I also think the reign of Septimius Severus did enormous damage to the Empire in the long term, though its effects were probably not immediately obvious. Because of the Senate's apparent support for his rival Clodius Albinus, Severus' revenge on that ancient institution was deep and lasting. He effectively removed the Senate as a tool for meaningful patronage and a possible (if only slight) counterbalance to the power of the army. The relocation from Rome to Mediolanum and later Ravenna only served to exacerbate the isolation of the Emperor and increase the power of their Barbarian masters.
So Why DID the Western Roman Empire Collapse?
- Thread starter asnys
- Start date
Arcadius had certain other advantages that had nothing whatsoever to do with his personal qualities (or lack thereof):
1) Much more defensible geography
2) Greater population and resources
3) A really nifty set of city walls and lots of seawater to defend his capital
Every time we ask why the Western Empire fell we must also ask why the East did not. A lot of that has to do with the factors listed above. If anything, the Western Empire had better leadership in that first decade of the 400's than the East did (that is to say, Stilicho).
No, immigration caused it. That's why we need to boot out the Muslims/Poles/Mexicans. It's only a matter of time till we have a black lesbian Muslim from Zimbabwe as a communist dictator, our odoacer.
Yes, that was what I was getting at. I would also point out though that the east had an entirely different way of managing crises than the west-they preferred to manage them diplomatically and also as a result did a better job (at least in the 5th century) at keeping the imperial office under control of the civil administration rather than the army.
I'd argue though that on paper the west had more defensible borders. All of the west's prosperous provinces were far from the frontier-ITaly, Spain, and especially North Africa. It had two rivers to defend its borders. The east, on the other hand, does have the advantage of being able to funnel invaders into the into the Balkans, but had a wide open land border with the Sassanians that exposed all their wealthiest provinces. The difference was, the Sassanians were a single stable empire, not a ton of petty chiefdoms that are looking to pour across the frontier.
Also, the Theodosian Walls weren't built until after Arcadius's death. The original walls of Constantinople weren't all that more difficult to breach than any other city.
1. That's a fair point on Constantinople's diplomatic focus. That may have developed in part from having to regularly deal with a peer competitor power (Persia).
2. I'd argue that rivers are generally poor defensive lines, especially if they're in plains or open steppe, if you're facing a numerous and determined foe. In practice, they proved easy for the barbarians to cross, even before the Rhine froze over in 406; the difference was that the cross-ers in question were usually manageable in numbers and organization for the Romans to deal with. Likewise, the Euphrates was not much help to the Eastern Empire, but the rugged terrain of Anatolia, on the other hand, was a different matter, as were the deserts that adjoined the Levant and Egypt.
The Eastern Romans were mainly able to contain the Sassanids thanks to both that geography and the fact that most of their mobile and garrison forces were stationed on that border. The price for that, of course, was that those commitments also limited what Constantinople could use in the Balkans, or assisting the Western Empire. The reality is that most of the Eastern Empire's boundaries were really sea or desert, and that was a great advantage over the West, which had long stretches of the Hungarian and North German plains to defend - and, of course, fewer resources with which to defend them.
3. You are indeed right that Constantinople was defended by Constantine's original walls during Arcadius's reign; the Theodosian Walls were built shortly thereafter, after which my point possesses my full force. Nonetheless, they were adequate up to that time, because being sited on a peninsula meant that only a fairly limited stretch of wall really had to be manned at full strength against a besieging army, unless it had a navy (which none of Byzantium's foes in that era possessed) - and the city could always be supplied or relieved by sea, unlike Rome.
It really was a superb site for an imperial capital, tactically as well as strategically.
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1.) Yes, I'd agree (also, Attila The Hun I believe played a large role as well in that development). Though afterward, the most effective method the ERE used to deal with steppe nomads descending on the Great Hungarian Plain was to contact and solicit the support of the steppe nomads further away to attack them.
