Cardamom Dreams: The Saga of India

I always love alternative political development porns like this ! :D The religious development is also completely bizzare, too, but indeed very fitting for a place as eclectic spiritually as India.
 
Iskander Chua: Sugar, Spice and Everything Nice: A History of the Spice Wars (Singhapur: Malaya, 2010)

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The Spice Wars are often given a romantic lens; adventurers, pirates, lovers and fighters, seeking out booty throughout the Indian Ocean and beyond- cutting down those who stood in their way. But the Spice Wars were inherently political in nature, a conflict between old and new instead of an escape from boredom. In fact, the First Spice War was the Karavali Network's reaction to the growth of the Lords of Islamabad.

...Throughout their painstakingly won monopoly, the Karavali Network had aggressively expanded throughout the Indian Ocean- outposts, cities, and ports all fell under their de facto control. In some places, they acted as agents of the government, with minor lords under their pocket. In others, they were simply the best middlemen; the Dutch East India Company (VOC) had established an alliance with them to contain the Portuguese, for example. The Karavali Network was also armed to the teeth- its ships were full to the brim with weapons, and so other Hindustani traders simply could not compete... soon ships bearing the Network's trident were visible from the Aceh to Zanj with all others bowing before them. But the end to the Gurkhani War changed that.

With the Firman-e-Hindiyyah protecting traders' rights, more and more people began to flock to commerce as an escape to destitution. Trade was one of the few options where caste was not a legal barrier, and Muslim merchants were more than happy to work with a cheap labour force. Even pragmatic Hindu bankers saw the value in conscripting untouchable 'runners' to help transport minor transactions throughout the country. Soon, this manpower transformed into an able workforce willing to leave the country; for an Untouchable, losing one's caste was not a real problem. Yet the Karavali Network was unwilling to work with newcomers. Obstinate in tradition, they stuck with traditional practice and refused to deal with lower castes; as a result, several Northern Hindustani firms chose to deal directly with the markets. Critically, Taj Khan Kharanni authorised the formation of the Lords of Islamabad; a new firm consisting of Ram Gopal Taulika, a paan vendor, Virji Vora, an up and coming Surat merchant, and a number of others. Soon, the firm began to deal with the Portuguese upriver on the Hughli, co-opting them as private mercenaries, while undermining the Karavali Network's hold over Hindustani markets.

Through Vora, the Lords of Islamabad established a presence in Gujarat- now they were operating in the two major ports of the Empire, Surat and Kolikata. With a simple policy of buying in, where new members would invest a certain amount as collateral, but sharing in security benefits, serai discounts, and lower restrictions on internal trade. This brought a great amount of followers into the Lords' camp, and by 1615, every major city throughout the Empire had an agent from the Lords operating in it; with its distinct indigo banner with a golden lion emblazoned on it, they came to be known as the Mogul Company.

The Karavali Network was not happy with the rapid rise of the Mogul Company- even less so because the latter began to trade with the Portuguese and the English, whereas the former retained a deal of exclusivity with the Dutch. The Mogul Company also had more agents in major inland centres of production like Agra, while the Karavali Network was confined almost entirely to the coasts. This, combined with the generally better relations the Mogul Company had with smaller firms, led to a bitter rivalry between the Network and the Company: soon, it would lead to war.

While most European powers were tentatively in a state of peace in Europe, throughout the Indian Ocean, it was another story altogether. The Dutch and English, nominally allies, clashed in competition for spices, gems and a host of other goods. Meanwhile, the Portuguese and Spanish also had their eyes set on other areas of Nusantara- Spain had already been expanding heavily into the northern Nusantaran islands, dubbing them the 'Philippines'. A permanent settlement having been established in 1565, the colonies were placed under the control of the Viceroyalty of New Spain in the Americas. From the towns of San Miguel and Manila, the Spanish extended their control over most of the islands in the vicinity, for the most part destroying the states of Hindu and Muslim faiths, with the exception of the south. However, the rise of the Karavali Network partially disrupted Spain's consolidation of their territory. The Muslim sultanates of the South were happy to have a strong patron, no matter their faith. And the Network, offering a big boost in trade, was allowed to establish a presence in the Spanish towns- which would be the downfall of Spain's efforts at Christianising the colony. Those of Hindu faiths found shelter underneath the Network's umbrella, and the town of Dharmapuram in the Sulu Sultanate became a safe haven for them. Once the Lords of Islamabad attempted to send traders to the Philippines, however, Spain quickly hatched a plan to remove the Karavali threat, and immediately approached their enemy's rival.

