“Soviet policy towards the Middle East saw two significant shifts over the course of a few years, first after the Six-Day War and later after the Purim War. Beforehand, the USSR had sought to expand its influence through alliances with bourgeois nationalist regimes, aiming to undermine American power and encourage the development of anti-colonial nationalism and economic development as a precursor to later proletarian socialist revolution. This manifested itself in close alliances with Arab regimes in Egypt and Syria and hostility towards the state of Israel, which, despite its socialist ruling party and tradition of progressivism, had firmly aligned itself with the Western camp. Afterwards, Soviet policy focused on support, up to and including extensive economic and military ties, for politically ‘reliable’ regimes, along with overturning pro-Western regimes when opportunities presented themselves. In some ways, this can be seen as a return to Stalin’s ‘two-camps’ philosophy…
The Six-Day War had demonstrated a number of serious issues for Soviet policymakers: the instability of Moscow’s clients and the lack of substantial Soviet control over their decision making; the instability of the area itself and the risks of war including (and especially) escalation and superpower confrontation. There were also the issues of the economic burden that supplying and resupplying the Arab regimes, and that, given the right incentives, Soviet allies might break their allegiances and realign with the West. The war had dealt a blow to the Soviets’ reputation, both in the weakness in their supplied arms and tactics, as well as their unwillingness to come to the direct aid of an allied Third World client in a moment of crisis. Further, it led to a renewed American interest in the Middle East and peacemaking in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Many in the Kremlin noted these negative elements of Soviet involvement in the Middle East and recommended withdrawal, or at least reassessment. The demotion of individuals believed to be proponents of a more aggressive policy in the region suggests such a rethinking. Yet, conversely, the Soviets may have sought to derive very significant benefits from this temporary humiliation of the Arab states. Aside from a direct political role ¬vis-à-vis the Americans in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviets could now expand their regional presence by exploiting the Arabs’ need for rebuilding and reequipping their armed forces. Air and naval bases, sought before the war, could be obtained with more favourable conditions. Consolidating the Soviets’ Mediterranean presence enabled Moscow to maintain and strengthen its naval challenge to Western dominance of the Mediterranean and to intervene in local crises more quickly. This presence, which might also psychologically (if not militarily) affect vulnerable NATO states such as Turkey and Greece, could also assist the USSR in its efforts to radicalize the Arab world and possibly, chip away at Western influence in the oil-producing states…
This modified form of intervention, despite the concerns related to it, became Soviet policy. One week after the end of the conflict, Brezhnev sent President Podgornyi to Egypt to negotiate terms for substantial Soviet assistance. Throughout 1967-70, Soviet efforts were focused on rebuilding the Egyptian and Syrian militaries with advisors and arms. Soviet advisors cultivated sympathizers among the bureaucracy and officer corps in order to consolidate future Soviet influence.
Yet, the USSR placed limits on its support. Militarily, it turned down Nasser’s request for a formal mutual-defence pact, which would have necessitated Soviet responsibility for the air defence of Egypt. Politically, it undertook efforts to build an Arab consensus in favour of a negotiated solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict that would include some recognition of Israeli territorial gains since the Israeli War of Independence. Communicated through policy and signaling, Moscow conveyed the message that Soviet military aid did not mean that the Soviets granted the Arab states carte-blanche to exercise the military option, nor did they believe that the military option against Israel was a viable or desirable one…
The Palestinian liberation war in East Palestine violated the strategic sensibilities of Soviet planners, who were initially anxious at what seemed to be an extremely risky gamble on the part of their Syrian client. Communiqués and intelligence reports suggest that the Soviets placed diplomatic pressure on Prime Minister Jadid to halt the invasion, with suggestions that U.S intervention might draw them into a direct superpower conflict. Soviet panic reached its height on April 5, with the downing of American fighter-bombers by Syrian anti-aircraft guns…
The Israeli invasion of Syria, beginning on April 14, refocused the Soviets’ mind. To the surprise of the Kremlin, the Americans appeared ineffectual through the early stages of the crisis. The Soviets thus mistakenly saw the Israeli invasion, which soon threatened Damascus, as an American response performed by their regional client rather than an independent action by a panicked Jewish state. Soviet pronouncements became increasingly dire and the Soviets began an emergency airlift of supplies to the Syrian military. These supply runs, protected by Soviet fighter jets, allowed the Syrian military to quickly regroup and prepare to relieve Damascus. Soviet air cover was even used to protect the movement of the 4th and 10th divisions south; while their fighters never directly engaged with IAF planes, they interfered with their ability to launch strikes on Syrian ground movements.
Yet, as the Soviet leadership realized the growing split between the Israelis and Americans, they pushed their Syrian ally towards the negotiating table. After a month and a half of sustained conflict and an Israeli withdrawal from the outskirts of Damascus to a defensive line along the Nahar al-Awaj, a temporary ceasefire was signed on June 1. Following the signing of the Sarajevo Agreement later that month, Soviet aid shifted from military equipment to humanitarian and economic support, with food, medicine, clothing, construction equipment and supplies and some industrial machinery making its way to Syrian and Palestinian ports and airports. While this aid did not come without conditions, it was a clear sign that the USSR valued its client states in the region…
The war cemented the shift in Soviet Middle East policy begin with Egypt’s firm break with the Nasserist left earlier that year. Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders saw bourgeois nationalists as, at best, unreliable and prone to defection from the socialist cause and, at worst, more damaging in the long term to Soviet interests than its obvious enemies. Instead, the USSR would focus its efforts on building up revolutionary states as a regional ‘vanguard’, meant to support and inspire revolution in their neighbours and defend Soviet interests. While these interests were largely second-order compared to Europe and Northeast Asia, Syrian, (and to a lesser extent) Iraqi and Palestinian sovereignty was guaranteed by Soviet protection. Ba’athism, despite its doctrinal similarities to fascism, was supported by the CPSU’s ideologues as an appropriate ‘Arab variation on revolutionary socialism’…
Claudia Cohen. Soviet Foreign Policy in the Middle East: From World War II to the Modern Day: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1990). Print
