32. The war. #8. Back to war. 1772
32. The war. #8. Back to war. 1772
Campaign of 1772 started in April with a daring raid of the Russian vanguard under command of general Weisman. His vanguard, under the leadership of Weisman, won an impressive victory over army of Numan-Pasha at Kainarji, for which, however, the brave Weisman paid with his life.
The 1st Army. Weisman had 5 thousand, the Turks had 20 thousand but he decided to attack. After marching through the one and a half kilometer long defile, the vanguard reached the Kyuchuk-Kainardzhi valley closed from all sides, where it formed a square, and, in this order, moving forward, took a position on the edge of the hill where it was joined by rest of the troops after which the whole force marched forward and was attacked by the Ottoman cavalry and infantry. A huge crowd of Turks, scattering the Russian skirmishers, fell on the left face of the square, where they caused confusion. In order to inspire the troops, Weisman personally led them; order was restored and the attack was repulsed, but Weisman himself was killed. He only managed to say: "Don't tell the people!" However, this was the last Ottoman’s attempt to attack and counter-attack of the Russian cavalry put them to rout. Major General Golitsyn, who took command of the detachment after Weisman's death, immediately sent all the available cavalry for pursuit, which drove the enemy for 12 versts. As a revenge for the death of their beloved commander the Russians were not taking prisoners. The Ottoman losses amounted to 5,000. Russian losses were only 167 people. Weisman's death deeply saddened the whole army. Suvorov, who was friends with him, wrote: "Weisman is gone, I'm left alone..."
In a meantime Rumyantsev’s main forces had been crossing the Danube. He decided to end the protracted war and penetrate, despite all the difficulties, to the Balkans. He divided his army into four corps (detachments) and the main forces. The main role was to be played by the Kamensky (10,850, 23 guns) and Suvorov corps (14,000, 14 guns), who were ordered to go to Shumla and defeat the 50,000 strong army of the vizier, and both were given complete freedom of action. Repnin's corps was ordered to make a reserve for them, Saltykov's corps to act against Silistria, Rumyantsev himself with the main forces could support in case of need of any of the detachments.
At the beginning of April 1772, Kamensky's division crossed from Izmail to the right bank of the Danube near Isakcha. Suvorov, crossing the Danube at Girsov, marched on May 16 to the Chernovods and, moving in parallel with Kamensky, covered his offensive. On June 2, 1772, Kamensky occupied Bazardzhik after defeating a 5,000-strong detachment of enemy cavalry, which retreated towards Kozluja. On June 8, the troops of Suvorov and Kamensky joined near the village of Yushenly, 7 km from Bazardzhik.
The Turkish army led by Reisefendi Abdul-Rezak, the former Turkish Commissioner at the failed peace congress, came out to meet the Russian troops from Shumla. The vizier gave him almost all his army (up to 25,000 infantry and up to 15,000 cavalry), leaving no more than 1,000 people in Shumla. The Russian army set up a camp in Yushenly for recreation, and Suvorov and Kamensky on the morning of June 9, with the vanguard of the cavalry and Cossacks went for reconnaissance on the way to Kozluja. A detachment of Turks was seen at the exit from the Deliorman Forest. The Turks began to retreat towards Kozluja, and the Russian cavalry went deep into the forest, from which Turkish troops were waiting for it. They attacked the Cossack detachments, which were in the vanguard, and sought to cut them off from the main detachment. The Cossacks began to retreat hastily, as a result of which, due to the extreme narrowness of the road on which the troops were moving and there was a mess. Then Kamensky sent a squadron of pikeman and two squadrons of Kharkiv hussars to deter the attack of the Turks, preventing them from entering the forest. The rest of the troops began to withdraw from the defile and line up on both sides of the entrance to it. This was done quite quickly and clearly, despite the extreme tightness on the trail. At the same time, Kamensky sent for infantry. Soon three battalions arrived (two Jäger and one grenadier), which formed three squares at the edge of the forest. These battalions were commanded personally by Suvorov. Kamensky, as the senior in subordination, led the whole battle. By sending the reinforcements he prevented the Turkish attacks on the Russian flanks and the rear forcing them to retreat back to the forest. A frontal attack was repulsed by the infantry and artillery fire and the Turks had to retreat.
Suvorov immediately moved his troops to pursue the enemy and, having passed the defile, stopped in the hollow. Here, on the heights in front of Kozluja, he met most of Abdul-Rezak's troops. Kamensky, anticipating stubborn resistance, sent all the other forces of his corps to help Suvorov. Part of his cavalry was at the head, and part was in the middle of the column. Suvorov arranged his squares in one line, having cavalry on the right flank, and two regiments in reserve. After the Russian field artillery with a difficulty passed through the defile, Suvorov went on a general offensive. Russian troops occupied the heights and, turning the enemy into flight, captured two of his guns.
Stopping at that position, Suvorov for three hours subjected the Turkish troops to the cannon and rifle fire. When the return fire began to subside, Suvorov moved all squares against the enemy camp, sending forward the cavalry. The Turks could not withstand the attack and when the Russian cavalry approached, they abandoned their camp, fleeing to Shumla and Pravoda.
The Battle of Kozluja began 15 versts from this settlement, located almost in the middle between Shumla and Varna, at twelve o'clock in the afternoon, and ended only at eight o'clock in the evening. Russian troops captured 29 enemy guns and 107 banners, as well as the entire Turkish camp and many military supplies. The number of Turks killed was 500, and the number of prisoners was about 100. The Russians lost 75 lower ranks, 4 officers and 130 soldiers were wounded. While their losses were not too big, the Turks were completely demoralized and hardly capable of a continued fight. On June 16, Kamensky blocked Shumla. Varna was occupied.
Crossing the Danube in early June, Rumyantsev moved to Silistria, and Saltykov was sent to Rushchuk. Kamensky's cavalry detachment of Brigadier Zaborovsky moved beyond the Balkans (where the Russian soldier had never set foot before), sowing horror and panic everywhere. In Shumla itself, the troops began to rebel and go home. Seeing the impossibility of further struggle and risking being left without troops, the vizier appealed to the Russian commander-in-chief with a request for a truce. But Rumyantsev refused him, saying that he could only negotiate peace (which undoubtedly showed a great political flair). The vizier only had to submit.
The procedure took place at the village Kyuchuk-Kainardzhi.
Other fronts:
Archipelago Expedition.