In Aceh, a region heavily influenced by the Karavali Network, the Sultan rolled with the status quo, with its benefits in trade with Hindustan and China, as well as giving his dominion control over the Malacca Straits. The Network offered him security, economic viability, ease of trade- in return, he offered them mercenaries and strength of arms. For the most part, it was a mutually beneficial relationship- Aceh recovered several ports on the Malayan mainland, while the Network grew to be economically dominant in any new Acehnese conquest. Even the Portuguese were very careful in their dealings with Aceh, fearing physical confrontation distracting them from their own operations against Johor.

Then, in 1615, the Yang di-Pertuan, Alauddin Riayat Shah III, was killed by Acehnese soldiers. His brother, Abdullah Ma'ayat Shah, was quick to signing alliances against Portugal, but more importantly, stemming the growth of Aceh. The Sultan approached the Dutch-allies of the Network- to help minimise the rift between Aceh and Johor. Later, however, opportunity abounded in the arrival of Bengali merchants affiliated with the Lords of Islamabad. The Lords, were, of course, an ally of the Portuguese, offering them trade in a way the Network had denied; but, they were willing to help Johor for a price. The relationship between the Nizamate of Bengal and the Lords of Islamabad was much more direct than that between Mysore and the Karavali Network. The Nizam of Bengal had given the Lords the ability to act as representatives of Bengal outside of the Empire of Hindustan: soon the traders in Johor offered the beleaguered Yang di-Pertuan help in the form of mercenaries- veterans of the Great Gurkhani War- along with requisitioned ships forming Bengal's small but growing navy. Under the terms of this agreement, Malacca would remain in Portuguese hands, but the governor would nominally be recognised as a vassal of Johor, opening up the city to Johor's subjects. However, Johor would have to submit as a vassal of the Nizam of Bengal.
 
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And there you have it: Part 1 of the Spice Wars. I've had this one done for a week, but I was hoping to add more to it.

I guess I'll just put that into a second update. :)
 
Hurrah~ ! it lives!

So essentially, Johor had actually completed it's long-term aim of owning Malacca (in a strange non-fighting way), and the only thing to do left is to be a vassal of Bangal to complete the process?

Something tells me Aceh won't be happy. :rolleyes:
 
Hurrah~ ! it lives!

So essentially, Johor had actually completed it's long-term aim of owning Malacca (in a strange non-fighting way), and the only thing to do left is to be a vassal of Bangal to complete the process?

Something tells me Aceh won't be happy. :rolleyes:

Yep. Question is, will they do it?

Aceh is no doubt miffed- but there is a little hint in the form of 'Singhapur' existing: it used to be an old Acehnese port. ;)
 
Even pragmatic Hindu bankers saw the value in conscripting untouchable 'runners' to help transport minor transactions throughout the country. Soon, this manpower transformed into an able workforce willing to leave the country; for an Untouchable, losing one's caste was not a real problem.

This makes sense - who better to break tradition than those who have nothing to lose by doing so? If some of these Dalits become rich, that will be a powerful challenge to the social hierarchy.

It's also interesting to see how both companies are getting involved in the colonial game. I assume the Spice Wars will involve multiple European as well as Indian players, and will accustom Indian armies to European ways of warfare.
 
This makes sense - who better to break tradition than those who have nothing to lose by doing so? If some of these Dalits become rich, that will be a powerful challenge to the social hierarchy.

It's also interesting to see how both companies are getting involved in the colonial game. I assume the Spice Wars will involve multiple European as well as Indian players, and will accustom Indian armies to European ways of warfare.

Exactly.

The Spice Wars are basically a loose mesh of interrelated conflicts, so you'll definitely see a lot of players. Indian armies will definitely get accustomed to European ways of warfare, but now, *Indonesian and Malayan armies will too.
 
