Why did Britain stay out of the American Civil War?

[the lord of rome]

"we have to help the south win so that the union will be weakeneed and we will lose competition on commerce.dont you agreed napoleon III?"

"yes but there is one problem the south allow slave work"

"then we will only help them if you do it first"

"and i will only help them if you do it first"

"then lets just watch this and have a good time watching the americans killing themselfs"

"ok but if prussia attacks me you will defenitly help right?"

"of course old boy. now pass me the popcorn general mcclellan is about to say that the south has 3 hundred thousand men in the peninsula"

 

[EnglishCanuck]

A Bigger USA, for example one covering what is now Canada, Mexico and the Greater Antilles at least with the option of Central America.

Well if there was the threat of the US growing beyond its current size Palmerston would probably have been far more interested in intervention. His anti-US paranoia was staggering at times.

I will have a look at it tonight. (I assume it is Wrapped In Flames)

Correct, thank you!

What's that phrase?

"When you know nothing about the civil war, you say it was about slavery. When you know a little about the civil war, you say it was about states rights. When you actually study all about the civil war, you realize that it was really just about slavery."

I mean, it's in their constitution and their declarations of succession. The Civil War was without a doubt about slavery, even if the Union was still a slave state. Of course, all your points about trade are valid, but Britain knew as much as the Union did what was really going on.

Yeah every discussion about the Civil Wars causes and it really ends up being a circular argument that comes around to slavery. (Seriously first class I ever took on it the prof told us not to assume to think it was about slavery, then after two hours of arguing about different causes she said, well it was basically about slavery ).

The problem though is was that what the man on the ground thought about the Civil War early on? Lincoln wrote his rather infamous letter to Horace Greeley; "If there be those who would not save the Union, unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union." in August 1862, which didn't go unnoticed in Britain.

The British also proved more than willing to believe that the South would in time be forced to abandon the institution (like they felt Russia had in abandoning serfdom), and like for the North were perfectly willing to turn a blind eye to its practice if the economics suited their needs. Most abolitionists in Britain were frustrated at Lincoln before he issued the Emancipation Proclamation since they felt he was losing the moral high ground. Really slavery wasn't as huge of a mitigating factor as most believe early on.

Post January 1st 1863? Definitely. Before that? Well... not so much.

 

[Caesar Biden]

Yeah every discussion about the Civil Wars causes and it really ends up being a circular argument that comes around to slavery. (Seriously first class I ever took on it the prof told us not to assume to think it was about slavery, then after two hours of arguing about different causes she said, well it was basically about slavery ).

The problem though is was that what the man on the ground thought about the Civil War early on? Lincoln wrote his rather infamous letter to Horace Greeley; "If there be those who would not save the Union, unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union." in August 1862, which didn't go unnoticed in Britain.

The British also proved more than willing to believe that the South would in time be forced to abandon the institution (like they felt Russia had in abandoning serfdom), and like for the North were perfectly willing to turn a blind eye to its practice if the economics suited their needs. Most abolitionists in Britain were frustrated at Lincoln before he issued the Emancipation Proclamation since they felt he was losing the moral high ground. Really slavery wasn't as huge of a mitigating factor as most believe early on.

Post January 1st 1863? Definitely. Before that? Well... not so much.

I totally get where you're coming from here. However, despite the words of many politicians, most people of the time knew this war was about slavery.

It's estimated that somewhere between 33,000 and 55,000 Canadians joined the civil war on the Union's side. They didn't do this cause they necessarily wanted the United States to be kept together, they did this to fight against slavery. Now, I know these people didn't have the foresight of today, but they definitely knew that a Confederate defeat would speed up the collapse of slavery by a whole lot.

The British knew this too. And even if they didn't, as soon as it looked like war would be likely between them and the US, you can be sure that Lincoln would remind them. Sure, there was no Emancipation Proclamation until 1863, but it's pretty telling that every state that seceded did so primarily over the issue of slavery.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

I totally get where you're coming from here. However, despite the words of many politicians, most people of the time knew this war was about slavery.

