allanpcameron
Donor
6 March 1942. Singapore.
Lieutenant General Alan Cunningham had arrived by flying boat a couple of days earlier, and had formally taken command of 12th Army on 4 March. He had requested time with Lieutenant General Percival to familiarise him with the current situation in Malaya. Cunningham was happy to give Percival the credit for a job well done. The Japanese attack could have been disastrous, instead, Percival’s command had brought the Japanese attack to a halt and thrown them back. III Indian Corps stopped the Japanese, and II Australian Corps had thrown them back. Once Schreiber’s V Corps, (1st, 4th and 51st Division) arrived Cunningham could see himself and General Alexander joining forces to take Thailand and push into French Indo-China. That was for the future.
There were a lot of hurdles to negotiate before the Japanese were defeated. The next Durban-Malaya (DM3) convoy was due shortly, and included among the personnel was the core of V Corps’ staff and a good number of engineers to prepare for the arrival of the three divisions. Some of Cunningham’s own 12th Army Staff had arrived with him, but more would be arriving by ship. Cunningham hoped that many of Percival’s staff would remain in place to make the transition as seamless as possible.
The two General Officers Commanding the two Corps that were now at the heart of 12th Army, were on hand to give their updates to their new C-in-C.
Lieutenant-General Heath (GOC III Indian Corps) was delighted to report that his men, who had suffered much, had had time to recover, and with the reinforcements that had come, he was now able to reconstitute his old 5th Indian Division (9th, 10th and 29th Indian Infantry Brigades) under the command of Major-General Harold Briggs. With 5th, 9th and 11th Indian Divisions, III Indian Corps was rested and ready for the next phase of the war.
Lieutenant-General Ivan Mackay (GOC II Australian Corps) gave an update of the situation where his three Divisions (8, 9 Australian, 18th British) had got to. 18th Division had managed to make it to Kroh and were holding there. The two Australian Divisions had pushed up to Gurun where they had halted for the most part and dug in. Aggressive patrolling had taken them as far as the Kedah River, but for the moment, all three Divisions needed time to rest and refit. This was in line with Percival’s orders and Cunningham knew that the Australians would only take the break if it was really necessary. What mattered was that the whole Corps was now linked with reasonable roads, allowing the resupply of 18th Division to be much easier.
Cunningham was tempted to put III Indian Corps back in the forefront of the action, pushing up to the Thai border and beyond. Bangkok was still another 700 miles north, and the remaining time before the onset of the next Monsoon season was limited. Cunningham had met with General Alexander in Rangoon on the way to Singapore and they had agreed to see this part of their combined push as being setting up a solid foundation for the next phase. The two commanders agreed that the combined Empire forces in Burma and Malaya weren’t quite ready to take Thailand.
By holding the Ping River line, Slim was allowing proper lines of communication to be prepared from Rangoon. Likewise, the build-up of forces in Malaya needed to be strengthened by the arrival of V Corps, and be able to replenish stocks of ammunition and all the other things an invasion of Thailand would need. Cunningham wasn't sure just yet about allowing Heath’s Corps just yet to move up and take over from the Australians. Certainly it would give the Australians time to recover and refit. Having the Australians back at full strength at the same time as V Corps would give Cunningham a really powerful force to move up into Thailand. Heath’s Indian Division would be more than capable of keeping up the aggression towards the Japanese not allowing them to dig in too hard, and keep up the pressure on them. But Cunningham believed the Australian Corps had a few more miles in them.
The other good news for Cunningham was that the situation with the RAF was continuing to improve. The arrival of DM 3 would strengthen that situation even further. Along with more replacement pilots, ground crew and crated aircraft, there were some mobile radar units, and the kind of ground echelon support that would allow the rebuilding of airfields and help the RAF transition towards offensive action. Air Vice Marshall Pulford was able to give a full assessment of the current situation. Basically, the air war was evenly balanced, the losses to the Japanese and the RAF were slightly in the RAF’s favour. The Tomahawks were holding their own against the Oscars and Japanese bombers. It was quite different from North Africa where the Hurricanes provided escort to the ground attacking Tomahawks. Here the Hurricanes acted primarily as ground attack aircraft, the Tomahawks were more capable of taking on the Japanese fighters.
The arrival of squadrons of Wellingtons in India, along with the American bombers in Australia, were another sign that the Japanese were shortly going to be at a terrible disadvantage. The losses taken by the Japanese fighters and bombers to the American Volunteer Air Group had been significant, and with the RAF learning from their tactics that had improved the ratio of kills to losses. The other element to this, as Pulford reported, was RAF staff from North Africa were now in place bringing some of their expertise in coordinating between ground and air forces. Generally, Pulford felt quite upbeat about an improving situation.
