So Why DID the Western Roman Empire Collapse?

Mostly what LSCatilina has been saying, but it should also be noted that Honorius really deserves a fair deal of personal blame for his incompetent rule.
 

TinyTartar

Banned
Mostly what LSCatilina has been saying, but it should also be noted that Honorius really deserves a fair deal of personal blame for his incompetent rule.

Kind of odd that the utterly useless ones were the ones that actually lived for a while. I guess maybe he and Valentinian were smarter than they appeared; being shit emperors meant they kept their heads for longer than anyone who showed promise.

Although really, Honorius did almost nothing and delegated to Stilicho and others almost everything.
 
To be fair, a lot of bad decisions isn't due to Honorius, but either Stilicho own interventionism, more than often going too importantly (even if it was objectively necessary) and the growingly anti-Barbarian senatorial elites (revolt of Eutropos, slaughter of Goths in 400, etc.)

Not that Honorius shouldn't be blamed but he makes me think of a Late Antiquity's John Lackland : percieving the political issues, relatively competent in some matters but generally deeply lacking basic skills to realize whatever he wanted, eventually allowing ambitious as Flavius Constantius to appear.

It was more of a real Roman political problem in the West, with antagonizing senatorial elites that didn't provided a viable alternative to the presence of Romano-Barbarians but still rejected them.
 
The East-West split also left the Western Empire without the East's resources.
Ultimately, Rome collapsed because of decisions made early in the history of the Empire (and in some cases, in the Republic) that seemed like good ideas at the time, but became unsustainable when times grew tougher. That's the only reason any power collapses.
The robot speaks the truth.
 
There, I'd disagree entierly. Feudality conceptually doesn't appear before late Carolingian times. The whole principle of systematical devolution of power associated with property is unknown in Merovingian Gaul, or Visigothic Spain.

I did not white nor mean that It was simultaneous. I mentioned the formation of kingdoms and then the split of these kingdoms into smaller principalities, and the fact that It took centuries.

Concerning feudality, of course it was completed under the last Carolingians and their successors, but the process of feudalization began much earlier. There was already strong signs in the late sixth and early seventh centuries, with the "civil" war between Brunehilde and Fredegonde, and the development of the mayors of the Palace who built very powerful territorial power bases, the most successful of whom were the Carolingians and the Capetians.
 
but the process of feudalization began much earlier
Feudality being understood as the mix of benefit (concession of royal or fisc's wealth) usually landed, and vassality (understood as a personal clientelism): or at least with the classical definition used since Ganshof, we're forced to see that it's not existing during Merovingian period.

It's not achieved with Carolingians, it only really appears there at the point both became undistiguishable from each other with the Xth century (before, even in the rare case it was a thing, it was always distinguished).

There was already strong signs in the late sixth and early seventh centuries, with the "civil" war between Brunehilde and Fredegonde
Which is more a counter-exemple, as we're on a fight over the royal fiscus and an unification trend (that would know its apogee with Dagobert, without a noticable dedication of the fisc), not about its dismembrement (even if Merovingian aristocracy managed to get a certain autonomy with regencies and conflicts, but that's more true with the situation after 640's)

As for the contemporary Gondovald's revolt, we're in the continuity of Late Antiquity co-kingships and usurpations, not a political desintegration as it would happen in the late IXth/Xth century.

and the development of the mayors of the Palace who built very powerful territorial power bases
Yes, but that's essentially concerning Carolingians, and Capetians (that weren't majordomo) ducal title didn't really provided them with a completly depleted royal fisc (Late Carolingians basically held only Laon) and they didn't benefited from the guardianship of ecclesiastical demesnes as Carolingians did to establish systematical vassality on landed families.

If something, the coronation of Hugues is related to the Robertian decline, and the disappearance of the huge Robertian sphere of influence in Francia after Hugues the Great's death. Not about its capacity to distribute land.

Peppinids/Arnulfians/Carolingians were powerful, but less about privatized political power on Austrasia (if it was that, their power wouldn't have survived the backleash after Grimoald's demise) but about a huge net of private fidelities on which they managed to get the lead on, without depleting their familial lands along the Rhine.

It's hard to give a year to date the process, but let's say the secularisation of ecclesiastical demesnes by Peppin II and Charles Martel could be the first start, with the councils of 743/744, that allowed Carolingians to do so legally (si necessitas cogat, technically, but in fact as much they saw fit).

Ganshof said:
At the beggining of the VIIIth century, concession of beneficii to vassals seems to have been accidental, never coming from state institutions. When in 768, Charlemagne takes power, the situation entierly changed. King gives largely, as much as lords (dukes, counts, great landowners or potentes, bishops, abbots) beneficii to a large number of his vassals. Without being necessary, the de facto union between benefice and vassality became a regular practice

For what matter Merovingians themselves, and that up to the end, we're in the continuation of Late imperial social structures, mixed with direct fidelities as the truste.
It's a bit different in other regions, but that's essentially the same in, say, Gothic Hispania (in spite of the, much outdated, protofeudal theory), where a family can have a "favoured" sphere of influence, but where political power and familial patrimony aren't mixed, safe rarily and incidentally.