I'm iffy on the definition of 'most people' since Lincoln (and most of his cabinet) had real doubts about issuing the Emancipation Proclamation at all. Even then it caused backlash and derision since people weren't to keen on the idea of hordes of freed blacks coming up and competing for jobs. The border states absolutely refused emancipation even so, and it took another two years of negotiations to get them to adopt the Thirteenth Amendment.

I think its important to draw the distinction of fighting to end slavery and fighting to contain it. The early Republicans were far more keen on containing it than they were ending it, and the Free Soil Movement certainly didn't give a damn if the South had slavery versus allowing it to move westward and gobble up land for settlers into slave plantations they couldn't compete with.

That's the distinction I've come to understand in the period between 1861 and 1864 before the passage of the 13th Amendment.

It's estimated that somewhere between 33,000 and 55,000 Canadians joined the civil war on the Union's side. They didn't do this cause they necessarily wanted the United States to be kept together, they did this to fight against slavery. Now, I know these people didn't have the foresight of today, but they definitely knew that a Confederate defeat would speed up the collapse of slavery by a whole lot.

This point is true, and I don't doubt one bit that many of these people were fighting against slavery. I cannot of course comment on when many of these people were fighting however, which means I don't know the whole range of ideological reasoning in someone fighting in 1861 versus someone who enlisted in 1863. To me the above distinction still exists in this case but I of course cannot prove it.

The British knew this too. And even if they didn't, as soon as it looked like war would be likely between them and the US, you can be sure that Lincoln would remind them. Sure, there was no Emancipation Proclamation until 1863, but it's pretty telling that every state that seceded did so primarily over the issue of slavery.

Oh the British were well aware, but as I pointed out before, many of the politicians simply didn't care, or were hoodwinked by Southern sympathizers into supporting them (it's telling that many British people who visited the South still sang its praises despite seeing slavery continue, and its rather unsettling) despite this fact. Though they were certainly no friends of slavery, they wouldn't have too much trouble overlooking this fact out of convenience.

I've always been skeptical of what Lincoln could do had the British intervened in 1862, he can't come out and say he's fighting to end slavery (all evidence points out that he didn't even think that at the time) and saying that publicly would raise some awkward questions in Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky. He could point to the South's explicit use of slavery, but he'd be fighting an uphill battle against both abolitionists at home who think he's not going far enough, and public opinion in Britain that would say the same. The issuing of an early Emancipation Proclamation would probably backfire horribly since it could drive the border states away, and it would look like a desperate move as Lincoln feared in 1862.

 

[robcraufurd]

As an aside you'd be absolutely shocked how few of the British higher ups gave a damn about slavery in this case.

I think you'd be shocked how many did. When Lincoln came to power, he announced he had no intention to act against slavery in order to avert a war. While Palmerston was in power, he was prepared to risk war with- among others- Portugal, Brazil, Spain and the US in order to combat the slave trade. In 1860 he explains to Gladstone that he has "two great objects always before him": one was the defence of England, the other was the abolition of the slave trade.

But, you may say, this only applies to the slave trade, not to slavery itself. That seems a little unfair, given that Palmerston never differentiated between the two- to him, the trade was "the root which gives life and spirit and stability to the condition of slavery... lay your axe to the root, cut off the supply of nourishment, and the tree will sicken and die, and you will no longer find difficulty in bringing it to the ground". If we argue that Palmerston is not anti-slavery because he focuses on the trade, that leaves Lincoln's focus on the territories on extremely shaky ground. Not to mention the fact that Palmerston was already voting for abolition of slavery in Britain at around the time that Lincoln was starting to aspire to membership of the Illinois legislature.

Contemporary observers were clear on Palmerston's hatred for slavery. CP Villiers wrote to John Bright in January 1862 that his detestation for it would mitigate against him dealing with the Confederacy. Motley wrote the same to Seward in October 1862. The fact that his fundamental motivating political principle seems to disappear when dealing with this topic is a fault in the historiography and not in Palmerston himself.

despite the words of many politicians, most people of the time knew this war was about slavery...The British knew this too.

