thoughtful observer would have picked up on the realities of the First Confiscation Act (August 8, 1861) and the Second (July 17, 1862); the entrance of Kansas as a free state in January, 1861, after the internal conflict of Bleeding Kansas should have made it clear what the realities were going to be... any reading that slavery was not going to be diminished, if not prohibited, as a result of the war was an intentionally "mistaken" interpretation on the part of individuals with intentions that had nothing to do with slavery; far from it.
Best,
Britannia's fist
About 7 years ago peter g. Tsouras started a trilogy called Britannia's Fist, which dealt with not only England but also France joining the war on the side of the south. The third and final book coming out in less than two weeks.
What brought it about was a Naval action between two union warships and two British warships over the capture of one of the Laird rams that were being built by the British for the Confederacy. This particular one was the C.S.S. North Carolina. The battle ended with the destruction of both British warship the scuttling of the North Carolina and the sinking of one of the Union warships. This took place in late 1863. Because of the loss of so many British sailors the British government declared war, followed by France. So far I have enjoyed the books and look forward to the third one when it comes out.
About 7 years ago peter g. Tsouras started a trilogy called Britannia's Fist, which dealt with not only England but also France joining the war on the side of the south. The third and final book coming out in less than two weeks.
What brought it about was a Naval action between two union warships and two British warships over the capture of one of the Laird rams that were being built by the British for the Confederacy. This particular one was the C.S.S. North Carolina. The battle ended with the destruction of both British warship the scuttling of the North Carolina and the sinking of one of the Union warships. This took place in late 1863. Because of the loss of so many British sailors the British government declared war, followed by France. So far I have enjoyed the books and look forward to the third one when it comes out.
TFSmith121
Banned
Haven't read it, but points to Col. Tsouras for a different POD:
Haven't read it, but points to Col. Tsouras for a different POD...
The problem is, of course, that any single departure would never be enough; even the British at their most deluded understood the realities of the situation, how much was at stake, and how little they could gain.
The idea the French, while neck deep in the Fangoso Grande, supporting the Italians, and facing the Prussians, would dive headlong into yet another conflict seems very a-historical.
The French supposedly said all sorts of things to urge the British to fight to the last Canuck and Newfie, but you'll notice they had no more intention to wade in than anyone else did...
Best,
Haven't read it, but points to Col. Tsouras for a different POD...
The problem is, of course, that any single departure would never be enough; even the British at their most deluded understood the realities of the situation, how much was at stake, and how little they could gain.
The idea the French, while neck deep in the Fangoso Grande, supporting the Italians, and facing the Prussians, would dive headlong into yet another conflict seems very a-historical.
The French supposedly said all sorts of things to urge the British to fight to the last Canuck and Newfie, but you'll notice they had no more intention to wade in than anyone else did...
Best,
Haven't read it, but points to Col. Tsouras for a different POD...
The problem is, of course, that any single departure would never be enough; even the British at their most deluded understood the realities of the situation, how much was at stake, and how little they could gain.
The idea the French, while neck deep in the Fangoso Grande, supporting the Italians, and facing the Prussians, would dive headlong into yet another conflict seems very a-historical.
The French supposedly said all sorts of things to urge the British to fight to the last Canuck and Newfie, but you'll notice they had no more intention to wade in than anyone else did...
Best,
Not to mention someone must have handed Lincoln or at least the USN the idiot ball for the US to take on the RN in the first place!
Another thing to consider is that the Taiping Rebellion is going on at the same time. China was an even bigger trade market for Britain at the time, and they chose to intervene there. The only way I could see Britain get involved in the Civil War is to either have the Confederates win a major victory in the North, or to have the Taiping Rebellion never happen or be done with by 1862
TFSmith121
Banned
Dunno how Tsouras sets it up;
Dunno how Tsouras sets it up; I have tried to avoid reading his work because I don't want to overlap in BROS.
Best,
Dunno how Tsouras sets it up; I have tried to avoid reading his work because I don't want to overlap in BROS.
