Japanese figure out their goose is cooked before Midway

[AbeLincoln1865]

Most Pacific War experts know how the US figured out Midway would be the location of the next Japanese offensive. On May 19, the Island was ordered to broadcast an uncoded message, that they
would soon be short of fresh water; Pearl Harbor then sent a reply, also uncoded, that a water barge was on its way. Allied listening stations were rewarded the same day with a Japanese message
reporting that “AF” the target of their next offensive, was running short of water. But, what if in mid-May 1942, a Japanese sailor, after transcribing the running short of fresh water message, had
turned to his superior to ask, “Why are they broadcasting this message in the clear? Don’t they care if we know that Midway is running short of water?” What if, acting on this the young communications officer had passed along his doubts? What if more experienced cryptographers and cipher specialists in Tokyo had not dismissed the idea that Imperial Japan’s codes could be broken; what if they had considered the possibility that the Americans could possibly be playing out an intelligence gambit. They might have reasoned, “If the Americans have been able to read some of our messages and are attempting to link potential objectives with cipher designations, would not this little message be an excellent way to trick us into confirming the code word for Midway? What if, with a red flag raised,
naval staff at Imperial General Headquarters Tokyo broadcast the now famous message of May 19, 1942, referring to “AF” being short of water not merely as a routine signal but as the first salvo in a Japanese intelligence offensive designed to lure the Americans to battle on terms favorable to Japan?

 

[CalBear]

The enlisted man would get slapped in the face by his commander (that, BTW, was the common way that (Imperial officers dealt with their enlisted men) and told to stop trying to think.

Tons of messages were sent in the clear by all sides (still are actually). The water message was not a statement that the base was on the verge of collapse, just that the desalination plant had broken down and a request was made for the parts needed to repair it.

 

[theg*ddam*hoi2fan]

Japan might win at Midway, which could set back Allied plans for a couple of years - depending on how big they win. Now, Japan - thanks to industrial disparity, their Army high command being bloody idiots, and having a million men bogged down in China - is never going to win the war. Buuuuut, if they're able to follow through on a Midway victory, the Japanese could make things so expensive for the Americans that instead of unconditional surrender, the Allies go for a beggar's peace for Japan instead (say, hand back everything occupied from the Wallies, but keep Taiwan, Karafuto and Korea). Of course, you'd need Japanese leaders who aren't barking mad or high on yamato damashii and can actually count who'd realise 'this is as good as it's going to get'. In other words, you'd need Admiral Yamamoto and Admiral Yonai to launch a coup...

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

Japan might win at Midway, which could set back Allied plans for a couple of years - depending on how big they win. Now, Japan - thanks to industrial disparity, their Army high command being bloody idiots, and having a million men bogged down in China - is never going to win the war. Buuuuut, if they're able to follow through on a Midway victory, the Japanese could make things so expensive for the Americans ...

Hah, hah, hah. 'Several years', good joke. 6 months delay, maybe, with a total victory at Midway. Essex class carriers were being built assembly line style, and the Japanese would be totally outclassed by '44 even if ASBs gave them total victory at Midway.

 

[phatmaus]

Hah, hah, hah. 'Several years', good joke. 6 months delay, maybe, with a total victory at Midway. Essex class carriers were being built assembly line style, and the Japanese would be totally outclassed by '44 even if ASBs gave them total victory at Midway.

It's not just the raw tonnage lost, it's the initiative, with a total US navy wipeout at Midway, they could have taken a lot of strategic objective, maybe even Hawaii, that would have been hell to dislodge them from afterwards.

 

[deathscompanion1]

It's not just the raw tonnage lost, it's the initiative, with a total US navy wipeout at Midway, they could have taken a lot of strategic objective, maybe even Hawaii, that would have been hell to dislodge them from afterwards.

....

How do they reach Hawaii and how do they take it from the thousands of defenders, hundreds of aircraft and fortifications when bloody wake island gave them a run for their money?