The British, or at least the majority of them, knew that the South had left the Union because of slavery. What they also knew was that Lincoln had disclaimed any intention to interfere with slavery, that Congress had passed a resolution in July 1861 saying the war was about preserving the Union not freeing the slaves, that there were slave-owning states still in the Union, one of which- Missouri- had attempted in late 1860 to have an escaped slave extradited from Canada to be burned alive, that Seward had requested foreign powers to return escaped slaves to their owners, that Lincoln had countermanded Fremont's own emancipation measures, that free blacks in the Northern States suffered levels of racial discrimination which even the British considered excessive, that the Emancipation Proclamation didn't touch slaves when their masters were loyal...

What the British knew was that if the South had decided that slavery could be secured within the Union and offered to lay down their arms and returning to the Union in return for it being secured, they were likely to get their way. The fact that in 1864 Lincoln drafted a private letter saying "if Jefferson Davis wishes to know what I would do if he were to offer peace and reunion, saying nothing about slavery, let him try me" strongly suggests that what they knew was right.

There are two areas that they're perhaps confused on. One is the fact that the South refuse to take an apparently easy avenue to secure slavery: this leads many to the incorrect conclusion that the South wants independence rather than the correct conclusion that they consider independence the best way of securing slavery. The second is that they are over-optimistic about the likelihood of slavery ending in the event of Southern independence: however, this is entirely understandable not just in the light of contemporary beliefs about providentialism and progress, but also when you consider that the British could expect to have the North pushing for abolition alongside them instead of helping to shore it up as they have done previously. What they weren't confused about, and what even the strongest Union partisan will concede, is that there was a serious risk that the restoration of the Union could have made slavery more, not less, secure than before.

Incidentally, the answer to this question:

Why didn't Britain intervene in the American Civil War?

can be found by taking a sheet of paper, making a list of all the civil wars which took place between 1815 and 1914, and then highlighting all the ones in which Britain intervened. Joining in a civil war took place only under absolutely exceptional circumstances: despite the amount of times it comes up on this boards, the closest that Britain actually came to intervening in the American Civil War was scheduling a cabinet meeting to discuss the propriety of raising the question with other European governments as to whether they should come together and make a non-binding offer of mediation. That's it, unless you count all the times that someone raised the question of intervention in Parliament and was shot down by a member of the government.

 

[jahenders]

True, the US would be in a two-front war, but Britain would be forced to (again) try to fight a war thousands of miles away (and that didn't work to well in the 1770s). The fact that ACW was just a few years after the bloody Crimean War doesn't make the UK inclined to really get involved.

Integration is a complete no-go. CSA was fighting for a limited objective of the North letting them go. Integration would require conquering the North -- a VERY different prospect. I don't think CSA would sign up for a much harder war just to have the British empire re-established on their border. In the UK fighting the North, the North was much more powerful than the colonies in 1776.

But if Britain joined the war then the union would be caught in a 2 front war. Historically speaking, two front wars rarely end in victories. Britain could then defeat the northern states and reintegrate them into the Empire.

 

[Juumanistra]

[T]he closest that Britain actually came to intervening in the American Civil War was scheduling a cabinet meeting to discuss the propriety of raising the question with other European governments as to whether they should come together and make a non-binding offer of mediation. That's it, unless you count all the times that someone raised the question of intervention in Parliament and was shot down by a member of the government.

I'm presently working on a timeline in which the Civil War ends in a mediated peace which originates in the adoption of the Roebuck Motion following an alternative first two weeks of July 1863. And the nature of mediation really is something which is overlooked in most timelines, as there's all kinds of potential for Great Power headbutting and scheming. In the context of that timeline, for instance, the January Uprising is occurring concurrently and Russia is opposed to any mediation of the ACW while it is on-going due to it (potentially) legitimizing the Polish revolt. (And Prussia is actively aiding Russia in suppressing the revolt, so their opposition can be expected too.) That Russia (and perhaps Prussia) might be willing to go to war over mediation throws the usual equation for mediation into a cocked hat. But in a good way! ...I hope.

