joatsimeon@aol.com
Banned
[/QUOTE]Remember all of that stuff about the CSA going to win because its just defending? Yeah, that applies to the Union now.[/QUOTE]
-- no, it doesn't. It's a matter of war aims.
The Union has to attack to win against the South; its victory conditions require the destruction of the Confederate armies and government and the occupation of its territory.
The British war aims in the event of conflict with the US in 1862 are limited: they want to force the Union to cry uncle and acknowledge the indepenence of the British Empire's ally, the CSA. (And of course to withdraw from any Canadian territory the US manages to occupy.)
To do this, the UK doesn't have to occupy Philadelphia or Chicago; it just has to hurt the US enough to make it decide that the game isn't worth the candle. Limited aims -- limited war -- limited means.
And it can hurt the US plenty, while the US can't do anything that seriously hurts the British.
Sure, they can occupy big chunks of Canada... temporarily. Whoopie-***t, frankly -- this does nothing to strike at the foundations of British power. It's an irritating nuisance, not a threat. The only real effect would be to strengthen the British government's domestic political position.
Meanwhile, the British clamp a blockade on the coasts, destroy Northern war finance and vastly strengthen the South and its armies and river-navy with money and arms. And the Confederates were fairly formidable to begin with.
This _does_ strike at the foundations of the Union's power to prosecute the war with any reasonable chance of success.
Remember, the Confederates _have_ to win, or they lose everything.
The British, once they start, have to show that they're still Top Nation, or other potential rivals will start getting ideas. In particular, they have a massive investment in the RN's dominance of the world ocean. These aren't motivations any stronger than those of the US -- but on the other hand, the British have far more raw power, and given their control of the sea, a vastly superior strategic position.
War is a matter of both material resources and willpower; the one can substitute for the other to a certain extent, which is how the US beat the Confederacy in OTL.
In this scenario the US has little prospect of victory but can, at the price of eating a distasteful dish of boiled crow with humiliation sauce, stop anytime and walk away from the table with moderate losses.
The only way the US can, in this situation, stop the pain is to give up. The longer it persists in trying to fight back, the worse its situation gets and the worse the eventual settlement. That's what happens when you try to punch out of your weight.
The only question would be how long it took the Union's political class to recognize this, and then how long it took them to screw up their courage to tell it to the voters.
-- no, it doesn't. It's a matter of war aims.
The Union has to attack to win against the South; its victory conditions require the destruction of the Confederate armies and government and the occupation of its territory.
The British war aims in the event of conflict with the US in 1862 are limited: they want to force the Union to cry uncle and acknowledge the indepenence of the British Empire's ally, the CSA. (And of course to withdraw from any Canadian territory the US manages to occupy.)
To do this, the UK doesn't have to occupy Philadelphia or Chicago; it just has to hurt the US enough to make it decide that the game isn't worth the candle. Limited aims -- limited war -- limited means.
And it can hurt the US plenty, while the US can't do anything that seriously hurts the British.
Sure, they can occupy big chunks of Canada... temporarily. Whoopie-***t, frankly -- this does nothing to strike at the foundations of British power. It's an irritating nuisance, not a threat. The only real effect would be to strengthen the British government's domestic political position.
Meanwhile, the British clamp a blockade on the coasts, destroy Northern war finance and vastly strengthen the South and its armies and river-navy with money and arms. And the Confederates were fairly formidable to begin with.
This _does_ strike at the foundations of the Union's power to prosecute the war with any reasonable chance of success.
Remember, the Confederates _have_ to win, or they lose everything.
The British, once they start, have to show that they're still Top Nation, or other potential rivals will start getting ideas. In particular, they have a massive investment in the RN's dominance of the world ocean. These aren't motivations any stronger than those of the US -- but on the other hand, the British have far more raw power, and given their control of the sea, a vastly superior strategic position.
War is a matter of both material resources and willpower; the one can substitute for the other to a certain extent, which is how the US beat the Confederacy in OTL.
In this scenario the US has little prospect of victory but can, at the price of eating a distasteful dish of boiled crow with humiliation sauce, stop anytime and walk away from the table with moderate losses.
The only way the US can, in this situation, stop the pain is to give up. The longer it persists in trying to fight back, the worse its situation gets and the worse the eventual settlement. That's what happens when you try to punch out of your weight.
The only question would be how long it took the Union's political class to recognize this, and then how long it took them to screw up their courage to tell it to the voters.