The factors that necessitated the birth of the Social Democratic Party can be traced as early back as the 1964 General Election. An optimistic Labour, led by the technocratic Harold Wilson, would enter Government confident in its own ability to solve the nation's economic woes, yet would be quickly hit by the brunt nature of reality. While the Wilsonian administration would oversee many major social reforms, its handling of the economy was an abject failure. Unemployment and inflation rose sharply, the pound was devalued, ambitious expenditure plans had to be cut and the rate of economic growth, which Labour had pledged to increase, would fall rapidly. Such a trend in failure would be repeated by the subsequent governments of Heath and Callaghan. As a result the two parties would begin to diverge in their outlooks and policies, resulting in the erosion of the post-war consensus. The Conservatives would turn towards economic liberalism, proclaiming their commitment to private enterprise, selective welfare benefits and the free market, before electing the firmly monetarist Margaret Thatcher as leader. On the other hand Labour would embark on a leftwards trajectory, adopting policies that were further left to anything known before the war, to the utter horror of social democrats within the party. This ever widening ideological chasm, along with a response to the political turbulence of the 60s and 70s under the tenures of both Labour and Tory Governments, resulted in a large proportion of the electorate feeling increasingly disenchanted with the two major parties.
Such a pervasive atmosphere of crisis had its deepest affect on the Labour party. Divided on virtually every major question of ideology and philosophy, Labour was in a state of transition. A major cause, and quite ironically consequence, of the successive failures of the governments of the 60s and 70s was the new militancy of the unions. Industrial action essentially doomed the administrations of Heath and Callaghan and attempted efforts to control the unions collapsed time and time again. The government had begun to appear utterly powerless and incapable of governing the nation. Having historically been aligned to the right wing of the party, many unions had been steadily shifting towards the left. In the face of their incomes being squeezed by inflation, a new generation of unionists had begun to emerge, with avid left wingers being elected to the top of a number of major unions. Committed to fighting aggressively on behalf of their members, such a process of generational change would have major repercussions inside Labour. The unions would become increasingly assertive, expanding their influence on the NEC, establishing greater links with MPs and speaking much more forcibly at party conferences.
Meanwhile Labour's rank-and-file membership would follow such a trend in becoming increasingly left-wing and militant. A major decline in party membership had resulted in a disproportionate number of leftists remaining in the party, while a disproportionate number of relatively apolitical moderates would opt to leave. The decline of Labour's grassroots membership would draw considerable attention to the change of character that the Labour left underwent. New kinds of left-wingers had begun to join the party, many of whom from extreme-left organizations. Following the abolition of the proscribed list in 1973, far-left organizations, such as Militant, adopted entryist tactics, extending their influence into trade union branches and CLPs. Maintaining a contempt for liberal democratic institutions and norms, many of these newcomers regarded violence as a legitimate revolutionary weapon and held beliefs considered totally unacceptable by many of their new fellow members.
Local CLPs, which had traditionally been left-wing in their outlook, had begun to manifest their newfound assertiveness through the selection of candidates. At Labour selection conferences, the choice often lay between two left-wingers, one of them on the "softer" inside left and the one on the "harder" outside left, with candidates on the social democratic wing of the party finding it increasingly hard to get selected without dissimulating from their real views. Throughout the 70s, multiple instances occurred where CLPs moved to de-select MPs often on account of their ideological position as right-wingers. The effects of the changes occurring at constituency level began to be felt within the Parliamentary Labour Party, the last bastion of right-wing authority, as cohorts of new Labour MPs were significantly more left-wing then those they had replaced. Meanwhile the NEC would fall more and more into the left's hands, with leftists establishing an overwhelming majority on Labour's governing body as early as 1970.