Given all of the interlocking interests in play with events going on between the ACW, January Uprising, and Holstein at roughly the same time, a fascinating divergence might be a Congress/conference held in late 1863 to sort out things before a civil war in the Western Hemisphere leads to Franco-Austrian armies clashing with Russo-Prussian ones in the Rhineland and Bohemia. All kinds of diplomatic shenanigans to be had if you're creative enough, I suspect.

 

[robcraufurd]

All kinds of diplomatic shenanigans to be had if you're creative enough, I suspect.

I'm sure I've said it before, but I'd really like to see the mediation conference war-gamed out in a similar way to the Washington Treaty Re-Evaluated (WTRE) exercise which the Warships1 board did. Not least because I reckon the US and the UK would go into the chamber as enemies and come out of it as friends after a long session of beating up the Confederacy in the name of anti-slavery.

 

[robcraufurd]

As an aside you'd be absolutely shocked how few of the British higher ups gave a damn about slavery in this case. In early 1862 slavery existed on both sides of the war and abolitionists in the Union didn't seem to be gaining any traction. The big three players in the Cabinet (Palmerston, Gladstone, and Russell) barely even mentioned it, with Palmerston saying at one point: "We don't like slavery but we want Southern Cotton."*

I've been dwelling on this comment and doing a little digging, because it's so utterly alien to what I've found in the course of my work. Unfortunately, the only conclusion I can come to is the one I've mentioned earlier: it's the fault of the historiography. I apologise if this seems to belittle your use of primary sources, but it's the only explanation that I can find that makes sense.

Let me illustrate. Here's pp.171-2 of Brian Jenkins' Britain and the War for the Union vol. 1:
"During a speech at Newcastle a few days earlier, in which he had described a war fought on the one side for empire and the other for power, Russell had asked whether it was not the duty of men "who profess a regard for the principles of Christianity," men "who wish to preserve in perpetuity the sacred inheritance of liberty, to endeavour to see whether this sanguinary conflict cannot be put an end to?"

And here's p. 182 of Howard Jones's Union in Peril:
"On October 7, 1862, Gladstone delivered a stirring speech before a large audience in Newcastle that left the mistaken impression that the ministry was ready to recognise the Confederacy and further solidified the cabinet's division over the American question. Amid loud cheering, he declared: 'We may have our own opinions about slavery, we may be for or against the South; but there is no doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy, and they have made what is more than either- they have made a nation.' In a dramatic conclusion, he proclaimed: 'We may anticipate with certainty the success of the Southern States so far as regards their separation from the North.'"

Now on the basis of that, I can understand why you'd say they barely mentioned slavery. However, that's not the whole of what they said. Here are some further extracts from Russell's speech at Newcastle:
"We now see two parties contending together, not upon the question of slavery- though that, I believe, is the origin of the conflict- not contending with respect to free trade and protection, but contending, as so many States in the New World have contended, one side for empire and the other for independence... Supposing this contest ending by the re-union of its different parts, that the South should agree to enter again with all the rights of the Constitution, should we not again have that fatal subject of slavery brought along with them? (Hear, hear). Because while one party contended that slavery was an institution of perpetual force, and ought to be extended over other parts of the world, another party contended that slavery must be acknowledged and respected wherever the constitution said it must be reported, but that it was a thing detestable in itself, and the time must come when it must cease from the face of the earth. (Applause). Well, then, gentlemen, as you will see, if this quarrel could be made up by the measures of those who opposed Mr Lincoln at the last election being carried, then some disputes would recommence, and perhaps a long civil war follow... If these should be the unhappy results to which we alone can look forward- if, by means of such as these the union of the States should be brought about, is it not the duty of those who so lately were citizens together, who have embraced the precepts of Christianity, and who wish to preserve their sacred inheritance of liberty, is it not their duty to see whether this sanguinary conflict cannot be stayed? (Hear, hear)” (Newcastle Courant, 18 October 1861)

