Robert Conroy's 1862

[joatsimeon@aol.com]

[/QUOTE]Remember all of that stuff about the CSA going to win because its just defending? Yeah, that applies to the Union now.[/QUOTE]

-- no, it doesn't. It's a matter of war aims.

The Union has to attack to win against the South; its victory conditions require the destruction of the Confederate armies and government and the occupation of its territory.

The British war aims in the event of conflict with the US in 1862 are limited: they want to force the Union to cry uncle and acknowledge the indepenence of the British Empire's ally, the CSA. (And of course to withdraw from any Canadian territory the US manages to occupy.)

To do this, the UK doesn't have to occupy Philadelphia or Chicago; it just has to hurt the US enough to make it decide that the game isn't worth the candle. Limited aims -- limited war -- limited means.

And it can hurt the US plenty, while the US can't do anything that seriously hurts the British.

Sure, they can occupy big chunks of Canada... temporarily. Whoopie-***t, frankly -- this does nothing to strike at the foundations of British power. It's an irritating nuisance, not a threat. The only real effect would be to strengthen the British government's domestic political position.

Meanwhile, the British clamp a blockade on the coasts, destroy Northern war finance and vastly strengthen the South and its armies and river-navy with money and arms. And the Confederates were fairly formidable to begin with.

This _does_ strike at the foundations of the Union's power to prosecute the war with any reasonable chance of success.

Remember, the Confederates _have_ to win, or they lose everything.

The British, once they start, have to show that they're still Top Nation, or other potential rivals will start getting ideas. In particular, they have a massive investment in the RN's dominance of the world ocean. These aren't motivations any stronger than those of the US -- but on the other hand, the British have far more raw power, and given their control of the sea, a vastly superior strategic position.

War is a matter of both material resources and willpower; the one can substitute for the other to a certain extent, which is how the US beat the Confederacy in OTL.

In this scenario the US has little prospect of victory but can, at the price of eating a distasteful dish of boiled crow with humiliation sauce, stop anytime and walk away from the table with moderate losses.

The only way the US can, in this situation, stop the pain is to give up. The longer it persists in trying to fight back, the worse its situation gets and the worse the eventual settlement. That's what happens when you try to punch out of your weight.

The only question would be how long it took the Union's political class to recognize this, and then how long it took them to screw up their courage to tell it to the voters.

 

[joatsimeon@aol.com]

If the British Empire was invested in a major war in NA wouldn't it also likely have to contend with France and Russia threatening it's colonial interests in Africa and Asia?

-- In a word, no.

France: Napoleon III made it a cornerstone of his policy to keep on the good side of the British. They were often suspicious of him, but he went to great efforts to avoid diplomatic clashes and would under no circumstances have risked war.

He'd just (1860) signed a major free-trade agreement with the British (against the protests of domestic protectionist interests) and in 1862 was in the process of a major adventure in Mexico which required British acquiesence if not active support.

Furthermore French sentiment was strongly pro-Confederate on the whole, particularly the strong textile-manufacturing lobby, which needed Southern cotton and disliked American (northern) competition.

If anything, France would be inclined to join a demarche against the Union -- Palmerston had conversations with Napoleon III about this in 1862 and got tentative agreement for a joint note to Washington.

Russia was somewhat hostile to British interests but had just abolished serfdom, thus disorganizing the economy for some time, and was in the throes of a major program of army reform. They weren't in a position to provoke the British and knew it; they wanted a period of peace and tranquility for internal reasons. They could launch expeditions against native states in Central Asia or crush a revolt in Poland (which also happened about this time), but that was about the limit of their capabilities until the army reforms and railway-building program of the next decade or two had time to take effect.

By the late 1870's they were in a position to threaten British preponderance in Turkey and give them cause to worry about Afghanistan, but not in 1862.
You have to remember that the British were the Big Dog in this period, particularly outside continental Europe, where their lack of a major conscript army reduced their influence (but even that hadn't yet become apparent the way it would over the Danish crisis and the Franco-Prussian war a bit later.)

In anything that involved salt water and considerable distance from the European rail network, they were the ones who could bind or loose.

 

[joatsimeon@aol.com]

Surprisingly, in OTL this was not true. The mill owners and many other employers did indeed support the South. However, the working people of Manchester especially but in the mill towns as well were solid in thier support of the Union or more particularly the eradication of chattle slavery.

-- no, this is a historical "urban myth", which grew up after 1865 and the abolition of slavery, with everyone retroactively back-dating their support for the winners.