The main force of Spiridov’s fleet was located in the Greek archipelago, using the island of Paros as a base for the Russian fleet, where a shipyard was built, as well as a small settlement. From here it was possible to control a significant part of the enemy supply lines, primarily the supply of provisions from southern Greece to Constantinople, as well as to carry out the blockade of the Dardanelles. The Aegean Sea in its narrowest part was actually completely blocked by Russian cruisers.
Plan of the direct attack on Constantinople through Dardanelles advocated by Elphinstone had been gone with its author: the operation was considered to be too risky: fortifications of the strait were not in a very good shape but they had a big number of the old huge guns capable of firing stone balls of up to 0.63 m diameter and a weight of 1,027.5 kilograms. Of course, their rate of fire was extremely slow but even a single hit could do a serious damage to a wooden ship and, anyway, the whole plan looked too risky and too much relied upon an assumption that the Sultan would freak out at the sight of the Russian ships opposite to his palace and beg for a peace.
At the military council, it was decided first of all to take the island of Tenedos, where there was a convenient parking lot for ships and from where it was possible to block the strait. The Turks rejected the proposal to surrender the fortress, after which a landing of 760 people with 6 guns landed on the shore. The fortifications of the Turks outside the fortress were taken by storm, and 5 banners were captured. The remains of the Turks who fled to the fortress were cut off in the suburbs and surrendered. To shell the fortress itself, 2 batteries with 8 guns were installed, supported by 2 ships. After the second offer to capitulate, the Turks surrendered the fortress without waiting for the assault. 1,200 prisoners and about 80 guns were taken in the fortress. Successful actions allowed the Russian fleet to get a base just 25 versts from the Dardanelles, which made it possible to completely stop the supply of food by sea to Constantinople. By the early July there were already riots in the Ottoman capital.
Azov and Black Seas.
In the campaign of 1772, the Russian Don Flotilla under the command of Vice-Admiral A. N. Senyavin performed the task of suppressing and repelling the attempts of the Ottoman fleet to land landings on the coast of Crimea, the Taman Peninsula and penetrate the Sea of Azov. In May detachment of the Don Flotilla under command of of Captain 2nd rank I. G. Kinsbergen (Jan Hendrik van Kinsbergen), two 16-gun "newly invented" (flat-bottom) ships "Crown" and "Taganrog" (the crew of both ships - 150 people, 32 guns) repaired minor damage on the Balaklava raid when approach of a big enemy ship was reported. Kinsbergen led his detachment to the Black Sea for interception. Upon approach, 3 more ships were found. Later it turned out that these were two 54-gun Turkish frigates, one 36-gun frigate and a 24-gun shebek with landing. Despite the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in the artillery (32 Russian guns against 168 Turkish guns), the commander of the Russian detachment did not evade the battle and continued to approach the enemy. The ensued battle continued for 6 hours with some visible damage being done to the Ottoman ships (on one of them, the side was so badly broken that when turning, several guns fell into the sea). Unable to withstand the Russian fire, the Turkish detachment was forced to stop the battle and leave. Due to their inferior speed, the Russian ships could not pursue effectively and returned to Balaklava. For this victory Kinsbergen was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th class. This was the first Russian sea battle on the Black Sea.
The Ottomans had been planning a big-scale landing in the Crimea where they were expected to get support from the local Tatars many of whom were “opposite to happy” with their changed status. The Ottoman fleet had been carrying anywhere between 30 and 50,000 troops under the command of the Trebezund Governor Seraskir Haji-Ali-bey Pasha (with a former Khan hanging around).
On June 9, the Turkish fleet, consisting of 40 pennants (5 ships of the line, 9 frigates, as well as 26 galleys and shebeks), trying to break through the Kerch Strait, suddenly attacked a detachment of Russian ships under the command of V. J. Chichagov, who cruised near the coast of Crimea to prevent the landing of Turkish troops. At that time, he commanded 3 frigates, 4 sixteen-gun ships, and 5 small auxiliary ships. Chichagov decided to cut off the Turkish attempts to return to their base. The Russian ship detachment anchored at the Kerch Strait, blocked the strait and the next day headed in the direction of Kerch.
On June 28, the Turkish fleet, consisting of 34 ships (6 ships of the line, 7 frigates, 1 koches, 20 galleys and shebeks), tried to break into the Sea of Azov and destroy the Russian flotilla of 12 pennants under the command of Vice-Admiral A. N. Senyavin, who guarded the Kerch Strait. The attack on Senyavin's ships by the Turks, despite three times the advantage of their force, failed and ended in complete failure. The guns of the Russian flotilla had a greater range than those of the Turks, which gave them advantage over the enemy. After artillery duel the Ottomans abandoned attempt to penetrate into the Sea of Azov and left. Due to the inferiority of his force and its low speed, Senyavin could not pursue and remained on his position guarding the Kerch Strait leaving the Ottomans with pretty much free hands in their further steps.
The Crimea.
Crimea was occupied by parts of the 2nd Russian Army under the command of General-in-Chef Prince Vasily Mikhailovich Dolgorukov. While being very good as he was at the conquest stage, in a defense he screwed things up.
The headquarters of the army commander was located on the Dnieper, and directly in the Crimea was the so-called Crimean Corps, less than 10,000, under the command of Lieutenant General Prince Alexander Alexandrovich Prozorovsky. Troops were scattered throughout the peninsula, large garrisons were located in fortresses: Perekop, Kozlov, Cafe, Balaklava, Kerch, Yenikal and Arabat. The corps headquarters and reserves were withdrawn deep into the peninsula for the convenience of control over different parts of Crimea and were located in three retranchments: near Ak-Mosque, Kafa and between Kozlov and Ak-Mosque (Simferopol).
In addition, special small (from company to battalion) detachments or posts were located at each more or less important point, primarily on the Black Sea coast. Such few posts were occupied by Alushta, Yalta, Balaklava, Sudak and other points. The cordon line of Russian troops was thin and weak everywhere. There was not a single intermediate detachment between Alushta and Yalta, Yalta and Balaklava, only weak posts (10-20 people), the nearest reserves in Bakhchisarai were too far by Crimean standards. In addition, communication between parts was extremely difficult for the mountainous terrain and the almost complete absence of carriageways. Such a line of individual posts, built on the well-known Austrian cordon system, when the army forces were scattered in vain for a huge length, any enterprising and strong opponent could easily break anywhere. The faulty of this system was always condemned by everyone, but the generals continued to adhere to it with manic persistence. To make things worse, with the Ottoman landing being expected at the Kerch Strait area, considerable forces had been moved there.
