Central and East Asia
Oghuz Khaganate – Often better known as the Afsar Khaganate, the Oghuz Khaganate is a confederation of Turkic peoples that stretches from the Kitai Empire in the East to Kundajid and Iran in the West. Loosely united and dominated by the interests of the twelve tribes, all of which can claim relation to the broader Oghuz ethnic group, the Oghuz Khanagate is not exactly a strong state. The Afsar rule by consensus and many young men leave their clans to become mercenaries for the Xasar or the Ifthal, which is becoming an increasing problem in preserving the strength of their confederates. Even when these men return, as they sometimes do, laden with treasury and tall tales of victories over the mail-clad western princes, they bring with them disruptive ideas and foreign brides, often causing chaos. Times are changing for the Oghuz.
They have many vassals, particularly in the east – most notably the Naiman, Merkit, and Jalayr clans who together form the “three blood loyal” a coalition which at times has rejected the rule of the Turks and tried to establish for themselves a Mongol Confederation. In 1087 they were defeated at the battle of the Onon River, and since then have not had the same strength they once did. Now they are mostly content to provide a frontier against Jurchen and Kitai raiding parties.
However, the Onon River and its associated campaign demonstrated the weakness of the Afsar even in victory – as the Khagan proved incapable of restraining his subordinates and vassals. The more the Afsar settle along the rivers of Xvarasm and seek to centralize, the weaker their hegemony becomes – and by 1100 they are very much a settled tribe, with capital cities and great palaces. Reconciling this society and the past century of luxury with the hard life of a nomadic Khaganate is never an easy task. It was the Khirichan who came closest to doing so, but ultimately their model has proven tough to replicate on the more open steppe of Central Asia.
Kitai (Yaol Dynasty) – by the standards of Chinese dynasties, there is a sense of unprecedented arrogance in the Kitai. Successors to the Uighur Khaganate, they have been far more willing to compromise both culturally and politically with the Han majority and in doing so have created a stable empire.
The Kitai are a Buddhist regime which like many of their steppe cousins incorporates syncretic elements of traditional religion. Accordingly, they have granted unprecedented power to the Buddhist temples, a paradigm shift from the persecutions of the Qi. Instead it is the Taoist “mystery cults” which are persecuted, considered a threat and a source of resentment. Clothes and symbols which are part of traditional Chinese religion have been banned outright, allowing the government to easily target those who do not obey their decrees.
Tianzuo of the Yaol is the current Emperor, and he resides in the Great Palace at Kaifeng. There he is surrounded by beautiful songbirds and gardens measureless to man. From the north come Jurchen and Uighur potentates to pay tribute to him, and he no longer calls himself “North King” but, as his father before him, considers himself Emperor.
Despite all their palatial grandeur, the Yaol have some critical weaknesses. They have not been able to gain the merest foothold in the Tarim Basin. In 1081 a joint alliance of the Viasha and the Turfan were able to repel a Yaol invasion. Furthermore, the two major Yangtze states of Wu and Chu remain stubbornly independent and beyond their control, despite the best efforts of the Emperor.
Wu – The Wu kingdom is a major center of manufacturing, controlling most of the ports along the eastern coast of China and the mouth of the Yangtze. It is from Wu that most finished goods come, particularly the famed lacquerware which has made many a merchant wealthy. With the destruction of the Red Standard army, Wu has become something a prosperous, if traditionalist realm.
The Wu army is vastly inferior to that of its Kitai rivals – and indeed the survival of the Wu can be traced more to defensive strategy and a denante with Chu which has ensured they need not fear a two-front war.
Chu – After defeating Tibet, Chu has had few successes worthy of the name. A succession of generals have ruled Chu since that day. Unlike the Wu, Chu has become a very martial state, holding defensible mountainous uplands in excess and fortifying them well. Unlike Wu it has less to fear from the Kitai, but the Yaol dynasty is still the overriding defensive concern, and according Chu has never moved against Wu – maintaining the rough stalemate into the 12th century.
Buddhism is popular in Chu as well, but the people of Chu are very traditional – a mixture of the Hakka exiles from the north and a variety of indigenous peoples including the diverse ethnic groups of the mountainous Yunnan region. Each valley and mountain is said to keep its own rituals and culture, all separate from the Han influenced court rituals at Chengdu
Tai – The Tai are a curious people, deeply influenced by Hindu traders and merchants from Srivijaya as well as the Sinic settler population with which they coexist. To the Chinese their realm is either called the South Kingdom or the Daiya.
The ruler of the “South Kingdom” is an ambitious conquer named Xaysetta or Gaozong. Unlike his northern counterparts, the Tai rule more along the lines of the tribal mandala system used by the Khmer and others. There is a feudal sensibility to their rule as well – fortified villas are commonplace along the hills of the south, and they control the mountainous river valleys which define the geography of the region.
Tibet – In 1035, the Bod Empire finally collapsed. Despite a long-standing alliance between the Chu and the Bod, their pact collapsed due to border struggles, and after a series of major battles in which it seemed the Bod might triumph, Rhasa was sacked by a Chu army. The Bod Emperor was carried back to the Chu capital and the Empire was left in utter disarray.
Since that time, Tibet has been a nation in disarray. Local temples and tribal patriarchs control her mountains and valleys. Artistically and philosophically, it is a nation in retreat, uncertain of its new place in the world. The Buddhist sects which predominate teach utter detachment from the material world, and encourage many of the finest thinkers and teachers to isolate themselves in distant monastic communities. Suffering, after all, is the nature of things. The Empire is gone. There is no glory any longer, and the great halls of Rhasa lie barren and ash-filled. The splendor of Kings is transitory.
What is there now for the children of Bod?
): where do the locals go on the tribal village - tribal coalition - small kingdom - etc. spectrum? I may want to add a "pastoral clans/alliances which aren't states but still are impactful" color. What goes on north of Al-Taif's sphere of influence - after the destruction of Yathrib, has any new center of Christian Arab power emerged? More generally, are there anything like actual states in interior Arabia and north along the Empire's border? What goes on in the Yunnan area? (Zhao?) Again, what's the local level of political development? (Most maps show a state in the Yunnan area OTL around this time - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dali_Kingdom http://www.worldhistorymaps.info/images/East-Hem_1100ad.jpg , but I presume they have been butterflied).
