Raid on Panama canal

[FlyingDutchman]

FlyingDutchman, you wrote,

Weren't there even torpedo-nets and the likes ? - Much like at Pearl Harbor, none that I have been able to find any proof of. AA guns with little ammo and fighters posted miles away etc., etc. A non-functional radar air warning system. Even though the British air strike on the Italian fleet at Taranto was known, it seems that the US felt that the Japanese didn't have the technology/training/aircraft needed to repeat it elsewhere. Plus, Panama is so far from Japan. Just like with 9/11 (using hijacked suicide airliners) our hindsight now is easy but in Dec.'41, before the Japanese had hit Pearl Harbor by air, any such air attack on Panama would have been an equally nasty and probably total, surprise. IMO.

Any meddling of Japan in the America's could just as well force the Americans to guard the Canal even better.

I don't forsee any greast amount of "butterfly" type effects since I'm not talking about that great an increase in Japanese efforts over and above the OTL. So an IJN carrier goes along on the trip instead of the OTL heavy cruiser ? News of this level of substitution would not start a war immediately. Considering the low number of warplanes carried by Hosho I'd expect the over-confident Americans to believe that their newly Panama based P-36s could handle any possible threat. Remember that the US armed forces didn't know much at all about the newish Zero's capabilities in Dec.'41.

I don't know. A carrier is IMHO a class above a mere cruiser and more comparable with a battleship. Not a very fair comparison.

To be honest I think the Americans had every reason to be arrogant versus the Hosho; AFAIK it's not capable of operating modern fighters like the Zero. During WWII it only ever carried Claude's as fighters.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Hōshō
I don't see how a minority of obsolescent/obsolete fighters is going to achieve much against a greater number of equally obsolete fighters (P-36).

You also downplay the 30 minutes of ammunition for the AA guns; against an airstrike of between 8 and 19 airplanes (assuming all of them make it) that would seem plenty to me.
It's not exactly a 1000 bomber raid overhead.

Who knows how the US would have responded to such a Japanese drive ? - Historically we know that the US was largely asleep at the wheel and did not much of anything militarily in response to the OTL Japanese efforts. Diplomatic discussions with several Central and South American governments were more than enough to ensure that the Japanese didn't get the oil and minerals that they searched for but in my scenario the Japanese effort is just a cover for the presence of a small carrier in the Eastern Pacific, anyway. Neither the Japanese nor I expected any real successes in buying South American oil but they had to try, even if just as a cover for their preparations to seize the NEI oil production areas.

IMHO not really asleep at the wheel, although they made plenty of mistakes.
The US was paranoid enough to occupy Iceland and guard Suriname long before they joined the Allies.
Any interest of Japan will spark more defence money going to Panama.
Not that Panama has any reason to complain about defencespending; it's part of the strategic triangle and is prioritized for funding.

 

[robdab]

FlyingDutchman, you wrote,

To be honest I think the Americans had every reason to be arrogant versus the Hosho; AFAIK it's not capable of operating modern fighters like the Zero. During WWII it only ever carried Claude's as fighters. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Hōshō
I don't see how a minority of obsolescent/obsolete fighters is going to achieve much against a greater number of equally obsolete fighters (P-36). - I would point out that in my posting #15 here on this thread I did indicate that I had NOT checked to see if Hosho could operate IJN firstline aircraft in 1941. It would have been a simple matter to substitute another small IJN carrier that could.

Your Wiki source does indicate that in 1941 she did operate 11 x A5M4 "Claude" fighters and 8 x B4Y1 "Jean" biplane torpedo bombers. Those are credited with a ranges of 1,200km and 1,580km respectively. More than adequite, IF surprise were achieved.

You also downplay the 30 minutes of ammunition for the AA guns; against an airstrike of between 8 and 19 airplanes (assuming all of them make it) that would seem plenty to me. It's not exactly a 1000 bomber raid overhead. - I believe that if you were to re-read the source that I presented you would find that the US defenders at Panama had AA ammunition sufficient for only ONE MINUTE of firing, NOT the 30 minutes that you have somehow just invented. I believe that a surprise (in peacetime) IJN air raid on Panama would have been very likely to receive the same type of weak initial response as they achieved at the OTL Pearl Harbor. SNAFU.

The US was paranoid enough to occupy Iceland and guard Suriname long before they joined the Allies. - So ? The Panama Canal zone had been occupied by the US since they built the Canal, some 2.5 decades before WW2.