A modern analogy would be the way so many Frenchmen retroactively supported the Resistance after 1945, whereas in fact in 1940-41 the overwhelming majority had been pro-Vichy and collaborationist.

In 1862, very few people in Britain regarded the war as a struggle over slavery -- in part due to the necessary "spin" which the Lincoln administration was putting out that the Union, not slavery, was the issue.

British opinion for the most part took Lincoln at his word; the spin fooled the British much better than it did anyone in the US.

Hence Liberals tended to denounce the effort to restore the Union by force, as analogous to the repression of Hungarian independence, and as a monstrously immoral waste of lives and money.

Eg., study Gladstone's positions in 1862.

There was an element of advanced democratic radicals who regarded themselves as the natural leaders of working-class opinion, and _they_ were pro-Union. And they got to write the books.

The actual workers themselves in 1862 mostly didn't give a damn and just wanted their jobs back, as fast as possible and by any means necessary.

(And, of course, anti-black sentiment had been on the increase since the 1830's, given the distinct disappointments of West Indian emancipation, the Jamaica crisis, etc.)

This would not be the last time that "working-class leaders" had concerned different from those of actual workers.

#1 Britain continued to have an involvement in China and on her coasts in part as a response to the Tai ping.

-- in a word, "no big". That was a minor colonial wog-thrashing expedition, not a pukka war, and even during the occupation of Beijing in 1860, handled mostly by troops from India.

#2 In the war over land against the Maori in New Zealand Imperial troop numbers peaked at 18,000.

-- again, "no big"

#3 The British also led the Simonoseki expedition (1864).

-- hadn't happened as of 1862.

#4 Ran the anti-Slavery patrol.

-- one small naval squadron, usually of obsolete ships. No big.

#5 Led military expeditions in the Himalayas (using sub-continental troops).

-- minor colonial expedition run out of Indian Army resources.

[QTielhardUOTE=]#6 Led military expeditions in Africa.[/QUOTE]

-- all very small.

#7 Garrison committments, Singapore, Cape, &c. &c..

-- again, not of any considerable magnitude. During the Crimean War the British expanded the size of the Regular Army by about a quarter of a million without much strain.

It's important to remember the sheer scale of the financial resources the British government could call on in a pinch. This was their Secret Weapon, the bottomless fund of reasonably-priced credit they could summon at a snap of the fingers; it's what enabled them to fight France for 25 years, and Britain was both absolutely and relatively stronger in that way in 1862 than it had been in 1792-1815.

Running up the national debt made financial puritans like Gladstone groan and sweat tears of blood, but they could do it whenever they decided to.

 

[Tielhard]

joatsimeon,

Regarding your first point, the suggestion that it is an urban myth that the working people of Manchester and the Mill towns did not support the Union cause when the Union cause became the eradication of chattle slavery. I have to say I believe you to be wrong and that you have offered neither evidence nor argument that would cause one to change one's mind. I also note that in present day Manchester this period and issue has been a major local history project for many years and there is a wealth of literature supporting my views. I also note that Lincoln himself was of my opinion in print. If the situation I suggested is so wrong why then did so many Union towns and cities rename themselves Manchester as homage in the aftermath of the war?

"This would not be the last time that "working-class leaders" had concerned different from those of actual workers."

Unless you want to offer something specific to back this up I would suggest that this is more an articulation of your own political prejudice than a statement germane to the discussion? I also note that the mill workers' response to the cotton famine was supported by church as well as political activists.

On your second point I am a little confused. Your original response to fenkmaster's assertion that Imperial committments abroad would have to be abandoned to pursue a war with the Union was:

"excuse me, but how do you figure that? No other power was in a position to threaten Britain's possessions in 1862, nor did any want to."

I then pointed out that you had answered a slightly different question to the one posed and listed Britain's overseas commitments at this time demonstrating that they were indeed small and easily met. You then disected my examples and conclued they were quite small??? Which is the point I was making in the first place. Which leaves me puzzled.

On the specifics:

Anglo-Maori wars over land. 18,000 Imperial Line was THE biggie of the period, it was the largest deployment of British troops outside India since the Crimea.
Anti-slavery patrol. BIG squadron of older small ships.
Himalayan Expeditions: You would know better than I if you are indeed who other posters believe you to be but I understand one of them was 50,000+ troops? Mostly Indian as you say but with significant British contingents.