The resurgence of the left throughout the decade marked the beginning of a new era for Labour, by the end of the 1970s the party had adopted new policies, new ethos and had a newly constituted NEC. The Labour left felt especially betrayed by the Wilson and Callaghan governments, believing they had electorally defeated, betrayed socialism and utterly failed in their aim of rejuvenating the British economy. Labour leadership had been dominated by the social democratic wing of the party and it's commitment to Croslandite/Labour revisionist ideals. As a result they would be scapegoated by the left for their abject failure in government. Eager to consolidate power, grass roots pressure began to build up for a series of reforms intended to increase direct democracy within Labour. The proposed amendments (including mandatory re-selection, greater union and CLP involvement in electing the leader and granting the NEC exclusive control of the party manifesto) would enable the left to assert their control. Thus would see the rise of the outside left faction through organizations such as the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD), lobbying for major constitutional reform within the Labour party. The outside left was a hybrid group seeking radical social change, encompassing of self avowed socialists, various Marxist groups, extreme democrats amongst various others, associated the likes of Tony Benn. As one of the most influential figures in the party, Benn was crucial in Labour's political evolution in the 70s, his explicitly socialistic ideology would develop a devoted following amongst leftists within the party. A advocate for every currently fashionable left-wing cause, Benn's increasingly socialistic convictions and sanctimonious personality aroused strong feelings. As a figure loathed by right-wingers, viewed as a messiah for the outside left and with a degree of cautious suspicion by fellow leftists, Benn's growing influence intensified the venomous environment of Labours internal strife.
These developments deeply disorientated Labour's social democratic right. Following a decade of gradual marginalization, the outlook for the right was bleak, having become a minority in the party's decision-making bodies apart from the Shadow Cabinet. The right was leaderless, with prominent social democrats in the party lacking in comparison to the towering influence of previous leaders such as Gaitskell. Callaghan offered little attraction to younger members, Healey proved to be an alienating figure, Crosland was brain-dead, and Williams and Jenkins were both out of Parliament. Furthermore while their rivals launched tides of new programmes, based on leftist theory, the social democratic right no longer commanded an intellectual dominance of the party, quite rather the opposite. The Croslandite ideals championed by the previous Labour governments appeared to have been exhausted and failed. The Labour right lacked both a leader and an ideology, incapable of resisting the left-wing onslaught. The alienation that formed, as social democrats found Labour becoming increasingly unrecognizable, would serve as fertile ground for the sowing of dissent.
The 1979 general election saw Labour descend into civil war between various ideological factions. The party conference in Brighton was notable for its peculiar unpleasantness and poisonous atmosphere, to the degree that it was likened to an impeachment trial. The left's consolidation of power deeply dismayed the chair of the right-wing Campaign for Labour Victory (CLV), Bill Rodgers. An avid Labourite, Rodgers (like many of his colleagues) found himself increasingly disillusioned with the leftwards trajectory of the party and role of the trade unions. In a speech in Newport on November 28th 1979 , Rodgers would warn that Labour had only a year to save itself, indicating that the actions of the NEC could soon herald a split in the party. In the aftermath, the left dominated NEC would once again spark controversy by refusing to approve the publication of Reg Underhill's report of the increasing patterns of far-left entryism into CLPs in January 1980. Pressure had begun to mount on social democrats within the party as the fringe
Social Democratic Alliance openly courted expulsion by threatening to put up eleven alternate candidates against sitting left-wing MPs. In the atmosphere of such controversy, Rodgers would soon find himself joined by David Owen, former Foreign Secretary, in his vehement criticism of the left. Owen had been infuriated by the conduct of Tony Benn in the General election over the re-opening of the EEC dispute during the general election and found himself infuriated by the Wembley special conference held in May 1980. Following the formal demand of the Labour Common Market Safeguards Committee, spearheaded by John Silkin, that Labour should be elected on a clear mandate to pull Britain out of the EEC, Rodgers would invite the outspoken Owen to a meeting with himself, Dickson Mabon and Shirley Williams. Williams alienation from the party had stemmed from her distaste of the growing influence of the outside left, detesting the anti-democratic tendencies of the Trotskyists. Mabon, serving as Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland, was an ardent pro-European and had been a founder of the
Manifesto Group, challenge the rising ascendancy of the leftwing within the Tribune Group.