The next day after departing from the Kerch, the Turkish ships reappeared off the Crimean coast and anchored near Alushta, a small place between Yalta and Sudak. It was here, where there were no significant Russian forces, that Haji-Ali decided to start landing. Having an overwhelming numerical superiority, Seraskir was confident of success, but still demanded that the Crimean Tatars support the landing operation by attacking Russian garrisons. After capturing the bridgehead on the southern coast of Crimea, Haji-Ali planned to go deep into the mountains and go to the Angara and Kebit-Bogaz passes, through which the roads led deep into the peninsula, including the capital of the khanate - Bakhchisarai. Having occupied the mountain passes, the Turks could feel safe and easily support the rebellion of the Crimean Tatars. According to Seraskir, one spark was enough to fire the whole Crimea, and his calculations were quite justified. The Tatars not only contributed in every possible way to the landing of Turkish troops, but also openly joined them, and then an uprising broke out everywhere on the peninsula.
The Russian garrison in Alushta consisted of 150 jagers of the Moscow Legion under command of captain Kolychev. The positions of the detachment were located in a redoubt built, apparently near the remains of the old tiny Alushta fortress. The Turks, not expecting any serious opposition from the Russian side, in view of their obvious superiority, quietly began to descend the boats from the ships, which, taking people on board, headed to the Alushta coast. Despite all the apparent absurdity of the resistance, the Moscow jagers met the enemy with shots. At first, with rifle and canister fire, they managed to drive away boats that were trying to approach the shore and land the troops. But the number of enemy boats launched was growing more and more, and finally, powerful fire of numerous large-caliber artillery of the entire Ottoman fleet fell on the coastline, which could not be opposed by Kolychev's detachment. Now the jagers could no longer prevent the landing of the enemy troops, and withdrew from the shore to the last line of defense - the redoubt. The Turks calmly went on land and, gradually accumulating strength, moved to attack the Russian positions. At the hottest moment of the fight, Kolychev's detachment from the rear was attacked by the Crimean Tatars who looted its camp. The jagers had been fighting for over six hours without getting reinforcements (commander of the nearest detachment saw the fight but was afraid to come to their rescue and, instead had been sending reports to his superiors. Kolychev, with his team, broke through and retreated inland. They even managed to save their artillery pieces.
The commander of the 2nd Army Dolgorukov finally arrived with his reserve to the interior of Crimea and stopped at the Salgir retranshement, deciding to gather the main forces of the Crimean Corps there to counter the Turks, wherever they came from. However, he managed to completely misjudge the Ottoman movements and, while the landing was at Alushta, sent his reserves to Balaklava, which allowed the Ottomans to attack another small post at Yalta. In the village of Yalta there were two musketeer companies of the Bryansk regiment, very small in composition, part of the artillery team of the same regiment and 11 Don Cossacks under command of Major Saltanov. Saltanov, having received news of the appearance of the Turkish fleet at Alushta and, most likely, about the upcoming landing, immediately gathered the largest possible detachment and rushed there to help. All night they sneaded along the mountain roads parallel to the shore and even managed to prevent one of the landings but then found that more than 1,000 Turks already landed in their rear. The Cossacks sent to Alushta found it already abandoned by Kolychev and, with the news about more landings, Saltanov decided to retreat back to Yalta where he arrived just ahead of the main Ottoman fleet. After few hours of a desperate defense and running out of the ammunition, Saltanov ordered to spike the now useless guns, collect all the wounded who could still move, and charge the bayonets. Dolgorukov-Krymsky wrote in the report to Ekaterina: "...when it was impossible for his team to stay in Yalta after his batteries were on fire, this major intended to break through the enemy.” They broke out but Saltanov was killed in a process. Along the road the Turks and Tatar kept attacking them killing the wounded. Only 17 people managed to reach the Russian posion. All Christian population of Yalta had been massacred.
After the occupation of Alushta, Haji-Ali Bey was in no hurry to deploy the offensive deep into the peninsula, obviously aware of all the difficulties of the mountain march and waiting for the development of the Tatar rebellion. He only pushed forward 10 versts from the camp of his main troops, an avant-garde of 7-8 thousand people, which occupied the gorges near the villages of Shumy and Demerdzhi to block the entrance to the Alushta valley. Under the cover of the forward detachment, the Turks quietly continued to strengthen the positions of their main camp.
In a meantime, Dolgorukov finally figured out what is going on and started concentration of his troops in the center of peninsula even if Alushta was much closer to Posorovsky than Ak-Mosque. The coastal garrisons had been ordered to assemble at Sudak. Dolgorukov’s plan was to concentrate his forces to prevent any change of the Turkish victories over the small detachments.
Dolgorukov, arriving in Yanisal on July 22 the next day on July 23, sent his son-in-law, Lieutenant General Count Musin-Pushkin, to "search for the enemy", allocating most of his reserve to him, and he himself with two battalions of infantry and two cavalry regiments remained to cover the rear of Musin-Pushkin's detachment. Instead of a decisive attack by the enemy, Dolgorukov ordered his son-in-law to make just a search in the direction of Alushta, and the day after that enterprise "whatever happens, immediately come to him, leaving no post in the mountains." It is not clear why this extremely risky offensive was needed at all, reduced, after all, to a simple demonstration. After joining Musin-Pushkin, Dolgorukov planned to retreat with him to the Ak-mosque, and a day later to move closer to Bakhchisarai, to make it more convenient to observe the development of the Tatar rebellion from there and retreat further beyond Perekop.
But Dolgorukov had a problem with his subordinates who were much more energetic than he was. Even before he sent Musin-Pushkin for his strange mission, Major-General Jacobi already marched out from Janisal towards Alushta with part of the troops, namely: the Tambov Infantry Regiment, the Grenadier and 2nd Musketeer Battalions of the Moscow Legion and the Jäger team. The Tambov regiment, although it had two battalions, was very weak and barely numbered 600 people. The detachment was to be marched along the only road leading to the southern coast of Crimea through the Kebit-Bogaz pass. This road could be called as such only with a big stretch of imagination, it was an ordinary mountain path, however, trampled for, perhaps, several millennia, it went to the Alushta valley and led directly to this Tatar village. At some places it was so narrow that the 12-pounder unicorns had to be carried by hands. The troops, having made a heavy march through the "narrow between the mountains and forests to Alushta defiley", having covered a distance of about 30 km, settled down on July 23 at 6 o'clock in the morning, before reaching the village of Shumy, opposite it in the mountains. With the arrival of Musin-Pushkin, the forces of the Russian detachment increased to 7 battalions of infantry and a small number of Cossacks. A reported total was 2,850 with 14 3-pounder guns or 8-pounder unicorns and few 12-pounder unicorns.