Best,
***
On the matter of wheat, see my post at https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/zLZg6EzfPps/W5SwgLfuUKkJ where I note
Interestingly, Owsley, despite his rejection of the wheat thesis, shared
the economic determinism of his time (the original edition of *King Cotton
Diplomacy* was published in 1931). (He rejected the notion that anti-
slavery sentiment among the British working classes was responsible for
non-intervention, arguing that they were far from unanimous on the war,
and that in any event they mostly could not vote, nor was there much
danger of insurrection.) He wrote that "One must admit the correctness of
the principle laid down by the economic interpretation group of
historians, namely that in order to counteract one economic impulse
another stronger economic motive is necessary. But it is difficult to see
that wheat was a strong element in the economic impulse which counteracted
the King Cotton impulse. It is proposed to substitute a much more
sinister term for wheat--'war profits.'" Here, obviously, Owsley had the
experience of the Great War in mind (and indeed says so). Anyway, he
ticks off (pp. 549-57 of the second, 1959, edition) a list of economic
interests that profited by a continuation of the war:
"Perhaps the most surprising of the war profits was in the cotton industry
itself. [Prior to the war] the warehouses of India, China, and of
England...had a surplus... The mills were already beginning to slow down
before the war...Then the Civil War came as if in answer to a prayer and
cut off the supply of cheap cotton. The price of raw cotton rose from
fourteen cents to sixty, and as time passed the surplus manufactured goods
followed...In the meantime, the larger and well-financed mills continued
to manufacture goods and hold against the rising markets. These larger
mills...not merely made a profit out of this vast surplus of cheap pre-war
goods, but managed a neat profit on their output over the four years of
war. The only people who went down were the small mill-owners and the
cotton operatives. They lost all they had. But the industry was saved
from one of the worst panics in history, and impending ruin turned into
undreamt-of profits....There is another phase of the cotton profits which
must not be overlooked, namely the development of India as a rival source
of raw cotton...The next great sources of profits are closely related to
the cotton industry--the profits which were reaped from the linen and
woolen industries, the old rivals of cotton...Another business which
prospered mightily during war conditions was the munitions industry...Nor
does [this figure] include the sale of ships and steamers to the
Confederacy or the building of steamers for English blockade-runners.
This last item is of great importance, for it stimulated very greatly the
shipbuilding industry...But the greatest profit of all, one which was so
enormous it cannot be measured in dollars and cents, was made possible by
the complete destruction of the American merchant marine directly or
indirectly by the Confederate privateers and cruisers...We see, therefore,
that England far from being hag-ridden by poverty during the American
Civil War made enormous material profits." Owsley quotes *The Times*
(January 7, 1864) as saying:
"Outside of Lancashire it would not be known that anything had occurred to
injure the national trade. That is the most extraordinary and surprising
incident of the story. An industry which we conceived to be essential to
our commercial greatness has been utterly prostrated, without affecting
the greatness in any perceptible degree. We are as busy, as rich, and as
fortunate in our trade as if the American war had never broken out, and
our trade with the states had never been disturbed. Cotton was no king,
notwithstanding the prerogatives which had been loudly claimed for him."
Except it wasn't
Well that would be nice save for Radical Republicans in Congress decrying the Lincoln administration for not doing enough towards emancipation in these early years (a sentiment shared by British abolitionists) and the fact that the Lincoln administration had explicitly dismissed a noted abolitionist general (John C. Fremont) for making an emancipation proclamation of his own. Nor were they interfering at all with the rights of loyal slave owners.
The fact is that none of the the confiscation acts were overt moves towards emancipation. Even Lincoln's early issuing of the Emancipation Proclamation led to Punch releasing this little cartoon depicting it as an act of desperation:
And as you could well note from robcraufurd's posted quotes, that men like Gladstone and Russell certainly are aware of slavery, (and these men are not idiots or anything but thoughtful observers) and discussed it, but with all these attendant facts you mention, do not arrive at the conclusion that the North is fighting to end slavery versus contain it.
Which is a far cry from what the British public would have been comfortable with.
As nice as it is to look back on history with hindsight it's pretty thoughtless to say that the Union was explicitly fighting for abolition or even the ending of slavery at the juncture in the war. One can pretty easily go back and see that Lincoln's thoughts on the matter were clearly evolving in the time period from his earlier views in 1858 at his argument with Douglas and see that his thoughts on the matter are changing, but not nearly quick enough as abolitionists at home or abroad would like.