Any interest of Japan will spark more defence money going to Panama. - Except that in the OTL, that was NOT what happened after the Japanese stepped up diplomatic and trade negotiations, post embargo. I'm suggesting just a couple of months of advanced notice here, before a small Japanese carrier could be in the area. AFAIK the US Congress doesn't approve panic revised defense budgets and forward the monies in that short a time frame and didn't back then, either. As you point out, huge sums were already being spent on improving the defenses of Panama. I really don't see the US panicing and approving even larger sums just because one Japanese carrier is scheduled to sail past, in International waters.

 

[FlyingDutchman]

FlyingDutchman, you wrote,

To be honest I think the Americans had every reason to be arrogant versus the Hosho; AFAIK it's not capable of operating modern fighters like the Zero. During WWII it only ever carried Claude's as fighters. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Hōshō
I don't see how a minority of obsolescent/obsolete fighters is going to achieve much against a greater number of equally obsolete fighters (P-36). - I would point out that in my posting #15 here on this thread I did indicate that I had NOT checked to see if Hosho could operate IJN firstline aircraft in 1941. It would have been a simple matter to substitute another small IJN carrier that could.

Yes, a simple matter, untill you take into account all the other Japanese requirements for carriers at that time.
But just like with the Hosho, the attackers will be massively outnumbered, even though they'll perhaps have a handfull of modern fighters. (how many defending airplanes are there again?)

That is, unless you plan on taking away a Shokaku from the strike on PH.
As you already more or less mentioned yourself, you'll only do significant damage if you manage to completely suprise the Americans and absolutely nothing will go wrong with the attacking airplanes and their navigation (you did propose to launch a very longrange attack, didn't you?)

You also downplay the 30 minutes of ammunition for the AA guns; against an airstrike of between 8 and 19 airplanes (assuming all of them make it) that would seem plenty to me. It's not exactly a 1000 bomber raid overhead. - I believe that if you were to re-read the source that I presented you would find that the US defenders at Panama had AA ammunition sufficient for only ONE MINUTE of firing, NOT the 30 minutes that you have somehow just invented. I believe that a surprise (in peacetime) IJN air raid on Panama would have been very likely to receive the same type of weak initial response as they achieved at the OTL Pearl Harbor. SNAFU.

My memory was playing games with the 1 minute ammunition for the 37 mm guns your source mentioned. One minute of ammunition does seem insufficient to me.

I'd however assume the Americans to have both lighter (HMG and the likes) and heavier AA (both 90 mm and the older 3 inch), would they perhaps have more ammunition then those 37 mm guns?
How large of a % would the 37mm guns make of all the AA anyways?

 

[robdab]

FlyingDutchman, you wrote,

Yes, a simple matter, untill you take into account all the other Japanese requirements for carriers at that time. - I would assume that if the Japanese had made such a major strategic raid decision then they would have had to re-arrange all of their priorites in order to make it work. This AH might indeed require a change or two to the OTL's missions.

But just like with the Hosho, the attackers will be massively outnumbered, even though they'll perhaps have a handfull of modern fighters. (how many defending airplanes are there again?) As the Japanese anticipated at Pearl Harbor, it matters not in the least how many defending fighters there are. What matters is how many are fuelled, armed, manned, in the air (at altitude) and well directed into good intercept positions BEFORE an air raid sweeps in.

The most painfull recent example being 4 hijacked airliners vs. the mightiest airforce in the world today. The total number of supersonic US fighters, the AA missiles, the best radars available and all other billions of dollars worth of peacetime defences mattered not a bit as they were out of position and an entire defense establishment not mentally ready for instant combat at home. No military ever could be 24/7/365. Thus the ongoing popularity of the surprise attack concept.

The OTL history tells us that the Japanese didn't know about American air warning radar at this point in time and thus could not take deliberate measures in this AH to avoid/defeat it.

I have already posted a source which details that, like the Americans at Oahu, the US defenders of Panama had not made their radar installations effective at all. Communication with the fighter airfields was poor, trained radar operators were in too short supply and like at Oahu, no IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) system was in place either. On a peacetime Sunday morning how likely was it that a rookie radar trainee would sound a full Panama wide air raid alarm just because a small group of planes flying in formation (probably US ones on a training mission ?) showed up on his screen ? With the limited abilities of the 270 radar of the day any such radar technician would not even been able to tell that there were 16 planes in that group (if it were flying from Hosho - 3 fighters retained for CAP), let alone that they were anything other than the usual USAAF aircraft.

That is, unless you plan on taking away a Shokaku from the strike on PH. - Such would be overkill. The IJN had a few other small carriers to choose from at the time.