Battle of Shumy. The Turks occupied a fortified position, which was arranged northwest of the village of Shumy "in a very favorable place, on both sides of which there were steep stone rapids reinforced by retranchment", a stone wall stretching from the village of Shumy down the slope through the gardens to the southwest, which blocked the entire defile and covered the batteries from the left flank. Position was occupied by 7 - 8,000.
Musin-Pushkin, having got acquainted with the terrain and location of the enemy, decided on the direction of the main blow. He ordered Jacobi to support the advance of Kolychev's team on the right flank with an attack on the grenadier battalion. Jacobi's square movement was greatly slowed down by natural obstacles, three times the battalion came at deep ditches. Dolgorukov reported to Catherine II: "When did the troops of Your Majesty lead... their attack... they were met with the most brutal of the guns and guns fire. The enemy, taking advantage of the convenience of the place and the superiority of forces, defended himself from retransments with such persistence that for more than two hours, when... the square, moving forward by impassable paths, acquired every step with blood, the strongest shooting made of cannons and guns on both sides did not stop.”
As soon as they crossed the last ditch, Jacobi ordered the grenadiers to "leave the rifle fire, because the continuation of it would have caused more damage to us than the enemy, who was sitting behind the stone wall... Instead of shooting with guns, he ordered them to hit him [the enemy] with the bayonets." The grenadiers’ charge brought them over the wall and the Turks, despite of their superior numbers, fled.
Colonel Liebgolt, who with the Tambov regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the Moscow Legion was placed on the neighboring mountain opposite to the village of Demerdzhi, in order to occupy the heights and gorges there in order to prevent the enemy from entering the rear of the rest of the detachment, arranged the musketeers of the Moscow Legion and the Tambov Regiment in a square and launched an attack on the second battery of the Turks. Before that, he sent 200 musketeers and 100 hurried Cossacks from his team, led by Major of the Tambov regiment Pretorius, "to cut off the enemy's way to the village of Demerdzhi." This square, overcoming powerful gunfire and rifle fire, despite the losses, also acted quite successfully, advancing to the position of the enemy. The attack was facilitated by the fact that the Turks moved most of the people from their right flank to the left to repel Jacobi's offensive. When defenders of the second battery saw the flight of the retrenchment’s defenders, they abandoned their guns and joined flight toward the main position in Alushta.
Meanwhile, on the left flank of the Musin-Pushkin detachment, Major Pretorius attacked the village of Demerdzhi, where a huge number of retreating Turks flocked from different sides. The Cossacks and musketeers broke into the village, killed those who resisted, and the rest were driven on the road to Alushta. Thus, the threat of a strike on the flank and rear of the Russian detachment was eliminated, and Musin-Pushkin's troops could calmly continue the pursuit. On a right flank the grenadiers pursued the Ottomans to Shumy, killing them with the bayonets. Some barricaded themselves in the houses but the buildings had been put on fire with their defenders burned alive: after what happened earlier the Russians were not inclined to play nicely. The resistance crumbled and pursuit continued, with the Don Cossacks being the most effective.
Only two ranking Turks had been taken prisoners. Over 300 Turks had been found dead in the main position at Shumy. Their total losses were impossible to count because many corpses were in the ravines and between the rocks. Russian troops lost 32 privates and non-commissioned officers killed, 163 lower ranks and several officers were wounded, including Major General Jacobi.
When in a hot pursuit the Russian troops got close to the Alushta position, Musin-Pushkin found that it was impossible to attack it with the force he had. Position was well-fortified with seven powerful batteries established and judging by the size of a fortified camp the enemy had an overwhelming numeric advantage. So the Russians returned to the position at Shumy.
The commander-in-chief, obviously, at this time was extremely concerned about the fate of his heavy baggage train, which he had to leave before marching to the mountains under the protection of only a small detachment. Dolgorukov constantly received reports that the rebellious Tatars are attacking Russian troops in many places, including his precious convoy, to which the Crimean khan himself allegedly rushed with a large army. The prince sent 6 cavalry squadrons to the pay and ordered Count Musin-Pushkin, who was already 24 versts from his camp in Yanisal, to immediately retreat from the fortified position of the Turkish landing.
Then Musin-Pushkin was to continue the retreat according to the order and, joining Dolgorukov, to move on the road to the Ak-Mosque to the Salgir retranschment. Dolgorukov, anticipating the "streams of blood", which, in his opinion, should have "soon flowed everywhere," was already preparing to come out of Sarabuz and intended to move further, directly to Perekop, although there was no urgent need for this. Russian troops everywhere successfully repelled Tatar attacks, in particular, the train, dilligently guarded by Dolgorukov, was freed from the Tatar blockade by only four squadrons of the Bakhmut Hussar Regiment and two squadrons of Borisoglebsk dragoons, which easily dispersed thousands of crowds of the Crimean Khan.
But before Prince Dolgurukov had a chance to embarrass himself beyond redemption, two Ottoman messengers arrived to his camp with the news that the peace was concluded in Kyuchuk-Kainardzhi. Dolgorukov was very lucky, because no one can say how his hasty flight from the Crimea would turn out to be for him. He was already reminded of all the minor failures of the Russian troops and was not forgiven for the fact that he could not prevent the landing of the Turks in Crimea and the Tatar rebellion provoked by this. At the end of the Turkish war, Catherine never awarded him the rank of field marshal, limiting herself only to the honorary title of Krymsky. This unspoken disfavor predetermined Dolgorukov's imminent resignation.
“With such good fellows... I'd kick the devil out of hell.”
Captain Kinsbergen, report after Battle at Balaklava
“The smaller the army, the more brave soldiers it has.”
“Speed and onslaught are the soul of a real war.”
Suvorov
“Two thousand warriors against ten... - Gimli said thoughtfully. - It's a sure death. So what are we waiting for?”
S.S.Musanif, ‘The shooter’s second rule’
“- There is nothing impossible either in this world or in any other, … there are only wrong approaches to solving problems.”
“If you want to win, you have to be ready to play unfairly.”
S.S.Musanif, ‘The shooter’s third rule’
“What is the main thing in the siege of the city? Don't stretch it for ten years.”
