usertron2020
Donor
Weren't most of the Pearl Harbor victims (except Arizona and Oklahoma of course) refloated and sent to CONUS by the time of Midway? I suppose West Virginia could still be on the bottom.
Japanese figure out their goose is cooked before Midway
- Thread starter AbeLincoln1865
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Weren't most of the Pearl Harbor victims (except Arizona and Oklahoma of course) refloated and sent to CONUS by the time of Midway? I suppose West Virginia could still be on the bottom.
Weren't most of the Pearl Harbor victims (except Arizona and Oklahoma of course) refloated and sent to CONUS by the time of Midway? I suppose West Virginia could still be on the bottom.
West Virginia was refloated on 17 May and put in drydock on 9 June. Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Tennessee were back in the fleet with Task Force One. Nevada was already at Puget Sound and California departed for Puget Sound on 7 June (probably could have left earlier if necessary).
TFSmith121
Banned
Not to disagree with the majority of your post, but
Not to disagree with the majority of your post, but by the spring-summer of 1942, all of the larger island groups in the South Pacific were well-garrisoned by ground and air forces. As examples:
Samoas - Samoa Defense Force, which amounted to a light division of the USMC, built around the 2nd and 3rd Marine brigades (7th and 8th Marines) plus several Marine defense battalions, field and AA artillery, Marine and Navy engineers, etc.
Fiji - US 37th Infantry Division and NZ 3rd Division; total of five infantry brigade/regimental combat team equivalents, plus several Marine defense battalions, field and AA artillery, Marine and Navy engineers, etc.
New Caledonia (and the New Hebrides, etc) - The Americal Division (3 infantry RCTs), plus several coast, field , and AA artillery battalions, Army and Navy engineers, and two separate regiments, one of infantry and another of cavalry (actually still horsed, in fact)
The other smaller island chains worth bothering with (Societies, Tonga, etc) all had their own garrisons, ranging up to an infantry regiment in size; New Zealand itself had about six brigades of infantry and cavalry, while Australia was garrisoned by about seven divisions of AMF, two AIF infantry divisions (6th and 7th; the 9th was still in the Med), and two US army infantry divisions (32nd and 41st).
New Guinea's garrison was fairly slender early on (about two brigades of AMF) but was reinforced throughout the summer and autumn by more AMF brigades and the 6th and 7th AIF and 32nd and 41st US divisions.
Hawaii, in this period, was garrisoned by the RA 24th and 25th divisions (each with three full mainland RCTs), the remaining infantry regiment of the Hawaiian National Guard, the "square" 27th Division (four RCTs), various and sundry corps and army-level troops, coast and AA artillery, army and marine engineers, and 2-3 Marine defense battalions, plus the Hawaiian Defense Volunteers, some 20,000 milita organized at the company and battalion level as everything from infantry to cavalry to engineers to AA batteries. The 1st and 2nd Marine divisions were within a few days steaming, as well, of course.
The Japanese, at their strongest in December, never had more than about four divisions afloat simultaneously, and trying to assemble the requisite transports to match that effort in 1942 would have actually required reducing the flow of supplies and replacements to Burma and the garrisons froim Thailand across to the Central Pacific...
All in all, the Japanese reached their high water mark in April-May, 1942 - they weren't going any farther, in any significant way.
Best,
Not to disagree with the majority of your post, but by the spring-summer of 1942, all of the larger island groups in the South Pacific were well-garrisoned by ground and air forces. As examples:
Samoas - Samoa Defense Force, which amounted to a light division of the USMC, built around the 2nd and 3rd Marine brigades (7th and 8th Marines) plus several Marine defense battalions, field and AA artillery, Marine and Navy engineers, etc.
Fiji - US 37th Infantry Division and NZ 3rd Division; total of five infantry brigade/regimental combat team equivalents, plus several Marine defense battalions, field and AA artillery, Marine and Navy engineers, etc.
New Caledonia (and the New Hebrides, etc) - The Americal Division (3 infantry RCTs), plus several coast, field , and AA artillery battalions, Army and Navy engineers, and two separate regiments, one of infantry and another of cavalry (actually still horsed, in fact)
The other smaller island chains worth bothering with (Societies, Tonga, etc) all had their own garrisons, ranging up to an infantry regiment in size; New Zealand itself had about six brigades of infantry and cavalry, while Australia was garrisoned by about seven divisions of AMF, two AIF infantry divisions (6th and 7th; the 9th was still in the Med), and two US army infantry divisions (32nd and 41st).
New Guinea's garrison was fairly slender early on (about two brigades of AMF) but was reinforced throughout the summer and autumn by more AMF brigades and the 6th and 7th AIF and 32nd and 41st US divisions.