As you already more or less mentioned yourself, you'll only do significant damage if you manage to completely suprise the Americans and absolutely nothing will go wrong with the attacking airplanes and their navigation (you did propose to launch a very longrange attack, didn't you?) - A similar situation to that accepted by the Japanese for their OTL Pearl Harbor attack. Why would they not accept the same levels of risk for a Panama Canal attack had they decided such to be of strategic import ?

IJN carrier aviators bet their lives on their over-water navigation abilities almost EVERYTIME that they took off. Suffice it to say that they were good at it. Should they somehow become lost, I suspect that they could find mainland Panama just by flying east and then flying overland until the Panama Canal itself was spotted. Since Panama also had commercial radio stations perhaps the IJN fliers could have used their onboard RDF gear to home in on a known commercial radio station location, much as Fuchida did in the OTL Pearl Harbor attack ?

I'd however assume the Americans to have both lighter (HMG and the likes) and heavier AA (both 90 mm and the older 3 inch), would they perhaps have more ammunition then those 37 mm guns? How large of a % would the 37mm guns make of all the AA anyways? - All valid questions that I have yet to find the answers to.

Certainly the Pearl Harbor AA results indicated that it was the lighter calibre AA weapons that were successful in shooting down IJN warplanes, rather than the old 3" and the modern (but still lacking in Panama) 90mm AA weapons. But it is NOT the total numbers of AA guns or their ammunition that really mattered. What mattered would have been exactly WHERE were those AA defences installed, were those AA installations 100% complete and ready to fire at a moment's notice (on a peacetime Sunday morning ? NBLIMO), were they actually MANNED with gunners in their seats (and ammo in-hand) as the IJN aircraft flew over (ie. no surprise at all for the IJN), would those US gunners recognize the deception & fire on IJN warplanes carrying US colours and markings and finally, had those US AA gunners had enough recent (peacetime) target practise to actually hit China combat experienced IJN pilots ? I just can't imagine such pilots following each other sedately along like tin ducks in an arcade shooting gallery, can you ? Clouds and mountains would be used to hide behind whenever possible.

Please remember that the entire Panama Canal installation is 48-50 miles long (depending on how you measure the navigation aids at each end) with dozens and dozens of potential bombing targets for the US defenders to protect. All the locks, numerous ships transiting the Canal, Gatun Dam, several coastal artillery sites, several military airfields, roads, bridges, troop barracks, radar stations (did the Americans know that the Japanese didn't know about them ?) etc., etc. The US could NOT know which targets that the Japanese intended to bomb even if the IJN (peacetime) surprise was somehow lost and all of Panama alerted. Unlike today, such alerts took lots of TIME in 1941. No cell phones on a Sunday morning back then. Much heavier church attendence (with no phones inside) than would be the case today. US fighter pilots included. You can't be strapped into a fighter's cockpit and climbing against an IJN attack flight if you are still driving from your church to your airfield.

 

[robdab]

Panama Canal Defenses on Dec.7'41

I just did a quick google search that came up with pages #273-291 on http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/I/AAF-I-8.html which detail the distressing state of US air warning measures at the time. Pages 299-302 give us: "The critical examination of air defenses which had followed the Pearl Harbor attack naturally included a re-examination of the defense of the Panama Canal. Plans made in 1940-41 for protection of the Canal had anticipated that the chief danger would come from the eastern approaches, but now the emphasis shifted." and "The real danger to the Canal was from the Pacific side, where virtually nothing had been provided by way of outlying defense and where, geographically, the Canal was most exposed to surprise attack."

Most damming is the page #274 assertion of: "The problems involved in providing a serviceable radar screen to alert the inner defenses of the Canal were less easily solved. Equipment in use at these stations was "inadequate" for early warning and "quite useless" for purposes of controlled interception. Sites had been selected for four British-type radars, the sets to be supplied from Canadian production, but improvement in equipment could not overcome deficiencies of operating personnel. Operators in Panama were largely untrained, had been given no indoctrination in the need for precision standards, and were frequently unenthusiastic about their assignment. Radar crews had made no effort to plot the permanent echoes in their search areas, and therefore could not discriminate between such echoes and "live" targets. The combination of inadequate equipment, poor site selection, and untrained operators produced such inefficiency that even the best station in Panama was "far below any acceptable standard of operational utility." The elimination of all the deficiencies noted depended on action by the War Department to provide improved equipment and better trained crews. No complete remedy was available to local commanders."