Agamemnon.
Captain Kinsbergen, report after Battle at Balaklava
“The smaller the army, the more brave soldiers it has.”
“Speed and onslaught are the soul of a real war.”
Suvorov
“Two thousand warriors against ten... - Gimli said thoughtfully. - It's a sure death. So what are we waiting for?”
S.S.Musanif, ‘The shooter’s second rule’
“- There is nothing impossible either in this world or in any other, … there are only wrong approaches to solving problems.”
“If you want to win, you have to be ready to play unfairly.”
S.S.Musanif, ‘The shooter’s third rule’
“What is the main thing in the siege of the city? Don't stretch it for ten years.”
Agamemnon.
Campaign of 1772 started in April with a daring raid of the Russian vanguard under command of general Weisman. His vanguard, under the leadership of Weisman, won an impressive victory over army of Numan-Pasha at Kainarji, for which, however, the brave Weisman paid with his life.
The 1st Army. Weisman had 5 thousand, the Turks had 20 thousand but he decided to attack. After marching through the one and a half kilometer long defile, the vanguard reached the Kyuchuk-Kainardzhi valley closed from all sides, where it formed a square, and, in this order, moving forward, took a position on the edge of the hill where it was joined by rest of the troops after which the whole force marched forward and was attacked by the Ottoman cavalry and infantry. A huge crowd of Turks, scattering the Russian skirmishers, fell on the left face of the square, where they caused confusion. In order to inspire the troops, Weisman personally led them; order was restored and the attack was repulsed, but Weisman himself was killed. He only managed to say: "Don't tell the people!" However, this was the last Ottoman’s attempt to attack and counter-attack of the Russian cavalry put them to rout. Major General Golitsyn, who took command of the detachment after Weisman's death, immediately sent all the available cavalry for pursuit, which drove the enemy for 12 versts. As a revenge for the death of their beloved commander the Russians were not taking prisoners. The Ottoman losses amounted to 5,000. Russian losses were only 167 people. Weisman's death deeply saddened the whole army. Suvorov, who was friends with him, wrote: "Weisman is gone, I'm left alone..."
In a meantime Rumyantsev’s main forces had been crossing the Danube. He decided to end the protracted war and penetrate, despite all the difficulties, to the Balkans. He divided his army into four corps (detachments) and the main forces. The main role was to be played by the Kamensky (10,850, 23 guns) and Suvorov corps (14,000, 14 guns), who were ordered to go to Shumla and defeat the 50,000 strong army of the vizier, and both were given complete freedom of action. Repnin's corps was ordered to make a reserve for them, Saltykov's corps to act against Silistria, Rumyantsev himself with the main forces could support in case of need of any of the detachments.
At the beginning of April 1772, Kamensky's division crossed from Izmail to the right bank of the Danube near Isakcha. Suvorov, crossing the Danube at Girsov, marched on May 16 to the Chernovods and, moving in parallel with Kamensky, covered his offensive. On June 2, 1772, Kamensky occupied Bazardzhik after defeating a 5,000-strong detachment of enemy cavalry, which retreated towards Kozluja. On June 8, the troops of Suvorov and Kamensky joined near the village of Yushenly, 7 km from Bazardzhik.
The Turkish army led by Reisefendi Abdul-Rezak, the former Turkish Commissioner at the failed peace congress, came out to meet the Russian troops from Shumla. The vizier gave him almost all his army (up to 25,000 infantry and up to 15,000 cavalry), leaving no more than 1,000 people in Shumla. The Russian army set up a camp in Yushenly for recreation, and Suvorov and Kamensky on the morning of June 9, with the vanguard of the cavalry and Cossacks went for reconnaissance on the way to Kozluja. A detachment of Turks was seen at the exit from the Deliorman Forest. The Turks began to retreat towards Kozluja, and the Russian cavalry went deep into the forest, from which Turkish troops were waiting for it. They attacked the Cossack detachments, which were in the vanguard, and sought to cut them off from the main detachment. The Cossacks began to retreat hastily, as a result of which, due to the extreme narrowness of the road on which the troops were moving and there was a mess. Then Kamensky sent a squadron of pikeman and two squadrons of Kharkiv hussars to deter the attack of the Turks, preventing them from entering the forest. The rest of the troops began to withdraw from the defile and line up on both sides of the entrance to it. This was done quite quickly and clearly, despite the extreme tightness on the trail. At the same time, Kamensky sent for infantry. Soon three battalions arrived (two Jäger and one grenadier), which formed three squares at the edge of the forest. These battalions were commanded personally by Suvorov. Kamensky, as the senior in subordination, led the whole battle. By sending the reinforcements he prevented the Turkish attacks on the Russian flanks and the rear forcing them to retreat back to the forest. A frontal attack was repulsed by the infantry and artillery fire and the Turks had to retreat.
Suvorov immediately moved his troops to pursue the enemy and, having passed the defile, stopped in the hollow. Here, on the heights in front of Kozluja, he met most of Abdul-Rezak's troops. Kamensky, anticipating stubborn resistance, sent all the other forces of his corps to help Suvorov. Part of his cavalry was at the head, and part was in the middle of the column. Suvorov arranged his squares in one line, having cavalry on the right flank, and two regiments in reserve. After the Russian field artillery with a difficulty passed through the defile, Suvorov went on a general offensive. Russian troops occupied the heights and, turning the enemy into flight, captured two of his guns.
Stopping at that position, Suvorov for three hours subjected the Turkish troops to the cannon and rifle fire. When the return fire began to subside, Suvorov moved all squares against the enemy camp, sending forward the cavalry. The Turks could not withstand the attack and when the Russian cavalry approached, they abandoned their camp, fleeing to Shumla and Pravoda.
The Battle of Kozluja began 15 versts from this settlement, located almost in the middle between Shumla and Varna, at twelve o'clock in the afternoon, and ended only at eight o'clock in the evening. Russian troops captured 29 enemy guns and 107 banners, as well as the entire Turkish camp and many military supplies. The number of Turks killed was 500, and the number of prisoners was about 100. The Russians lost 75 lower ranks, 4 officers and 130 soldiers were wounded. While their losses were not too big, the Turks were completely demoralized and hardly capable of a continued fight. On June 16, Kamensky blocked Shumla. Varna was occupied.