The four would meet at the
Il Comolario restaurant on the 9th June 1980, agreeing to draft a statement on their support for Europe. As relations within the party further deteriorated, an internal party commission would hold a session to submit its findings in Bishop Stortford in June. The complicated set of recommendations proposed, posed as a compromise between the left and right wings of the party, proved to satisfy nobody. Instead the debacle saw Callaghan's position as leader significantly weakened, as divisions deepened within the shadow cabinet. Callahan's criticism of his colleagues, including Rogers, Mabon and Owen, for their rejection of the compromises would do little to subside the rapidly growing tensions within the once united shadow cabinet. On August the 1st, the Guardian published an open letter signed by the ''Gang of Four'' (named after the notorious CCP officials) declaring their support for Europe and deemed Labour's current situation as the gravest crisis in its history. The ensuing controversy would see mixed responses, leftists equivocally condemned the letter, meanwhile while many sympathetic social democrats would express their support (quite a few in private) the four would be criticised for the manner and timing of the publication.
The triumph of the left in the Blackpool annual conference would serve as the catalyst for the social democratic breakaway. In an attempt to counter proposals favouring an electoral college, David Owen had led right-wingers in support of endorsing One Member One Vote (OMOV). However the motion would fail, along with Owen dramatically storming out of the conference in anger following rancorous vitriolic heckling during his speech. The conference had been a miserable affair for the social democratic right, virtually all the decisions taken had gone in the left's favour. At a CLV meeting scheduled a day following the conference, rather then discuss who to support in the upcoming leadership election (following Callahan's retirement), an incensed Williams and Owen would launch a tirade against the left in their speeches, with the former abruptly stating that Labour had until January. Her statement would be widely publicised in the media as foreboding of an imminent split, indeed that evening social democrats would openly discuss the prospect of splitting from Labour in William's hotel room.
On the continent, president of the European Commission Roy Jenkins (once considered a future leader of the Labour party), would deliver a lecture entitled "Home Thoughts from Abroad" at the BBC's annual televised Dimbleby lecture on the 22nd November 1979. Jenkins would call for proportional representation, implicate the need for a new political force and the "strengthening of the radical center." His speech would be well received, yet viewed sceptically within the Labour party. Amongst his "Jenkinsite" supporters, various possibilities would be endlessly discussed. Media speculation would begin to form over the possibility of a new centre-left party forming, often a result of deliberate leaks within the Jenkinsite camp. Within this element of the Labour right, division existed at their frequent meetings on the appropriate course of action. The "hawks" would favour the formation of a skeletal party with a vacant leadership, which Jenkins would lead once concluding his tenure in Brussels. On the other hand, the ''doves'' would favour such a party being joined by prominent Labour MPs in order to stand a chance electorally. Jenkins, often present at such meetings, would come to favour the latter approach, remaining in heavy correspondence with Rodgers. Yet the Gang of Four (initially) had little interest from splitting from Labour, determined to fight from within. Williams would go as far as openly denouncing the prospect of a centre party because it would have "no roots, no principles and no values." By the summer of 1980, excitement over a new party had largely died down, the relevance of the Dimbleby lecture had largely subsided and Jenkins remained relatively isolated in Brussels. The Blackpool conference would rapidly alter the situation, the two separate political circles that were the Jenkinsites and Gang of Four would find their interests increasingly lay together.
The defeat of Denis Healey in the Labour leadership election appalled many social democrats within the party. Healey had ran a poor campaign, overconfident and abrasive in his approach. His opponent Michael Foot had attained significant support positioning himself as a unity candidate capable of preventing a Bennite take-over, appealing to the emerging loose alliance within the PLP against Benn and the outside left. In spite of such, many of Foot's ideological positions were unacceptable to many right-wingers. The thundering blow of his election had now seen the left win on policy, on constitution and now the leadership. The consequences of such were further compounded by Healey's pledge of loyalty to Foot by agreeing to serve as his Deputy Leader rather then voicing any sort of opposition. Social democrats would find themselves deeply dismayed, in their eyes the situation had become desperate. Amongst the Gang of Four, David Owen had viewed the leadership election as the final straw, publicly announcing he would not seek re-election to the shadow cabinet on the 2nd of November. He would begin to recruit a group of sympathisers within the House of Commons, namely John Horam, Robert Maclennan, Tom Bradley, Ian Wrigglesworth, Mike Thomas and the reluctant Philip Whitehead. The Owen group, as they would be dubbed by Labour colleagues, did not immediately desire to split from Labour, yet would spend considerable time contemplating it. Bill Rodgers had found himself increasingly despondent, astonished by the shadow cabinet's narrow vote in favour of an electoral college and infuriated by Foot's ineptness. On the 28th November, Williams would decline to stand as a parliamentary candidate, arguing that she could not honestly expound and defend Labour's current platform. Despite her roots within the party, a split had become increasingly imminent in her mind. Dickson Mabon would remain the most reluctant, while having become increasingly disillusioned with Labour, still believing to an extent that the party could be saved.