2.) While true, the most productive regions of the ERE were highly vulnerable from a pure geographic standpoint-Egypt and Syria mainly. Compare this to the western Empire-you had the Alps to protect Italy from the north, Spain was sheltered by Gaul and the Pyrenees, and North Africa was sheltered of course by the sea, Spain, and Italy. It isn't that bad for the empire if Gaul or Dalmatia is raided; the main income of the west came from those areas mentioned far from the frontier. Any breakthrough of the Rhine, if it can be contained to Gaul, will not be that damaging until the time comes to defeat it. The problem came when the west was faced with barbarians roaming around Gaul, a usurper in Gaul preventing the main government from dealing with said barbarians, another usurper rising in Spain, Goths marauding in Italy, and a power struggle erupting to to take control of the emperor.
Only then were the barbarians able to seriously threaten the productive lands of the west for, really, the first time during the entire empire's existence. Otherwise, from a pure geographic standpoint, the economic heartland of the west is much better protected than that of the east.
3.) I won't disagree with you there.
2.) While true, the most productive regions of the ERE were highly vulnerable from a pure geographic standpoint-Egypt and Syria mainly. Compare this to the western Empire-you had the Alps to protect Italy from the north, Spain was sheltered by Gaul and the Pyrenees, and North Africa was sheltered of course by the sea, Spain, and Italy. It isn't that bad for the empire if Gaul or Dalmatia is raided; the main income of the west came from those areas mentioned far from the frontier. Any breakthrough of the Rhine, if it can be contained to Gaul, will not be that damaging until the time comes to defeat it. The problem came when the west was faced with barbarians roaming around Gaul, a usurper in Gaul preventing the main government from dealing with said barbarians, another usurper rising in Spain, Goths marauding in Italy, and a power struggle erupting to to take control of the emperor.
Only then were the barbarians able to seriously threaten the productive lands of the west for, really, the first time during the entire empire's existence. Otherwise, from a pure geographic standpoint, the economic heartland of the west is much better protected than that of the east.
3.) I won't disagree with you there.
Hello Sly,
My reading of Heather is this: That late 4th/5th Century Rome had the strength to held at bay a vigorous new Persian Empire under the Sassanids, or the wave of more sophisticated Germanic and Hunnic tribes threatening the Danube frontiers - but not both at the same time.
As Heather says, it took the Roman Empire about half a century to cope with the Sassanid threat, which it managed to do mainly by stripping the western provincial towns and cities of their regional taxation income; something like a quarter of the army's full manpower was basically tied down permanently on the Persian frontier, an unprecedented situation. The resulting expansion of military forces on the Persian frontier was finally successful in stabilizing the frontiers with the Sassanids by the late 4th century, but the reduction of real income in the provinces of the Empire led to a drying up of incentives for local (western) officials to spend their time and money in the development of local infrastructure.
Of course, Heather has his critics...but whether you buy into the large or small late Roman Army argument, or however much qualitative deterioration you might ascribe to the post-Constantinian Army, it strikes me that never before in its history had Rome had to face such a powerful set of foes at the same time.
My reading of Heather is this: That late 4th/5th Century Rome had the strength to held at bay a vigorous new Persian Empire under the Sassanids, or the wave of more sophisticated Germanic and Hunnic tribes threatening the Danube frontiers - but not both at the same time.
As Heather says, it took the Roman Empire about half a century to cope with the Sassanid threat, which it managed to do mainly by stripping the western provincial towns and cities of their regional taxation income; something like a quarter of the army's full manpower was basically tied down permanently on the Persian frontier, an unprecedented situation. The resulting expansion of military forces on the Persian frontier was finally successful in stabilizing the frontiers with the Sassanids by the late 4th century, but the reduction of real income in the provinces of the Empire led to a drying up of incentives for local (western) officials to spend their time and money in the development of local infrastructure.
Of course, Heather has his critics...but whether you buy into the large or small late Roman Army argument, or however much qualitative deterioration you might ascribe to the post-Constantinian Army, it strikes me that never before in its history had Rome had to face such a powerful set of foes at the same time.
I agree completely with Heather, so you'll see no argument from me here.
