Actually the name should better be Friedrich Turm
I rely on your linguistic expertise on this.
You mean that after having effectively destroyed a papacy that had lasted 18centuries we are also going to completely marginalise marxism?
Practically yes.
When your provide an alternative, more acceptable means of socio-political organization and advocacy for the lower and lower middle classes (which bypasses the need for the gradual evolution of its doctrine from revolutionary extremism to reformist social democracy), you have stolen the thunder of marxism. IOTL, it happened to a very large extente in the Anglosphere, ITTL it extends to cover most of continental western Europe as well. At this point, anarchism, un-Marxist socialism, and radical fringes of progressive christian democracy can cover the need for political representation of the far left fringes.
If you prefer, I can give you an alternative scenario which leaves Marxism some meaningful role in the european politcal landscape. You may make it survive as part of the underground dissidence to the Carlist regime in France-Spain, and/or the Tsarist regime in Russia, and the circumstances of those regimes' military defeat and downfall cause it to emerge as one of the mainstream political forces (but not so much that they attempt an immediate revolutionary takeover, which would be ruthlessly repressed, and cast the commies back to square one). This would ensure them a relevant degree of following and influence in the Gallo-Ispanic-Russian area. It's the same basic process that made the Communists get a large following in OTL post-WWII France & Italy.
However, marxist movements would still reap very little following and influence in Germany, Italy, and the countries in their sphere of influence (Low Countries, Scandinavia, Hungary). Those countries are sent by the TTL on a different political trajectory, more akin to OTL Anglosphere.
Of course, it is also quite possible that post-Great War political systems in the defeated great powers mold themselves on the victors, or their far left movements get dominated by non-Marxist traditions instead. There's plenty of room for butterflies fluttering in either sense here.
There will be electoral reforms also, lowering the threshold to vote and redesigning he electoral precincts. The weakening of the aristocracy would have a positive effect on the minds of the royal families too.
Both points quite true, and rather beneficial on the long-term health of the countries, too.
Quite true In such a case, my greed would push me to prod iers to move, in order not to squander the reserves of the Banque Nationale which are needed to pay the bill
So very true. That money can put to much better use than fueling the hopeless efforts of a bunch of doomed extremists.
not to mention that the Commune cannot win, n need therefore to lengthen its agony
Yes. And by the way, the same constraints are going to show themselves again after the Great War. Short of being horribly exhausted, Berlin and Rome (or London for that matter) are not going to let a Communist regime take over on their borders after they defeat the Holy Alliance and have occupation troops in the field. While a Red Russia indeed may have a window due to its sheer size and peripheral location to the core of Europe (but it would require the victors to be as exhausted as OTL Entente), a Red France has close to none.
Germany and Italy maybe in 10-15 years In 1870 the wounds are still too fresh. Britain and USA would betworeasonable choices. Maybe south America too (Argentina?)
Good point about the short term. I was indeed taking the long view and considering the whole span of the ca. 1870-1895 Victorian "Cold War".
What you describe was also my first thought, and it's what reasonable countries would do. The only problem was that Disraeli was not completely rational whenever te subject of Egypt came up.
As you wish. However, I'd like to point out that Disraeli was not a dictator, and the rest of the British ruling elite may easily act to rein him in if he's obviously and irrationally overreacting on the Suez issue when Berlin and Rome are apparently wholly liable to a sensible sharing compromise. After all, until France lost the war, Disraeli apparently had no such big objection to France keeping all those shares, and in 1870, arguing that Germany and Italy (even TTL optimal cases) are going to be a bigger potential threat to the British interests in the Middle East than France (or Russia for that matter) is not going to sound very believable in the House of Commons or in the British press.