The garrison of the Hawaiian Department as approved by the joint Chiefs and the President was to consist of 74,000 ground troops on Oahu, 13,000 on Hawaii, and 12,800 distributed among five other islands. With small additions during March, the authorized strength of the department became at the beginning of April 106,000 ground and 16,000 air troops, including replacements for all soldiers of Japanese descent; and the department reached these strengths before the end of June 1942. The Army air units to be retained in the islands for local defense were to contain 96 heavy and 24 medium and light bombers and 225 pursuit planes, and the Navy was obligated to keep 67 patrol planes on hand for long-range and local reconnaissance. Because Army officials in Washington were wary of Navy claims on heavy bombers that might be present in Hawaii, it took the impetus of a new and grave Japanese threat to get the planned increment of them out to the islands; and their number was quickly reduced after the Japanese challenge had been met.67

 

[jayel]

not to mention any "peace talks" would involve prisoner exchanges,
Americans... Where are the rest of our men?
Japanese... Well we kind of shot, beheaded, bayoneted, and starved a bunch of them
Americans... See you in Tokyo, we're kind of pissed off about this

 

[ObssesedNuker]

*Reads title*

Well, they surrender. Duh. Sucks for Germany.

*Reads Post*

BWAHAHAHAHA!

 

[CalBear]

It's not just the raw tonnage lost, it's the initiative, with a total US navy wipeout at Midway, they could have taken a lot of strategic objective, maybe even Hawaii, that would have been hell to dislodge them from afterwards.

Seriously?

The Japanese would need to put 300,000 men onto the beaches to get even close to taking the Island of Oahu alone. They would have to keep their carrier force on site until they were able to establish an airfield to provide air support. They would be facing some of the most potent defensive fortification in the world in addition to the mobile artillery of three full Army divisions including a square (i.e. over sized) division) and two full Marine Defense Battalions with a variety of coastal defense guns, medium and light AAA and a number of .50 cal anti-aircraft MG.

Not even counting the two squadrons of USN F4F, the U.S. would have a 3:2 advantage in fighters assuming the Kido Butai retains all six CV and the same squadron distributions as at Pearl Harbor. By early June the USAAF had a B-17 bombardment group on alert in addition to the aircraft that were forward deployed to Midway. There was all around radar coverage, and the lesson of December 7th had greatly altered the understanding of what radar meant to a defense.

Lastly, and perhaps most critically, one of the first steps taken after the Raid was to address the food needs of the islands. By early February there was a six month supplyof food available, for both military and the full civilian population, just in case the Japanese managed to set up a siege/blockade. There was also a large supply of seeds laid in so needs beyond six months were covered (in OTL the planting effort was never undertaken as it was decided in Washington that as the IJN was eliminated the best way that Hawaiian agriculture could support the war effort was in sugar and pineapple production).

 

[Badshah]

I have a genuine question about Japan. What would the reaction be if Japan were to sue for a conditional peace around 1944?

While the likelihood of it happening isn't very likely, it's a simple question. Would the Allies respond favourably or would they attempt to press onwards? And how would that affect the homefront?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I have a genuine question about Japan. What would the reaction be if Japan were to sue for a conditional peace around 1944?

Rejection of the offer, reiteration of the demand for unconditional surrender.

And how would that affect the homefront?

Not a dot.

 

[ivanotter]

Interesting topic.

We typically discuss WI Japan had won at Midway.

OK, so Japan stops after Coral Sea.

If this is still an Allied strategic victory (but a Japanese tactical one), there is no incentive for US to start negotiations. They have just won.

The entire Japanese strategy was to hit US so hard (PH) that US (soft as they are!) would sue for peace and hand over China, Asia, Java,... to them.

If this would not come through, AND peace negotiations would be suggested, it would go against Tojo.

So, the entire Japanese military rule had to come down. Maybe not so plausible.

So, let us try again on this:

If Japan loses at Coral Sea there is no incentive for US to negotiate

If Japan should win at Coral Sea there is no incentive to negotiate.

I think it is one of these historical facts it will take major 'panel beating' to change.

Ivan

 

[MattII]

Yamamoto resigns December 9, having realised he's just played a big role in pissing off the most powerful nation in the world.

Also, I have a question, is there any PoD that would see the Japanese realising they're in deep sh*t after seeing the results of Midway?

 

[AbeLincoln1865]

The enlisted man would get slapped in the face by his commander (that, BTW, was the common way that (Imperial officers dealt with their enlisted men) and told to stop trying to think.

It's just that since Midway was the target of their next offensive this one might stand out. Was taking some initiative really considered insubordination? I thought that was something the Army thought not the Navy.

 

[Glenn239]

What if, with a red flag raised,
naval staff at Imperial General Headquarters Tokyo broadcast the now famous message of May 19, 1942, referring to “AF” being short of water not merely as a routine signal but as the first salvo in a Japanese intelligence offensive designed to lure the Americans to battle on terms favorable to Japan?