Iskander Chua: Sugar, Spice and Everything Nice: A History of the Spice Wars (Singhapur: Malaya, 2010)

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The Sultan of Johor was wary of submitting under Bengal's vassalage, and for good reason. Being within Bengal's sphere meant partly being under Portugal's as well- and the zeal of the Portuguese never went unnoticed. There was also apprehension whether or not being a vassal of Bengal would even be better than simply submitting to Aceh- while the latter had a history on the Malayan Peninsula, the Bengalis were political newborns in the area, oblivious to the social mores of the region. Furthermore, they might even impose their own ideals- rather forcefully- upon Johor. In the end, the deal was made, with the Portuguese governor of Malacca becoming an officer of the Yang di-Pertuan of Johor in perpetuity, while the latter was designated the 'Nawab of Johor', obligated to grant a percentage of taxes to the Nizam of Bengal. While the alternatives were many, Bengali overlordship meant a light hand- as long as trade was not hampered, and officials not harried, Taj Khan Kharanni was perfectly satisfied with the sultan exercising full authority. In fact, once the Sultan confiscated the goods of Karavali traders, the Nizam sent a white Arabian horse as a gift of gratitude. Unofficially, thirteen hundred soldiers accompanied said horse, armed to the teeth with wootz steel muskets: veterans of the Gurkhani War, and skilled in battle.

The mercenaries quickly found their place as trainers, and a cadre formed themselves around the Sultan as a personal guard. Unlike the standards of the era, they were all infantry, and for good reason. Because the Karavali Network used its influence to shore up the horse trade by sea, Johor's cavalry options were severely limited. While Afghanistan offered an alternative land route, that would mean crossing through the entirety of Hindustan, through Burma, Ayutthaya and finally down the other Malayan sultanates- a trip that would take far too long and be far too inconsequential. And while Bengal was ready to extend a hand of friendship, horses were too important a commodity for them to squander. Infantry became the key component of Johor's remaining army, and they would play an important role in the coming months.
In 1616, Aceh captured what would become Singhapur with the help of the Karavali Network. Now that Malacca had been opened up to the Malayans, it had found itself needing another way to control trade in the region, and if needed, cut it off completely. Controlling the sea was an immensely valuable prospect, and Aceh's forces were adamant in securing not only their kingdom's security, but its wealth- in perpetuity. And if Johor should rise too high, not only would it damage Aceh's influence and power, but possibly drain away its trade within the Karavali Network- something the Sultan absolutely refused to countenance.

Aceh was not solely beholden to the Network, however: they had a willing ally in the Dutch. The Dutch East India Company had encountered pre- Network traders early on, and upon the formation of the Network , became a willing partner. Under Pieter Both, Dutch ships moored in Karavali ports, and the VOC traded almost exclusively with the Network, undermining Portugal's control over the Indian Ocean. To add to this, Both established a Dutch presence in the Maluku islands, carrying out independent trade, while sinking Portuguese or Spanish ships travelling the archipelago. Each action built up into an overarching offensive with the final goal of ridding all Habsburg influence in the Indian Ocean. Through their mutual contacts, Both and the Sultan of Aceh found common cause to rid the Malacca Straits of the Portuguese- hopefully to install a more friendly regime in the most important port cities. Paramount to the VOC was the acquisition of Malacca port; any others were acceptable concessions. For Aceh, however, there was a glimmer on a small island south of Malacca: what would become Singhapur today.