Page #274 also leads to pages #160-166 of: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/I/AAF-I-5.html#page160 which detail the poor condition of US Caribbean defenses which Panama was the most important part of. The overal situation in Panama is summarized by: "The vital importance of this phase of Canal defense was revealed in an estimate of enemy capabilities prepared by the Caribbean Defense Command in the latter part of November 1941. Japan was regarded in respect to the Canal itself as the primary potential enemy, and a carrier-based attack from the Pacific was considered "not an improbable feat." Other possibilities were taken into account, but it was concluded that in any event the most important defensive measure was "increasing and thorough reconnaissance and observation of the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone." Existing forces in the area were regarded as sufficient to repel any probable initial attack on the Canal provided they were given "timely warning" of the approach of hostile forces. The inability of defending naval and military air forces to perform the required amount of reconnaissance and to provide the "timely warning" constituted perhaps the chief weakness in Caribbean defense immediately prior to American entry into the war. It was a weakness which was recognized by both Army and Navy commanders, their expressed hope lay in the postponement of attack by an enemy until the defending forces could achieve the proper degree of co-ordination and the necessary equipment for complete coverage of the vast sea frontiers.

Thus it is revealed that the primary US defense of the Panama Canal in December 1941 relied solely on the mere hope that the Japanese would NOT attack them anytime soon !!!

Just how pathetic was that ?

Had the Japanese but known ...

 

[robdab]

Another Panama Variation ...

Since it seems that an IJN carrier strike on Panama wasn't too widely accepted, I'd like to propose a floatplane strike instead.

Seaplane carrier Chitose, modified by the replacement of 1 of it's 5
light duty seaplane cranes with one as shown on the model of
floatplane carrier Akitsushima at http://www.aeronautic.dk/Warship Akitsushima.htm would be dispatched, with only 1 oiler along for company, on a "show- the-flag" tour to South America as previously described for Hosho & company. Not to Central America, just to a South American nation or two ... In reality she would also be close escorted by three IJN long
ranged (and capable of 21 knots on the surface) submarines. Please
note that at 12,600 tons, the Chitose was MUCH bigger than the 4,600
ton Akitsushima and thus able to carry 3 Mavis flyingboats instead of just the Akitsushima's 1 Mavis/Emily.


Any peacetime Allied vessel or aircraft spotting Chitose during her
long Pacific "training cruise" crossing would merely report two IJN
auxilliaries on course and schedule for their approved South American
visits. That transit would be scheduled to approach Ecuador's
Galapagos Islands on the afternoon of Dec.6 '41 when a single engined
seaplane or two would be launched by Chitose to scout 2-3 prospective
deserted island anchorages already identified by pre-war Japanese
agents on those Islands. Ecuador had a sizeable ethnic Japanese
population at the time and many earned a living as fishermen and guano
miners, both perfect cover stories for a group of pre-war agents sent
to investigate the Galapagos group.


Once tucked into a quiet lee anchorage (guarded by the 3 submarines)
and after the fall of night, the 3 Mavis floatplanes could be lowered
onto the sea from Chitose and prepared for a daylight takeoff and a
855 nmile (the one-way distance) flight to the Gatun Dam at Panama,
hauling 2 torpedoes each, as per the photo at
http://www.warbirdphotographs.com/NavyJB&W/H6K-1.jpg


To further deceive Panama's US defenders I would suggest that each
Mavis could have been pre-painted and marked to more closely resemble
the PanAmerican Airways Sikorsky S-42 "China Clipper" aircraft as seen
at http://www.flyingclippers.com/S42.html that were making regular
passengeer runs thru Panama's airspace in 1941. Perhaps a "breakaway"
propeller cover could have been added to each underwing torpedo so as
to make each appear to be a long range fuel tank rather than a weapon,
which would NOT be accepted on a peacetime civilian airliner. All
three would fly widely seperated but co-ordinated courses to Gatun as
real Pan-Am airliners would be unlikely to fly in tight three aircraft
military formation.


I am still trying to discover the range of a drop-tank equipped Rufe
seaplane fighter (if such existed at all in Dec.'41 ?) to deterrmine
if some might also be launched from Chitose to simultaneously raid
Albrook Field, the Panama home base of most of the USAAF's modern P-40
fighter aircraft. Certainly some would fly daylight CAP over Chitose
to down any lucky US PBY scout or similar "tailgater" of a returning
Mavis. Please note that at the time the US had only 12, yes that was
twelve, PBYs to conduct Pacific searches west of Panama.


Since this approach eliminates US worries about an IJN carrier
taskforce approaching Panama, I think it greatly reduces the odds of
the US discovering the Japanese efforts in time to warn either Panama
or Oahu ?


Your constructive opinions, please ?

 

[robdab]

Gents,

Not even a single comment ?