The senior intelligence officer’s briefing was to Cunningham’s mind the weakest of all he was hearing. It was clear that there just weren’t enough intelligence assets in Thailand to really know what the Japanese were up to. Cunningham had been briefed on the code breaking, and whatever radio traffic intercepts which added to the store of knowledge. Aerial reconnaissance was helpful, but with much of the ground under tree cover, there could be whole Divisions that little or nothing was known about. Battlefield assessment of Japanese dead (there were very few prisoners) gave some idea of what units the Japanese had deployed, but without a completely accurate list of Japanese army units, especially those raised in 1940 and 1941, the intelligence wasn’t entirely helpful.
The only half-decent intelligence was coming from the couple of groups that were working behind enemy lines and radioing reports. Some of these brave men had met brutal ends, but the Royal Navy was still able, especially on the west coast to support and supply the units. Cunningham decided that this was a real priority and put his Chief-of-Staff in charge of developing every possible means to improving the intelligence that as GOC 12th Army he needed.
The Engineer in Chief of Malaya Command gave up an update on the progress of improving the infrastructure allowing for better communications and resupply. Much of the work of his men was fixing the things they had destroyed as the Empire forces had retreated down the Malay peninsula. He presented a fairly positive picture of how it was going, except for two things they were short of: bridging equipment and heavy equipment. It wasn’t completely hampering their work, but it was slowing things down.
The Deputy Adjutant & Quartermaster General’s report included a section on what was expected in the next convoy, the most essential of which were artillery shells. The profligate use (as the QG described it) by the Australian Corps had reduced stocks of 25-pdr ammunition to below acceptable levels. Other ammunition stocks were also low, so the ammunition being brought on the convoy was crucial to looking towards any kind of major offensive or defensive action. This was a deciding factor for Cunningham.
He informed his new command that operations were to halt where they were, though aggressive patrolling would be expected. He would spend the next week touring the various units to get to know the men and see for himself the kind of terrain they were fighting in. Once ammunition stocks were built up, he wanted 18th Division to attempt to get over ‘the Ledge’ towards Pattani, and for the Australian Divisions to put together a mobile force to try to push up towards the border into Thailand. The Corps and Divisional Staffs would need to work up their plans for accomplish this objective, it seemed the Japanese didn’t have much to stop tanks, Cunningham wanted to use this advantage while they still had it. If the Australians managed to make progress, then Heath’s III Indian Corps would replace them in the front line, allowing Mackay’s men time to regroup and rest.
Lieutenant General Alan Cunningham had arrived by flying boat a couple of days earlier, and had formally taken command of 12th Army on 4 March. He had requested time with Lieutenant General Percival to familiarise him with the current situation in Malaya. Cunningham was happy to give Percival the credit for a job well done. The Japanese attack could have been disastrous, instead, Percival’s command had brought the Japanese attack to a halt and thrown them back. III Indian Corps stopped the Japanese, and II Australian Corps had thrown them back. Once Schreiber’s V Corps, (1st, 4th and 51st Division) arrived Cunningham could see himself and General Alexander joining forces to take Thailand and push into French Indo-China. That was for the future.
There were a lot of hurdles to negotiate before the Japanese were defeated. The next Durban-Malaya (DM3) convoy was due shortly, and included among the personnel was the core of V Corps’ staff and a good number of engineers to prepare for the arrival of the three divisions. Some of Cunningham’s own 12th Army Staff had arrived with him, but more would be arriving by ship. Cunningham hoped that many of Percival’s staff would remain in place to make the transition as seamless as possible.
The two General Officers Commanding the two Corps that were now at the heart of 12th Army, were on hand to give their updates to their new C-in-C.
Lieutenant-General Heath (GOC III Indian Corps) was delighted to report that his men, who had suffered much, had had time to recover, and with the reinforcements that had come, he was now able to reconstitute his old 5th Indian Division (9th, 10th and 29th Indian Infantry Brigades) under the command of Major-General Harold Briggs. With 5th, 9th and 11th Indian Divisions, III Indian Corps was rested and ready for the next phase of the war.
Lieutenant-General Ivan Mackay (GOC II Australian Corps) gave an update of the situation where his three Divisions (8, 9 Australian, 18th British) had got to. 18th Division had managed to make it to Kroh and were holding there. The two Australian Divisions had pushed up to Gurun where they had halted for the most part and dug in. Aggressive patrolling had taken them as far as the Kedah River, but for the moment, all three Divisions needed time to rest and refit. This was in line with Percival’s orders and Cunningham knew that the Australians would only take the break if it was really necessary. What mattered was that the whole Corps was now linked with reasonable roads, allowing the resupply of 18th Division to be much easier.