Crossing the Danube in early June, Rumyantsev moved to Silistria, and Saltykov was sent to Rushchuk. Kamensky's cavalry detachment of Brigadier Zaborovsky moved beyond the Balkans (where the Russian soldier had never set foot before), sowing horror and panic everywhere. In Shumla itself, the troops began to rebel and go home. Seeing the impossibility of further struggle and risking being left without troops, the vizier appealed to the Russian commander-in-chief with a request for a truce. But Rumyantsev refused him, saying that he could only negotiate peace (which undoubtedly showed a great political flair). The vizier only had to submit.
The procedure took place at the village Kyuchuk-Kainardzhi.
Other fronts:
Archipelago Expedition.
The main force of Spiridov’s fleet was located in the Greek archipelago, using the island of Paros as a base for the Russian fleet, where a shipyard was built, as well as a small settlement. From here it was possible to control a significant part of the enemy supply lines, primarily the supply of provisions from southern Greece to Constantinople, as well as to carry out the blockade of the Dardanelles. The Aegean Sea in its narrowest part was actually completely blocked by Russian cruisers.
Plan of the direct attack on Constantinople through Dardanelles advocated by Elphinstone had been gone with its author: the operation was considered to be too risky: fortifications of the strait were not in a very good shape but they had a big number of the old huge guns capable of firing stone balls of up to 0.63 m diameter and a weight of 1,027.5 kilograms. Of course, their rate of fire was extremely slow but even a single hit could do a serious damage to a wooden ship and, anyway, the whole plan looked too risky and too much relied upon an assumption that the Sultan would freak out at the sight of the Russian ships opposite to his palace and beg for a peace.
At the military council, it was decided first of all to take the island of Tenedos, where there was a convenient parking lot for ships and from where it was possible to block the strait. The Turks rejected the proposal to surrender the fortress, after which a landing of 760 people with 6 guns landed on the shore. The fortifications of the Turks outside the fortress were taken by storm, and 5 banners were captured. The remains of the Turks who fled to the fortress were cut off in the suburbs and surrendered. To shell the fortress itself, 2 batteries with 8 guns were installed, supported by 2 ships. After the second offer to capitulate, the Turks surrendered the fortress without waiting for the assault. 1,200 prisoners and about 80 guns were taken in the fortress. Successful actions allowed the Russian fleet to get a base just 25 versts from the Dardanelles, which made it possible to completely stop the supply of food by sea to Constantinople. By the early July there were already riots in the Ottoman capital.
Azov and Black Seas.
In the campaign of 1772, the Russian Don Flotilla under the command of Vice-Admiral A. N. Senyavin performed the task of suppressing and repelling the attempts of the Ottoman fleet to land landings on the coast of Crimea, the Taman Peninsula and penetrate the Sea of Azov. In May detachment of the Don Flotilla under command of of Captain 2nd rank I. G. Kinsbergen (Jan Hendrik van Kinsbergen), two 16-gun "newly invented" (flat-bottom) ships "Crown" and "Taganrog" (the crew of both ships - 150 people, 32 guns) repaired minor damage on the Balaklava raid when approach of a big enemy ship was reported. Kinsbergen led his detachment to the Black Sea for interception. Upon approach, 3 more ships were found. Later it turned out that these were two 54-gun Turkish frigates, one 36-gun frigate and a 24-gun shebek with landing. Despite the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in the artillery (32 Russian guns against 168 Turkish guns), the commander of the Russian detachment did not evade the battle and continued to approach the enemy. The ensued battle continued for 6 hours with some visible damage being done to the Ottoman ships (on one of them, the side was so badly broken that when turning, several guns fell into the sea). Unable to withstand the Russian fire, the Turkish detachment was forced to stop the battle and leave. Due to their inferior speed, the Russian ships could not pursue effectively and returned to Balaklava. For this victory Kinsbergen was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th class. This was the first Russian sea battle on the Black Sea.
The Ottomans had been planning a big-scale landing in the Crimea where they were expected to get support from the local Tatars many of whom were “opposite to happy” with their changed status. The Ottoman fleet had been carrying anywhere between 30 and 50,000 troops under the command of the Trebezund Governor Seraskir Haji-Ali-bey Pasha (with a former Khan hanging around).
On June 9, the Turkish fleet, consisting of 40 pennants (5 ships of the line, 9 frigates, as well as 26 galleys and shebeks), trying to break through the Kerch Strait, suddenly attacked a detachment of Russian ships under the command of V. J. Chichagov, who cruised near the coast of Crimea to prevent the landing of Turkish troops. At that time, he commanded 3 frigates, 4 sixteen-gun ships, and 5 small auxiliary ships. Chichagov decided to cut off the Turkish attempts to return to their base. The Russian ship detachment anchored at the Kerch Strait, blocked the strait and the next day headed in the direction of Kerch.
On June 28, the Turkish fleet, consisting of 34 ships (6 ships of the line, 7 frigates, 1 koches, 20 galleys and shebeks), tried to break into the Sea of Azov and destroy the Russian flotilla of 12 pennants under the command of Vice-Admiral A. N. Senyavin, who guarded the Kerch Strait. The attack on Senyavin's ships by the Turks, despite three times the advantage of their force, failed and ended in complete failure. The guns of the Russian flotilla had a greater range than those of the Turks, which gave them advantage over the enemy. After artillery duel the Ottomans abandoned attempt to penetrate into the Sea of Azov and left. Due to the inferiority of his force and its low speed, Senyavin could not pursue and remained on his position guarding the Kerch Strait leaving the Ottomans with pretty much free hands in their further steps.
The Crimea.
Crimea was occupied by parts of the 2nd Russian Army under the command of General-in-Chef Prince Vasily Mikhailovich Dolgorukov. While being very good as he was at the conquest stage, in a defense he screwed things up.
The headquarters of the army commander was located on the Dnieper, and directly in the Crimea was the so-called Crimean Corps, less than 10,000, under the command of Lieutenant General Prince Alexander Alexandrovich Prozorovsky. Troops were scattered throughout the peninsula, large garrisons were located in fortresses: Perekop, Kozlov, Cafe, Balaklava, Kerch, Yenikal and Arabat. The corps headquarters and reserves were withdrawn deep into the peninsula for the convenience of control over different parts of Crimea and were located in three retranchments: near Ak-Mosque, Kafa and between Kozlov and Ak-Mosque (Simferopol).