The locale had previously hosted an Acehnese port, and its location was attractive both in its elusiveness and its potential. It was easy for early Acehnese raids to retreat into the forests surrounding the area, and with time, the Sultan was hoping to build up a worthy point of control of his own; with the Karavali Network's help, of course. It was also a point of pride: if the port could be restored under Acehnese hegemony, and if Aceh could use it as a way to further their own power in Malaya, they could become regional hegemon at the least; at best, a trading powerhouse. Thus, by 1620 a joint expedition led by Feroz Dhillon of the Karavali Network landed on the island of what he christened 'Singhapur'- the Lion City. With the majority of the Bengali force dispatched near Malacca, the Karavali-Acehnese force penetrated Southwestern Malaya. With the goal of making contact with the lords of the region, and perhaps subverting them to the Karavali cause, the Network forces were bolstered by the addition of several thousand soldiers. Several thousand men to challenge what was left of the Sultan of Johor's battered army, and his new Bengali reinforcements- and yet- it would not be a quick war at all.
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While there remains a tendency of historians exaggerating their own nations’ importance within the Spice Wars, several claims are not unfounded. For example, while the conflict at the start was extremely localised, it began to spread out relatively quickly. Consequently, this meant a growth in participants, ranging from the Nusantarans kingdoms and sultanates to France, England, the Netherlands, Spain, and even the nizamates of Hindustan. Of course, this is itself a reflection of the resurgent cosmopolitanism of the Indian Ocean. While the independent players each had important roles to play within the conflict, vindicating national claims, it is also important to look at this trend, along with others, including an increasing demand for the riches and spices of the Indian Ocean.

Of course trade is bound to the internal developments of commercial actors. The main European powers can be portrayed as greedy to a fault, but they were propelled by issues within their own borders, as well. Henry IV’s France with its Huguenot conciliation, as well as King James I and VI granting even more concessions to the East India Company, not to mention the VOC, were all bought and paid for by national interests. This is not solely applicable to Europe either.

Mysore, with its centralisation under Dharmaraja became something of a trading powerhouse. While the Karavali Network could be called independent, its notables were heavily integrated into Mysore’s elite, and many of the decisions taken by the Karavali Board were made by Mysorean officials! This also conflicts with the Mogul Company, and its own interests as dictated by the Nizam of Bengal. With Taj Khan Kharanni’s second son occupying an influential post as tax collector to the Company’s ‘districts’ it becomes increasingly clear that the Spice Wars were fueled equally by Indian greed as European greed.
And thus, perhaps it is better to define greed as ‘demand’ and ‘interest’. There is a real ‘interest’ involved with all the actors, with a clear market developing, not only in Europe, but in India as well. This action in Nusantara developed the idea of markets within the Indian framework. Soon saltpetre was not the only thing Fatehabad wanted access to- spice was equally as important. By 1624, the Wars had acquired an economic component in India, and that is what caused their escalation.
 
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Good to see this back! I wonder if the need for military action - and thus, effectively, a state - will lead the Karavali network to integrate more closely with Mysore. I'm also looking forward to seeing how the proxy wars play out in Malaya and Nusantara.
 
Its back!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Yeah. To be honest, I had everything but the last two paragraphs done by the time I posted the last update. I had a bit of free time, so I decided to finish it and post it. Sorry for being so late with it. :eek:

Good to see this back! I wonder if the need for military action - and thus, effectively, a state - will lead the Karavali network to integrate more closely with Mysore. I'm also looking forward to seeing how the proxy wars play out in Malaya and Nusantara.

Right on the money. The Karavali Network has a lot of foreign independence because Mysore as a state is so focused internally, but that doesn't mean there isn't money coming in from the state's coffers.

It should be interesting, since I don't have it specifically planned out. :p
Nevertheless there will be some surprising and odd developments. Southeast Asia is really conducive to those.
 
So from what I'm reading, the actions of both Aceh and Johor caused one of the first trans-continental wars in recorded history.

Continue. :cool:
 
update will come soon. Really sorry, guys.
It's okay, it's given me time to catch up once again.

So Aceh has seen the potential of Singapore this early eh? I wonder how long they can hold it for. Also, where does the name come from in TTL? A Malay friend of mine told me that the person who had originally founded the city had called it Tiger City because he erroneously believed that Tigers lived on the island. Is this true of the Acehnese settlers here too? Great stuff all around!
 
Humayun Gilani: Empire and Intelligence: A Study of Administration in the Empire of Hindustan (Surat: University of Surat Press, 1964)

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Most popular studies of the Hindustani intelligence framework tend to focus more on the aggressive aspects of espionage. In this work, it is more important to understand the workings of internal espionage, and what might be called ‘intelligence-driven government’: the framework of an administration that relies upon a constant source of reports and information. However, the intelligence-driven governments of today are not new, and in fact have been present since antiquity. Within the context of Hindustani intelligence, internal information was not only present, but vital, in the exercise of state power. Perhaps even more so, following the decentralisation of a medieval feudal power into an administrative empire based upon recording information and constant political intrigue. This is why the rule of Akbar II is more important than his predecessor: for while many of the offices and functions of intelligence were established by Akbar I, his successor matured these institutions to the point where they would be similar to those of today. This not only had the effect of stabilising what might have been able to fall much too easily, but helped entrench a bureaucracy within an empire that was constantly mobile in the past. Information is, after all, power.