On the 15th December, the Gang of Four would meet at the
Il Comolario restaurant once again. They would be joined, by Rodger's invitation, by Roy Jenkins. Following the dinner and subsequent difficult discussion, all of the four had come to the conclusion that there was no alternative and a split was inevitable. While Foot and Healey had attempted to convince Williams to commit her future in the party, she had gradually become inclined to abandon the party. Like many others, Rodgers was deeply torn yet had grown tired of soldering on, incapable of continuing "living a lie." Developments in the party, and in their own thinking, had pushed them towards the belief that their position in the Labour party had become unattainable. Throughout this arduous period, Mabon remained the black sheep of the group. While Owen, Rodgers and Williams had all been senior ministers in the Callaghan administration, Mabon had instead been made effective minder to Tony Benn, whom Callaghan wanted to keep inside the government, at the Department of Energy, as a minister of state. Appointed as shadow Secretary of State for Scotland following the general election, Mabon had aligned himself with Rodgers and Owen in the increasingly frequent disputes within the parliamentary committee, fostering a good relationship with the two. Such a relationship would see his heavy involvement in the Gang of Four's open letter to The Guardian, yet he would often not attend/be invited to meetings, appearing much more distant. He had come to the same conclusion as Rodgers by their meeting at the restaurant, yet still felt determined to prolong such as split to a later date.
Roy Jenkins's impending return from Brussels would hasten co-operation between himself and the Gang of Four. Having agreed on the key principles on which a party would have to be founded, Jenkins would begin regularly meeting with the others, agreeing on a detailed plan of action. Thus began the transformation of the Gang of Four into the Gang of Five. Over the course of the next month, the primary focus would be on preparation of a joint statement following the January Wembley Conference and recruitment. Such major developments would become subject to intensive media speculation. Jenkins would often deliberately leak the date of meetings at his East Hendred manor, to the consternation of Shirley Williams. In such a nerve-wracking environment, relations between the founding defectors were often strained by conflicting interests. Meetings of the Manifesto Group and CLV were often tense, as factions of future defectors had clearly began to emerge. Attempts for reconciliation would often fail quite miserably, devolving into MPs reproaching one another for refusing to fight on, or having not fought hard enough.
The Wembley Conference would mark the beginning of the social democratic breakaway. Owen would lead one final crusade in favour of OMOV, supported heavily by the Electric, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing Union (EETPU). Foot had attempted to prevent a breakaway by endorsing a motion that would ensure the PLP as the largest voting bloc, with 50% of the vote in the College. OMOV would fail miserably once again. In yet another triumph for the left, the conference would vote in favour of a 35-30-35 distribution (Trade unions-CLP-PLP), defying Foot and securing a greater degree of influence for the unions and CLPs. An astonishing result now meant a Labour leader could be elected without a singular vote from an MP. Having attended their final event ever as members of the party, Mabon, Owen, Williams and Rodgers would return home, their claims about the left vindicated in the eyes of many.
On the 28th January, journalists would be invited to a special event at Roy Jenkins' manor. A luxurious occasion, it would serve for the joint announcement setting up a Council for Social Democracy. The statement would be primarily concerned with policy, an effective restatement of the Gang of Five's well-known political positions. Throughout the following week, fifteen Labour MPs would declare their support for the newly founded council.