In addition, special small (from company to battalion) detachments or posts were located at each more or less important point, primarily on the Black Sea coast. Such few posts were occupied by Alushta, Yalta, Balaklava, Sudak and other points. The cordon line of Russian troops was thin and weak everywhere. There was not a single intermediate detachment between Alushta and Yalta, Yalta and Balaklava, only weak posts (10-20 people), the nearest reserves in Bakhchisarai were too far by Crimean standards. In addition, communication between parts was extremely difficult for the mountainous terrain and the almost complete absence of carriageways. Such a line of individual posts, built on the well-known Austrian cordon system, when the army forces were scattered in vain for a huge length, any enterprising and strong opponent could easily break anywhere. The faulty of this system was always condemned by everyone, but the generals continued to adhere to it with manic persistence. To make things worse, with the Ottoman landing being expected at the Kerch Strait area, considerable forces had been moved there.
The next day after departing from the Kerch, the Turkish ships reappeared off the Crimean coast and anchored near Alushta, a small place between Yalta and Sudak. It was here, where there were no significant Russian forces, that Haji-Ali decided to start landing. Having an overwhelming numerical superiority, Seraskir was confident of success, but still demanded that the Crimean Tatars support the landing operation by attacking Russian garrisons. After capturing the bridgehead on the southern coast of Crimea, Haji-Ali planned to go deep into the mountains and go to the Angara and Kebit-Bogaz passes, through which the roads led deep into the peninsula, including the capital of the khanate - Bakhchisarai. Having occupied the mountain passes, the Turks could feel safe and easily support the rebellion of the Crimean Tatars. According to Seraskir, one spark was enough to fire the whole Crimea, and his calculations were quite justified. The Tatars not only contributed in every possible way to the landing of Turkish troops, but also openly joined them, and then an uprising broke out everywhere on the peninsula.
The Russian garrison in Alushta consisted of 150 jagers of the Moscow Legion under command of captain Kolychev. The positions of the detachment were located in a redoubt built, apparently near the remains of the old tiny Alushta fortress. The Turks, not expecting any serious opposition from the Russian side, in view of their obvious superiority, quietly began to descend the boats from the ships, which, taking people on board, headed to the Alushta coast. Despite all the apparent absurdity of the resistance, the Moscow jagers met the enemy with shots. At first, with rifle and canister fire, they managed to drive away boats that were trying to approach the shore and land the troops. But the number of enemy boats launched was growing more and more, and finally, powerful fire of numerous large-caliber artillery of the entire Ottoman fleet fell on the coastline, which could not be opposed by Kolychev's detachment. Now the jagers could no longer prevent the landing of the enemy troops, and withdrew from the shore to the last line of defense - the redoubt. The Turks calmly went on land and, gradually accumulating strength, moved to attack the Russian positions. At the hottest moment of the fight, Kolychev's detachment from the rear was attacked by the Crimean Tatars who looted its camp. The jagers had been fighting for over six hours without getting reinforcements (commander of the nearest detachment saw the fight but was afraid to come to their rescue and, instead had been sending reports to his superiors. Kolychev, with his team, broke through and retreated inland. They even managed to save their artillery pieces.
The commander of the 2nd Army Dolgorukov finally arrived with his reserve to the interior of Crimea and stopped at the Salgir retranshement, deciding to gather the main forces of the Crimean Corps there to counter the Turks, wherever they came from. However, he managed to completely misjudge the Ottoman movements and, while the landing was at Alushta, sent his reserves to Balaklava, which allowed the Ottomans to attack another small post at Yalta. In the village of Yalta there were two musketeer companies of the Bryansk regiment, very small in composition, part of the artillery team of the same regiment and 11 Don Cossacks under command of Major Saltanov. Saltanov, having received news of the appearance of the Turkish fleet at Alushta and, most likely, about the upcoming landing, immediately gathered the largest possible detachment and rushed there to help. All night they sneaded along the mountain roads parallel to the shore and even managed to prevent one of the landings but then found that more than 1,000 Turks already landed in their rear. The Cossacks sent to Alushta found it already abandoned by Kolychev and, with the news about more landings, Saltanov decided to retreat back to Yalta where he arrived just ahead of the main Ottoman fleet. After few hours of a desperate defense and running out of the ammunition, Saltanov ordered to spike the now useless guns, collect all the wounded who could still move, and charge the bayonets. Dolgorukov-Krymsky wrote in the report to Ekaterina: "...when it was impossible for his team to stay in Yalta after his batteries were on fire, this major intended to break through the enemy.” They broke out but Saltanov was killed in a process. Along the road the Turks and Tatar kept attacking them killing the wounded. Only 17 people managed to reach the Russian posion. All Christian population of Yalta had been massacred.
After the occupation of Alushta, Haji-Ali Bey was in no hurry to deploy the offensive deep into the peninsula, obviously aware of all the difficulties of the mountain march and waiting for the development of the Tatar rebellion. He only pushed forward 10 versts from the camp of his main troops, an avant-garde of 7-8 thousand people, which occupied the gorges near the villages of Shumy and Demerdzhi to block the entrance to the Alushta valley. Under the cover of the forward detachment, the Turks quietly continued to strengthen the positions of their main camp.
In a meantime, Dolgorukov finally figured out what is going on and started concentration of his troops in the center of peninsula even if Alushta was much closer to Posorovsky than Ak-Mosque. The coastal garrisons had been ordered to assemble at Sudak. Dolgorukov’s plan was to concentrate his forces to prevent any change of the Turkish victories over the small detachments.
Dolgorukov, arriving in Yanisal on July 22 the next day on July 23, sent his son-in-law, Lieutenant General Count Musin-Pushkin, to "search for the enemy", allocating most of his reserve to him, and he himself with two battalions of infantry and two cavalry regiments remained to cover the rear of Musin-Pushkin's detachment. Instead of a decisive attack by the enemy, Dolgorukov ordered his son-in-law to make just a search in the direction of Alushta, and the day after that enterprise "whatever happens, immediately come to him, leaving no post in the mountains." It is not clear why this extremely risky offensive was needed at all, reduced, after all, to a simple demonstration. After joining Musin-Pushkin, Dolgorukov planned to retreat with him to the Ak-mosque, and a day later to move closer to Bakhchisarai, to make it more convenient to observe the development of the Tatar rebellion from there and retreat further beyond Perekop.