Which is a long way to get back to the discussion at hand, I agree, but essentially : the political collapse of WRE isn't directly tied up with Carolingian feudality (and its ulterior mutations), even in a long-time context; but to the consequences of an aristocratic takeover and the necessity to replace fidelities and former dynasty's truste, and thanks to an alliance with Church that allowed Carolingians to use ecclesiastical and monastic demenses to create a new vassalic "class".
 
Recommendations:
Heather - The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians
Halsall - Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, 368-576

Reminds me of History 120: From Rome to Renaissance. The first day the professor, an Austrian, hands out a map of Europe labelled "The Wanderings of the Peoples", with arrows showing the Vandals, Goths etc.

Me: Excuse me, what does this "Wanderings of the Peoples " mean?
Prof: The migrations of the Germanic peoples into territory of the the Roman Empire.
Me: Oh, I see- the Barbarian Invasions.
Prof: DEY VERE NOT BARBARIANS!!!
 
- excessive outsourcing of the army to germanic foederati. One should never outsourcing the core of its defence. The ERE, on the contrary, saw the danger and led a "de-germanization" of its army.

I think this is probably one of their worst mistakes. They made foreign mercenaries the core of Rome's defense and then game them no compelling reason to actually defend Rome outside of a paycheck. Bringing in the Germanic tribes would have been a fine move if Rome had followed it up by giving them positions of power and authority within the empire and a compelling reason to fight. Of course in the long term that would have meant a Germanic Rome rather than a Roman Rome.
 

GdwnsnHo

Banned
Of course in the long term that would have meant a Germanic Rome rather than a Roman Rome.

By that logic Rome wasn't Roman, it was Gallo-Puni-Latin-Greco-Iber-Roman.

It would gain some German characteristics sure, but the Germanic tribes would be subsumed by Roman culture and demographics, and change the definition of Roman.

Good idea though, but you'd want to distribute their power bases. We don't want all the Germanics in Gaul, as they could unite and rebel. Have one in a small part of Africa, Spain, Italy, Gaul, Britain (that could be interesting, use the Germanic tribes to conquer the rest of Britannia and Hibernia - and then make sure they're fed - could free up a legion or two - plus Germans rebelling against the Empire in Britainnia is less costly than the same in the rest of the Empire.
 

Sulemain

Banned
Simple----overspending and lavishly generous welfare created crazy debts that, when unpaid, resulted in a massive crash that saw Rome's population go from 2million to under 20 thousand almost overnight.

Even shorter version: tax-and-spend always fails in the end. ;^)

If you count spending on the Army as tax and spend, sure, why not.
 

GdwnsnHo

Banned
Simple----overspending and lavishly generous welfare created crazy debts that, when unpaid, resulted in a massive crash that saw Rome's population go from 2million to under 20 thousand almost overnight.

Even shorter version: tax-and-spend always fails in the end. ;^)

Oh, the onerous 2-5 tax rate. However could they cope? :rolleyes:
 

Faeelin

Banned
Simple----overspending and lavishly generous welfare created crazy debts that, when unpaid, resulted in a massive crash that saw Rome's population go from 2million to under 20 thousand almost overnight.

Even shorter version: tax-and-spend always fails in the end. ;^)

Thank you for adding to this conversation, and my ignore list.
 

Faeelin

Banned
That's more of a consequence of Western Roman collapse. Before the Vth century, you still had a long-distance range. Among many exemples, the trade domination in northern Gaul by Syrian traders, or the continued exportation of sigilled African pottery.

Hrm. But you do see significant declines in urbanization in the west. Not in the east, but that suggests things aren't hunky dory in Gaul and Hispania.
Note that Augustean Empire wasn't exactly centralized either : governors, municipalities, etc. had a really important power already.

I've always seen the late empire as more centralized than the early empire, so I find this complaint a bit odd.
 

Faeelin

Banned
The reasons are to be found in domestic policies: if outer threads would be the dermining factors of collapse, Rome would have crippled much before - the Cimbri and Teutones of 100 BC were quite strong, but the republic, armed with inner strength and stability managed to crush the two Germanic tribes.

You're ignoring, and I think other posters are, that the Germanic peoples of the 4th and 5th centuries were more sophisticated, more numerous, and better armed than the Cimbri. They hadn't been passive; they had adapted Roman statecraft and built up societies of their own. 4th century Germania was more developed than it was in 50 BC.


Economic troubles and overreliance on slave labor

Slavery peaked in the late republic and early empire. So this doesn't make sense.
 

TinyTartar

Banned
I still feel that while the signs of collapse had been set for quite a while, what ultimately undid the empire was the loss of its African cash cow. The foederati system was a poor one at times, but it still was probably the best army in the West and by a substantial margin by the time of the loss of Africa to the Vandals.