Well that would be nice save for Radical Republicans in Congress decrying the Lincoln administration for not doing enough towards emancipation in these early years (a sentiment shared by British abolitionists) and the fact that the Lincoln administration had explicitly dismissed a noted abolitionist general (John C. Fremont) for making an emancipation proclamation of his own. Nor were they interfering at all with the rights of loyal slave owners.
The fact is that none of the the confiscation acts were overt moves towards emancipation. Even Lincoln's early issuing of the Emancipation Proclamation led to Punch releasing this little cartoon depicting it as an act of desperation:
And as you could well note from robcraufurd's posted quotes, that men like Gladstone and Russell certainly are aware of slavery, (and these men are not idiots or anything but thoughtful observers) and discussed it, but with all these attendant facts you mention, do not arrive at the conclusion that the North is fighting to end slavery versus contain it.
Which is a far cry from what the British public would have been comfortable with.
As nice as it is to look back on history with hindsight it's pretty thoughtless to say that the Union was explicitly fighting for abolition or even the ending of slavery at the juncture in the war. One can pretty easily go back and see that Lincoln's thoughts on the matter were clearly evolving in the time period from his earlier views in 1858 at his argument with Douglas and see that his thoughts on the matter are changing, but not nearly quick enough as abolitionists at home or abroad would like.
The idea the French, while neck deep in the Fangoso Grande, supporting the Italians, and facing the Prussians, would dive headlong into yet another conflict seems very a-historical.
The French supposedly said all sorts of things to urge the British to fight to the last Canuck and Newfie, but you'll notice they had no more intention to wade in than anyone else did...
Yup Napoleon the one who pushed for recognition harder than Great Britain, gave just as much in terms of material gain and political/financial support to the Confederacy (and somehow the Union believed Napoleon was partial to them
) despite Sewards stated intention to declare war on a power that recognized the CSA would never have acted in a manner that would get him involved Though funny that Napoleon is facing down Prussia roughly six years early, before Bismarck has risen to power and taken care of Austria or had his diplomatic coup which isolated France...
Hmm interesting. I have noted the 'King Wheat" argument referenced in passing in many works, which they say Union grain was more important than Confederate cotton, but I've never seen anything more than it being an assumption.
The arguments here certainly seem to cast doubt on the matter. And to be truthful I've seen the British reference their concern over Southern cotton, but have not yet seen a quote from the time where politicians mention Northern grain.
Orsino
Banned
The british could not intervene on the side of the Confederacy because the british didn't want to support slavery.
The british could not intervene on the side of the Union because the british didn't want to support the maintenance of the Union through force.
Therefore the british could not intervene full stop.
As is so often the case with civil wars, there was no simple compelling moral argument for intervention; the Confederacy may have supported the continuation of slavery but the Union wasn't selling the war as a war to end slavery but rather as a war to save the union, and the british were queasy about the idea of helping the USA maintain its territorial integrity through force of arms.
And as to the idea that the british might intervene to reduce American power and forestall the rise of the USA: the british political classes were neither that prophetic nor that foolhardy and cynically opportunistic.
In the absence of a compelling national interest or moral argument the british were never going to go to war just to try and knock bits of the USA for the sake of it.
I won't even address the idea of the british trying to occupy and reintegrate parts of the USA in the 1860s since it is patently absurd and would not have been seriously considered by any leader of the time.
The british could not intervene on the side of the Union because the british didn't want to support the maintenance of the Union through force.
Therefore the british could not intervene full stop.
As is so often the case with civil wars, there was no simple compelling moral argument for intervention; the Confederacy may have supported the continuation of slavery but the Union wasn't selling the war as a war to end slavery but rather as a war to save the union, and the british were queasy about the idea of helping the USA maintain its territorial integrity through force of arms.
And as to the idea that the british might intervene to reduce American power and forestall the rise of the USA: the british political classes were neither that prophetic nor that foolhardy and cynically opportunistic.
In the absence of a compelling national interest or moral argument the british were never going to go to war just to try and knock bits of the USA for the sake of it.
I won't even address the idea of the british trying to occupy and reintegrate parts of the USA in the 1860s since it is patently absurd and would not have been seriously considered by any leader of the time.
