So within an hour then?(It's 11:00 PM where I live.)
Gorramit, this is why I always put the date when I say these things, since not all of us live in the same place/time zone (obviously).
By "Today" I mean
13th July 2014 -- which is right now!
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THE BATTLE OF FRANCE
The commander-in-chief of the French armed forces was General Maurice Gamelin, a veteran of the Great War whose “subtle mind” was respected even by the top Wehrmacht commanders. However, he was caught between conflicting ideas of military and political necessity, and his division of attention and strength between them proved to be disastrous for the Allied efforts in France and the Low Countries. He initially preferred a static defence along the Maginot Line; however, its defences did not extend into the Franco-Belgian border, and the cold winter of 1940 prevented extension works. Therefore, it was necessary for a more mobile defence to be organised.
Several proposals were submitted, most prominently the Dyle Plan (Plan D) and the Escaut Plan (Plan E), each named after the rivers that the defence was to be concentrated around. The former would have the Wehrmacht engaged by Allied forces further into Belgium than the latter, which was closer to the Franco-Belgian border. Complicating the situation was the Belgian declaration of neutrality in 1936. For reasons of better logistics, a deeper strategic reserve, and the insufficiently developed defences in Gembloux, Plan E was chosen, meaning that the Belgians would have to essentially fend for themselves [1].
However, ironically, the initially determined defence of the Netherlands by General Henri Winkelman suggested to Gamelin that it might after all be able to stymie the German advance in the Low Countries, especially now that the defences at Gembloux were now further developed; Plan D was hastily employed, overextending French logistical lines and committing the British Expeditionary Force along the Dyle with the barest of acknowledgement by the Belgian government. The sudden Dutch capitulation in the face of continued bombardment by the Luftwaffe meant that instead of flanking the Germans as hopes, the underprepared Allied forces were now doomed to encirclements in the face of Army Group B [2].
The sudden switch to Plan D from Plan E remains one of the most controversial decisions by the Allied Powers in the Spring War. The link-up with Dutch forces had been lost, but adopting Plan D meant that a narrower front would need to be defended, relieving pressure on the line.. Fergusson suggests that it may have been justified had the Dutch forces held out merely a week longer, to give the French, British and Belgian forces enough time to consolidate and outflank the Germans.
Figure 18: General Maurice Gustave Gamelin, commander-in-chief of the French forces during the opening stages of the Battle of France.
The attempt by the BEF to encircle the German forces emerging from the Netherlands was thus doomed to failure when the Wehrmacht turned around earlier than expected, and tore through the unprepared defensive lines, forcing the Allied forces to hastily retreat to the better-equipped defences along the Escaut. Thankfully for Gamelin, the suddenness of the German breakout meant that relatively few units had been deployed along the Dyle, and thus were able to retreat in an orderly fashion. However, the re-commitment to Plan E meant that the Belgian forces and the majority of the BEF were now practically stranded in Belgium, and the Wehrmacht overrode the country in less than two weeks, with King Leopold of Belgium surrendering on 16 May.
The entrapment of the BEF, which could only be relieved by escaping into France, and the confused diplomatic situation in Norway, led to total frustration with Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. Although he managed to barely survive a vote of confidence in Parliament, Chamberlain knew his days were numbered, and drew up a proposal for the Labour Party to join his government. When the Labour leader Clement Attlee declined, stating that they would happily join the government if not for Chamberlain himself, Chamberlain met with the Viscount Halifax, who commanded considerably more popularity at this point. Halifax, in his memoirs, notes that he was “initially hesitant”, but when Chamberlain pressed on the points of Halifax’s support from the people, the political system and the King himself in their three-hour discussion, Halifax conceded that the British people would need a leader with mass support, and accepted the position.
Figure 19: Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, 1st Earl of Halifax and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom after Neville Chamberlain’s resignation [3].
Halifax’s first priority was to rescue the British forces, which were now trapped in a perilous corridor leading towards Dunkirk, on the French coast. Preparations were made for a massed fleet of various types of vessels to evacuate the BEF. However, the situation on the ground rapidly changed again when the true assault envisioned in Manstein’s version of Fall Gelb kicked into action. The massive push of German forces from Luxembourg, which had capitulated in less than a day, and southern Belgium, through the Ardenees forest on 14 May, later termed as “Sichelschnitt” (“Sickle-Cut”), took the Allies nearly totally by surprise, and soon formed an unmanageable pocket within the French border. The one major obstacle to German advances was the imposing fortress at Eben-Emael, which was practically invulnerable to all forms of air or land attack, and only surrendered well into 17 May despite enduring nearly 72 continuous hours of bombardment and assault, even after King Leopold III had announced the Belgian surrender [4].
However, German luck soon began to run dry there. The delaying actions of the Allied forces meant that the advance of Army Group A in the north had stalled along the Escaut, and the steadfastness of the defenders of Eben-Emael meant that the Wehrmacht had to spend several precious days resupplying and regrouping, especially since the logistics train was not as motorised as the main bulk of the Heer. Fergusson notes another “wasted opportunity” at this juncture – had the Allies committed fully to a counterattack along the Ardennes Gap or in Northern France, breaking through the German lines, it would have confounded the Wehrmacht strategy and force them to concentrate on either front, leaving the other weakened to further assaults. However, events further south would soon force Gamelin’s hand – to his, and France’s, ruination [5].
[1] See here. In TTL, the Gembloux defences are considered inadequate since the invasion's even earlier, and Gamelin goes for the safe bet...at first.
[2] The Netherlands holds out for longer in TTL than OTL, and Gamelin now thinks that he can catch the Germans on their flanks. Epic fail, unfortunately.
[3] To those throwing their arms up in consternation, I only said Churchill would eventually become PM, and really, you all should have seen this one coming once I mentioned a negotiated peace. Let's see how Halifax does, eh?
[4] Weber doesn't have the slight tactical insight that Hitler had, and never twigs on to the idea of landing a glider on the roof. This small change is going to have big implications in the Spring War.
[5] "Look to my coming on the first light of the fifth day, at dawn look to the East..."
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And so we conclude this update on that massive cliffhanger...
Next update (later this week): Benito Mussolini...saviour of the Nazis???