And here's what Gladstone said at Newcastle:
"I can understand those who say- and it is my own opinion- that it is greatly for the interest of the negro race that they should have to do with their own masters alone, and not with their own masters backed by the resources of the Federal power. That has been the state of things heretofore, and which some mistakenly supposing it in the interest of the negro race, have thought it desirable to retain. The laws have been made by the owners of the slaves, but the enforcement of the laws made by the owners of the slaves has been carried out by the Federal Government... But it has appeared to me rather for the interest of England that the Union should continue, though I know that is not the opinion generally entertained. But I am sure we all feel that the course which Her Majesty’s ministers have endeavoured to pursue, of maintaining strict neutrality, has been the right course, and an expression of the general sense of the community. (Applause)... We may have our own opinion of slavery. We may be for the North or the South..." (Newcastle Courant, 10 October 1862)

And here's what Gladstone said earlier that year at Manchester:
"we may have our own opinions, and I imagine we have our own opinions about the institutions of the South- ('hear hear,' and applause)- as unfortunately we may have our own private opinions about the countenance that has been given to those institutions in the North- ('hear hear' and applause)... Why, no doubt if we could say this was a contest of slavery or freedom, there is not a man in the length and breadth of this room- there perhaps is hardly a man in all England- who would for a moment hesitate upon the side which he would take- (hear, hear)- but we have no faith in the propagation of our institutions at the point of the sword ('Hear hear' and cheers)... You cannot invade a nation in order to convert its institutions from bad ones into good ones, and our friends in the North have, as we think, made a great mistake in supposing that they can bend all the horrors of this war to philanthropic ends. (Hear, hear). Now, gentlemen, there are those among us who think- and I confess, for one, I have shared the apprehension- that if in the course of the vicissitudes of the war the Southern States of America should send an embassy to Washington, and should say, 'Very well; we are ready to lay down arms... upon one condition- that you shall ensure us that there shall be no interference with our domestic institutions.' Ah, gentleman, we have had a fear that that application, if it were made, would receive a very favourable reply. ("Hear hear", and cheers)." (Liverpool Mercury, 25 April 1862)

Slavery is also explicitly discussed in Gladstone's memorandum for intervention- I've posted the quote on these boards before. So the idea that they don't think, talk or care about slavery seems to me to be unsupported by the evidence. In fact, the overwhelming majority of comments in Britain about the war engage at some point with slavery- even if they don't reach the conclusions about it that the North might have liked.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

I've been dwelling on this comment and doing a little digging, because it's so utterly alien to what I've found in the course of my work. Unfortunately, the only conclusion I can come to is the one I've mentioned earlier: it's the fault of the historiography. I apologise if this seems to belittle your use of primary sources, but it's the only explanation that I can find that makes sense.

-quotes snipped for brevity-

Slavery is also explicitly discussed in Gladstone's memorandum for intervention- I've posted the quote on these boards before. So the idea that they don't think, talk or care about slavery seems to me to be unsupported by the evidence. In fact, the overwhelming majority of comments in Britain about the war engage at some point with slavery- even if they don't reach the conclusions about it that the North might have liked.

No, no this is excellent work. I would agree that the fault would lay with how I've discovered the quotes in the context that I have (snipped from the majority of the speeches) and in my wording of my objection. Though my assertion with "barely mentioning slavery" is indeed incorrect, my assertion that slavery did not quite lead to anti-Confederate sentiment amongst the people of Britain (in 1862) would be correct here, especially amongst movers like Russell and Gladstone which would allow for that idea of recognition, or at least mediation, to flourish.

I suppose what I mean to say is that slavery as an issue by itself in the early phase of the Civil War was not grasped firmly by the Union as a cause for war, and the British perspective of progress and eventual liberalism (as they saw the case being in Russia with the emancipation of the serfs) would have made the issue of the South fighting over slavery a moot point when they considered intervention/recognition in this period.

