That's touch-and-go. But the Khmer Rouge never stood for election in Depression-era Germany.JHPier said:
That's touch-and-go. But the Khmer Rouge never stood for election in Depression-era Germany.JHPier said:Including the Khmer Rouge?
Germany wanted to reassert itself after a miserable peace. The fact is, Germany DID lose the Great War, and were humiliated at the peace table. Hitler blamed those he called "the November Criminals" for signing a humiliating treaty. Hitler, ever the politician, however, spun the disaster of Versailles as being the fault of Socialists (aimed at Ebert), et al, and NOT the military because he saught the support of the army.benedict XVII said:The Germans did not seek retribution because they were humiliated, but because they did not really believe they had been defeated...
As to Foch's remark, he was referring to the fact that the Rhineland remained part of Germany...
Wendell said:Germany wanted to reassert itself after a miserable peace. The fact is, Germany DID lose the Great War, and were humiliated at the peace table. Hitler blamed those he called "the November Criminals" for signing a humiliating treaty. Hitler, ever the politician, however, spun the disaster of Versailles as being the fault of Socialists (aimed at Ebert), et al, and NOT the military because he saught the support of the army.
Nonetheless, Hitler used this to his advantage.Chengar Qordath said:In fairness the Dolchstoßlegende was around long before Hitler, having been created by Ludendorff and Hindenburg to protect their reputations after the loss of WWI.
The treaty laid down strong military restrictions on Germany, they were just undone by later treaties.As I understand, the problem with the treaty of Versailles was that it was punitive enough to make Germany want revenge, but not not so harsh as to destroy Germany's warmaking abilities.
I agree with your point concerning Mr. Wilson's points. Each of the Central Powers agrred to surrender with terms reflective of Wilson's proposals. These stipulations were largely ignored at Versailles, particularly with Germany.Going more to either direction might have helped; peace on the 14 points would have created much less bad feeling in Germany, and if the Rhineland had gone to France Germany would be far less dangerous.
Well, they thought they were Macedonians. Why argue with a plebiscite just because the resulting map doesn't appeal to you?Imajin said:Many of these make no sense- why give Greek Macedonia, which is wholly Greek by this time, to "Macedonia", which didn't exist until the 1990s and in this period is Southern Serbia?
According to Google you are right about the Aland islands.Sir Isaac Brock said:I agree that Wilson sort of half-assed it, which was a dangerous thing to do. But remember that "the Paris writ does not run" (i.e. the Allies couldn't enforce all their decisions as it was. It would be harder to enforce all of these too.
All of the Polish Corridor?
The Paris conference did not deal with the lands involved in the Russian Civil War, only those affected by Great War, and controlled by a country party to the talks, which the Soviets were not.
Yes, West part makes sense because the East is part of Russian Civil War. You also have a problem that the largest city in the region was majority Polish. (L'viv / Lwów) The surrounding country-side. and most of eastern Galicia, was all Ukrainian, but not the city. You have to get the Poles to agree to a partition that still leaves the Ukrainians with a viable state, and that’s tough because they really wanted Lwów, it was the second largest Polish city in the old A-H. Also OTL, the Poles quickly changed their mind about supporting Ukrainian nationalism and annexed and attempted to Polonise the region. That's why there was a Polish-Ukrainian war in 1918-1919, which in turn led to the Russo-Polish war in 1920. In other words, it didn't matter what the Paris powers said if they couldn't enforce it. The Poles, Ukrainians, Red Russians, White Russian, Anarchists, all fought it out on the ground.
Again, only the west.
Nope, Russian. Unless the Allies decide to send massive amounts of troops to finish what they sort-of half-assed started by intervening in the Russian Civil War, they have no say here. That or let the Germans off their leash to do it for them.
Nope, considered an internal problem of Britain. US and France had no desire to antagonise them by bringing it up. Only a still-powerful Germany could suggest it, but they would have other matters as higher priorities.
Kosovo wasn't as Albania in those days. It became Albanians after the Croats, Italian, and Germans evicted (or cleansed) all the Serbs in WWII.
Is Greek Macedonia Slavic?
If such a union ever gets started that is.
Ethnic partitioning every else is okay, but not here? I dunno. I agree it is one of the most mixed up regions of all. But so was Teschen, the mixed areas between Yugoslavia and Romania (the Bant? Banat? something like that). I agree a multiethnic federation would be better than an all or nothing mentality, but that’s not the trend of your TL. You’ve have to make a compelling case for this change of character. My personal thought? Multiethnic federations work better when they don’t include the heartland, or only territory of a given nation. E.g. Switzerland doesn’t need to work to preserve French or German or Italian language or culture because it is sounded by them. Same with Belgium vis a vis French and Dutch, and Canada vis a vis French and English (although less so because Québécois hate to be called French, and think of themselves as a separate “nation”. Czechoslovakia failed because it encompassed the sum-total of the Czech and Slovakia nations, and therefore was too conflicted as to its identity and direction. This is the same as Yugoslavia and the USSR.