That's the premise of Wing Commander from 1999 - the Kilrathi armada is going to attack Earth, and the aliens permit the human forces to decode their battle plan, which as it turns out, is a ruse. The plot seemed inspired by the Midway incident.

 

[Glenn239]

If Japan loses at Coral Sea there is no incentive for US to negotiate

If Japan should win at Coral Sea there is no incentive to negotiate.

I'm missing what the significance of Coral Sea is supposed to be in relation to end of war negotiations.

 

[ivanotter]

Sorry, what I meant to say was that if Japan should figure out that the war is lost before Midway (and we stick to OTL), then it has to be the period between Coral Sea and Midway.

If Japan scores a decisive victory at Coral Sea, why would they then sue for peace?

At the other end of it:

If they realise the significance of Coral Sea - (and now we must look at the OP: Japan figure out ...) AND based on that sues for peace, then US (also realising the significance) has no incentive to go into negotiations.

Maybe not a Catch-22 but I think we must take into account that for anyone to convince Tojo et al that the war is lost after a resounding victory at Coral Sea is an uphill battle.

Even with a strategic set-back (as Coral Sea was) it is hard to convince the powers that the war is lost in five month.

To get into the OP, maybe a coup? a TL before the war?

Ivan

 

[Glenn239]

Sorry, what I meant to say was that if Japan should figure out that the war is lost before Midway (and we stick to OTL), then it has to be the period between Coral Sea and Midway.

If Japan scores a decisive victory at Coral Sea, why would they then sue for peace?

At the other end of it:

If they realise the significance of Coral Sea - (and now we must look at the OP: Japan figure out ...) AND based on that sues for peace, then US (also realising the significance) has no incentive to go into negotiations.

Maybe not a Catch-22 but I think we must take into account that for anyone to convince Tojo et al that the war is lost after a resounding victory at Coral Sea is an uphill battle.

Even with a strategic set-back (as Coral Sea was) it is hard to convince the powers that the war is lost in five month.

To get into the OP, maybe a coup? a TL before the war?

Ivan

Ok, I understand partly. But what I still don't understand is what the significance of Coral Sea is supposed to be? You mention some sort of "strategic" setback at Coral Sea. I don't understand what you mean; at the time it was viewed as nothing more than a tactical delay to the invasion of Port Moresby, which was rescheduled for after Midway. Even Midway (which really did have strategic significance), neither side viewed the outcome as impacting at the grand-strategic level, which is where peace talks resided.

So, if Japan had decided in early 1942 that the war was lost after a string of remarkable successes, then this conclusion would have also been evident before these victories were won, which means before the war, and it wouldn't have gone to war in the first place, right?

 

[Devolved]

Seriously?

The Japanese would need to put 300,000 men onto the beaches to get even close to taking the Island of Oahu alone. They would have to keep their carrier force on site until they were able to establish an airfield to provide air support. They would be facing some of the most potent defensive fortification in the world in addition to the mobile artillery of three full Army divisions including a square (i.e. over sized) division) and two full Marine Defense Battalions with a variety of coastal defense guns, medium and light AAA and a number of .50 cal anti-aircraft MG.

Not even counting the two squadrons of USN F4F, the U.S. would have a 3:2 advantage in fighters assuming the Kido Butai retains all six CV and the same squadron distributions as at Pearl Harbor. By early June the USAAF had a B-17 bombardment group on alert in addition to the aircraft that were forward deployed to Midway. There was all around radar coverage, and the lesson of December 7th had greatly altered the understanding of what radar meant to a defense.

Lastly, and perhaps most critically, one of the first steps taken after the Raid was to address the food needs of the islands. By early February there was a six month supplyof food available, for both military and the full civilian population, just in case the Japanese managed to set up a siege/blockade. There was also a large supply of seeds laid in so needs beyond six months were covered (in OTL the planting effort was never undertaken as it was decided in Washington that as the IJN was eliminated the best way that Hawaiian agriculture could support the war effort was in sugar and pineapple production).

What was the American garrison on Oahu in the summer of 1942?

 

[Devolved]

What was the American garrison on Oahu in the summer of 1942?

Whoops. Skipped over the oversized divisions and battalions bit. I am guessing around 90,000 men.