 

[Dave Howery]

the blockade would indeed be the most effective (and probably the only) thing the Brits could do to the north, and it would be a devestating blow indeed. But I doubt their ability to do anything else... the RN, so dominant at sea, would fare worse if they tried to get too close to the US shore, as even our despised ironclads would be able to operate there, along with the US's formidable batteries of artillery. But then, the RN doesn't really need to get too close, as parking offshore from our ports would do the job just fine.

Then what? Does the UK permanently ally itself with the new CSA? If so, then the CSA is likely to stay free for quite a while, while the UK is in for some serious unrest at home so long as the CSA has slavery. Will the US just shrug and let it all go by? Or will they try to conquer the CSA later, after building up their armed forces a lot more? The former could happen after a couple of generations has gone by, and the bitterness has eased up some. The latter could happen too, which leads you into Turtledove territory...

 

[Tielhard]

Dave Howery,

A) Please see above for discussion of likely chances of USN ironclands against the RN in coastal or riverine theatres. In (almost) any situation you can think of they will loose.
B) Coastal artillery? Four points to be made here as I don't think it has been covered in this thread yet.

1) Coastal forts and guns normally fare poorly against ships. The British spent most of the Napoleonic was using them for target practice. They don't need to use ironclads against them they don't even need steamships. They can use older 1st raters under sail with modern guns. If they do this then they can probably suppress most fortifications without using capital ships. They can also use the mortar flottilla, much reduced in 1860 but it could be reassembled quickly enough. God help the poor Union soldiers if they start putting Whitworths firing AP on ships!

2) American coastal guns are mostly big, Rodmans and Dhalgrens. When they hit a hull they will do serious dammage. However, they are slow to aim at a moving target, slow to fire and the Dahlgrens at least are quite short range. RN guns are smaller but there are more of them, they can can fire quicker and the target does not move.

3) Every soldier on the coast firing a gun, guarding a fort or even just delivering bread to a fort is a soldier who is not fighting the CSA or in Canada but the Union still needs to feed and arm him.

4) The only way the Union has any chance of protecting coastal cities and harbours from the RN is by concentrating its ironclads and steam frigates. Maybe even a few first raters if the start of the Civil war is different and the big Federal naval base evacuates differently.

C) "the UK is in for some serious unrest at home so long as the CSA has slavery." Unrest yes but unlikely to be uncontrolable and certainly not prolonged. Consider the recent British participation in the Invasion of Iraq two thirds of the population was against it, even more now but London is not in flames, they have the same Government that took them to war not a revolutionary council. Local unrest yes. It probably has to be put down by soldiers but not prolonged unrest or anything that cannot be controlled or suppressed.

D) You are making assumptions about how the Union will grow after a British involvement in the war. I don't think you can assume the high rates of immigration or investment into the Union that made it grow so fast in OTL. If there are harsh reparations, if the war years immigrants have prospered elsewhere, if the CSA and Britain put a halt to western expansion, pull California and Oregon from the Union all or any of these things would slow the rate at which the Union could prepare for another war. If they do get to the stage where they want a rematch there is no reason to assume that the CSA will be as weak as it was in 1862 or that Britain will decline as rapidly as in OTL.

 

[Wozza]

joatsimeon,

"This would not be the last time that "working-class leaders" had concerned different from those of actual workers."
ngents.

On this last point I think it important to point out that the Manchester school politicians were most definitely middle class.

The issue of working class activism is an interesting one. In The Making of the English Working Class the socialist historian EP Thompson admits that the demands of the leadership were different to those of the masses - something about the political demands of the active few serving as articulation for the apparently economic demands of the masses (the exact quote is not at hand to me.)

Fundamentally you can approve or disapprove of this process as you will, but it is real enough.

The masses want bread.
The leaders want power so they can give the masses bread.

The synergies and tensions between those demands are clear enough and obviously depend upon circumstance.

As for the revisionist view of what happened in Manchester, I am scarcely surprised to hear that such a view exists.
What did people really think? Imagine the average debate on this board, a score of different views, very few of them easily categorised.

 

[Grimm Reaper]

Except that there is nowhere for the immigrants to go.

The CSA is not desired and Canada is not an acceptable option while at war either.

If we assume Great Britain is going for a harsh war the question exists: For a decade or longer, during the war and afterwards as the British eagerly get back to low taxes and small armies, Great Britain will be virtually helpless in the event of another major crisis, which begs the question as to whether the Tsar or Bismark or Napoleon III might consider fomenting a crisis.