Cunningham was tempted to put III Indian Corps back in the forefront of the action, pushing up to the Thai border and beyond. Bangkok was still another 700 miles north, and the remaining time before the onset of the next Monsoon season was limited. Cunningham had met with General Alexander in Rangoon on the way to Singapore and they had agreed to see this part of their combined push as being setting up a solid foundation for the next phase. The two commanders agreed that the combined Empire forces in Burma and Malaya weren’t quite ready to take Thailand.
By holding the Ping River line, Slim was allowing proper lines of communication to be prepared from Rangoon. Likewise, the build-up of forces in Malaya needed to be strengthened by the arrival of V Corps, and be able to replenish stocks of ammunition and all the other things an invasion of Thailand would need. Cunningham wasn't sure just yet about allowing Heath’s Corps just yet to move up and take over from the Australians. Certainly it would give the Australians time to recover and refit. Having the Australians back at full strength at the same time as V Corps would give Cunningham a really powerful force to move up into Thailand. Heath’s Indian Division would be more than capable of keeping up the aggression towards the Japanese not allowing them to dig in too hard, and keep up the pressure on them. But Cunningham believed the Australian Corps had a few more miles in them.
The other good news for Cunningham was that the situation with the RAF was continuing to improve. The arrival of DM 3 would strengthen that situation even further. Along with more replacement pilots, ground crew and crated aircraft, there were some mobile radar units, and the kind of ground echelon support that would allow the rebuilding of airfields and help the RAF transition towards offensive action. Air Vice Marshall Pulford was able to give a full assessment of the current situation. Basically, the air war was evenly balanced, the losses to the Japanese and the RAF were slightly in the RAF’s favour. The Tomahawks were holding their own against the Oscars and Japanese bombers. It was quite different from North Africa where the Hurricanes provided escort to the ground attacking Tomahawks. Here the Hurricanes acted primarily as ground attack aircraft, the Tomahawks were more capable of taking on the Japanese fighters.
The arrival of squadrons of Wellingtons in India, along with the American bombers in Australia, were another sign that the Japanese were shortly going to be at a terrible disadvantage. The losses taken by the Japanese fighters and bombers to the American Volunteer Air Group had been significant, and with the RAF learning from their tactics that had improved the ratio of kills to losses. The other element to this, as Pulford reported, was RAF staff from North Africa were now in place bringing some of their expertise in coordinating between ground and air forces. Generally, Pulford felt quite upbeat about an improving situation.
The senior intelligence officer’s briefing was to Cunningham’s mind the weakest of all he was hearing. It was clear that there just weren’t enough intelligence assets in Thailand to really know what the Japanese were up to. Cunningham had been briefed on the code breaking, and whatever radio traffic intercepts which added to the store of knowledge. Aerial reconnaissance was helpful, but with much of the ground under tree cover, there could be whole Divisions that little or nothing was known about. Battlefield assessment of Japanese dead (there were very few prisoners) gave some idea of what units the Japanese had deployed, but without a completely accurate list of Japanese army units, especially those raised in 1940 and 1941, the intelligence wasn’t entirely helpful.
The only half-decent intelligence was coming from the couple of groups that were working behind enemy lines and radioing reports. Some of these brave men had met brutal ends, but the Royal Navy was still able, especially on the west coast to support and supply the units. Cunningham decided that this was a real priority and put his Chief-of-Staff in charge of developing every possible means to improving the intelligence that as GOC 12th Army he needed.
The Engineer in Chief of Malaya Command gave up an update on the progress of improving the infrastructure allowing for better communications and resupply. Much of the work of his men was fixing the things they had destroyed as the Empire forces had retreated down the Malay peninsula. He presented a fairly positive picture of how it was going, except for two things they were short of: bridging equipment and heavy equipment. It wasn’t completely hampering their work, but it was slowing things down.
The Deputy Adjutant & Quartermaster General’s report included a section on what was expected in the next convoy, the most essential of which were artillery shells. The profligate use (as the QG described it) by the Australian Corps had reduced stocks of 25-pdr ammunition to below acceptable levels. Other ammunition stocks were also low, so the ammunition being brought on the convoy was crucial to looking towards any kind of major offensive or defensive action. This was a deciding factor for Cunningham.
He informed his new command that operations were to halt where they were, though aggressive patrolling would be expected. He would spend the next week touring the various units to get to know the men and see for himself the kind of terrain they were fighting in. Once ammunition stocks were built up, he wanted 18th Division to attempt to get over ‘the Ledge’ towards Pattani, and for the Australian Divisions to put together a mobile force to try to push up towards the border into Thailand. The Corps and Divisional Staffs would need to work up their plans for accomplish this objective, it seemed the Japanese didn’t have much to stop tanks, Cunningham wanted to use this advantage while they still had it. If the Australians managed to make progress, then Heath’s III Indian Corps would replace them in the front line, allowing Mackay’s men time to regroup and rest.
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