So in other words, a federation of ALL of Hungary and Romania would never work. I think you figured that, but so many people tried and failed to make multiethnic states in Eastern Europe on this model and failed.
You could sell it to the people if Romania and Hungary both exist as independent and viable states, with relatively few minorities. And Transylvania is an official neutral, bi- (or multi-) lingual state forbidden from union with either neighbour. That could work.
Nothing about that in Wikipedia. It says there was a petition to join Sweden, actually.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aland_Islands
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Åland_crisis
Wendell said:No, I am not suggesting that. What I am suggesting is that they shouldn't benefit territorially from a war in which they were not involved. All Imajin as done is make it seem even more absurd that the Schleswig referendum even took place.
Wendell said:Nonetheless, Hitler used this to his advantage.
Wendell said:The treaty laid down strong military restrictions on Germany, they were just undone by later treaties.
Wendell said:I agree with your point concerning Mr. Wilson's points. Each of the Central Powers agrred to surrender with terms reflective of Wilson's proposals. These stipulations were largely ignored at Versailles, particularly with Germany.
Wendell said:As for the Rheinland, a guerrilla campaign might have happened, unless you are removing all of the Germans. Even then, there will be resentment...
When exactly was there a plebisite in Macedonia?wkwillis said:Well, they thought they were Macedonians. Why argue with a plebiscite just because the resulting map doesn't appeal to you?
If it had nothing to do with World War I, it would not have been decided as part of the Versailles package.Redbeard said:The Slesvig-Holstein question had nothing specifically to do with WWI but went back many centuries before.
In ancient times the border between the Danes and the Saxons had been approx. at the border between Slesvig and Holstein but in medival times the Kings of Denmark were recognised as Dukes of both Slesvig and Holstein, but in a 15th century agreement also promised never to part Slesvig and Holstein. This was utilised by Bismarck after the 1864 war to take both Slesvig and Holsten, although only Holsten was populated by ethnic Germans.
In the following decades the wish for a referendum was a major cause for the Danes left in Slesvig-Holstein and the outcome of WWI simply provided a window of opportunity to realise a referendum over where to belong. At the actual referndum in 1920 the northern zone (80% of Slesvig) voted 75% Danish and 25% German and the mid Zone (southmost 10-20km of Slesvig) voted 75% German and 25% Danish. It would not have been possible to draw the border without leaving minorities, but it was long after discussed if Flensborg, which was in the mid-zone but had 50% Danes, should have been included in Denmark.
Not accepting a referndum over S-H after WWI would have been political madness and only have acted as a reward to Bismarckian power play. WWI was not at least seen by contemporaries as the final rejection of Bismartck's schemes. In this context you could say that WWI started in 1864 and the Danes if supported then could have saved the world of a lot of trouble.
After WWI the actual question actually wasn't if Denmark should have something back, but if they ought to take a larger bite. The French told that Denmark could take as much as she wanted, but the Danes wisely went for a more moderate scheme.
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
I don't disagree.Chengar Qordath said:As would any nationalist leader; it was a popular enough idea that it was all but inevitable that someone would pick up on it.
Of course. Consider how the Germans got around not being able to have a "General Staff" for its army.Well the Germans were trying to sneak around the restrictions as much as possible, but cheating on treaty limits has been around as long as treaties have existed. Certainly in retrospect letting Germany re-arm was a really bad move.
Exactly. But try to get the vengeful French to go along with it.Exactly so, if the 14 Points had been the basis of the treaty there would not have been nearly so much resentment about Versailles, not only would the treaty be more lenient, but there would not be so much resentment about what the Germans saw as peace being made under false pretenses.
Well, you have a point, to an extent. Doing this, however, might have pushed the Germans firmly into the arms of the Soviet Union.It certainly would not have made the French very popular in Germany, but the Rhineland plan was not meant to endear France to Germany. It was the French plan to take away Germany's industrial heartland so that while angry and resentful, Germany would not really be able to do anything about it.
Tis true. The Paris peacmakers did not have an easy task.wkwillis said:According to Google you are right about the Aland islands.
I've seen ethnic maps of Europe in 1914. Messy. Especially messy when the cities are one language and the farmers are another.
If that's the case, why didn't the US use this financial weight to get its way more IOTL?However, since the US was subsidizing ALL the governments of Europe except the Soviets, the US had the ability to make people do what it wanted or suffer the financial consequences. Worst case is things pretty much went the way they did in OTL and we just saved a lot of money.
Chengar Qordath said:As I understand, the problem with the treaty of Versailles was that it was punitive enough to make Germany want revenge, but not not so harsh as to destroy Germany's warmaking abilities. Going more to either direction might have helped
There are suggestions that Wilson had his first stroke in Paris in 1919, or was poisoned, or suffered from neural damage associated with the Influenza epidemic, or was just an idiot of an anglophile who assumed that the British establishment would keep their word about the 14 points.Sir Isaac Brock said:Tis true. The Paris peacmakers did not have an easy task.
If that's the case, why didn't the US use this financial weight to get its way more IOTL?
That's kind of the point, isn't it?Imajin said:When exactly was there a plebisite in Macedonia?