For instance, what happens when the British are bogged down in the North American war and the Tsar issues an ultimatum to the Ottomans?

If the British go for harsh conditions the war will last much longer and be much bloodier and then Great Britain is guaranteed enmity. If they go for separating the West Coast...well, I suppose that in theory there are enough men in Great Britain whose deaths might purchase that but will the British government and populace welcome a massive bloodletting which they can easily see leading to future conflict?

Tielhard, you're missing a few points of history. First, the investment and development of the US is not going to be greatly delayed. If the result of the war leaves the US with a larger government with some actual planning in terms of railroads, defenses and such then industry may even move faster.

Further, British investment will not stop. London would not dare tell the rich and powerful that investment is off, but not to worry, French and German industrialists will do it instead. Investors at this time revolved around profit, not nationalism, as witness the large French and British investment in the Berlin-Baghdad railway which alarmed London and Paris or the fact that Germany's top trade partner in 1914 and in 1939 was France. Trade and investment meant nothing once the shooting began, but in times of peace the capitalists were not going to let anything stand between them and some cash.

Further, Germany was rising fast and there is simply no chance of Great Britain accepting a Europe dominated by another power.

Yet, without any economic or military support from the US, with Canada and the CSA helpless to send much out of fear of the US, and with the RN also overstretched is there any prospect for Germany NOT winning WWI?

Not even considering that in OTL the US slacked on the naval buildup after Teddy Roosevelt yet still was third in dreadnaughts. If the US keeps on going, it is very likely that in 1914 the US and Germany together can take the RN.

Canada in OTL was even more hostile to defense spending and a large military than the US was so the response from Ottawa when they have been saddled with universal conscription and massive defense spending remains to be seen.

The fact remains: America the genuinely neutral would be enough to destroy the British Empire in WWI simply by NOT firing a shot.

 

[Wozza]

Except that there is nowhere for the immigrants to go.

The CSA is not desired and Canada is not an acceptable option while at war either.

Argentina
Australia

If we assume Great Britain is going for a harsh war the question exists: For a decade or longer, during the war and afterwards as the British eagerly get back to low taxes and small armies, Great Britain will be virtually helpless in the event of another major crisis, which begs the question as to whether the Tsar or Bismark or Napoleon III might consider fomenting a crisis.

Whilst I agree that there is a big question about British motivation here the Tsar will not want to start a war with Britain again. Napoleon III is an ally. The British ignore all Prussia's actions from 1861-71 anyway.

If the British go for harsh conditions the war will last much longer and be much bloodier and then Great Britain is guaranteed enmity. If they go for separating the West Coast...well, I suppose that in theory there are enough men in Great Britain whose deaths might purchase that but will the British government and populace welcome a massive bloodletting which they can easily see leading to future conflict?.

Tielhard, you're missing a few points of history. First, the investment and development of the US is not going to be greatly delayed. If the result of the war leaves the US with a larger government with some actual planning in terms of railroads, defenses and such then industry may even move faster.
.

Investment goes to where there is low political risk. Once this war is fought then that will cease to be the case for the US and investment will decline.
In truth we do not know what sort of country a defeated US would become. Once the British have got involved, for whatever reason, they have strong incentives to do the job properly.

Yet, without any economic or military support from the US, with Canada and the CSA helpless to send much out of fear of the US, and with the RN also overstretched is there any prospect for Germany NOT winning WWI?

This is reading history backwards. The US becomes strong because it is convenient for the British to invest, and then in ww1 spend there. Strip out that factor and the important of the US declines dramatically. In WW1 it was artificially cheap for the British to import things from the US rather than to make them in Europe, due to manipulation of the financial system. This will cease to be true and the British will invest the capital at home (a la the Napoleonic Wars perhaps?)

Not even considering that in OTL the US slacked on the naval buildup after Teddy Roosevelt yet still was third in dreadnaughts. If the US keeps on going, it is very likely that in 1914 the US and Germany together can take the RN.

Again reading backwards. British policy may change dramatically. Maybe there will be a massive appeasement of the US, maybe of Germany. Maybe the US will seek France or Russia as an ally, leading to all sorts of odd developments.
What do the US and Germany really have to offer each other?
The Turtledoveque scenario you postulate is only one possible outcome. I do not see it as the most likely, it does not involve enough other changes.

The fact remains: America the genuinely neutral would be enough to destroy the British Empire in WWI simply by NOT firing a shot.