Faeelin
Banned
But surely the western and eastern empires had separate fiscs; why would the western empire be paying to defend Syria, when Egypt could afford it?
That's not really a disagreement, unless you place no blame on Honorius. I certainly wasn't denying that there were a number of factors at play, it's just that Honorius (and Valentinian for that matter) hadn't been mentioned for the parts they played in this thread. With a more competent head of state in 400 the empire could have seen fewer civil wars, and with fewer civil wars more invasions could potentially have been turned aside before they caused significant damage to core provinces.
TinyTartar
Banned
I think Severus was probably the last chance for an actual Roman conquest of Germania. The army was powerful at this point, as powerful as really it had ever been, the Persian frontier was relatively secure after the quick campaign at the start of his reign.
And more importantly, by this point in time, Germania had started to adopt enough Roman ideas and structures through extensive mercantile ties, while militarily were at a pretty weak point in time due to the lack of strong confederations. Essentially, they were still small enough in population and weak enough militarily to be defeated by the Roman Legions, who were as strong as they probably ever would be with a good soldier leading them, while at the same time, they had enough Romanesque structures in place to allow for Roman conquest to be lasting, unlike with the time of Augustus where it would turn into a never ending game of revolts and separatism, with Roman administration basically trying to do the equivalent of lassoing jello.
Severus probably could have pulled this off had he wanted to, but the Rhine was by this point an embedded concept in Roman strategical mindset. His campaign in Scotland was a waste of time, really. A campaign into Germania where he sets up some clients, takes a shitload of slaves and all the wealth he could carry off (which would help the economic situation that he screwed up with devaluing the currency to cover the civil war) would be beneficial for Rome, a lot more that is than messing about in Scotland.
I suppose the Barbarians must have won through superior equipment, like you know, more ubiquitous and better armour and supply systems, or like, maybe cannons. Or because the late Romans were sissified moral deviants who lost the pure martial spirit of their ancestor.
Cause you know, DISCIPLINED HEAVY INFANTRY IS UNBEATABLE.
I must note, though, for something that's so unbeatable it sure gets beaten a lot.
I don't think there are any real mounted archer armies in Europe prior to the Huns, and perhaps not even the Huns qualify (I've see LSCatilina argue that and he's more of an expert on the migration era).
On the other hand we do see light and heavy horse make increased appearances in Germanic armies basically at the same time as the Romans go cavalry-heavy.
What don't we see? Evidence of massive amounts of metalwork outside Roman territory which would suggest the Germans would have had equipment parity let alone superiority. So "heavy infantry" remained mostly with the Romans who could equip men better and cheaper, yet still lost in the long run. Why would both the Romans and their neighbours build up strong cavalry forces if they couldn't actually fight their most likely opponents (Romans in both cases)?
As for archery, I don't think foot archery was really ever a war-winning weapon by itself, and the late Romans certainly employed a lot of archers, like the very Germans we were talking about earlier (including as bodyguard units).
What does this suggest to me? Well, it suggests the migration-era Germans got more cavalry as a result of their increasing strategic and political sophistication. The answer about why they succeeded probably lies in that and not in some battlefield-winning superweapon.
But if there is a thing that's as close to a superweapon as can be in the period, heavy cavalry is it. It's effective as a tactical unit, a strategic war-waging tool, and as a state-buidling tool as well, especially if the state you are building is a military oligarchy.
IDK, I sorta have this feeling the force Trajan used to conquer Dacia would have been more than enough to easily win at Adrianople or Chalons or to stop the crossing of the Rhine, to name a few examples.
As for my opinion on why it fell - I think all of the following factors were necessary. Take out any one of them, and it's a totally different story.
- the Great Migration
These were peoples who had been exposed to Roman influence for centuries, influence which transformed their societies and allowed them to wage the campaigns they did. Had they stayed put on the other side of the Rhine/Danube, the Empire would not have fallen
- Plague
Having a large part of your tax base and of your professional military killed doesn't really help.