Hawaii, in this period, was garrisoned by the RA 24th and 25th divisions (each with three full mainland RCTs), the remaining infantry regiment of the Hawaiian National Guard, the "square" 27th Division (four RCTs), various and sundry corps and army-level troops, coast and AA artillery, army and marine engineers, and 2-3 Marine defense battalions, plus the Hawaiian Defense Volunteers, some 20,000 milita organized at the company and battalion level as everything from infantry to cavalry to engineers to AA batteries. The 1st and 2nd Marine divisions were within a few days steaming, as well, of course.
The Japanese, at their strongest in December, never had more than about four divisions afloat simultaneously, and trying to assemble the requisite transports to match that effort in 1942 would have actually required reducing the flow of supplies and replacements to Burma and the garrisons froim Thailand across to the Central Pacific...
All in all, the Japanese reached their high water mark in April-May, 1942 - they weren't going any farther, in any significant way.
Best,
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The answer, obviously, is that Yamamoto would be measuring the drapes in the Oval Office inside a month.
Saphroneth
Banned
Sure it wasn't "elements of three divisions"? Or that the divisions were overallocated for the transport capacity?
IJA 17th army is listed as 4 rgt for MO, RY, FS and used one of them for MI.
I think the idea of 3 div available, much less transportable is pushing it.
I think the idea of 3 div available, much less transportable is pushing it.
The poster that made the claim the first wave would be 5,000-10,000 men for Oahu of all places has not posted since to clarify where he got that figure. What's next? That the IJA planned to invade Luzon with three guys and a hunting dog in December 1941?
I'd have to review cited source, but from what I recall the assault was to be made by three divisions, of which 2nd and 7th were elite and 52nd was a 2nd or 3rd rate formation that would require reinforcement, training and equipment. Training was to be for sea assault over coral reefs without air superiority, and the target (IIRC) was to be the west coast of Oahu, outside the main defence belt.
By 1942, 'taint no way that would have worked - a beachhead, contained, then evacuated under fire. But 5,000 guys to assault Oahu? C'mon. We weren't born yesterday.
The divisions listed were all available. That's why they were earmarked in the first place. The more important question is what, if any, follow-up divisions were earmarked? That I don't recall there being any information on.
In terms of transport, the requirement at Luzon for 14th army (16th, 48th ID) of about 45,000 men was just shy of 500,000 tons. So for three triangular divisions, maybe about 700,000 tons. The Japanese merchant marine was intact in May 1942, so this size of transport force could be made available.
Like to see the sourcing on that, really.
I have 2 ID starting in the DEI and is fed in piecemeal to Guadalcanal. 7th ID sends one Rgt to Guadalcanal nd the remainder stays in Hokkaido sys the sources that feed wiki.
Transport per Div would be around 125k tons. That's short as it only includes light load and is per the guadalcanal campaign.
Lifting 3 Div, with no army troops, air force or resupply amounts to a minimum of 375kt of shipping. But you will need to put in an air force and its ground support elements Flak and base defense personnnel.
Rabaul to anywhere useful is like Fiji ~ 10 days in a straight line at speed for a merchie conservatively say 14 days out of service or a month round trip.
Without resupply the battle fleet has about 2 weeks steaming before it has to turn for home. With combat probably less especially for the carriers as the magazines empty fast.
The IJA/IJN total tonnage available for all purposes is 2m ton. So the proposition is to send minimum of 25% of the total available merchant tonnage for an invasion convoy.
There is a reason the IJA used regiment sized invasions and cycled the rest of the formation in over the following days.
I have 2 ID starting in the DEI and is fed in piecemeal to Guadalcanal. 7th ID sends one Rgt to Guadalcanal nd the remainder stays in Hokkaido sys the sources that feed wiki.
Transport per Div would be around 125k tons. That's short as it only includes light load and is per the guadalcanal campaign.
Lifting 3 Div, with no army troops, air force or resupply amounts to a minimum of 375kt of shipping. But you will need to put in an air force and its ground support elements Flak and base defense personnnel.
Rabaul to anywhere useful is like Fiji ~ 10 days in a straight line at speed for a merchie conservatively say 14 days out of service or a month round trip.
Without resupply the battle fleet has about 2 weeks steaming before it has to turn for home. With combat probably less especially for the carriers as the magazines empty fast.
The IJA/IJN total tonnage available for all purposes is 2m ton. So the proposition is to send minimum of 25% of the total available merchant tonnage for an invasion convoy.
There is a reason the IJA used regiment sized invasions and cycled the rest of the formation in over the following days.
Figure 10 tons per man at that distance. (In closer campaigns, it was more like 5 tons per man).
375,000 tons would be too light - double that figure, I think. The IJA did three big ops in WW2 - Malaya, Luzon, Java. Figure 50% bigger than Java, but not as big as Malaya and Luzon combined.
Yes, perhaps more than 10% of the entire merchant marine. OTOH, exactly how much of an effort do you imagine it was to the Japanese military to make sure the Allies couldn't bomb Japan flat?
Anyways, the whole thing was a non-starter in 1942. The Hawaiian garrison was simply too strong, US airpower was too strong, the IJN carrier force, too weak relative to Oahu's air base network.