No, US neutrality+trade creates British dependence on the US (and vice versa) "Genuine" neutrality (an economically disadvantageous no trade arrangment would simply see the capital spent elsewhere.

 

[Ghost 88]

Except that there is nowhere for the immigrants to go.

The CSA is not desired and Canada is not an acceptable option while at war either.

If we assume Great Britain is going for a harsh war the question exists: For a decade or longer, during the war and afterwards as the British eagerly get back to low taxes and small armies, Great Britain will be virtually helpless in the event of another major crisis, which begs the question as to whether the Tsar or Bismark or Napoleon III might consider fomenting a crisis.

For instance, what happens when the British are bogged down in the North American war and the Tsar issues an ultimatum to the Ottomans?

If the British go for harsh conditions the war will last much longer and be much bloodier and then Great Britain is guaranteed enmity. If they go for separating the West Coast...well, I suppose that in theory there are enough men in Great Britain whose deaths might purchase that but will the British government and populace welcome a massive bloodletting which they can easily see leading to future conflict?

Tielhard, you're missing a few points of history. First, the investment and development of the US is not going to be greatly delayed. If the result of the war leaves the US with a larger government with some actual planning in terms of railroads, defenses and such then industry may even move faster.

Further, British investment will not stop. London would not dare tell the rich and powerful that investment is off, but not to worry, French and German industrialists will do it instead. Investors at this time revolved around profit, not nationalism, as witness the large French and British investment in the Berlin-Baghdad railway which alarmed London and Paris or the fact that Germany's top trade partner in 1914 and in 1939 was France. Trade and investment meant nothing once the shooting began, but in times of peace the capitalists were not going to let anything stand between them and some cash.

Further, Germany was rising fast and there is simply no chance of Great Britain accepting a Europe dominated by another power.

Yet, without any economic or military support from the US, with Canada and the CSA helpless to send much out of fear of the US, and with the RN also overstretched is there any prospect for Germany NOT winning WWI?

Not even considering that in OTL the US slacked on the naval buildup after Teddy Roosevelt yet still was third in dreadnaughts. If the US keeps on going, it is very likely that in 1914 the US and Germany together can take the RN.

Canada in OTL was even more hostile to defense spending and a large military than the US was so the response from Ottawa when they have been saddled with universal conscription and massive defense spending remains to be seen.

The fact remains: America the genuinely neutral would be enough to destroy the British Empire in WWI simply by NOT firing a shot.

While you maybe correct,where is the wealth the US is using to build coming from you loss more than half your coal and almost all your Known oil reserves to the south with out oil your dreadnauhgts are going to be slower.
And why would the south not build its own Navy,this always puzzle me about ATLs where the south wins they they take Cuba,Puerto Rico and parts of Central America but never build a battle fleet to defend it,flies in the face of logic. Grimm a large portion of the wealth that built the norths industrial might before and after the ACW came from the exploytation of southern resources,tariffs before and looting after.

 

[Tielhard]

Grimm Reaper,

1) WWI is not inevitable in an ATL where the CSA breaks free of the Union supported by Britain.
2) The expansion of the Union is not inevitable in an ATL where the CSA breaks free of the Union supported by Britain.

These things may happen, the may not. If they do happen AND the USA remains neutral then the British Empire will probably fall. What of it? That is the purpose of Alternative History, to examine possibilities. I have no personal investment in the continued existance of the British Empire in some ALT. What we are looking at here is the ACW beyond that all sorts of things could happen.

Except that there is nowhere for the immigrants to go.

Australia, the Cape, South America, New Zealand, Mexico and British Columbia. The Maritimes may also be a possibility. Even the CSA and Canada would be attractive to young men if they offered passage and land for military service. Emigrants left thier homes to go to America not because it was America and the emigrants supported the ideals on which it was based but because it was an opportunity. If it stops being an opportunity because of the blockade or because someone else looks a better bet they will go there instead.

"If we assume Great Britain is going for a harsh war the question exists: For a decade or longer, during the war and afterwards as the British eagerly get back to low taxes and small armies, Great Britain will be virtually helpless in the event of another major crisis, which begs the question as to whether the Tsar or Bismark or Napoleon III might consider fomenting a crisis."

I don't understand the point you are trying to make, could you try again please?

"For instance, what happens when the British are bogged down in the North American war and the Tsar issues an ultimatum to the Ottomans?"