But Dolgorukov had a problem with his subordinates who were much more energetic than he was. Even before he sent Musin-Pushkin for his strange mission, Major-General Jacobi already marched out from Janisal towards Alushta with part of the troops, namely: the Tambov Infantry Regiment, the Grenadier and 2nd Musketeer Battalions of the Moscow Legion and the Jäger team. The Tambov regiment, although it had two battalions, was very weak and barely numbered 600 people. The detachment was to be marched along the only road leading to the southern coast of Crimea through the Kebit-Bogaz pass. This road could be called as such only with a big stretch of imagination, it was an ordinary mountain path, however, trampled for, perhaps, several millennia, it went to the Alushta valley and led directly to this Tatar village. At some places it was so narrow that the 12-pounder unicorns had to be carried by hands. The troops, having made a heavy march through the "narrow between the mountains and forests to Alushta defiley", having covered a distance of about 30 km, settled down on July 23 at 6 o'clock in the morning, before reaching the village of Shumy, opposite it in the mountains. With the arrival of Musin-Pushkin, the forces of the Russian detachment increased to 7 battalions of infantry and a small number of Cossacks. A reported total was 2,850 with 14 3-pounder guns or 8-pounder unicorns and few 12-pounder unicorns.
Battle of Shumy. The Turks occupied a fortified position, which was arranged northwest of the village of Shumy "in a very favorable place, on both sides of which there were steep stone rapids reinforced by retranchment", a stone wall stretching from the village of Shumy down the slope through the gardens to the southwest, which blocked the entire defile and covered the batteries from the left flank. Position was occupied by 7 - 8,000.
Musin-Pushkin, having got acquainted with the terrain and location of the enemy, decided on the direction of the main blow. He ordered Jacobi to support the advance of Kolychev's team on the right flank with an attack on the grenadier battalion. Jacobi's square movement was greatly slowed down by natural obstacles, three times the battalion came at deep ditches. Dolgorukov reported to Catherine II: "When did the troops of Your Majesty lead... their attack... they were met with the most brutal of the guns and guns fire. The enemy, taking advantage of the convenience of the place and the superiority of forces, defended himself from retransments with such persistence that for more than two hours, when... the square, moving forward by impassable paths, acquired every step with blood, the strongest shooting made of cannons and guns on both sides did not stop.”
As soon as they crossed the last ditch, Jacobi ordered the grenadiers to "leave the rifle fire, because the continuation of it would have caused more damage to us than the enemy, who was sitting behind the stone wall... Instead of shooting with guns, he ordered them to hit him [the enemy] with the bayonets." The grenadiers’ charge brought them over the wall and the Turks, despite of their superior numbers, fled.
Colonel Liebgolt, who with the Tambov regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the Moscow Legion was placed on the neighboring mountain opposite to the village of Demerdzhi, in order to occupy the heights and gorges there in order to prevent the enemy from entering the rear of the rest of the detachment, arranged the musketeers of the Moscow Legion and the Tambov Regiment in a square and launched an attack on the second battery of the Turks. Before that, he sent 200 musketeers and 100 hurried Cossacks from his team, led by Major of the Tambov regiment Pretorius, "to cut off the enemy's way to the village of Demerdzhi." This square, overcoming powerful gunfire and rifle fire, despite the losses, also acted quite successfully, advancing to the position of the enemy. The attack was facilitated by the fact that the Turks moved most of the people from their right flank to the left to repel Jacobi's offensive. When defenders of the second battery saw the flight of the retrenchment’s defenders, they abandoned their guns and joined flight toward the main position in Alushta.
Meanwhile, on the left flank of the Musin-Pushkin detachment, Major Pretorius attacked the village of Demerdzhi, where a huge number of retreating Turks flocked from different sides. The Cossacks and musketeers broke into the village, killed those who resisted, and the rest were driven on the road to Alushta. Thus, the threat of a strike on the flank and rear of the Russian detachment was eliminated, and Musin-Pushkin's troops could calmly continue the pursuit. On a right flank the grenadiers pursued the Ottomans to Shumy, killing them with the bayonets. Some barricaded themselves in the houses but the buildings had been put on fire with their defenders burned alive: after what happened earlier the Russians were not inclined to play nicely. The resistance crumbled and pursuit continued, with the Don Cossacks being the most effective.
Only two ranking Turks had been taken prisoners. Over 300 Turks had been found dead in the main position at Shumy. Their total losses were impossible to count because many corpses were in the ravines and between the rocks. Russian troops lost 32 privates and non-commissioned officers killed, 163 lower ranks and several officers were wounded, including Major General Jacobi.
When in a hot pursuit the Russian troops got close to the Alushta position, Musin-Pushkin found that it was impossible to attack it with the force he had. Position was well-fortified with seven powerful batteries established and judging by the size of a fortified camp the enemy had an overwhelming numeric advantage. So the Russians returned to the position at Shumy.
The commander-in-chief, obviously, at this time was extremely concerned about the fate of his heavy baggage train, which he had to leave before marching to the mountains under the protection of only a small detachment. Dolgorukov constantly received reports that the rebellious Tatars are attacking Russian troops in many places, including his precious convoy, to which the Crimean khan himself allegedly rushed with a large army. The prince sent 6 cavalry squadrons to the pay and ordered Count Musin-Pushkin, who was already 24 versts from his camp in Yanisal, to immediately retreat from the fortified position of the Turkish landing.
Then Musin-Pushkin was to continue the retreat according to the order and, joining Dolgorukov, to move on the road to the Ak-Mosque to the Salgir retranschment. Dolgorukov, anticipating the "streams of blood", which, in his opinion, should have "soon flowed everywhere," was already preparing to come out of Sarabuz and intended to move further, directly to Perekop, although there was no urgent need for this. Russian troops everywhere successfully repelled Tatar attacks, in particular, the train, dilligently guarded by Dolgorukov, was freed from the Tatar blockade by only four squadrons of the Bakhmut Hussar Regiment and two squadrons of Borisoglebsk dragoons, which easily dispersed thousands of crowds of the Crimean Khan.
But before Prince Dolgurukov had a chance to embarrass himself beyond redemption, two Ottoman messengers arrived to his camp with the news that the peace was concluded in Kyuchuk-Kainardzhi. Dolgorukov was very lucky, because no one can say how his hasty flight from the Crimea would turn out to be for him. He was already reminded of all the minor failures of the Russian troops and was not forgiven for the fact that he could not prevent the landing of the Turks in Crimea and the Tatar rebellion provoked by this. At the end of the Turkish war, Catherine never awarded him the rank of field marshal, limiting herself only to the honorary title of Krymsky. This unspoken disfavor predetermined Dolgorukov's imminent resignation.