Orsino is right. Anti-slavery sentiment amongst the British working class was massive. See here for how the Lancashire mill workers faced starvation rather than use Confederate cotton:
http://www.theguardian.com/theguard...b/04/lincoln-oscars-manchester-cotton-abraham
At the time working men had no vote and Chartism was transforming into socialism. The government would have faced revolution had it tried to conscript into an army supporting the south.
http://www.theguardian.com/theguard...b/04/lincoln-oscars-manchester-cotton-abraham
At the time working men had no vote and Chartism was transforming into socialism. The government would have faced revolution had it tried to conscript into an army supporting the south.
However, they also know that:
1) SOME US states are slave states
2) ALL CSA states could apparently be slave states if they chose to rejoin the Union
3) MOST US states had no love for their black population.
The latter really helps to kill off any belief the North cares about helping the slaves:
“Not only slaves but free coloured men were treated with the greatest ignominy in the Northern States... From the Northern churches the people of colour were practically excluded; they were treated with a contumely which was more insulting even than the direct tyranny of the South... He believed that the North would willingly give up not only the four millions of slaves, but the half million of free-coloured people resident in the North, if by that means the reconstruction of the Union could be effected.” (William Howard Day, Sheffield Independent, 17 January 1862)
“Wherever you find a black person in the Northern cities of America he is most wretchedly treated; he is treated worse than you would treat a dog… At this moment there are fights constantly taking place in Washington and other cities because the poor black man wishes to ride in an omnibus (Hear, hear). I said the people who would do that are not the friends of the black man (Cheers.)” (John Arthur Roebuck MP, Sheffield Independent 11 July 1865)
And Lincoln really doesn't help:
“The most miserable exhibition of imbecile weakness has been made by the President in addressing a deputation of the coloured people who were invited to meet him at the White House and hear his oracular utterances... He tells the coloured people that their presence in the republic is a great embarrassment... The proud, tyrannical, dominant race, who make fine professions of universal freedom and world-wide philanthropy, are the humble suitors to the despised and down-trodden coloured people, and entreat them to go.... America is as much the native country of the men of African, as those of English, Irish, or German descent.” (Sheffield Independent, 4 September 1862)
Anti-slavery sentiment amongst the British middle and upper classes was massive as well. The Confederate ambassador James Mason concluded "In my conversations with English gentlemen, I have found it was in vain to combat their sentiment. The so-called anti-slavery feeling seems to have become with them a sentiment akin to patriotism."
Except, as the article admits, the Lancashire mill workers had worked slave-picked cotton in vast quantities for decades without a single complaint. What the article is talking about is them facing starvation rather than urge the government to break the blockade.
Now, a reader with a more questioning instinct might wonder why a supposedly working-class meeting is being led by people like "Mr T. Bazley, MP," and "Professor Greenbank"- how many working-class professors are there in the Victorian period? A really questioning reader would have dug out the original records of the meeting and discovered this supposedly working-class meeting featured the extremely prominent involvement of middle-class dignitaries like Doctor John Watts, Samuel Pope, W.A Jackson and Thomas Bayley Potter, being presided over by the mayor of Manchester, Mr Alderman Heywood. They might have looked at what newspapers other than the Guardian thought of the meeting, finding comments such as "a very artfully contrived enterprise on the part of the friends of Messrs. Cobden and Bright and the peace-at-any-price party" (Manchester Courier). They might even have dug into the records of Freeman H. Morse, the US consul in London, and found his admission that "It has cost much labor [sic] and some money to get it [mass meetings] well started but I think both have been well spent and are producing results far better than had any reason to hope" (Morse to Seward, Jan 17th 1863).
Needless to say, the Guardian makes it more difficult to do any of this by claiming the meeting took place in 1832- good old Grauniad.
Exactly how many times do you think the British used conscription in the two centuries before 1914?
RodentRevolution
Banned
Thanks I really had looked and wondered at that for it did not feel quite right. Thanks for the detailed research into the actual background of the affair.
The fact that the meeting was addressed and organised by prominent people isn't the point, it was the audience and the result that mattered, as Lincoln knew.
A drawn-out war with the Union would have had to involve conscription, even for the first time.