Your earlier point on Palmerston is also very accurate. Palmerston did indeed hate slavery which is why (if I'm on the ball here like I believe I am) he was so unaccepting of Confederate recognition, but would be more than happy to go to war with the US over neutral rights. I actually can't see Palmerston being enthusiastic about recognizing or working with the Confederacy myself, he may do it as a necessity if war broke out, but on his own I don't think he would make a move to recognize the Confederacy. (Gladstone's change of tune in October '62 seems to have come from Palmerston's firm hand in stepping on the idea post-Antietam).

 

[British Republic]

Well if there was the threat of the US growing beyond its current size Palmerston would probably have been far more interested in intervention. His anti-US paranoia was staggering at times.

He would be very willing thus to kill off what would look like a very dangerous rival, especially considering their ITTL disputes in the Americas.

Yeah every discussion about the Civil Wars causes and it really ends up being a circular argument that comes around to slavery. (Seriously first class I ever took on it the prof told us not to assume to think it was about slavery, then after two hours of arguing about different causes she said, well it was basically about slavery ).

The problem though is was that what the man on the ground thought about the Civil War early on? Lincoln wrote his rather infamous letter to Horace Greeley; "If there be those who would not save the Union, unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union." in August 1862, which didn't go unnoticed in Britain.

Well that was really the South's real argument, it was not about states rights or regional identity it was all about slavery and to a lesser extent Tariffs.

 

[RodentRevolution]

He would be very willing thus to kill off what would look like a very dangerous rival, especially considering their ITTL disputes in the Americas.

Then he missed his chance with the Trent Affair, after that the door rapidly closes on British intervention being cheap or easy. While the two side are still balanced in terms of effective forces in the field Britain need only look to tilt that balance slightly.

However what you see is the Union forces grow much faster than the Confederates. At 2-1 they have just about the margin of superiority given the geography of the regions being fought over to conduct effective offensive operations, by the end of the war they have ground the Confederacy down so the margin of superiority is more like 3-1 and so the pace of the offensive picks up.

However were the US to go on the defensive against the Confederacy in just some theatres of operations they could have freed up troops to meet the British threat. Not to mention that while their Navy may be overwhelmingly a brown water force it is very effective in those waters.

There just is only a small window when it makes remotely plausible military sense unless there had been some game changing Confederate victory which did not occur OTL.

Then add in the economic arguments against intervention; trade with the Union is profitable, the humanitarian; wars are bad and hurt people, the lazy; oh that does sound like a lot of effort old boy and the indifferent; not our fight, you still have the old slavery issue as stated above

So not a whole lot of motivation in the end.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

South's motive to secede?

He would be very willing thus to kill off what would look like a very dangerous rival, especially considering their ITTL disputes in the Americas.

Not stalking you, honest


Maybe so, but (AFAIK) he didn't press for the UK to the chance during the Trent affair. Perhaps he thought it wouldn't work or there was too much opposition within the UK for a war to save slavery.

Well that was really the South's real argument, it was not about states rights or regional identity it was all about slavery and to a lesser extent Tariffs.

I think so too but it was more nuanced perhaps than fear of immediate abolition by a Lincoln administration. He couldn't and wouldn't do that

I suspect it was more that Lincoln's election showed the South had lost its grip on power. The slave states faced being outvoted in Congress once new states were to be admitted predominantly as Free States thereafter. Also they were losing the argument on tariffs as you say. Hence I wonder if they simply thought that at some point abolition would be inevitable as opinion shifted in Congress and anti-slavery presidents packed the Supreme Court?

However, we'd need experts on the US at that period to provide more detail!

 

[EnglishCanuck]

He would be very willing thus to kill off what would look like a very dangerous rival, especially considering their ITTL disputes in the Americas.

He was concerned about America's growing power, but he wasn't going to war willy nilly. He would have to be pushed into it (or at least feel like he was being pushed) in order to sanction another far off war.

Well that was really the South's real argument, it was not about states rights or regional identity it was all about slavery and to a lesser extent Tariffs.

