Doesnt everyone have a low opinion of Freddy III?
depends where you're standing. IIRC his difficult relationship with Max had to do with tem being two opposite temperaments- and partly because Max blamed his dad for his mom's death.
The "King Sleepyhead" nickname was given to him by someone who didn't quite grasp the situation (or had very little grasp of it). Fritz
couldn't really act because he didn't have eiither the money or the "legitimacy" to act (OTL, until Ladislaus the Posthumous died, he was seen as a sort of "caretaker"). In order to "get" elected, he'd needed to sign a Wahlkapitulation* with the electors. While every emperor did this, and no emperor ever elevated the Wahlkapitulation to the status of an imperial edict or actual law, they
were constrained to abide by its terms to a greater or lesser extent, dependent on how much power they had. OTL, had Fritz gone against the Wahl while Ladislaus the Posthumous was still alive, it'd have been very easy for the electors/pope to depose him.
1457- Ladislaus dies, removing a rival candidate for the throne
1464- his brother-in-law the elector of Saxony dies, removing his obligations towards Saxony for the Wahlkapitulation**
1470- the elector of Bradenburg dies, removing Friedrich's obligations towards Brandenburg
1476- the Elector Palatine dies, removing Friedrich's obligations towards the Palatinate (and Philipp of the Palatinate absolutely
hated the Habsburgs)
And that's before one takes into account the two far more dangerous threats of Matyas Corvinus and Charles the Bold.
A bissl links, a bissl rechts (little to the left, a little to the right) was the only option that Friedrich
had to work with.
*this was essentially a promise of what he would "give" to the electors should they elect him. To give an idea of how complex this sort of document was, the last one, signed by Franz II in 1792, was over 110 pages long (and that was when the election of a Habsburg was pretty much an undeniable fact)
**this was the thing, a Wahlkapitulation could never be renegotiated, so it was only good for the signatories' lifetimes
Not defending Fritz, but I think that he was the man to survive both Charles the Bold* and Matyas Corvinus** has a sot of canniness
*while the panicked flight from Trier in 1473 is often cited on Friedrich-Charles relations, the fact is that Friedrich had been watching Burgundy with suspicion since Philippe le Bon had refused to swear fealty to him in 1449 at Besançon already. Fritz refused to receive Phil at Regensburg in 1455 (instead sending his secretary, Piccolomini). It's also worth noting that when Friedrich
had offered Charles a "higher crown" in 1471, Charles intimated to Archduke Sigmund (the usual conduit), that he had no aspirations to any crown aside from that of king of the Romans as was the emperor's "dearest wish". Even going so far as to suggest that he [Charles] would be only too willing to take up Friedrich's "more onerous" duties, even that he should abdicate.
His [Friedrich] answer to the duke was that he did not exercise sufficient influence over his electors to ensure their accepting his nominee as successor to the imperium.
The situation in Trier was slightly more complicated than just Friedrich not wanting to grant Charles a crown. Firstly, Charles had troops quartered in the city (Friedrich, as emperor, was not allowed such a privilege, even if he had had them to spare). Secondly, while he had sent a summons out to the other electors to assemble, only Mainz and Trier turned up. The remainder's response? Let Charles wait until the Reichstag convened at Augsburg November following. Charles was the one to break off negotiations with Friedrich less than a week after they'd agreed to everything on October 15th because he was convinced that Friedrich was the one stalling. Friedrich, understandably, left town for fear that he would wind up imprisoned (or worse), by Charles.
**
Meantime, the Emperor Frederic tried to knit links with this same Matthias by suggesting that he might be the next emperor, assuring him that he could count on the support of the electors of Mayence, of Trèves, and of Saxony. He himself was world-weary and was anxious to exchange his imperial cares for the repose of the Church could he only find a safe guardian for his son, Maximilian, and a desirable successor for himself.[page 247] Would not Matthias consider the two offices?
Potent arguments like these induced Matthias not only to turn his back on Podiebrad, but to accept that deposed monarch's crown which the Bohemian nobles offered him May 3, 1469. Then he proceeded to ally himself with Frederic, elector palatine, and with the elector of Bavaria. This was the moment when the ex-king of Bohemia made renewed offers of friendly alliance to Charles of Burgundy. In his name the Sire de Stein brought the draft of a treaty of amity to Charles which contained the provision that Podiebrad should support the election of Charles as King of the Romans, in consideration of the sum of two hundred thousand florins (Rhenish).
3
This modest sum was to secure not only Podiebrad's own vote but his "influence" with the Archbishop of Mayence, the Elector of Saxony and the Margrave of Brandenburg.
4 While Podiebrad thus dangled the ultimate hopes of the imperial crown before the duke's eyes, he over-estimated his credulity. As a matter of fact the royal exile had no "influence" at all with the first named elector, and the last, too, showed no disposition whatsoever to serve his unstable policy. Both were content to advise Emperor Frederic. The sole result of the empty overtures was to increase Charles's own sense of[page 248] importance