The offices of ‘waqai nigar’ and ‘waqai navis’ were established by the Emperor Akbar I, and were to be present in every governing institution within the Empire [1]. The first was to record exactly matters of revenue, while the latter was to mark down all court events. Both were to send this information to the Emperor in Fatehabad through a system of runners – ‘harkaras’. The information would be supplemented by village spies, and akhbarats. But this system, while surprisingly well-developed, was also very informal at the upper echelons, which helped to prevent a clear path from the recorder of the events to Fatehabad. Because the ‘waqai’ offices were also independent of the kotwals of each city and village (they had their own informal system), the information was not helpful on a local scale- it could detect local abuses of power, but enforcement was left to the Emperor’s discretion.

It was Akbar II who changed the system. Not for altogether altruistic motives- intelligence was a handy way with which to keep his nizams in check- but conveniently practical ones. The idea of establishing covert power appealed to the Emperor, especially in the aftermath of the bloody Great Gurkani War, not to mention the advent of the Spice Wars. Seeking to quell internal dissent, and perhaps avoid the dozens of rebellions his forebears faced, he established the Khabr-e-Daulat, the ‘Information of the State’, an office designed to directly and covertly coordinate the information given by the waqais. In addition, the supplementary spies were dubbed ‘dubash’, and were put under the command of local kotwals, who themselves fell under the authority of the Panah-e-Daulat (Refuge of the State), another new office in charge of law enforcement.

The two new wings of Hindustani state administration were also extended into the territories of the nizamates, with the noted exception of Mysore. The Khabr was a critical means to undermine Quwwat-ud-Din’s power by making all of his lieutenants essentially accountable to Fatehabad.
The foresightedness of the Emperor must not be ignored however, in the appointment of his brother Daniyal as the head of the ‘Khabr’ and the ‘Panah’. Daniyal’s experience in the War had made him a masterful diplomat. The network of spies, kings and governors that came with the GGW naturally created a scene of extreme intrigue, and with Daniyal pulling the strings of Imperial domestic actors, Akbar II had a level of control over the Empire that absolutely dwarfed his predecessors. In many ways, it allowed the development of absolute authority within Hindustan; politically tying minor officials with Daniyal’s court in Delhi, and by extension, with Fatehabad.

A second line of intelligence also developed; however, this one was largely informal. The growing amounts of traders and sailors throughout Hindustan and its nominal vassals allowed governors to develop networks of allies and associates; soon the fears of the centre were realised as power bases were formed by governors receiving support from rich patrons; merchants, business owners and guilds being foremost. Indeed, local guilds were the most important hubs of informal intelligence; consequently they played host to the waqais’ agents as a way to monitor not just the level of trade and the size of interguild transactions, but also as a way to keep a steady flow of information on rebels, bandits, thieves, and undesirables. As the latter often found themselves exchanging their ill-gotten goods with traders, soon provincial governors made it a priority to exact as much information as possible from the guilds; the nexus of trade in a large city.

The development of good systems of intelligence throughout the Empire was perhaps the key to controlling and administering the vast swathes of land that it possessed- it kept its key officials in line, and created the basis of a proper law enforcement agency within the state. Undoubtedly, both the formal and informal lines of intelligence served as a model for administration throughout the continent of India, and extended into China, Nusantara and beyond. In fact, it might even be credited for sowing the seeds of overseas expansion. Certainly it created an image of the land beyond India- if not to the Emperor then to his enterprising nobles and governors; each ambitious and searching for wealth. And while stoking the flames of ambition was not positively received in the state itself, the nobles were gifted with a vision for more wealth; if they could not share fully in the wealth at home, then why not try and seek it abroad?
 
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