Slavery was indeed, but they managed to hoodwink an alarming number of important people into thinking otherwise (or couching it in such romantic terms as liberty and self-determination).

 

[British Republic]

Then he missed his chance with the Trent Affair, after that the door rapidly closes on British intervention being cheap or easy. While the two side are still balanced in terms of effective forces in the field Britain need only look to tilt that balance slightly.

What are you saying a bigger America alone will prevent any military action by the UK? The British Empire it also bigger ITTL thanks to RDP, bigger South Africa and the East Indies.

However what you see is the Union forces grow much faster than the Confederates. At 2-1 they have just about the margin of superiority given the geography of the regions being fought over to conduct effective offensive operations, by the end of the war they have ground the Confederacy down so the margin of superiority is more like 3-1 and so the pace of the offensive picks up.

Well I feel that the bigger Confederate disadvantage would encourage Britain and France to try and "save it"

However were the US to go on the defensive against the Confederacy in just some theatres of operations they could have freed up troops to meet the British threat. Not to mention that while their Navy may be overwhelmingly a brown water force it is very effective in those waters.

There just is only a small window when it makes remotely plausible military sense unless there had been some game changing Confederate victory which did not occur OTL.

Then add in the economic arguments against intervention; trade with the Union is profitable, the humanitarian; wars are bad and hurt people, the lazy; oh that does sound like a lot of effort old boy and the indifferent; not our fight, you still have the old slavery issue as stated above

So not a whole lot of motivation in the end.

I did not suggest the Confederates would win a victory against a wanked USA with Anglo-French support rather it would encourage it. Especially since there are disputes with by the Americans against the British for example.

 

[British Republic]

He was concerned about America's growing power, but he wasn't going to war willy nilly. He would have to be pushed into it (or at least feel like he was being pushed) in order to sanction another far off war.

What about worse ties due to British Holdings in Latin America? ITTL Britain builds a new colony in the Southern Cone area.

Slavery was indeed, but they managed to hoodwink an alarming number of important people into thinking otherwise (or couching it in such romantic terms as liberty and self-determination).

Shame really.

 

[British Republic]

I think so too but it was more nuanced perhaps than fear of immediate abolition by a Lincoln administration. He couldn't and wouldn't do that

I suspect it was more that Lincoln's election showed the South had lost its grip on power. The slave states faced being outvoted in Congress once new states were to be admitted predominantly as Free States thereafter. Also they were losing the argument on tariffs as you say. Hence I wonder if they simply thought that at some point abolition would be inevitable as opinion shifted in Congress and anti-slavery presidents packed the Supreme Court?

However, we'd need experts on the US at that period to provide more detail!

Well it was ultimately over their loss of power in terms of the USA. As for if they saw it coming well they did try and delay it though expansion into Mexico to prevent what ended up happening.

 

[TFSmith121]

For the same reasons they stayed out of the other

Why didn't Britain intervene in the American Civil War?

For the same reasons they stayed out of the Danish, Austrian, and Franco-Prussian conflicts; nothing to gain and far too much to lose.

And, after the Russian War, there was little appetite for something similar, less than six years after that triumph.

International conflict, even in the Nineteenth Century, was not a board game.

Best,

 

[EnglishCanuck]

What about worse ties due to British Holdings in Latin America? ITTL Britain builds a new colony in the Southern Cone area.

I'm not quite sure what you mean here. Britain could surely exercise more than her already considerable influence over the Southern Cone ITTL, but she's not really in a position to build new colony.

Shame really.

It really was, thankfully it didn't amount to anything OTL.

 

[IndefatigableRN]

For the same reasons they stayed out of the Danish, Austrian, and Franco-Prussian conflicts; nothing to gain and far too much to lose.

And, after the Russian War, there was little appetite for something similar, less than six years after that triumph.

International conflict, even in the Nineteenth Century, was not a board game.

Best,

But, but, but, in Victoria I can scoop up colonies and raise armies to conquer Europe