This I do understand. 1) Why would the Russians do that? 2) How would the Prussians feel about it? The Austro-Hungarians? 3) The RN can beat the USN AND the Russians AND keep up her key colonial committments, its BIG and it has enourmous reserves and if that is not enough Britain's ship building capacity is vast. As for Armies that is what the other Europeans like the French could bring to the alliance.

"If the British go for harsh conditions the war will last much longer"

It might in which case the Union will not just be defeated it will be a ruin. The CSA can walk in and take over vast swathes of the country. However, the overwhelming probability is that it will be a very short war. Two, two and a half years tops. Shorter still if it gets brutal ("burn another city Captain!").

"Tielhard, you're missing a few points of history. First, the investment and development of the US is not going to be greatly delayed. If the result of the war leaves the US with a larger government with some actual planning in terms of railroads, defenses and such then industry may even move faster."

Yes it will. Three reasons for this. 1) Just because the British don't invest does not mean that the French and others will. They will go where the best opportunities lie and they won't be in the Union. 2) If the Union looses then there are several more attractive investment opportunities. The CSA to start with. The history of Mexico is likely to be very different because the French and especially British probably won't leave so that becomes safe for investment. A defeated Union will not enforce the Monroe doctrine, the British won't let the CSA do it even if they had the resources and unlike erlier periods the British are unlikely to do it for the Americans so suddenly South America is a money pit. 3) Even Capitalists have family and many of them will have served in the armed forces of great Britain and perhaps killed or wounded. It won't stop them investing in the Union but it will certainly slow things up for many years.

Wozza,

"On this last point I think it important to point out that the Manchester school politicians were most definitely middle class."

In some respects this is correct which meant they had a lot more funds than to support laid off workers and thier families than might otherwise have been the case. Especially as the Churches were involved. However, it is worth reminding you that this was the same Manchester that a few years later built the MMI and helf the first TUC.

 

[Grimm Reaper]

Wozza, neither Argentina nor Australia were especially desirable alternatives to immigrants. If they had been surely the US would not have recieved quite so many immigrants while the ACW was still raging(800K 1861-1865).

Napoleon III may have had common interests but was not always to be relied on. As for the Tsar, if the British are bogged down elsewhere and can't afford a second major war, defined as 100K troops or more...

Investment will continue to flow to the US. France and Great Britain were alarmed over the economic and military potential of the Berlin to Baghdad railroad yet did that stop the British and French investors who paid for more than a third of it?

The US will be strong and economically important with or without British investment. A modest reduction might take place or the new markets and goals created by a larger military might expand it, or other nations might take advantage of markets temporarily shunned by the British(which it is doubtful they would do).

As for WWI, you've got it completely wrong. The British and allies spent so much in the US and elsewhere to obtain whatever they needed and could not obtain at home, in part due to all the men at the front and the French mines and industries overrun. The agricultural costs alone were bound to be staggering. If this loss of the nation's financial life blood could have been avoided, it would have.

As for appeasement, no government in London can survive appeasement to the point of being inferior/unsafe in Europe and if they announce that the life of the British Empire now depends on earning the forgiveness of the US?

More to the point, what do they do to earn that forgiveness?

...in 1863 and 1881 a hundred thousand Englishmen lay down their lives to free the CSA and put the USA in their proper place. Now our survival may depend on the good wishes of a nation whose hatred we have firmly secured. I must therefore regretfully announce the sale of Canada's western provinces and territories to the United States, along with reparations in gold several times what the United States is paying for Canada...​

THAT will go over real well.

The USA would certainly have had more than sufficient oil until the 1930s or later and Pennsylvania and West Virginia alone outweighed the entire south in coal reserves.

How does the CSA, an agrarian society with little industry, build a mighty navy? Argentina also enjoyed great prosperity due to her agriculture yet never became a great naval power or, even with her grain sales and British good will, managed to outclass Brazil or Chile. Some destroyers and a fleet in being of one or two battleships, perhaps, but no more.

Should the CSA actually find itself with possessions dependent on control of the seas then the CSA may downgraded to a puppet of the British as their very territorial security now depends solely on a foreign power.

The argument that northern wealth and industry depended on exploitation of southern resources, tariffs, or 'looting' is part and parcel with the same assumptions that King Cotton would force the British to save the CSA.

 

[David S Poepoe]

Has anybody else actually read the book?

 

[Ghost 88]

Wozza, neither Argentina nor Australia were especially desirable alternatives to immigrants. If they had been surely the US would not have recieved quite so many immigrants while the ACW was still raging(800K 1861-1865).