- Environmental causes
Besides creating the conditions for the Great Migrations, they also lead to decreasing agricultural yields in the Roman Empire, something which can be fatal for a complex yet agrarian society
- Rise of Sassanid Persia
Required a lot more of the east's ressources to contain them, ressources that were thus unavailable to combat the Goths or Huns
- Political instability
Sure, the other circumstances exacerbated an already existing problem. Still, people like Constantine III or Bonifacius really, really fucked up. Their actions led directly to the loss of Britain, Gaul, Hispania and Africa. Had a competent leader prevented the Germanics from crossing the Rhine, or the Vandals from crossing the Med, it's quite possible the Empire would have continued, even given the presence of the Goths
Sure - if for no other reason than that Trajan would have been leading that army, rather than Valens...
The point is not that Adrianople wasn't winnable, or any other particular battle (though the Huns might have been a tough fight at their peak). The problem is that the quality and quantity of foes Rome had to face in the aggregate in this time frame were well beyond what it had had to deal with during the Principate, even with the greater resources of the (more thoroughly Romanized) 4th century Empire.
Basically, no Barbarian army is only cavalry-based, and the ratio may even be lesser than for Romans.
For exemple, at Adrianople, the ratio is maybe 1/3 for Romans, while, as for Goths...
Robert Eisenberg said:
As for Franks, the use of cavalry is largely due to influence of Roman military, whom "cavalrisation" is itself due to Sarmatic/German influences in the IInd to IIIrd centuries.
Huns are often depicted as some Late Antiquity version of Mongols, but...
Well, first, Hunnic hegemony gathered a lot of peoples, and Huns propers were the minority (25% at best). The rest was including Goths, Franks, Herulii, Burgundians, etc.
What we identify as Hunnic warfare was eventually pretty close to the usual German warfare, hugely influenced by Sarmatians and Romans uses. (And even for Huns proper, it's actually not that easy to make a radical distinction between Sarmatians and Huns in part of the equipment in tombs).
While Huns may had more access to cavalry (which doesn't means cavalry-dominated, see below), it's more certain by the Late Antiquity situation, once they're reduced to Danubian and Black Sea coasts : Strategikon advices to attack them in winter, to prevent them using efficiently their cavalry (while, at this point, Huns may have been "Avarized" or plainly Avars, Byzantines being known to use "Huns" for unrelated peoples). But there's nothing to wholly disprove a more important cavalry among Huns proper (even if they're known to be not predominantly so).
But that Hunnic armies, once including their subjects (they lost by the mid Vth) were predominantly or even largely cavalry-based? That can't really be sustained, neither supported.
Essentially trough their entry in Romania, where influence of a Roman army (itself more cavalry based, would it be only trough more ressources avaible), and with the constitution of Romano-Barbarian hegemonies, using both Roman/Romanized troops and more cavalry-based peoples (as Alans).
As was demonstrated by the Battle of Chalons : it's a weapon hard to master (again, Goths had a really limited cavalry at Adrianople, contrary to Romans, but the latter were defeated, altough for political/structural problems rather than strategical, strictly speaking), but that can pressure efficiently.
The Romans of the late empire rarely lost on the battlefield against barbarians. When they do encounter barbarian armies, it's almost always a victory-Julian at Strasbourg, Stilicho against Alaric in the Balkans, Stilicho against ALaric in ITaly, Stilicho against Radagaisus Constantius against the Goths in southern Gaul, Constantius against the barbarian tribes in Spain, Aetius against the Burgundians, Aetius against the Huns, Majorian etc. Adrianople was an exception to this rule because Valens mishandled the situation so badly.
The problem for the Romans was not that they thought they couldn't win in a pitched fight. It was that they calculated that they could not afford the losses a series of pitched battles would incur. So for Stilicho, destroying Alaric would not only cause him to lose too many men that he couldn't replace, but he would lose Alaric's Goths as potential forces at his disposal. The same went for Stilicho's calculations against Radagaisus's forces, for Constantius with the Goths in Spain and southern Gaul. The Roman Empire in the west and east simply could not replace their losses effectively anymore.