How to avoid this loss? I think that the defection of Bonafacius, who probably never should have been given the job in the first place, needed to be preempted. While treason and usurpations among Roman officials was a Roman tradition as long lasting as the regular army and disdain for barbarians, had the Emperor at the time realized the importance of the province in holding up the sinking edifice, he likely would have given it to a trusty right hand man who had no use for Vandalic pretensions.

Also, keeping a stronger defense in the province would not have hurt. As long as Rome held Africa, they could to an extent pay for what they needed to hold Italy and Dalmatia. An empire that holds these three provinces has the defense capabilities to sustain itself and the financial capabilities to sustain its defense. While taking back Spain and Gaul would likely be nigh unto impossible by this point, over time and with a solid recovery, it might not be impossible.

Curbing the Senate's growing hatred and intransigence towards Barbarians would be difficult (and really, why couldn't those attitudes been more prevalent earlier on when it might have been helpful rather than at the point where they literally needed to just accept facts of life?), but getting them on board with restoration might make tax collection a little bit easier, as it had utterly faded into a joke by the time of Aetius.
 
probably 1/3 to half of the population simply meet their creators during the period between 300 and 600.

I would expect all the population from 300 would have met their creators duing that period :D ... and probably also some 8-10 generations deep :D
 
Hrm. But you do see significant declines in urbanization in the west.
I agree entierly on the decline of urbanisation.

That said, it was concerning regions where urbanisation was more political than societal (most of Gallo-Roman cities had less then 2000 inhabitants, even during the Augustean period), and on which the insecurity of the IIIrd century and demographical decline eventually meant fortification (that didn't covered all the inhabited places of the cities/castri, that said) smaller than Ist century cities size and gradual disappearance of the suburbium at the benefit of cultivated fields.

It didn't meant long-range trade disappeared. Some products that were typical of such exchanges within Romania didn't disappeared before the Vth.

Not in the east, but that suggests things aren't hunky dory in Gaul and Hispania.
Actually you did have such in the East, but a bit differently : Balkans were ravaged (safe Achaia) and Northern Syria still had to deal with Persian raids in the IIIrd century.
But overall, the region was "sanctuarized", and the municipal/urban model that was way more present in the East to begin with mostly survived and even prospered by the Vth in Syria.

I've always seen the late empire as more centralized than the early empire, so I find this complaint a bit odd.
Maybe not much more centralized structurally, but more unified around the imperial persona (urban elites saw more fit to directly deal with the emperor for their careers, for instance) and more bureaucratized (still really far from China standards, with at least 4x more public service employees).

I would expect all the population from 300 would have met their creators duing that period :D ... and probably also some 8-10 generations deep :D
Someone feeling snarky, apparently? :p

"Meet their creators earlier than they planned". Better?
 
You're ignoring, and I think other posters are, that the Germanic peoples of the 4th and 5th centuries were more sophisticated, more numerous, and better armed than the Cimbri. They hadn't been passive; they had adapted Roman statecraft and built up societies of their own. 4th century Germania was more developed than it was in 50 BC.

Indeed. And Peter Heather and Bryan Ward-Perkins have made this point repeatedly in recent years.

This is why the exogenous shock theory really does seem to hold the most water. The real test is the reality that the Empire of the Julio-Claudians or the Antonines, were it magically transported to the late 4th or 5th century, really could not have resisted the combined pressure of the Hunnic invasions and more numerous and sophisticated Germanic tribes they were driving before them, to say nothing of the more formidable Sassanid Empire that had replaced the Parthians. It would have fallen even more rapidly.

It doesn't mean that the internal weaknesses that many have identified did not exist, and were not real problems - just that they weren't decisive in determining the collapse of the Western Empire. Especially given that many were even more true of the Eastern Empire, which managed to survive and even expand again in the following century.
 
Reminds me of History 120: From Rome to Renaissance. The first day the professor, an Austrian, hands out a map of Europe labelled "The Wanderings of the Peoples", with arrows showing the Vandals, Goths etc.

Me: Excuse me, what does this "Wanderings of the Peoples " mean?
Prof: The migrations of the Germanic peoples into territory of the the Roman Empire.
Me: Oh, I see- the Barbarian Invasions.
Prof: DEY VERE NOT BARBARIANS!!!

We'll just call them "gastarbeiter."
 
Mostly what LSCatilina has been saying, but it should also be noted that Honorius really deserves a fair deal of personal blame for his incompetent rule.

I disagree. Arcadius was just as incompetent and yet Arcadius' 13 year rule did not see complete dysfunction arise in the east. It has a lot to do with literally everything hitting the west in a two-three decade timeframe:

-The loss of two successive civil wars to Theodosius
-A weak emperor in the west dominated by a half barbarian general at a time when anti-barbarian sentiment was reaching a boiling point in Italy
-The barbarians breaking across the Rhine and Constantine III crossing into Gaul at roughly the same moment, leading to an inability in the west to deal with those barbarians
-The death of Constantius right after he was declared co-emperor
 
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