“When is a tank a defensive weapon?”
“When the French have it.”
“When is the aircraft carrier a defensive weapon?”
“When the British have it?”
“When are fortifications an aggressive weapon?”
“When we have them.”-German diplomat, 1932
If the Conference is not a success… then there is nothing before the world but a war more disastrous than any the world has ever seen, which would bring our civilization down with a greater crash than the fall of Rome-Aristide Briand
When the World Disarmament Conference returned from its Easter break, little more was done until June, by which point the situation had changed. In Germany, the spectacular defeat of the DDVP and SDP in the Reichstag elections brought the Nazis to their electoral peak of 24% of the Reichstag’s seats. In an effort to appease Right Wing voters, Stresemann believed he had to become firmer with Germany’s demands. Yet in France, the election results had brought the left wing to power, and with them the possibility of an accommodation.
Into this volatile atmosphere, President Hoover made a dramatic proposal: the abolishment of all tanks, mobile guns, bombers, and chemical warfare. Given Hoover’s ability to pressure the French with the promise of abolishing their war debts, there is a heady atmosphere, and it seems as if disarmament can succeed. Then some jerk asks what a tank is, and a subcommittee spends several weeks hashing that term out. Meanwhile, the British argue that since aircraft carriers only serve as a base for air planes, they are not, in and of themselves, offensive weapons. [1]
A discussion of Geneva could continue for several more pages, and has elsewhere. The real problem is that Germany wanted equality with French; yet France could only accept that with the promise of British security. Britain, however, had no desire to be bound to a French alliance. [2] And while Stresemann might have been willing to make conciliatory gestures, he required the backing of the German army to ensure his position in the first few years.
It is not until November of 1932 that a treaty is proposed, and thought by many to be a cynical compromise. The treaty bans the construction of tanks about twenty tons, and the use of bombers against civilian targets. Bombers, moreover, would have to weigh less than three tons. Armies on the European continent were to be standardized on the basis of 8 months service, and each country was allocated a number of average daily effectives. Germany was to be allowed a total of 200,000, France 400,000
(200,000 metropolitan and 200,000 abroad), Italy 250,000 (200,000 metropolitan and 50,000 abroad), and the USSR 500,000. No figures were given for Britain. Mobile land guns were to be 105 mm maximum, though existing guns up to 155 mm could be retained, and the maximum size of coastal defence guns would be 406 mm. The Treaty was a failure in some respects, such as the lack of discussion about naval forces, and future generations would reminisce about what might have been. Yet overall, it provided a firm foundation for peace in Europe.
And if Russia and Germany are carrying out weapons test in the Ukraine, well, who will stop them?
A Question Mark in a Babushka: The Soviet Union and Stresemann
Since the mid 1920s, the Soviet Union and Germany had a close relationship. As early as 1923 the Soviets had assisted Germany, warning Poland about taking advantage of the French invasion of the Ruhr, and military collaboration had proven fruitful. Soviet orders kept some German factories afloat during the Depression, and Stalin’s Five Year Plan called for extensive imports of German machinery. There was nothing, in short, to keep the USSR and Germany from continuing their fruitful relationship well into the decade. Indeed, Germany’s relations were good with all of its neighbors, except, of course, Austria.
But that’s a story for another time.
[1] You can’t make this up.
[2] And while the British think that while bombing London is bad, the RAF should have some on hand to subdue the restless natives.