Napoleon III may have had common interests but was not always to be relied on. As for the Tsar, if the British are bogged down elsewhere and can't afford a second major war, defined as 100K troops or more...

Investment will continue to flow to the US. France and Great Britain were alarmed over the economic and military potential of the Berlin to Baghdad railroad yet did that stop the British and French investors who paid for more than a third of it?

The US will be strong and economically important with or without British investment. A modest reduction might take place or the new markets and goals created by a larger military might expand it, or other nations might take advantage of markets temporarily shunned by the British(which it is doubtful they would do).

As for WWI, you've got it completely wrong. The British and allies spent so much in the US and elsewhere to obtain whatever they needed and could not obtain at home, in part due to all the men at the front and the French mines and industries overrun. The agricultural costs alone were bound to be staggering. If this loss of the nation's financial life blood could have been avoided, it would have.

As for appeasement, no government in London can survive appeasement to the point of being inferior/unsafe in Europe and if they announce that the life of the British Empire now depends on earning the forgiveness of the US?

More to the point, what do they do to earn that forgiveness?

...in 1863 and 1881 a hundred thousand Englishmen lay down their lives to free the CSA and put the USA in their proper place. Now our survival may depend on the good wishes of a nation whose hatred we have firmly secured. I must therefore regretfully announce the sale of Canada's western provinces and territories to the United States, along with reparations in gold several times what the United States is paying for Canada...​

THAT will go over real well.

The USA would certainly have had more than sufficient oil until the 1930s or later and Pennsylvania and West Virginia alone outweighed the entire south in coal reserves.

How does the CSA, an agrarian society with little industry, build a mighty navy? Argentina also enjoyed great prosperity due to her agriculture yet never became a great naval power or, even with her grain sales and British good will, managed to outclass Brazil or Chile. Some destroyers and a fleet in being of one or two battleships, perhaps, but no more.

Should the CSA actually find itself with possessions dependent on control of the seas then the CSA may downgraded to a puppet of the British as their very territorial security now depends solely on a foreign power.

The argument that northern wealth and industry depended on exploitation of southern resources, tariffs, or 'looting' is part and parcel with the same assumptions that King Cotton would force the British to save the CSA.

The bulk of the profits from the souths resources went north thats the looting,and what makes you believe Virginia is going to give up her western counties.The south was agraian if it had a nasty nieghbor to the north I think priorities might change a wee bit. The south was as it was OTL because of no investment look at the region today when there is investment.

 

[Grimm Reaper]

Tielhard, first, I absolutely agree with your point on the examination of alternatives here.

...Tielhard and Grimm agreed on something? Is this the end? all is lost! Flee for your liv... ...​

On some specifics, first, since 800K immigrants came to the US during the ACW it would appear that the alternatives were somehow lacking in appeal. Given the war and the number of immigrants 'persuaded' to join the Union forces had I been Irish or German I would definitely have considered a delay but hundreds of thousands did not. Thus a blockade may delay but will not noticeably reduce the long-term pattern.

I was inquiring as to the results if the British are forced to make damaging concessions or consider an economically shattering two major wars at one time. As for the Russian quesiton in particular, I doubt that England would enjoy requiring another 250-500K men under arms while I suspect that Bismark would have little interest in Turkey but would take great delight in either France or Austria being weakened and distracted.

The US would remain a major source of wealth and profitable investment, with large areas not yet developed and minerals even with loss of the south.

The CSA, on the other hand, is a fundamentally agrarian society(much like Argentina) with much less undeveloped land and limited industry or the desire for industry. I might also note that only likely territories to fall to the CSA were Oklahoma and Arizona/New Mexico, which were the least favorable and last settled continental states, not even mentioning the best organized and most formidable(arguably) Native American populations.

As for Mexico the British would be very unlikely to stay for long while the French might hold out until this ATL equivalent of the Franco-Prussian War. In the interim, the Juarez government's resistance will not leave Mexico looking very attractive.

The rest of Latin America is already a British trade oyster so why would they wish to mess with a good thing? Remember that it was the Royal Navy which really made the Monroe Doctrine viable.

As an aside, I can even see a potentially disastrous POD out of this. Austria and France draw closer due to the events in Mexico and threat to Maximillian, forcing Prussia/Germany and Russia to come to some arrangement.

Possibly, just possibly, the British could accomodate Berlin or St Petersburg, with serious loss, but not both.

 

[wkwillis]

The Union outnumbered the south nine to one. Not three to one. The south was one third proConfederate, one third slave, one third hillbillies who wanted to be left alone, as is evidenced by what the Confederate conscripts did as soon as the Union occupied their counties. They went home.
The Confederates held out only because the British pumped so much free munitions into their ports in 1861 and 1862, because they suspended repayments of debts to the North AND to the UK during the war, and because they imposed conscription at once to bulk up their armies to fight the war. So the Union would just do the same. Without the exports necessary to pay the interest on the money we owed the UK, we had plenty of food and manpower to build huge armies and industrialise. We would have had lots of farmboys that were no longer necessary to grow food to export to the South and to Europe.
Should the Union be attacked by the UK, the Union would impose a draft with the wholehearted approval of the population. Following that, it would conquer the South by the methods they used in 1864, specifically by entrenching a matching army in front of each of the Confederate armies and sending an equally large army around the flank of the Confederate army. They don't have to attack the Confederates head on, just march around them. That was what finally worked. Imposing conscription and outflanking. The head on attacks rarely worked on either side.
Figure that after the Union has already had one year to import weapons and gunpowder, staff up an army by a factor of twenty, and max out their construction of factories as they did in OTL, it's already too late for the UK to intervene. Specifically, by the spring of 1862 it was already too late for the UK to do anything more than it did in OTL.
Our manpower capacity was so great that we would have annexed Canada to the railhead limits in the first campaign, then surrounded all the Confederate armies in the second, followed by two years of not much happening while we built the smelters, foundries, and shipyards to build a navy and a transcontinental railroad. Well, we would have built a railroad to Halifax in Canada to remove the UK from that port, and to Brownsville in Texas as we chased what was left of the Confederate army.
We always ramped up industrial production that quickly during war. Look at the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, not to mention the Civil War itself, World War One, and World War Two. Remember, this is iron and steel we are talking about, not timber. It's more of a trade than a craft. Not like working wood in a shipyard, or even mining.
So the timeline is the Trent Affair with Prince Albert assassinated earlier so he doesn't calm it down. Hey, maybe they bump off Lincoln, too, and there is no one to restrain Seward! Hamlin certainly wouldn't.

 

[sikitu]

This book is a lot better than the infamous "Stars and Stripes". The naval battles have a more realistic touch, and there is no sudden alliance of the CSA with the US due to British incompetences.

Nevertheless, I fear that I have to join Mr. Stirling's side. It is very unlikely that the US would have won a war as shown in "1862". Especially the effects of a naval blockade, combined with economic and material support of the CSA by the British Empire are not accurately reflected in the book. I think that Conroy shares some of these doubts, as his introduction refers to aspects such as manufacturing enough gunpowder...

Finally, the UK shipyards where building a considerable number of ironclad warships, including turreted ones, in OTL 1860s.

 

[Tielhard]

Joatsimeon,

I have a question? Well two actually. I have just been hunting up the nature of British ships in the 1860/61 period and was surprised to discover that in another AH group way back in 1998 you were essentially defending the position you took above. The arguments you made there are essentially the ones you made here. There does not seem to be any greater detail to support your position today than there was then. So question one is: have you at any time between 1998 and now produced a more rigourous and detailed defence of your position? Did you post or publish it anywhere? Question two: why, why are you still banging on about the same argument you had over 8 years ago? Don't get me wrong I have always been way impressed by a single minded rant over a prolonged period, I just can't understand your motivation!

 

[sikitu]

According to this site

http://www.thoemmes.com/dictionaries/bdm_carnegie.htm

British steel production in 1870 was 292,000 tons, while the US only produced 69,000 tons.

Some ships built in Britain:

Rolf Krake (begun in 1862, commissioned in 1863 for Danish navy) http://www.milhist.dk/weapons/rolf_krake/rolf_krake.htm

various ironclads of the RN

http://www.battleships-cruisers.co.uk/battleships.htm

 

[sikitu]

According to this site

http://www.thoemmes.com/dictionaries/bdm_carnegie.htm

British steel production in 1870 was 292,000 tons, while the US only produced 69,000 tons.

Some ships built in Britain:

Rolf Krake (begun in 1862, commissioned in 1863 for Danish navy) http://www.milhist.dk/weapons/rolf_krake/rolf_krake.htm

various ironclads of the RN

http://www.battleships-cruisers.co.uk/battleships.htm